Supreme Court of Washington Blog : Supreme Court of Washington Blog : Washington Public Policy & Budget News : Freedom Foundation : WA State Tax & Labor Law Commentary & Updates

Justice Tom Chambers, the Supreme Court's Renaissance man, announced recently that he won't seek another term on the high court's bench. The Seattle Times has the story here. We'll have more on his tenure in months to come.

The announcement opens another seat at the rapidly-changing court. Justice Charles Wiggins replaced Richard Sanders last year, and Justice Stephen Gonzalez was sworn in this month to replace retiring Justice Gerry Alexander. By law Gonzalez must run again this fall.

Former Pierce County Executive John Ladenburg and King County Superior Court Judge Bruce Hilyer have both announced their bids to replace Chambers.

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Today the Supreme Court issued opinions in several cases.

In re the Dependency of K.N.J., No. 83516-1. Generally speaking, before a trial court terminates a parent-child relationship, the court must determine that the child has been found to be a dependent child.

K.N.J., a minor child, was placed in foster care after it was discovered that she severely abused by her mother. A dependency petition was filed by the state and ordered by a judge pro tempore. Michael Jenkins, the father of K.N.J., was not present at the hearing and the judge entered a default order despite his lack of consent.

Later the state filed for termination of Jenkins' parental rights, and he moved to vacate the original dependency order due to lack of his consent. The state argued the subsequent dependency review hearings cured any defect in the original order. The Court of Appeals found that the original dependency order was invalid, but that the subsequent hearings cured the defect.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Charlie Wiggins writing, affirmed the Court of Appeals by a 6-3 vote, and upheld termination of Jenkins' parent-child relationship with K.N.J., on the grounds that his dependency was proved at the termination trial.

Justice Gerry Alexander dissented: “Because family relationships are exalted, they should be nurtured. Therefore, this court should not promote or countenance shortcuts in the process of terminating the relationship between parent and child. Unfortunately, this is what the majority does here. Thus, I dissent.” Justice Debra Stephens filed a dissent as well.

Michaels v. CH2M Hill, Inc., No. 84168-3. A horrific accident at the Spokane wastewater treatment plant killed one man and injured two others. The survivors successfully sued CH2M, the engineering firm that was working with the city at the time. The question for the Supreme Court was whether CH2M enjoys immunity from suit under the Industrial Insurance Act. The Act immunizes a design professional performing professional services “on a construction project” or any employee of a design professional assisting or representing the design professional performing professional services on the “site of the construction project.” RCW 51.24.035.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Tom Chambers writing, concluded that the immunity clause did not apply to CH2M. The court further determined CH2M’s negligence caused the accident: “[H]ad CH2M not breached its duty, and had it performed the engineering analysis, the city employees would not have been confused and the collapse would not have occurred.” Chief Justice Barbara Madsen concurred separately.

Samantha A v. WA Dept. of Social & Health Services, No. 84325-2. The Supreme Court holds that a Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) regulation that reduces the financial assistance payable for in-home personal care services violates federal Medicaid law.

As part of Medicaid, DSHS provides paid personal care for disabled individuals. The extent of the care is based on a variety of eligibility factors that are re-evaluated periodically. A “children’s personal care rule” reduces the amount of paid care a child can receive based on the child’s age or if the child is living with parents (who already have a duty to care for the child).

This rule was challenged on behalf of a child named Samantha A. Samantha is cared for by a single mother but is eligible for 24-hour institutional care. The challenge claims (and the trial court agreed) that the children’s personal care rule violates Federal Medicaid law “requiring comparability of amount, duration, and scope of services among all recipients.” In other words, the rule treats disabled children differently based on their ages and on their relation to their caregivers.

Writing for the majority, Justice Charles Johnson affirmed the trial court. Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Stephens each wrote dissents.

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The Supreme Court issued opinions in three cases today.

Humphrey Indus. LTD v. Clay St. Assocs. LLC, No. 82687-1. Humphrey Industries, Ltd. (through several business partners) created Clay Street Associates, LLC, to hold a single real estate asset located in Auburn, Washington. In order to break a deadlock with principal George Humphrey regarding the sale of the property, the other members of Clay Street agreed to merge the company into a new limited liability company to facilitate the sale. Humphrey dissented from the merger and demanded payment pursuant to the dissenters’ rights provisions of the Washington Limited Liability Company Act, chapter 25.15 RCW. Clay Street agreed to pay Humphrey the fair market value of his interest as of the merger date but did not pay until the property sold.

Humphrey rejected the value calculation and sued. The trial court found that the property was worth more than Clay Street had calculated, and awarded Humphrey the difference plus interest. However, the court awarded Clay Street attorneys fees, finding that the dissenting Humphrey had acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) affirmed.

The Supreme Court (Justice Jim Johnson writing) reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for reconsideration of the attorney fee award. The court held that the lower courts erred in finding that Clay Street “substantially complied” with the LLCA.

In re Custody of S.C.D.-L., No. 84186-1. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s order awarding custody of S.C.D-L. to her grandmother, Edna Littell. The court wrote that Ms. Littell failed to allege or offer facts at the show cause hearing conducted under RCW 26.10.030 that S.C.D-L. was not in the physical custody of one of her parents or that neither parent was a suitable custodian.

“A nonparent may petition for custody of a child if the child is not in the physical custody of a parent or if the petitioner alleges that neither parent is a suitable custodian. RCW 26.10.030(1). The trial court must deny a hearing on the petition unless the nonparent submits an affidavit (1) declaring that the child is not in the physical custody of one of the child’s parents or that neither parent is a suitable custodian and (2) setting forth facts supporting the requested custody order. S.C.D-L. was in [her father] Mr. Littell’s physical custody at the time Ms. Littell filed her petition, and the petition
does not allege that he is an unfit parent. Instead, the petition implies it would be in the child’s best interest to reside with Ms. Littell, but the ‘best interests of the child’ standard does not apply to nonparent custody actions."

State v. Patel, No. 82649-8. The Supreme Court upheld a conviction for attempted child rape where the “victim” was actually a police officer posing as a child.

Mitel Patel was caught in a police sting operation when he chatted with a detective pretending to be a 13-year-old girl and went to meet and have sex with “her.” He was convicted of second degree attempted rape of a child. Patel argues that the state did not offer proof that the intended victim (the detective) was underage, and thus did not prove an essential element of the attempted crime. The trial court and Court of Appeals disagreed, holding it sufficient that Patel believed his intended victim to be underage.

The Supreme Court (Justice Tom Chambers writing the four-vote lead opinion) agreed, holding that “a defendant may be convicted of attempted rape of a child where the alleged victim is a fictitious underage character created by the police.” The court reasoned that unlike convictions for actual child rape, which require a showing that the child was underage, attempt crimes do not depend on the ultimate harm that would have resulted from commission of the crime. Rather, the person is guilty of an attempt “if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he or she does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” RCW 9A.28.020(1).

Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Richard Sanders wrote separate concurring opinions.

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The Supreme Court issued opinions in several cases today.

Port Angeles v. Our Water-Our Choice, No. 82225-5. The question before the court is whether citizen initiatives to reverse a city council’s decision to fluoridate its water supply are valid. The Port Angeles City Council decided to fluoridate its city’s water supply, but two citizen groups filed local initiatives to repeal the fluoridation plan. A trial court reviewed the initiatives and determined they were invalid for three reasons: they were administrative rather than legislative, they interfered with the council’s legislatively-delegated authority to regulate the water supply, and they exceeded the council’s legislative authority. In a 5-4 ruling, with Justice Tom Chambers writing, the Supreme Court ruled against the citizen’s groups. Citing previous cases, the court held that local initiatives that are administrative in nature (that is, initiatives which carry out an existing law or policy rather than making a new law) go beyond the scope of local initiative authority. Justice Richard Sanders, dissenting, wrote that the majority diminished the state’s constitutional commitment to the people’s right to directly create law.

Hudson v. Hapner, No. 82409-6. At what point can a party withdraw a request for a civil trial? Clifford Hapner rear-ended Lea Hudson, and Hudson sued for damages. The case went to mandatory arbitration where Hudson was awarded $14,538. After mandatory arbitration Hapner requested a trial, and the jury awarded Hudson $292,298. Hapner appealed, won a reversal, and the case was remanded for a new trial. After discovery for the second trial, but before the trial took place, Hapner filed a notice of withdrawal of his motion for a trial. This would allow him to pay only the arbitration award, plus Hapner’s court costs. The trial court struck the withdrawal at Hudson’s request. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen, writing for the majority, agreed that court rules allow for a unilateral withdrawal, but held that this right must be exercised prior to the start of trial proceedings. Thus, Hapner was precluded from withdrawing his request for a trial and the trial will move forward unless the parties reach a settlement. Justice Sanders dissented, writing: “It is difficult to address the majority’s reasoning because, much like Frankenstein’s monster, the majority opinion is a sewn-together collection of partial arguments, each pilfered from a different cadaver and none lending any real support to its conclusion.”

Overlake Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Health, No. 82728-1. The legislature created the certificate of need program, which authorizes the Department of Health to control the number and types of health care services and facilities that are provided in a given area, in order to ensure that services and facilities are developed according to identified priorities and without unnecessary duplication. For certain health care providers to establish or expand health care facilities within this state they must obtain a certificate of need from the Department. The Department granted such a certificate to Swedish Health Services. Overlake Hospital Association and Evergreen Healthcare objected to the CN, and requested an adjudicative hearing. The hearing officer and later a superior court judge upheld the Department decision, but the Court of Appeals held the decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of governing statutes. The Supreme Court held that the appeals court failed to accord sufficient deference to the Department’s interpretation of the law, and affirmed the decision to issue a certificate of need. Justice Gerry Alexander wrote the unanimous opinion.

Rousso v. State, No. 83040-1. Lee Rousso, an attorney and amateur poker player, is challenging the state’s ban on Internet gambling, arguing it violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the ban. Justice Sanders opened the court’s opinion with an emphatic statement:

The question before this court is not whether Internet gambling, including playing poker on-line, should be illegal. That determination is reserved to the legislature, and the legislature addressed the issue by enacting and amending RCW 9.46.240, which criminalizes the knowing transmission and reception of gambling information by various means, including use of the Internet. Since sending and receiving gambling information is illegal, Internet gambling in the state of Washington is effectively banned.

It is not the role of the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom of the legislature, which enacted this ban. The court has no authority to conduct its own balancing of the pros and cons stemming from banning, regulating, or openly permitting Internet gambling.

The court rejected the argument that the ban was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. The court reasoned that the language of the statute does not openly discriminate against out-of-state entities in favor of in-state ones, as the ban applies evenly in state and out of state. “Here, the legislature balanced public policy concerns and determined the interests of Washington are best served by banning Internet gambling. The legislature chose the advantages and disadvantages of a ban over the advantages and disadvantages of regulation. … Under the dormant commerce clause, the burden on interstate commerce is not ‘clearly excessive’ in light of the state interests. RCW 9.46.240 does not violate the dormant commerce clause.”

State v. Doughty, No. 82852-1. A police officer observed Walter Doughty drive up to a drug house at 3:20 a.m., stop for two minutes, and leave. The officer stopped Doughty, discovered that he was driving with a suspended license, and upon searching him found that he had, indeed, bought drugs. Doughty claims that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. The issue in this case is whether Doughty’s actions created reasonable suspicion for the officer to conduct a Terry stop. Doughty was convicted in Spokane County Superior Court and the Court of Appeals upheld his conviction. The Supreme Court, with Justice Sanders writing the majority, held that the police officer lacked sufficient to stop Doughty. As a result, the court suppressed the evidence and vacated Doughty’s conviction. Justice Mary Fairhurst dissented. While the officer might lack grounds for an arrest, she wrote, he was certainly justified in stopping and questioning Doughty.

State v. S.J.W, No. 83177-7. This case presents the question of whether the burden of proving a child witness incompetent to testify is on the party calling the witness. S.J.W., a minor, was convicted of raping another minor. At trial, the court required S.J.W. to prove that the victim was incompetent to testify. S.J.W. failed to do so. S.J.W. appealed, claiming the burden should have been on the state to prove his victim’s competency. The Court of Appeals agreed, but found that the state met its burden and upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court, with Justice Charles Johnson writing the unanimous opinion, held that a party challenging the competency of a child witness has the burden of rebutting that presumption. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals but hold that trial courts should presume that 14-year-old children are competent to testify.

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Internet Community & Entertainment Corp., d/b/a Betcha.com v. State, No. 82845-8. Internet Community & Entertainment Corporation launched a website called Betcha.com -- a person-to-person betting site that allowed users to post wagers on the outcomes of a wide variety of events. Betcha.com charged its customers a fee for user transactions. Losing bettors had up to 72 hours after a winning claim was made to choose not to pay the loss.

In 2007, the Washington State Gambling Commission informed the company that Betcha.com was engaged in illegal gambling. The company sued the state seeking a declaratory judgment that its social wagering site does not violate state law. Betcha.com lost at superior court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Betcha.com had not “gambled” because bettors understood that the losing bettor might not honor the debt.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Tom Sanders writing the unanimous opinion, reversed the Court of Appeals. The state Gambling Act prohibits bookmaking, which is defined as “accepting bets, upon the outcome of future contingent events, as a business or in which the bettor is charged a fee or ‘vigorish’ for the opportunity to place a bet.” RCW 9.46.0213. The court concluded that Betcha.com’s entire business model was based on charging fees from users for the opportunity to place a bet. Based on the conclusion that Betcha.com was engaged in prohibited bookmaking, the court declined to address whether the site’s users are actually engaged in gambling.

