New Opinions: October 6, 2011

The Supreme Court issued per curiam opinions in two criminal matters today. 

State v. McKague, No. 85657-5. The Supreme Court upholds a second degree assault conviction but clarifies the definition of “substantial bodily harm.” Jay McKague shoplifted a can of smoked oysters from Kee Ho Chang’s convenience store. Chang followed McKague out of the store and confronted him in the parking lot. A scuffle took place, during which McKague punched Chang in the head several times and pushed him to the ground, causing Chang’s head to strike the pavement. Chang was diagnosed with a concussion, a scalp contusion and lacerations, head and neck pain, and lacerations on his arm. Police photographs taken three days after the assault showed bruising around Chang’s eye.

McKague was eventually convicted of third degree theft and second degree assault. On appeal, a question was raised as to the sufficiency of the evidence of “substantial bodily harm” done to Chang. Second degree assault is defined as when the defendant intentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly causes “substantial bodily harm.” RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a). The Court of Appeal relied on to a dictionary definition of the term “substantial” as including “something having substance or actual existence.” The Supreme Court ruled that this definition would make practically any injury “substantial” no matter how minor. The Supreme Court indicated that substantial harm should be considerable. Nevertheless, the court upheld McKague’s conviction.

State v. Robinson, No. 83444-0. The Supreme Court allows a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon discovering that past offenses would count against his offender score. Chucco Robinson was charged with first degree attempted rape, burglary, and kidnapping. He erroneously believed that earlier juvenile convictions no longer counted toward his offender score. Based on this, he pleaded guilty. Later Robinson learned that his juvenile convictions would count toward his offender score and would increase the sentencing range. Robinson “immediately” sought to withdraw his plea. The trial court determined that Robinson’s plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, given his reasonable misunderstanding. The State contended on appeal that the trial court based her discretion by allowing the plea withdrawal. The Supreme Court held that the ruling was within the discretion of the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings.

More Opinions from this week and last

Blair v. TA-Seattle East No. 176, No. 83715-5. The plaintiff, Blair, failed timely to disclose her witness list according to the discovery schedule. The trial court twice sanctioned Blair by striking some of her witnesses and imposing monetary fines, though it did not enter into the record any findings to support these decisions. Eventually, the trial court granted a defense motion for summary judgment since Blair had no medical witness who could testify to causation. Blair appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court.

The Supreme Court reverses the courts below. It holds that the trial court abused its discretion when it struck the witnesses because it did not set forth its reasons for the sanctions in the record. And because those actions were improper, the summary judgment order must be reversed as well. Justice Stephens wrote for the Court. The holding was unanimous, but Justice James Johnson wrote a concurrence to emphasize that this decision does not limit the sanctions that can be imposed by trial courts. (briefs, argument)

Schnall v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., No. 80572-5. The federal government, through the Federal Communications Commission, requires AT&T and other telecommunications companies to pay into the Universal Service Fund, which subsidizes telecommunications services in certain areas. The government expressly permits companies to recover these funds from customers, which AT&T does as a "Universal Connectivity Charge" line item on customers' bills. An AT&T Wireless customer, Martin Schnall, sued, alleging that this practice by AT&T violates the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and the terms of AT&T's customer contract. Schnall asked the trial court to certify a nationwide class; the trial court denied class certification; Schnall appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court and certified the class.

AT&T's customer contracts include a choice of law provision requiring customers to litigate contract issues in the jurisdiction where the contract was signed. The trial court found no reason to invalidate this contract term, thus it declined to certify a nationwide class on Schnall's contract claim. The Supreme Court agrees with the trial court and reverses the court of appeals. On the state CPA claim, the Court affirms the court of appeals, noting that the trial court's decision predated the Supreme Court's opinion in Indoor Billboard/Washington, Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Washington, Inc. The case is remanded to the trial court.

The Chief Justice wrote for the Court and was joined by four other justices. Justice chambers wrote a concurrence in part, but also agreed with Justice Pro Tem. Sanders's dissent that the majority failed to consider factors weighing in favor of certifying the national class. Justice Owens and Stephens also signed the dissent. (briefs, argument)

State v. Robinson, No. 83525-0. In these consolidated appeals, two criminal defendants challenged the admissibility of evidence used against them at trial. Both defendants first raised the issue on appeal after the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Arizona v. Gant. That case narrowed the exception to the warrant requirement for automobile searches incident to an arrest. The State Supreme Court holds for both defendants and remands their cases.

We hold that principles of issue preservation, as embodied in RAP 2.5(a), do not apply where (1) a court issues a new controlling constitutional interpretation material to the defendant's case, (2) that interpretation overrules an existing controlling interpretation, (3) the new interpretation applies retroactively to the defendant, and (4) the defendant's trial was completed prior to the new interpretation. As these criteria are met in both Millan's and Robinson's cases, their raising the admissibility of evidence under Gant and Patton for the first time before the Court of Appeals and this court, respectively, are permissible.

Justice Owens wrote for the seven-member majority. The Chief Justice wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justice James Johnson. (briefs, argument)

Today's arguments - October 26, 2010

Today the Court will hear four arguments as usual. (Docket, briefs)

Morning session (9:30 a.m.)

Blair v. Travel Centers of America, No. 83715-5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing medical witnesses to be called due to violation of a local procedural court rule.

Truck driver Maureen Blair slipped and fell on spilled oil at a gas station, and sued the station. The King County Local Court Rules require parties to disclose possible witnesses by certain deadlines before trial. Blair's counsel failed to submit a list on time. The court allowed a list to be submitted, but as a sanction only allowed 7 witnesses on the list (instead of 14).

