Today's Opinions: Counsel's bad immigration advice prejudiced defendant
State v. Sandoval, No. 82175-5. Valentin Sandoval is a noncitizen resident alien who was charged with rape in the second degree. Prosecutor's offered to reduce the charge to rape in the third degree if Sandoval would plead guilty. Sandoval was concerned about deportation, but his attorney advised him to accept the plea agreement and assured him that "he would not be immediately deported" and that he could challenge "any potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea." Sandoval accepted the plea deal, served his jail sentence. When he was then held pending deportation proceedings, Sandoval appealed and filed a personal restrain petition (PRP), alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and arguing that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had been properly advised by his attorney. The court of appeals consolidated the two actions and denied both. The Washington State Supreme Court accepted review and, subsequently, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a similar case, Padilla v. Kentucky.
Today, the State Supreme Court holds that the advice given to Sandoval by his attorney was objectively unreasonable in light of Padilla. In that case, a drug trafficking defendant had pleaded guilty after his attorney had downplayed the likelihood of deportation even though deportation was required by law. The Supreme Court of the United States held that, contrary to most previous case law, immigration consequences are so closely connected to the criminal process that advice about these consequences is within "the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
The State Supreme Court further holds that the advice prejudiced Sandoval because "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty...." The Court reverses the court of appeals, vacates Sandoval's conviction, and remands to the trial court. Justice Fairhurst writes for the Court, joined by Justices Charles Johnson, Alexander, and Owens, and Justice Pro Tem. Sanders.
Justice Stephens concurs in the result but writes a separate opinion, signed also by the Chief Justice and Justice Chambers, to emphasize that the appropriate test for the advice of counsel is "whether his advice, taken as a whole, was objectively reasonable under prevailing professional norms," and not simply whether on examination it was mistaken. Justice James Johnson also concurs but writes separately because he finds the immigration law in this case "not 'succinct or straightforward,'" and so he would apply a different standard even though the result would remain the same. (briefs, argument)