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The Supreme Court today ruled that a library’s Internet filter policy does not violate the free speech protections in the Washington State Constitution. The case is Bradburn v. North Central Regional Library District, No. 82200-0 (briefs and argument).

The North Central Regional Library District maintains Internet filters on its computers to block websites and images considered “harmful to children.” Library patrons were blocked from accessing numerous websites, including sites about drug and alcohol addiction, an art gallery website, health information websites, the “personals” section of Craigslist.org, the MySpace pages of presidential candidates, the Seattle Women’s Jazz Orchestra website, and womenandguns.com, a site maintained by the Second Amendment Foundation.

Several patrons and the Second Amendment Foundation sued the library in federal court for violating federal and state free speech protections. They claim the library’s filtering policy is overbroad and rises to the level of prior restraint of speech. They also argue that the filtering policy is an impermissible content-based restriction on speech. The U.S. District Court for Eastern Washington asked the Washington Supreme Court to address whether the library’s Internet filtering policy violates the free speech protections in Article 1, Section 5 of the Washington State Constitution.

The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Barbara Madsen writing, concluded that a library can  filter Internet access for all patrons, including adults, without violating the Washington Constitution. The Court wrote that in many cases the Washington Constitution’s protection of free speech is no more expansive than the U.S. Constitution’s. In other contexts, the state constitution affords broader protections. For example,  time, place, and manner restrictions on free speech will be upheld only upon a showing of a “compelling state interest.” Additionally, unlike the First Amendment, the state constitution prohibits prior restraints on constitutionally-protected speech.

Analyzing whether the library’s filtering policies were overbroad, Chief Justice Madsen wrote:

The principle that a library has no obligation to provide universal coverage of all constitutionally protected speech applies to Internet access just as it does to the printed word in books, periodicals, and other material physically collected and made available to patrons. “The Internet is simply another method for making information available in a . . . library’” and “is ‘no more than a technological extension of the book stack.’” A.L.A., 539 U.S. at 207 (quoting S. Rep. No. 106-141, at 7 (1999)). Just as it is entitled to exercise its acknowledged discretion in amassing a collection of printed materials physically placed on the shelves in order to carry out its mission, it is entitled to exercise discretion when it comes to Internet access involving its facilities and equipment.

The discretion that public libraries enjoy in selecting materials for their collections is not merely a function of what a library can afford in terms of costs and space . . . .  [R]egardless of its resources a library need not place pornographic materials on its shelves, although such materials are constitutionally protected. It need not place children’s comic books on its shelves, although these, too, are constitutionally protected. As another example, if a private collector offered a library a collection of books at an attractive set price for the entire collection and the library purchased the collection, it would not have to include all of the books in its own collection and would not have to make them all available to its patrons.

The plaintiffs also argued that irrespective of the library’s policies, the Internet filtering software used was too aggressive, resulting in overbroad filtering of Internet content. The Court disagreed.

Here, if a library patron wants to access a web site or page that has been blocked by FortiGuard, he or she may send an e-mail to NCRL administrators asking for a manual override of the block. The site or page is reviewed to ascertain whether allowing access would accord with NCRL’s mission, its policy, and CIPA requirements. If not, the request is denied. If the request is approved, access will be allowed on all of NCRL’s public access computers.

Because adults can request and obtain unblocking of erroneously blocked sites, we conclude that on this record no overbreadth problem exists under article I, section 5 as a result of overblocking.

Ultimately, the Court held that just as a library may exercise discretion in its literary acquisitions, it can also decide what Internet content to provide.

Most importantly, just as a public library has discretion to make content-based decisions about which magazines and books to include in its collection, it has discretion to make decisions about Internet content. A public library can decide that it will not include pornography and other adult materials in its collection in accord with its mission and policies and, as explained, no unconstitutionality necessarily results. It can make the same choices about Internet access.

A public library has traditionally and historically enjoyed broad discretion to select materials to add to its collection of printed materials for its patrons’ use. We conclude that the same discretion must be afforded a public library to choose what materials from millions of Internet sites it will add to its collection and make available to its patrons.

The Court concluded that the filtering policy did not run afoul of the free speech protections in article I, section 5 of the Washington Constitution.

Jim Johnson concurred with the result in a separate opinion, Justice Tom Chambers (joined by Justices Sanders and Stephens) dissented. He wrote:

North Central Regional Library’s Internet filters reach admittedly constitutionally protected speech, and, we are informed, it 'does not and will not disable the filter at the request of an adult person." Simply put, the State has no interest in protecting adults from constitutionally protected materials on the Internet. These policies do exactly that. The filter should be removed on the request of an adult patron. Concerns that a child might see something unfortunate on the screen must be dealt with in a less draconian manner.

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Justice Tom Chambers – the only Washington justice with a blog – has offered his opinion on the debate over how we select judges.

He discusses the issue in a very thoughtful post that acknowledges the flaws in each system. Elections, appointments, selection committees ... they all have their shortcomings.

He discounts the concern that judges up for re-election would pander to popular opinion. “[I]n my 40 years in the law, the judges of Washington State have consistently done the courageous thing and are not swayed by fear of being unelected.” But Chambers cites problems in other states and says the election process can potentially threaten judicial independence.

Lifetime appointments, he says, are also problematic. “Some judges appointed for life have become tyrants and do not treat lawyers, parties, or jurors with respect. On the other hand, it was my experience that state court judges faced with periodic elections see every lawyer, party, and witness as a future potential vote and almost always treated all with respect.”

Appointment committees that screen potential judges? “In the past, such blue ribbon panels have been perceived as a good old boy network; clubbish and difficult for women and minorities to break into.”

Justice Chambers offers an interesting Solomon compromise: elect trial judges, who are closer to their communities, and appoint appellate judges, who are ultimately responsible for interpreting the law. He recommends using a diverse appointment committee and requiring appellate judges to stand for retention elections.

Chambers concludes by showing he is a pragmatist. “Although interesting, this discussion is likely academic as I think it highly unlikely that the people of Washington State are ever going to relinquish their constitutional right to elect judges.”

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In re PRP of Grantham, No. 82194-1 (briefs and argument). James Grantham is an inmate at McNeil Island prison. A correctional officer was caught smuggling tobacco and marijuana to him, and Grantham was charged with violating prison rules regarding controlled substances. The evidence against him included a report of suspicious comments he was overheard making to his brother on the phone. A recording of the phone call, however, was not played at the hearing. Based on the investigative report, a hearing officer found Grantham guilty of both counts. He was sanctioned with 25 days disciplinary segregation and a loss of both 90 days good time credit and 7 days of yard privileges.

