Today's opinions - April 7, 2011

Posted on April 7, 2011 by Michael Reitz

Burton v. Twin Commander Aircraft, No. 83030-4. The Supreme Court ruled that an action against Twin Commander, an airplane manufacturer, was time barred. A crash occurred in Mexico in May 2004, killing seven government agents on board. Kenneth Burton, personal representative of the decedents’ estates, filed a wrongful death action against Twin Commander. Twin Commander moved to a decision on the basis of the General Aviation Revitalization Act. The law bars actions against aircraft manufacturers if the accident occurs 18 years after delivery of the aircraft to the first purchaser. The trial court ruled in Twin Commander’s favor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that Twin Commander has failed to prove that it is a “manufacturer” of the aircraft, and was thus covered by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Barbara Madsen writing, reversed the Court of Appeals. Justice Debra Stephens and two others dissent.

In re PRP of Carlos John Williams, No. 84711-8. Carlos Williams, an inmate at Monroe Correctional Center, filed two civil complaints for monetary damages against the Department of Corrections, claiming cruel and unusual punishment and racial discrimination. The superior court treated both actions as postconviction challenges and referred them to the Court of Appeals for consideration as personal restraint petitions. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions as improperly seeking monetary relief. The Supreme Court (in a per curiam decision) reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the trial court to treat Williams’ actions as civil complaints.

State v. Simms, No. 83826-7. Daniel Simms was convicted (among other things) of robbery, with sentence enhancement for use of a firearm. Because Simms had a previous conviction of assault with a firearm enhancement in 2000, the court doubled the firearm enhancements, adding 22 years to his sentence. Simms challenged the enhancement on appeal—specifically whether the state, in seeking a double firearm enhancement based on the prior imposition of a firearm enhancement, is required to allege in the information that the defendant has previously been sentenced to a firearm enhancement. The Court of Appeals held that the prior conviction was not essential to prove the enhancement itself, and that there is no requirement to give notice of a prior conviction “for purposes of a sentencing enhancement.” The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Court of Appeals. Justice James Johnson wrote the decision of the court.

State v. Weaver, No. 84982-0. The Supreme Court previously granted Oliver Weaver’s petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision that had affirmed his sentence for second degree child rape and second degree rape. The Supreme Court had ordered reconsideration by the Court of Appeals in light of State v. Mendoza (2009). On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals adhered to its original decision. Weaver again appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court holds today that Mendoza entitles Weaver to relief, reverses the Court of Appeals, and remand to the superior court for further proceedings.

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Today's arguments - Jan. 20, 2011

Posted on January 20, 2011 by Michael Reitz

The Supreme Court will hear arguments in four cases today (briefs, docket).

Morning session (starting at 9 a.m.)

State v. Posey, No. 82957-8. The issue here is whether the superior court had jurisdiction to sentence an offender for a juvenile offense after the offender had turned twenty-one years old. Daniel Posey, a 16-year-old, was charged with three counts of second degree rape and one count of first degree assault with a firearm. Since the assault was a “serious violent offense,” the juvenile court was required to decline jurisdiction and Posey was tried in superior court. He was convicted of two rape charges, but not the assault, and sentenced as an adult.

Posey appealed the adult sentence, since he had not been convicted of the assault, which is the crime that put him in superior court in the first place. The Supreme Court agreed, and Posey’s case was remanded to juvenile court for sentencing. However, by the time he got back to juvenile court Posey had turned 21.

Posey claimed that the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction to sentence him, and the trial court agreed. The trial judge adjourned juvenile court and reconvened as an adult court, sentenced Posey, and entered a protection order. Posey appeals, claiming that the adult court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the adult court had “residual jurisdiction” once the juvenile court’s jurisdiction ended.

In Re PRP of Flint, No. 83815-1. Whether the rule returning a criminal to prison after his third community custody violation hearing is ex post facto law when applied to a prisoner convicted before the law was passed. Eric Flint pleaded guilty to robbery, served time in prison, and was released to community custody. He was brought to three community custody violation hearings, at each of which he was found guilty of various community custody violations. The law at that time (RCW 9.94A.737) required him to be returned to prison after his third violation hearing, and he was.

The rule sending him back to prison had been passed into law after Flint’s conviction. Flint argues that the rule as applied to him is “ex post facto law” because it imposes a more severe punishment on him. The appellate court dismissed the petition as frivolous.

Afternoon session (starting at 1:30 p.m.)

State v. Simms, No. 83826-7. Whether the state must give notice of a prior firearm conviction in order to double the term for a firearm sentencing enhancement. Daniel Simms was convicted (among other things) of robbery with a firearm enhancement. The trial court doubled the length of confinement for the enhancement because Simms had a previous firearm conviction.

