In re Detention of Gale West, No. 82568-8. Gale West was found by a jury to be a sexually violent predator (SVP), and the trial court entered a civil commitment order which the Court of Appeals upheld. West challenges the ruling, saying he was prejudiced by the trial court’s rulings on evidence in the trial, and that he was entitled to discovery of the SVP evaluations done for other persons by the State’s expert witness. The Supreme Court (Justice Mary Fairhurst writing), upholds West’s conviction, rejecting his argument that witness testimony about the conditions and treatment phases at the Special Commitment Center was inadmissible. The court agrees in part that the court wrongfully denied West’s request for the State’s expert witness work product. But because this error was harmless, the Supreme Court upholds the decisions below. Justice Pro Tem Richard Sanders dissents.

State v. Sims, No. 83779-1. Jack Irvin Sims directly appealed to the Supreme Court to challenge only a particular condition of his sentence while not challenging his underlying conviction.
Sims pleaded guilty to one count of first degree molestation of a child.

The trial court imposed imposing a sentence of 60 months to life to be suspended after 180 days of confinement as long as Sims followed all the sentencing conditions. The judge imposed a lifetime no-contact order and, over Sims’ objection, ordered him not to reside in Cowlitz County and to not never enter the city limits of Castle Rock, where the incident took place and the victim continued to reside.

Sims appealed, challenging only the condition banning him from Cowlitz County and Castle Rock. The State conceded that the condition Sims challenged was unconstitutional and then argued that his entire sentence should be invalided and remanded to trial court for reconsideration. The Supreme Court (Justice Susan Owens writing) ruled on the proper scope of remand:

The proper remedy in this case is resentencing for the limited purpose of narrowly tailoring the geographic condition of Sims’s SSOSA sentence that currently banishes him from Cowlitz County. A broader remedy was not properly before the Court of Appeals because such a remedy is affirmative relief for the State, for which the State did not file a cross appeal and which is not demanded by the necessities of the case. We remand to the trial court for resentencing for the purpose of making the vacated banishment condition constitutionally sound.

Justice Debra Stephens dissents, arguing the majority decision “wholly discounts the trial court’s discretion” for resentencing.

Whatcom County Fire Dist. No. 21 v. Whatcom County, No. 83611-6. Writing for the majority of the court, Justice Owens observed: “At bottom, this case is a dispute between two independent municipal corporations over whether completion of the proposed developments would reduce fire protection services below an adequate level of service.”

In 2006, Whatcom County approved three land use applications for development in the Birch Bay urban growth area. Whatcom County Fire District No. 211 filed a land use petition challenging the approvals. The fire district asserted that it was not equipped to provide adequate services with the arrival of additional structures.

The superior court granted the fire district’s petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the County’s comprehensive plan had established the adequacy and availability of fire protection. The appeals court reinstated the approvals.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the approval of the land use applications. The court determined that had Whatcom County assigned responsibility for assessing the adequacy of fire protection services to the Fire District by adopting a county code prohibits approval of certain land uses without a letter of adequacy from the fire district. Justice Tom Chambers dissents.

• State v. Robinson, No. 83525-0
• State v. Barber, No. 83640-0
• State v. Coucil, No. 83654-0
• Jackowski v. Hawkins Poe, Inc., No. 83660-4
• Whatcom County Fire Dist. No. 21 v. Whatcom County, No. 83611-6
• State v. Millan, No. 83613-2
• State v. Ford, No. 83617-5
• City of Seattle v. May, No. 83677-9
• State v. Martin, No. 83709-1
• Blair v. TA-Seattle East #176, No. 83715-5
• Hardee v. DSHS, No. 83728-7

State v. Barber, No. 83640-0. Danny Barber pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to felony driving under the influence of intoxicants. The trial court sentenced him to 51 months of confinement, with no community custody. Subsequently, the Department of Corrections informed the court that a mandatory term of 9 to 18 months of community custody applied to Barber’s crime of felony DUI, but DOC recommended no community custody. The court stated it was not bound by a plea agreement and modified Barber’s judgment and sentence to add a term of 9 to 18 months of community custody. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) held that the trial court had the authority to modify the sentence.