Grantham filed a personal restraint petition, arguing that the investigator acknowledged that he and his brother never explicitly discussed marijuana or tobacco. He also argued that the disciplinary hearing notice failed to specify the time and place of his conversation with his brother. The Court of Appeals dismissed Grantham’s petition.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the issue is the applicable standard of review for prisoners challenging disciplinary decisions. The Supreme Court, with Justice Tom Chambers writing the 7-2 majority, held that inmates challenging prison discipline need not make out a prima facie case of prejudice in order to obtain review (known as the Isadore standard). However, the Court said prisoners facing discipline are not entitled to the same range of constitutional protections afforded defendants facing criminal charges, but are only entitled to minimum due process protections. The Court stated that inmates challenging prison discipline must show that the disciplinary hearing was so arbitrary and capricious as to deny them a fundamentally fair proceeding. The Court held that Grantham has not met this standard, and dismissed his petition. Justice Gerry Alexander dissented. While he agreed with the Court’s explanation of the applicable law and standard of review, he argued that Grantham was denied a fair proceeding.

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Today the Supreme Court released three decisions.

State v. A.N.J., No. 81236-5. In 2004, when Defendant A.N.J. was 12 years old, he pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation. Shortly thereafter, after realizing the consequences of his juvenile sex offense criminal history, he attempted to withdraw his guilty plea. A.N.J. contends his court appointed counsel was ineffective and as a result his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. According to testimony, the defending attorney spent something between 35 to 90 minutes total with A.N.J. before the plea hearing, did not adequately explain the consequences of the plea, did no independent investigation, did not carefully review the plea agreement, and consulted with no experts. The Supreme Court, with Justice Tom Chambers writing the opinion, agreed that court appointed counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard guaranteed by the constitution and that A.N.J. was prejudiced. The Court remanded to the trial court with directions to allow A.N.J. to withdraw his plea. Justices Sanders and James Johnson each wrote separate concurring opinions.

State v. Gamble, No. 80131-2. The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Madsen writing the 8-1 majority opinion, concluded that the mandatory joinder rule does not bar the homicide charges brought against the defendants. In four consolidated appeals, each of the defendants was originally convicted of second degree felony murder with assault as the underlying felony. After their convictions, the Supreme Court held in another case (Andress) that a conviction of second degree felony murder could not be based on assault as the predicate felony. Each of the defendants challenged their convictions, which were vacated. The defendants were then retried on new charges. Each contended that under the mandatory joinder rule the new charges would have to have been joined with the original second degree felony murder charge. The trial courts each ruled that the Andress decision was an extraordinary, unforeseeable event, and the “ends of justice” exception to the mandatory joinder rule applied. The Supreme Court agrees today. Justice Richard Sanders dissented.

State v. Mandanas, No. 80441-9. May a sentencing court impose multiple firearm enhancements when the defendant's underlying crimes constitute the same criminal conduct? Bayani John Mandanas was convicted of felony assault and felony harassment, both while armed with a firearm. The trial court ruled that the offenses were not the same criminal conduct for purposes of sentencing, and that the firearm enhancements were to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals agreed in part, but held that the offenses were the same criminal conduct and that the enhancements were to run consecutively. Mandanas argues that multiple enhancements for the same conduct should not be imposed. Reviewing the sentencing statute (RCW 9.94A.589), the Supreme Court (Justice Alexander writing) says “a sentencing court must impose multiple firearm enhancements where a defendant is convicted of multiple enhancement-eligible offenses that amount to the same criminal conduct under the sentencing statute.”

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The Supreme Court issued rulings in seven cases this morning, including two highly-anticipated decisions dealing with whether an authorization to use medical marijuana is a defense to criminal possession, and whether the state's Consumer Protection Act allows out-of-state litigants to join a Washington class action lawsuit.

Clayton v. Wilson, No. 81920-3. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the unanimous ruling holding that a couple’s marital community is liable for the intentional wrongful sexual acts of one spouse. Without his wife’s knowledge, Mr. Wilson repeatedly sexually abused a neighbor boy, Andrew Clayton, whom he was paying to do yard work at the Wilson’s home. After Mr. Wilson was arrested the couple began dissolving the marriage and executed a property settlement transferring 90 percent of community assets to Mrs. Wilson (and theoretically insulating the funds from any potential lawsuit). Clayton sued, and the entire marital community was found liable because the assaults occurred while Clayton was working for the community. The trial court also found fraud in the extremely lopsided division of marital property, and voided the transfer. The Court of Appeals agreed and the Supreme Court upheld the decision.

In re the Dependency of C.S., No. 81720-1. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the unanimous opinion holding that Amy Singleton’s parental rights had been improperly terminated. Singleton has a son diagnosed with ADHD and other behavioral problems. She has a history of drug and alcohol abuse and is under the supervision of social workers. She continues to have substance abuse issues, although evidence was introduced that she is improving. The state filed a third party custody action and the court terminated her parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed this order as the State had not offered Singleton required training that would allow her to rehabilitate.

Schnall, et al. v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., No. 80572-5. Should AT&T Wireless customers nationwide be allowed to pursue a class action under the WA Consumer Protection Act? Chief Justice Barbara Madsen, writing for a 5-4 majority, declined to make Washington “a locus of nationwide class action litigation.” The Court said the trial court was correct in declining to certify a nationwide class.

Drum v. State, No. 81498-8. Justice Debra Stephens, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed Patrick Drum’s conviction for burglary after he entered a house while high on spray paint. Drum entered a drug program and signed a Drug Court Contract, under which he agreed that the court would determine his guilt on the burglary charge if he was terminated from the program. As part of this contract, he waived various rights including the right to testify and the right to a jury trial. Drum left the drug program, and the court found him guilty of burglary. Drum appealed, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that the contract did not fulfill due process requirements for a guilty plea. The Jefferson County Superior Court found that Drum had stipulated that the evidence was sufficient, and that the contract did not violate due process because it was not a guilty plea.

State v. Erickson, No. 81594-1. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld an assault conviction, with Justice Tom Chambers writing the opinion. Anthony Erickson was convicted of fourth degree assault and released on probation, but his probation officer claimed that he violated the terms of his probation agreement. Erickson was summoned to a probation hearing, failed to appear, and an arrest warrant was issued. Upon arrest he was found with drugs on him and convicted of possession. He appealed, claiming the arrest warrant was invalid because there was no probable cause that he had violated probation (only the officer’s word). The Court wrote: “We conclude that the warrant was valid because it was supported by a well-founded suspicion that Erickson had violated the terms of his release.”

