Today's Opinions in Criminal Cases

State v. Adams, No. 82210-7. A King County Sheriff's Deputy stopped a vehicle because the registered owner had an arrest warrant for driving with a revoked license. Coryell Adams, the registered owner, was the driver and sole occupant in the car. When stopped, he got out of the car, locked it, and walked several steps away, all in violation of the officers orders to get back into the vehicle. After Adams was arrested, officers searched the car and found cocaine. Adams moved to suppress that evidence; the trial court denied the motion and was affirmed on appeal.

While awaiting review, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gant, which limits searches incident to arrest. The State filed a supplemental brief conceding that Gant applies here, but arguing for the court to apply the "good faith" exception.

Today, in a unanimous opinion by the Chief Justice, the Court declines to apply the good faith exception. The Court puts itself in its place, reasoning that while reliance on statutes that are subsequently struck down may warrant a good faith exception, reliance on the Court's erstwhile case law does not. (briefs, argument)

State v. Turner, No. 81626-3 (consolidated with State v. Faagata, No. 82336-7). In these cases, each defendant was convicted of two charges stemming from a single event. The trial courts set aside the lesser conviction to avoid violating double jeopardy, but issued an order that if the remaining conviction was overturned on appeal, the lesser conviction could be reinstated. The trial courts were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In a unanimous opinion by Justice James Johnson, the Court first reviews federal case law, which holds that double jeopardy does allow trial and conviction on lesser included offenses and "does not require permanent, unconditional vacation of the lesser of two convictions for the same criminal conduct...." However, the Court today reverses the Court of Appeals, and holds that the trial courts conditional vacation of the lesser offenses violated double jeopardy.

... a trial court must avoid (i) entering judgment on a defendant's lesser conviction and (ii) referencing that conviction when sentencing a defendant convicted of multiple crimes for the same criminal conduct. This is precisely what Turner and Faagata demanded, but did not receive, at trial and on appeal -- vacation of their lesser convictions without reference to any validity attributable to those convictions.

The Court notes that convictions for lesser included offenses that have been vacated can later be revived.

However, the lesser conviction, once vacated, and prior to reinstatement, is not "a valid conviction" and is not "entitled to some weight," contrary to the trial courts' rulings in these cases. ... In the future, the better practice will be for trial courts to refrain from any reference to the possible reinstatement of a vacated lesser conviction.

(briefs, argument)

Today's arguments - January 21, 2010

Today the Court is hearing three arguments, two in the morning and one this afternoon. (Docket, briefs)

Morning session

State v. Turner/Faagata, No. 81626-3. These consolidated cases present the question of whether two crimes can be merged for sentencing without completely wiping out any potential future sentencing on the lesser crime.

Both defendants are charged with two crimes (Turner for assault and robbery, Faagata for two murders) that arose out of the same facts, so it would be a violation of double jeopardy if a court convicted them of each crime separately. In both cases, the trial court merged the two crimes for sentencing, but stated that the lesser of the two crimes was still valid (i.e. separate) for future sentencing if the conviction for the greater crime was invalidated on appeal.

The cases originated in Pierce County Superior Court, and were appealed to Division Two Court of Appeals. The defendants lost at the appellate level.

Seglaine v. Washington Department of Labor & Industries, No. 81931-9. This case concerns whether L&I has statutory immunity from charges of malicious prosecution for complaints to the police about an individual.

Due to arguments between Seglaine and East Wenatchee L&I employees, the department staff served Seglaine with a "no trespass" notice, ordering him to not enter the building. Seglaine later tried to come back, staff called the police and Seglaine was arrested. Charges were later dropped, but Seglaine sued L&I for malicious prosecution, among other things.

Under RCW 4.24.510, a person who complains to a government agency, like the police, is immune to prosecution for the complaint. The trial court ruled for L&I based on this statue. Seglaine argues that L&I is not a "person," that it doesn't apply to malicious prosecution claims, and that L&I must prove it acted in good faith.

Summary judgment for the defendant was granted by Thurston County Superior Court and upheld by Division Two Court of Appeals.

Afternoon session

State v. Peterson, No. 82089-9. The question before the court is whether the state has to prove which time limit requirement a sex offender falls under in order to convict them of failing to register.

Sex offenders are required to register with the county sheriff when they change addresses. The statute requiring this registration gives different time limits depending on where the offender is moving: 72 hours for a fixed address, 42 hours for homeless, 10 days for out of county. Sex offender Michael Peterson left his residence and failed to register with the state for over a month.

Peterson was convicted of failure to register. On appeal, he argues that the time limit is an element of the crime, and that the differing time limits create alternative methods of committing the crime. Since the state doesn't know where he was during the time he failed to register, it can't prove which time limit applies, and thus can't convict Peterson of any form of failure to register.

The Division One Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the time limits “do not define the elements or create alternative means of committing the crime of failure to register as a sex offender. For a sex offender, like Peterson, there is only one means of committing a crime--knowingly failing to register[.]”