State v. Coucil, No. 83654-0. Nikeemia Coucil was arrested and charged with felony harassment after threatening to kill Paul Carlson. He failed to appear at a hearing on the charge. Eventually arrested and convicted of a lesser charge of misdemeanor harassment, Coucil was also convicted of bail jumping. Coucil argued that as he was convicted of a misdemeanor, his bail jumping conviction should have been sentenced as a misdemeanor. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) disagreed, holding that for sentencing purposes bail jumping is classified according to the underlying charge at the time the defendant jumps bail—not according to the ultimate conviction.

Jackowski v. Hawkins Poe, Inc., No. 83660-4. Timothy and Eri Jackowski purchased a waterfront home in Mason County in 2004. Following landslide damages to the house, the Jackowskis sued the seller, the seller’s agent, and their own real estate agent, alleging fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeal (Div. 2) affirmed in part and reversed in part, dismissing all claims against the seller’s real estate agency, reinstating the purchaser’s statutory and common law claims against their own agent, and reversomg dismissal of the breach of contract claims against the sellers as they were not properly before the trial court. The Supreme Court granted the petitions for review of both the sellers and the purchaser’s agent.

Whatcom County Fire Dist. No. 21 v. Whatcom County, No. 83611-6. Although a fire district asserted it was not equipped to serve more new structures, the county’s comprehensive development plan stated the fire district was able to provide adequate services based on its current taxing abilities. As a result, a hearing officer determined the fire district was precluded from asserting a lack of ability to do so on a project by project basis. The superior court reversed. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) ruled against the fire district and reinstated the permit approvals, holding that the evidence was substantial and sufficient to support the examiner’s finding that fire district had capacity to provide services to new developments.

State v. Millan, No. 83613-2. Defendant Francisco Millan was convicted of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Police had responded to a report that a man and woman were fighting in a car. The police arrested Millan and seized the firearm they found during the search of the vehicle incident to his arrest. On appeal, Millian argued that under Arizona v. Gant the search of his vehicle was unlawful. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) held that Millan had waived his right to appeal the adminssion of evidence seized during the search by failing to file a motion to suppress. The Supreme Court is consolidating this case with State v. Robinson, No. 83525-0.

State v. Ford, No. 83617-5. Tyrone Ford was convicted of second and third degree child rape. The different degrees reflected that the victim was 13 years old during the first incident and 14 years old during the second incident. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) reversed the first count but upheld the conviction for third degree child rape. The Court held that sending the jury back to the jury room to fill in a blank verdict form relating to second degree rape charge was manifest error affecting defendant’s right to fair trial; the trial court did not err by allowing state to amend alleged dates of charged incidents in information to conform to proof at trial; statements by two prospective jurors about their experiences with sexual abuse did not violate defendant’s right to impartial jury; and defense counsel did not perform deficiently in connection with prospective jurors’ discussions of those experiences.

City of Seattle v. May, No. 83677-9. Robert May was convicted for violation of a permanent domestic violence protection order. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) held the order was facially valid.

State v. Martin, No. 83709-1. Timothy Martin was convicted of kidnapping and robbery charges. On appeal, Martin argued that the prosecutor’s questions concerning his opportunity to tailor his testimony to the evidence introduced at trial infringed his rights under article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution to be present at trial, to meet witnesses face to face, and to testify in his behalf. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) disagreed, noting that the federal constitution permits a jury to consider a defendant’s opportunity to tailor testimony, and that the questions were allowable under the Washington Constitution.

Blair v. TA-Seattle East #176, No. 83715-5. Maureen Blair, a commercial truck driver, was injured when she slipped and fell in a puddle of spilled gasoline at truck stop. She sued the truck stop operator. The trial court struck several of Blair’s witnesses, including her expert medical witnesses, as a sanction for Blair’s willful violations of the trial court’s discovery orders. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) held that the trial court acted within its discretion. As causation could not be established without expert medical testimony, the trial court properly dismissed the case in the truck stop’s favor.

Hardee v. DSHS, No. 83728-7. The Department of Early Learning revoked Kathleen Hardee’s license to operate a home daycare after the Department learned that Hardee’s 19-year-old son was accused of molesting a child he was babysitting. (The child did not attend the daycare and the incident did not take place at the daycare.) In revoking Hardee’s license, the Department cited a number of other incidents involving her son. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) affirmed the revocation.