State v. Fry, No. 81210-1. Justice James Johnson writes a 4-vote lead opinion, with four other justices agreeing in a separate opinion, that rejected a defendant’s claim that he was qualified to use marijuana for medicinal purposes in defense to a charge of unlawful possession of marijuana. Two police officers were informed of a marijuana growing operation at the residence of Jason and Tina Fry. The officers smelled marijuana when they approached. Fry did not consent to a search, and presented a document purporting to be authorization for medical marijuana. The officers obtained a warrant and seized over two pounds of marijuana. At trial, Fry argued to suppress the marijuana because of his medical marijuana authorization. The judge denied the motion. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to allow the evidence seized at the Frys’ home, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

State v. Kelly, No. 82111-9. Dustin Kelly approached a couple, threatened to kill them both, and then shot at them, killing the man. In addition to murder, he was convicted of second degree assault (intentional assault with a deadly weapon). The court imposed firearm sentence enhancements on both crimes. Kelly argues that since the use of the firearm is already an element of second degree assault, imposing the sentence enhancement on the assault essentially punishes him twice for using the firearm—a claimed violation of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this argument, with Chief Justice Madsen writing the opinion.

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Lallas v. Skagit County, No. 81672. When a court security guard is injured by a fleeing prisoner, does judicial immunity shield the deputy sheriff and the county from negligence liability?

A Skagit County District Judge directed a deputy sheriff to take the prisoner from the court room to jail. On the way, the unrestrained prisoner fled, knocking down and injuring a private security guard. The guard sued the deputy, the county, and the prisoner; the trial court granted summary judgment for the deputy and the county on the theory that they were protected by judicial immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed.

In an opinion by Justice Fairhurst the Supreme Court unanimously holds that escorting a prisoner is a ministerial rather than a judicial duty and therefore judicial immunity does not protect the deputy or the county from negligence liability. (briefs, argument, previous post)

State v. Pugh, No. 80850-3. Bridgette Pugh called 911 and reported that her husband, defendant Timothy Pugh, "was beating me up really bad." Police responded and arrested Timothy Pugh. Mrs. Pugh failed to show up and testify, but the recording of her 911 call was allowed as evidence. Timothy Pugh was convicted of  felony violation of a court order, domestic violence. He challenges that the admission of the recorded 911 call violated his right to confront the witnesses against him according to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 22 of the State Constitution.

Today, the Court holds that Mrs. Pugh's statements on the 911 recording were admissible: that they were nontestimonial excited utterances not prohibited by the Sixth Amendment and that they "qualify as res gestae [and as such] do not implicate Article I, section 22." Justice Madsen wrote the majority opinion and was joined by all the other justices except for Justice Chambers, who concurs while expressing "serious reservations about the broadest applications of the excited utterance rule being made in the wake of Crawford v. Washington," and Justice Sanders, who dissents. (briefs, argument)

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Satomi Owners Ass'n v. Satomi, LLC, No. 80480-0 (consolidated with Blakely Commons Condominium Ass'n v. Blakely Commons, LLC, No. 80584-9 and The Pier at Leschi Condominium Owners Ass'n v. Leschi Corp., No. 81083-4). The issue common to these consolidated cases is "whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, preempts the judicial enforcement provision of the Washington Condominium Act (WCA), RCW 64.34.100(2)." The FAA is a federal law that requires federal and state courts to enforce arbitration agreements. The WCA is a state law that allows judicial review notwithstanding any "alternative methods of dispute resolution," including arbitration.

Each case began in 2005 or 2006 as a lawsuit by a condominium owners association alleging various construction defects and related claims. Most or all of the owners in each case had signed a warranty addendum containing an arbitration clause (either requiring arbitration for any construction defect claims or giving the seller the option of requiring arbitration).

In Satomi, the trial court quashed Satomi, LLC's motion to enforce the warranty addendum and compel arbitration, holding that (1) the FAA does not preempt the WCA, (2) all parties did not sign the warranty addendum, and (3) Satomi Association was not bound by the addendum. Satomi, LLC appealed, but then the parties settled. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals denied Satomi Association's motion to terminate review and decided the case. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's preemption ruling, but reversed as to the non-WCA claims (thus requiring arbitration of those claims). Satomi, LLC appealed the preemption ruling to the State Supreme Court. The Blakely and Leschi cases were subsequently consolidated with Satomi.

While recognizing the mootness of Satomi, the Court here "choose[s] to review the preemption question" because "it is one of 'continuing and substantial public interest.'" The Court reviews de novo both a trial court's decision to compel or deny arbitration and its determination of whether a state statute is preempted by federal law.

The FAA "simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms" (Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees). It's scope extends to "the full reach of the Commerce Clause." Here, the questions are whether the sale and warranting of the condominiums were transactions reached by the Commerce Clause and, if so, whether the WCA conflicts with the FAA and is therefore preempted in these three cases.

The State Supreme Court holds, per Katzenbach v. McClung and Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, "that the commerce clause necessarily reaches the warranting and sale of the condominiums in Satomi because 'such goods' [that came from out of state] amount to more than 70 percent of the component parts." Because the WCA would interfere with the arbitration agreements in these cases, it is preempted by the FAA. The Court upholds the Court of Appeals that the arbitration agreements signed by condominium purchasers applies to Blakeley Association because it only asserts claims on behalf of those purchasers. The Court finds that Blakeley Association has failed to prove that the arbitration clauses were either procedural or substantive unconscionable. The Court declines to decide a number of factual and other issues, and remands Blakeley and Leschi to the trial courts.

The Chief Justice wrote the majority opinion, joined by five other justices. Justice Chambers, joined by Justices Charles Johnson and Richard Sanders, dissents with a strong argument for federalism.

The majority incorrectly frames the issue, answers the wrong question, and ignores the nature of the homeowners' claims. The issue before us is whether a claim for breach of implied warranty, established by Washington statute after consultation with the stakeholders, imposed on Washington state builders, to protect condominium purchasers in Washington State, is preempted by federal laws because some of the materials used in building condominiums came from across the border. The answer is no....

(briefs, argument)

After the jump, search incident to arrest (State v. Buelna Valdez) and attorney discipline (In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanai).

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In a brief opinion, the Supreme Court overturned a traffic conviction as the police officer had insufficient authority to issue a citation. State v. Magee, No. 81746-4.

Andrew Magee was cited for second degree negligent driving when the state patrol received reports from other drivers that a vehicle was traveling the wrong direction on the highway. A trooper was dispatched, and she found Magee parked nose-to-nose with a friend’s car, facing the wrong direction on the shoulder of the SR 512 on-ramp. The trooper assumed Magee had driven against traffic in order to get in this position, and cited him for negligent driving. Magee challenged the infraction. He contending the officer did not have the authority to issue a citation when she had not witnessed an infraction.

RCW 46.63.030 lists the instances where a law enforcement officer has the authority to issue a notice of traffic infraction:

(a) When the infraction is committed in the officer’s presence;

(b) When the officer is acting upon the request of a law enforcement officer in whose presence the traffic infraction was committed;

(c) If an officer investigating at the scene of a motor vehicle accident has reasonable cause to believe that the driver of a motor vehicle involved in the accident has committed a traffic infraction;

(d) When the infraction is detected through the use of a photo enforcement system under RCW 46.63.160; or

(e) When the infraction is detected through the use of an automated traffic safety camera under RCW 46.63.170.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Tom Chambers writing, overturned Magee’s conviction. “RCW 46.63.030 plainly requires us to conclude that an officer must either be present when the infraction occurs or meet one of the other statutory circumstances before issuing a ticket. There is no contention subsections (b) through (e) apply in this case. Instead, the State argues that the trooper actually witnessed the citable offense because the negligent behavior was "ongoing." But negligent driving in the second degree is a moving violation. For the infraction to be valid, the movement must have been made in the officer’s presence.