An information must include all the essential facts for the charged crime, including enhancements. The information with which Simms was charged did not mention his previous conviction. Simms claims that this conviction was an essential fact to the doubling of his firearm enhancement, and appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the prior conviction was not essential to prove the enhancement itself, and that there is no requirement to give notice of a prior conviction “for purposes of a sentencing enhancement.”

In Re PRP of Coats, No. 83544-6. Jeffrey Coats pleaded guilty to robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and conspiracy to commit murder. Both his judgment and his plea statement listed incorrect maximum penalties for the conspiracy to commit robbery charge; both were too high. Although Coats’ conviction has been final for more than a year, he argues that the incorrect maximum makes his judgment facially invalid, allowing him to bring a personal restraint petition after the normal time limit. He seeks to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that it was involuntary because he did not know the actual maximum penalty.

The Court of Appeals held that since Coats received a standard range sentence, the incorrect maximum penalty was a “technical misstatement that had no actual effect on the rights of the petitioner.” Thus, the court held that the judgment was not facially invalid and Coats’ petition was time barred.

The Supreme Court will review the question of whether the judgment and sentence are facially invalid.

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New cases accepted for review

Posted on March 3, 2010 by Michael Reitz

The Supreme Court granted several petitions for review during its March 2 conference.

  • Qualcomm, Inc. v. Dept of Revenue, No. 83673-6
  • State v. Sims, No. 83779-1
  • Snohomish County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area Corp. v. Firstgroup Am., Inc., No. 83795-3
  • ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm'n., No. 83745-7
  • State v. Simms, No. 83826-7
  • State v. Donaghe, No. 83738-4

Qualcomm, Inc. v. Dept of Revenue, No. 83673-6. Qualcomm is seeking a refund of retail sales taxes it paid after a Department of Revenue ruling. Qualcomm sells a communications system to trucking companies to assist them with tracking and managing vehicles. After an audit, the Department of Revenue determined that Qualcomm was improperly paying the lower business and occupations (B & O) tax service rate, and DOR assessed Qualcomm $900,573 based on its assumption that the tracking portion of Qualcomm's system is a “network telephone service,” which is taxed at a higher rate. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) upheld the Department of Revenue assessment.

State v. Sims, No. 83779-1. Jack Sims pled guilty of first degree child molestation. He was sentenced to in prison, with 60 months of minimum mandatory confinement, but the court suspended this sentence in imposing a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative. The court also entered an order prohibiting Sims from entering or residing in Cowlitz County. Sims appealed this banishment, arguing it is a violation of his right to due process and equal protection under the constitution. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) held that the order banishing Sims from the county for life impermissibly impinged on his constitutional right to travel. The Court vacated the entire sentence, including the banishment, and remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

Snohomish County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area Corp. v. Firstgroup Am., Inc., No. 83795-3. Coach USA Transit contracted with Community Transit to provide commuter transit service between King and Snohomish counties. Thereafter Coach USA Transit assigned the contract to First Transit. In 2004, a 5-vehicle accident occurred on Interstate 5 involving both a First Transit bus and a Community Transit bus. Community Transit settled 42 claims incurring $1,250,950 to investigate and settle the claims. First Transit refused to defend or indemnify Community Transit, despite an indemnification clause in the party’s contract. Community Transit sued, seeking to enforce the indemnity clause. The trial court ruled in First Transit’s favor. Community Transit argued the agreement requires First Transit to indemnify it for tort claims caused by the combined negligence of Community Transit and third parties, but the Court of Appeals (Div. 1) held the contract does not does not clearly and unequivocally state this intention, and affirmed the dismissal of the claims against First Transit.

ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm'n., No. 83745-7. The State Gambling Commission denied ZDI Gaming’s application to distribute electronic pull-tab machine incorporating cash card technology, finding ZDI’s pull tab machine was an illegal “gambling device.” A Thurston County Superior Court judge overruled the Commission. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) held that the Commission’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence, and ruled in ZDI’s favor.

State v. Simms, No. 83826-7. Daniel Simms was convicted of first-degree robbery, two counts of second-degree assault, and first-degree unlawful possession of a firearm. As he was armed when committing the crimes the length of confinement for the firearm sentencing enhancements was doubled. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed to review the issue of whether there is a constitutional requirement to give notice of intent to seek an enhanced penalty.

State v. Donaghe, No. 83738-4. The Thurston County Superior Court denied Samuel Donaghe’s motion to issue a RCW 9.94A.637(1) certificate of discharge for his rape convictions and sentences. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) affirmed. The Supreme Court has consolidated this case with State v. Jones, No. 83451-2.

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