Supreme Court of Washington Blog : Supreme Court of Washington Blog : Washington Public Policy & Budget News : Freedom Foundation : WA State Tax & Labor Law Commentary & Updates

State v. Brown, No. 84083-1. Maurice Brown was granted a 72-hour furlough from the Benton County Jail to attend a drug treatment program. He failed to return,and  was arrested, charged, and convicted of escape. On appeal, Brown challenged that the charging information had not alleged that he acted knowingly. The Court of Appeals found that the information had failed to allege knowledge, an essential element of the crime, but held also that Brown was not prejudiced and thus upheld the conviction.

In a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court today overturns the Court of Appeals. "Because the information did not adequately apprise Brown of the elements of the crime, the charge must be dismissed without prejudice."

State v. Willingham, No. 84036-9. Jesse Willingham was charged with indecent liberties with a child. The crime has a three-year statute of limitations. Prosecutors argued and the Court of Appeals agreed that the statute of limitations was tolled for a two-week period when Willingham was in Utah for job training. Today, in another per curiam reversal of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court holds that the temporary absence from Washington for job training did not toll the statute of limitations.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In re PRP of Steven Clark, No. 81522-4. Steven Clark agreed to plead guilty to two counts of second degree robbery in 1998 in exchange for the state dropping a third robbery charge (all involving bank robberies). Clark was sentenced to 25 months in prison. His plea agreement included at least one year in community placement after his release. Yet shortly after Clark's sentencing it was discovered that he did not meet the necessary statutory criteria for community placement and his sentence was amended to remove it.

Clark was released in 1999 and quickly robbed two more banks. He was convicted and sentenced as a "persistent offender" to life imprisonment. Clark challenges his 1998 plea bargain because he was wrongly informed that his sentence would include community placement. The Court does not reach that issue because it determines that Clark's petition is untimely. Justice Fairhurst, joined by seven other justices, determines that the one-year statute of limitations applies and so Clark's filing comes eight years too late. The test is whether the sentence is invalid on its face and the Court determines that Clark's sentence was not, even though there was confusion about his plea agreement.

Justice Sanders strongly dissents. He would find Clark's petition timely and indicates that he would hold that Clark could withdraw his earlier plea. (argument, briefs)

Merriman, et ux. v. Cokeley, et ux., No. 83700-7. The Court of Appeals had overturned a trial court's determination in a quiet title action that three boundary markers in an area overgrown with blackberries and ivy could not constitute a "clear and well-defined boundary." Here the Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion reverses the Court of Appeals and holds that the evidence supports the trial court's finding. (briefs)

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Alhadeff v. Kitsap Cmty. Fed. Credit Union d/b/a Kitsap Credit Union, No. 81833-9. A swanky condominium project, "The Meridian on Bainbridge [Island]," flopped, leaving the courts to sort through a letter of credit (LOC) controversy that the Supreme Court today deems "significantly more complex than a typical LOC transaction." 

Developer Meridian received a construction loan from Kitsap Credit Union for $4,500,000. The Credit Union required that Meridian contribute equity in the form of a $1,000,000 LOC. Meridian arranged for the LOC from investor Jack Alhadeff, who authorized his bank, Wells Fargo, to issue the LOC to Kitsap Credit Union. The terms of the LOC required the Credit Union to certify that Meridian was not in default before drawing on the LOC.

Kitsap Credit Union drew on the letter three times, in May, June, and July of 2004, exhausting the full $1,000,000. Despite the Credit Union's certification each time that Meridian was not in default, two "events of default" had already occurred: a tax deficiency and the imposition of a construction lien by a contractor. The Credit Union was also aware that Meridian was exceeding its budget. In September 2004, Meridian asked the Credit Union for a further loan. The Credit Union eventually declared Meridian in default in November 2006.

In August 2006, Alhadeff sued Kitsap Credit Union alleging eight causes of action related to the LOC. The trial court granted the Credit Union's motion for summary judgment, finding the situation covered by U.C.C. Article 5 and the claims thus barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Alhadeff appealed, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and Kitsap Credit Union appealed.

Today, the Supreme Court unanimously reverses the Court of Appeals, holding that the U.C.C. Article 5 statute of limitations does apply and that none of Alhadeff's claims survive summary judgment. Justice James Johnson wrote the opinion, which includes a helpful Diagram of Letter of Credit Transaction. And somewhere in there, reversed Court of Appeals Judge Theodore Spearman administered this author's oath of attorney. (briefs and argument)

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Supreme Court has issued a ruling in WA State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Construction, No. 81029-0. The Public Facilities District initiated the action to recover damages for SAFECO Field construction defects. The construction company ("HK") claimed the action was barred by the 6-year statute of limitations, and the trial court awarded summary judgment in the company's favor.

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice Debra Stephens, writing the 6-3 majority decision, said that construction of Safeco Field by the PFD involves the exercise of sovereign power, and claims based on its construction fall within the "for the benefit of the state" exemption to the statute of limitations. Justice Richard Sanders dissented, protesting that "[c]onstruction of a professional baseball stadium for private profit is certainly not 'for the benefit of the state' as that phrase is understood in our case law." Justices Tom Chambers and James Johnson joined Sanders' dissent.

UPDATE: The Washington Construction Law Blog, published by Davis Wright Tremaine, has more information about the case here.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link