Justice Barbara Madsen filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with the result, but pointing out that the infraction could have been initiated by a prosecuting authority, in which case the limitations of RCW 46.63.030 would not apply. (Briefs and Argument)

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Seattle v. Winebrenner/Seattle v. Quezada, No. 81279-9. Both Scott Winebrenner and Jesus Quezada were arrested multiple times for driving under the influence. Each had a deferred prosecution agreement from one arrest which they violated with a subsequent arrest. The question is whether the subsequent offense constituted a "prior offense" at the time of sentencing. The Court holds that RCW 46.61.5055's use of "prior offense" is ambiguous because it is "subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." The rule of lenity requires "that an ambiguous criminal statute cannot be interpreted to increase the penalty imposed." The Court unanimously holds that offenses committed after the original offense are not "prior offenses" and cannot be considered at sentencing for the original offense. Justice Chambers wrote the lead opinion. Justice Madsen, joined by Justices Charles Johnson and Fairhurst, concurs in the result but believes the statute unambiguously requires it. (briefs and argument)

Kitsap County Deputy Sheriff's Guild, et al. v. Kitsap County, et al., No. 80720-5. Kitsap County Sheriff's Deputy Brian LaFrance was fired after he allegedly became unstable and dishonest with his superiors. The County had previously entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Deputy Sheriff's Guild that allowed the Guild to file a grievance and put the matter into binding arbitration. The arbitrator found that the county had proven the 29 charges against LaFrance but had not shown that dismissal was the appropriate remedy and ordered his reinstatement. It did not order back pay, but did require that he be provided retroactively the benefits that he would have received if he had remained a deputy and unemployment benefits.

The Guild alleges that because the arbitrator ordered LaFrance's reinstatement, the County is obligated to pay LaFrance's back pay. The County challenges that the arbitrator's order is unenforceable because it "violate[s] an explicit, well defined, and dominant public policy." The Court today, in an opinion by Justice Owens, holds that even if "the arbitrator's decision was not good public policy," the County failed to show that it contravened a clear public policy. Collective bargaining agreements and arbitration clauses, the Court suggested, should be deferred to where possible to protect parties' freedom of contract. The Court also upholds the arbitrator's refusal to provide back pay to LaFrance.

Justice James Johnson dissents, finding a sufficient public policy interest exemplified in the law enforcement officer's "oath to truly, faithfully, and impartially perform his duties," that he would overturn the arbitrator's decision to reinstate LaFrance. He is joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Pro Tem. Teresa Kulik. (briefs and argument)

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In re Det. of Fair, No. 80498-2. David Tyler Fair was charged with molesting several young girls, plead guilty to one count of second degree child molestation, and was sentenced to 20 months in prison. The sentence was suspended as part of a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA). Fair failed to meet the requirements of that sentence, committed a robbery, then fled the state. Eventually, after being imprisoned in New Mexico, Fair was returned to Washington to serve his original sentence and the robbery sentence. In a treatment program, he admitted numerous other sexual contacts with children between 2 and 12 years old. The State petitioned to have Fair committed as a sexually violent predator.

Fair challenged his commitment, arguing that the State was required to "plead and prove a recent overt act." The Court today holds that the Sexually Violent Predator Act (RCW 71.09) only requires the state to prove a recent act if the person is not incarcerated. The Court further holds that this interpretation of the Act does not violate Fair's right to due process, in part because "due process does not require that the absurd be done before the compelling state interest can be vindicated." Justice Jim Johnson wrote the lead opinion, joined by Justices Madsen and Owens. Justice Fairhurst, joined by Justice Charles Johnson, concurs, but offers a slightly different analysis.

Justice Sanders, joined by the Chief Justice, dissents, arguing that the statute plainly requires that a person must be in total and continuous confinement following the original sex offense. Because Fair was originally released and only later incarcerated, and because he was actually serving only the robbery sentence at the time of the commitment proceedings, the dissent would require the state to plead and prove a recent overt act. Justice Chambers joined the dissent, but only as to the result.

In re Pers. Restraint of Duncan, No. 81230-6. Bryan Duncan challenges his commitment as a sexually violent predator based on several evidentiary rulings of the trial court. Duncan was convicted of three counts of first degree child molestation in 1992 and 1993. The State moved to commit him in 1996 and he was finally committed in 2005 (the Court notes that the nine-year delay is troubling, but was mostly attributable to Duncan and was not raised as an issue). Duncan challenges the trial court's admission of evidence that he refused a psychological evaluation and its refusal to allow Duncan to present evidence about the treatment program at the Special Commitment Center and about his proposed roommate if he was released.

The Court today holds, in an opinion by Justice Chambers, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the evidentiary rulings. Justices Charles Johnson, Madsen, Owens, Fairhurst, and Jim Johnson and Justice Pro Tem. Philip Thompson joined the majority opinion.

Justice Sanders dissents, arguing that allowing the reference to Duncan's refusal to be reevaluated was "irrelevant and prejudicial." He would also find the refusal to allow Duncan's evidence about his proposed roommate after the state had introduce its evidence about the roommate to be reversible error. The Chief Justice, in a separate dissent, agrees with Sanders except that he would find the trial judge "impermissibly commented on the evidence by stating to the jury that Duncan 'did not wish' to be reevaluated."

State v. Patton, No. 80518-1. Randall Patton was wanted on a felony warrant when a Skamania County Sheriff Deputy spotted him. Patton was leaning into his own car through the window, rummaging with something on the seat. The Deputy told Patton he was under arrest and Patton fled, but was soon apprehended inside a trailer. Deputies searched the car and found methamphetamine. Patton challenged that the search violated his state and federal constitutional rights because it was not a valid search incident to arrest. The trial court suppressed the evidence but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously sides with Patton and the trial court.

The Court first disagrees with the trial court, which had found that Patton was not arrested until he was taken into custody in the trailer. He was arrested when the officer "manifest[ed] an intent to take [him] into custody" while Patton was standing by his car. Nevertheless, "the search incident to arrest exception is narrow and should be applied only in circumstances anchored to the justifications for its existence."

The question before us, then, is whether it would stretch the search incident to arrest exception beyond its justifications to apply it where the arrestee is not a driver or recent occupant of the vehicle, the basis for arrest is not related to the use of the vehicle, and the arrestee is physically detained and secured away from the vehicle before the search. We believe it would.

Justice Stephens wrote the majority opinion, joined by all other justices except for Justice Jim Johnson, who concurred but found the case identical to Arizona v. Gant, decided earlier this year by the United States Supreme Court.

Thompson v. Hanson, No. 81311-6. The Court resolves a dispute between the Courts of Appeals over Washington's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). Division Three had held that a creditor can only enforce their rights against a transferee who has received fraudulently conveyed property from a debtor if the transferee had "intent to hinder or delay [the] creditors." Today, the Court unanimously eschews that position and upholds a Division One ruling that no proof of intent is required by the UFTA. Justice Owens writes the main opinion and Justice Madsen concurs, but would not have reached one of the issues (the "offset" provision) addressed by Owens.

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In re Pers. Restraint of Brooks, No. 80704-3. Jeffrey Brooks, convicted of three counts of first-degree robbery and one count of residential burglary, was sentenced to 120 months in prison plus 18 to 36 months of community custody. He challenges the sentence as exceeding the maximum, which is 120 months for both imprisonment and community custody. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Chambers, the Court upholds the courts below and finds Brooks's sentence lawful. The Court reasons that Brooks will likely earn early release credits that reduce his sentence below the maximum and, if he does not, the sentence was already amended to note that Brooks total time in confinement and supervision may not exceed 120 months. "We hold that when a defendant is sentenced to a term of confinement and community custody that has the potential to exceed the statutory maximum for the crime, the apropriate remedy is to remand to the trial court to amend the sentence and explicitly state that the combination of confinement and community custody shall not exceed the statutory maximum." (briefs and argument)

State v. Hughes, No. 81270-5. Raymond Hughes admitted to sexual intercourse with a 12-year-old girl with cerebral palsy whom he had been hired to nurse. He was charged with both second-degree rape and second-degree rape of a child. Hughes challenges that the two charges amounted to double jeopardy and that his exceptional sentence of 102 months to life is an indeterminate exceptional minimum sentence that exceeds the trial court's authority. Here, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Charles Johnson, the Court holds that the two charges do amount to double jeopardy because they are based on the same single incident and the elements of each crime are essentially identical. The Court rejects Hughes's challenge to his sentence because he was convicted before the Sentencing Reform Act amendments that are essential to his argument. The case is remanded to the trial court to vacate one of the two convictions. (briefs and argument)

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In Re Stephen Eugster, No. 200,568-3. Attorney Stephen Eugster got caught up in a dispute between his elderly client and her son. The Washington State Bar Association filed a complaint against Eugster alleging multiple ethical violations, including failure to abide by his client's objectives, disclosure of confidential information, and wrongfully filing a petition for guardianship. A hearing officer determined that "Eugster acted knowingly and intentionally" and that his actions caused financial and other harm. The findings were unanimously approved by the Disciplinary Board, which recommended disbarment. In an opinion by Justice Chambers and joined by four other justices, the Court declines to disbar Eugster and instead suspends him for 18 months. Justice Fairhurst, with three other justices, filed a strong dissent arguing for disbarment. (Briefs, argument).

State v. Riofta, No. 79407-3. Ten people were gunned down, five of them killed, in Tacoma's "Trang Dai massacre" on July 5, 1998. One of the suspects, Veasna Sok, had agreed to testify against the other defendants. On January 27, 2000, Veasna's brother Ratthana was confronted near his home by a man he recognized as "Alex," someone he had known in the neighborhood for several years and who was associated with some of the Trang Dai defendants. Alex pulled out a revolver and fired multiple shots at close range at Ratthana, who escaped uninjured. Ratthana identified Alex Riofta from a photograph at the police station, and Riofta was convicted of first degree assault with a firearm. Riofta subsequently sought DNA testing of a white hat found at the crime scene.

Here, the Court upholds the decisions below and declines to order a DNA hat test per RCW 10.73.170. The majority holds that Riofta failed to show that the results of a DNA test on the hat (which had been stolen the day before Ratthana was shot at) "would demonstrated innocence on a more probable than not basis." Justice Madsen penned the opinion and was joined by five other justices. Justice Charles Johnson authored a dissent joined by Justices Sanders and Chambers, and Justice Chambers wrote a separate dissent calling on the legislature to provide greater clarity. (2003 appeal, 2006 appeal, briefs, argument)

State v. Thomas, No. 80643-8. Covell Paul Thomas robbed and murdered Richard Geist, gunning the small business owner down at close range in order to steal about $5000 in cash. Thomas was originally sentenced to die; that sentence was overturned due to an improper jury instruction on the aggravating factors. On remand, the state sought only life imprisonment. A jury found that Thomas had committed four aggravating factors and the trial judge sentenced Thomas to life without the possibility of parole. Thomas again challenges the jury instructions and also brings due process, Double Jeopardy, Batson v. Kentucky, and other claims. The Court rejects them all, with Justice Madsen writing for a majority of seven. Justice Sanders, joined by Justice Stephens, dissents. (Earlier opinion, briefs, argument)

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The court today released three opinions in two cases.

In re F5 Networks, Inc., No. 81817-7 Justice Chambers writes for a unanimous Court, answering two questions certified from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Shareholders of F5, a Washington-based technology company, sued alleging improper backdating of stock options. The questions both revolve around the plaintiff's failure to first demand action by the corporate board. Does Washington law require such a demand before commencing litigation (a "universal demand" requirement), or does it allow plaintiff's to proceed in litigation if such a demand would have been futile (the "demand futility standard")? The Court today holds that, "until the legislature says otherwise, Washington follows Delaware's demand futility standard and the reasoning of Ryan [a similar case from Delaware where such a suit was allowed to proceed]." (case briefs, argument, "F5 Networks to restate financials back to 2001", "State Ruling Could Blunt Backdating Litigation Wave")

State v. Elmi, No. 80380-3 Justice Charles Johnson writes for a six-member majority, upholding Ali Elmi's convictions for first degree assault with a firearm. Elmi fired multiple gunshots into a house after he saw his estranged wife look out the window. The shots missed his wife and three young children who, unbeknownst to Elmi, were with her in the room. The question here was whether Elmi had the criminal intent necessary for the assault convictions against the three children. The Court holds that he did.

Where a defendant intends to shoot into and to hit someone occupying a house, a tavern, or a car, she or he certainly bears the risk of multiple convictions when several victims are present, regardless of whether the defendant knows of their presence. And, because the intent is the same, criminal culpability should be the same where a number of persons are present but physically unharmed.

Justice Madsen, joined by Justices Sanders and Fairhurst, dissent, arguing that the legislature's statutory doctrine of transfered intent was not intended to be and is not broader than the common law doctrine. At common law, the doctrine provides that "a defendant who shoots at B but misses and hits C instead" may be punished as he had intended to shoot C. The dissent challenges that "Using the transferred intent doctrine to hold a defendant liable for inchoate crimes like attempted battery criminalizes the unintended and unaccomplished potential consequences of a defendant's actions." (case briefs and argument).

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The Supreme Court was largely in agreement today, issuing opinions in five cases, with no dissents.

In re the Estate of Kissinger, No. 81328-1. The Supreme Court unanimously held Joshua Hoge “willfully and unlawfully” killed his mother and cannot collect a portion of the wrongful death settlement obtained by his mother’s estate, under the state’s “Slayer Statute.” Justice Tom Chambers wrote the opinion.

In re Recall of Telford and McGreggor, No. 81865-7. The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed a recall petition against two Port of Olympia Commissioners. The petitioner presented a constitutional challenge to the requirement that a recall petition be reviewed by a superior court for factual and legal sufficiency, arguing this is an unconstitutional limit on citizens' right to recall public officials. The Supreme Court rejected this challenge, with Justice Barbara Madsen writing the opinion.

In re Interest of Silva, No. 81573-9. This case involves the judicial authority to incarcerate a child for contempt of court for failing to comply with court orders entered in at-risk youth (ARY) proceedings. The Supreme Court held that a juvenile court in an ARY proceeding must find all statutory contempt sanctions inadequate before it may exercise its inherent contempt power to sanction a youth. In this case, the juvenile court failed to do so, and the Supreme Court vacated the contempt order. Justice Charles Johnson wrote the opinion of the court, with Justices Madsen and Fairhurst concurring in the result.

Tomlinson v. Puget Sound Freight Lines, No. 80811-2. James Tomlinson fell down a flight of stairs and injured his arthritic left knee while working for Puget Sound Freight Lines. After total knee replacement surgery, he filed a claim for permanent partial disability compensation under the Industrial Insurance Act. The Department of Labor & Industries awarded Tomlinson a permanent partial disability payment of 75 percent of the amputation value of his left leg above the knee, less the preexisting 50 percent attributable to his arthritis. Tomlinson challenged the finding of preexisting condition, arguing that he had no functional impairment that required modification of his work activities. The Supreme Court upheld the L&I award in favor of the employer, with Justice Tom Chambers writing the opinion.

Weber v. Associated Surgeons, No. 82163-1. At issue is whether a plaintiff properly served the defendant with his complaint for medical malpractice. The Supreme Court (in an unsigned opinion) held that service upon the registered agent's office manager satisfied service of process requirements. Charles Weber suffered an injury and was treated by Dr. Michael Moore, of Associated Surgeons. Dr. Gregory Luna was Associated Surgeons' registered agent. Associated Surgeons stopped doing business in 2004, but remained a registered corporation as of February 2007. In 2007, Dr. Luna worked for Inland Vascular Institute in Spokane, Washington. Weber sued Associated Surgeons for malpractice, and a process server attempted to serve Associated Surgeons at Inland Vascular, where Dr. Luna then worked. Associated Surgeons moved to dismiss the suit because the Webers failed to properly serve it.

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In re the Estate of Kissinger, No. 81328-1. Can Joshua Hoge, who killed his mother and was ruled not guilty by reason of insanity, inherit a portion of the wrongful death settlement obtained by his mother’s estate? The Supreme Court of Washington unanimously said “no,” with Justice Tom Chambers writing the opinion.

The question before the court was whether Hoge was a “slayer” as defined by the state’s “Slayer Statute” (RCW 11.84) and was therefore barred from benefiting from his mother’s death. Washington’s slayer statute prohibits individuals who have participated in the “willful and unlawful” killing of another person from receiving any benefit as a result of their acts. But when a person is held not guilty by reason of insanity, can his act be characterized as willful and unlawful?

Hoge has a long history of mental illness. On June 23, 1999, Hoge entered his mother’s house and stabbed her and his stepbrother to death. Hoge also attempted to kill his mother’s boyfriend with an ax. At the time, Hoge was not taking his antipsychotic medication. Hoge pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, and stipulated that he had committed the acts. On January 13, 2000, Hoge was acquitted by reason of insanity and the court entered an order committing him to treatment at a state mental hospital.

The estate of Pamela Kissiner, Hoge’s mother, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the state mental health agency, claiming it was liable for Kissinger’s death for not timely providing the medications necessary to control Hoge’s mental illness. The lawsuit was settled, and the personal representative of the estate then filed a petition, arguing that Hoge was prohibited from sharing in the proceeds of the settlement.

Hoge argued that because he was found “not guilty” by reason of insanity, he was absolved of any wrongdoing. (The insanity defense says a defendant, as a result of a mental disease or defect, was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the act or that he was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the particular act charged.)

The Supreme Court looked at the meanings of “willful and unlawful.” Justice Chambers wrote: “The insanity statute does not make homicide lawful; it simply declines to punish a defendant who has committed an unlawful act but is found legally insane.” Therefore, the court held “not guilty by reason of insanity does not make an otherwise unlawful act lawful for application of the slayer statute.”

The court has previously interpreted the meaning of “willful” in the context of the slayer statute in the Jones case, holding that “willful” was to be given its ordinary, everyday meaning – whether an act was committed “intentionally and designedly.” Justice Chambers held that Jones applied in this case. The Supreme Court departed from the Court of Appeals, which had sent the case back to trial court to evaluate whether the act was committed willfully. Justice Chambers wrote that the evidence clearly shows that Hoge intentionally and designedly, and therefore remanding the case was unnecessary. (More background on the case in this Seattle Times story.)

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Talking today to Venkat Balasubramani, who blogs at the very-readable Spam Notes, and he alerted me to the fact that Justice Tom Chambers has a blog. So using everyone's favorite research tool -- Google -- I looked it up. His website (www.tomchambers.com) has a biography, a slideshow, a categorized archive of his opinions, and yes, a blog.

Technically, the blog is more of a semi-monthly e-newsletter. Since July 2008 he's posted four entries, which is not exactly prolific. But the entries are very interesting: he writes about his thought process in specific cases (did the Supreme Court really say it's okay to lie?), his complaints about talk radio (pundits distort careful legal analysis), his political leanings (Libertarian). Did you know he likes to watch Bill O'Reilly on Fox News?

An interesting read, and definitely worth keeping an eye on. One of the complaints I often hear is the difficulty in deciding how to vote in a state that elects its judges -- especially for voters who don't continually monitor the court. Commentaries like Justice Chambers' blog help fill the gap.

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The Court released one unanimous opinion this morning. There are no oral arguments today.

In re Pers. Restraint of McKiearnan, 81102-4. Justice Chambers writes for a unanimous Court, rejecting Michael McKiearnan's attempt to overturn his 1987 plea agreement for first degree robbery. McKiearnan had thumbed a ride and robbed and punched the driver. When he plead guilty, both the plea agreement and the judgment form had misstated the maximum sentence as "twenty (20) years to life" instead of simply, and correctly, "life." McKiearnan was sentenced to three years. The Supreme Court holds that "he was not substantively misinformed as to the maximum sentence, his judgment and sentence is not invalid on its face, and his petition is time barred." (briefs, oral argument)

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