Just before trial, Blair's counsel indicated an intent to call two medical witnesses who had not appeared on either possible witness list. The defense objected, and the court disallowed the new witnesses. The case was later dismissed for lack of necessary medical evidence. Blair argues that the trial court failed to make necessary findings and abused its discretion when it disallowed witnesses and dismissed the case. The Division One Court of Appeals disagreed with him.

State v. Wilson, No. 83797-0. Whether resentencing is appropriate if a court erroneously classifies a gross misdemeanor as a felony when calculating a criminal sentence.

Jason Wilson pleaded guilty to identity theft. The plea agreement incorrectly listed a prior conviction for an attempted drug crime as a felony instead of as a gross misdemeanor, and calculated Wilson's offender score accordingly. Wilson argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his offender score was miscalculated.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, since the law requires attempted felonies to be treated as felonies when calculating offender score. This means the gross misdemeanor would be counted as a point toward Wilson's offender score anyway, and the factual error would not invalidate the sentencing.

Afternoon session (1:30 p.m.)

State v. Robinson (consolidated w/State v. Millan), No. 83525-0. Whether the admissibility of evidence can be challenged on appeal based on a new constitutional interpretation, when that point was not raised at trial.

Michael Robinson and Francisco Millan were each convicted of crimes based on evidence obtained through warrantless searches of their cars. In both cases they were confined away from the car before the search took place.

While Millan's case was on appeal the U. S. Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, holding that the search of a car incident to arrest is only valid if the defendant is still within reaching distance of the passenger compartment (or if there is reason to believe the search will uncover evidence). Millan challenged the search of his car based on Gant, but the Court of Appeals rejected his argument since he hadn't raised the issue at trial. Millan claims that he should be allowed to challenge the search on appeal because the law changed after the trial was over.

In re the Personal Restraint of Glenn Nichols, No. 83742-2. Whether an issue can be raised in a personal restraint petition that was not raised at the trial court, and whether a police search of a hotel registry was valid.

Glenn Nichols was convicted of drug crimes based on a police search of a motel registry. After he had appealed his conviction (but before the appeal had been denied) Nichols filed a personal restraint petition based on the claim that the registry search violated the state constitution. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, saying that since the issue had not been raised at trial and could not be raised for the first time on appeal, it also couldn't be raised for the first time in a personal restraint petition.

Today's arguments - October 19, 2010

Today the Court is hearing four oral arguments, two this morning and two this afternoon. (Docket, briefs)

Morning session

State v. Jones, No. 83451-2. (consolidated with State v. Donaghe). These cases concern the issue of whether excess time spent in prison can offset the "community custody" portion of a sentence.

Cliff Jones was sentenced to 130 months of incarceration and 36 months of community custody for child molestation. He was later re-sentenced to only 51 months of incarceration. At the time of his re-sentencing Jones had already spent 81 months in custody. The trial court credited this time to his new prison sentence, but did not credit the remaining 30 months to offset the community custody portion of his sentence.

Sam Donaghe was sentenced to prison and community custody for multiple counts of rape. After the prison portion of his sentence, Donaghe was committed as a sexually violent predator. The trial court refused to issue certificate of discharge after a year (necessary for Donaghe to regain his voting rights) because Donaghe hadn't served his community custody.

Both Jones and Donaghe argue that the time they have spent in custody beyond their prison sentences should count toward their community custody time. The Court of Appeals disagreed in both cases, holding that the offender must be "in the community" for his community custody to commence.

Kittitas County & Central Washington Home Builders Assoc. v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board, No. 84187-0. This case concerns whether Kittitas County's comprehensive land use plan complies with the Growth Management Act.

Various environmental groups challenged Kittitas County’s Comprehensive Plan and the Hearings Board invalidated it on several grounds. It found that the county allowed rural densities of one unit per three acres and that it failed to provide for a variety of rural densities. The Central Washington Home Builders Association was joined as a party while the plan was still before the Hearings Board, and now both Kittitas County and the CWHBA are challenging the Board’s decision.

Afternoon session

State v. Robinson, No. 83444-0. Here the Court must determine whether changing the sentence for a conviction after uncovering previous past crimes invalidates a defendant's guilty plea, when that plea was made in reliance on the original sentencing terms.

Chucco Robinson pleaded guilty to rape and burglary charges as part of a plea agreement. Robinson's potential sentence was incorrectly calculated because the state was unaware of four juvenile convictions. Robinson did not reveal the convictions because he mistakenly believed that they would not affect his offender score.

When the state discovered the juvenile convictions, it modified Robinson's recommended sentence to take into account his actual offender score. Robinson argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, but the Court of Appeals held that he bore the risk of the prosecutor discovering his undisclosed criminal history.

Veit v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. No. 83385-1. Whether an excessive speed claim against a railroad company is preempted by federal law, or should be judged by internal speed limits.

Alizon Veit drove her car onto a railroad crossing, stopped on the track, and was hit by a train. She sued the railroad and the city, claiming that the crossing was improperly designed and that the train was going too fast. Before trial, the court held that the claims based on train speed were preempted by federal law, because under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) the type of track in question has a speed limit of 40 mph. and the train was going slower than that.

Veit argues that the FRSA requires railroads to maintain track to certain standards based on their own internal speed limits, rather than setting speed limits based on the track. She claims that because of this, evidence of the railroad's internal speed limits is not preempted by the FRSA.

New cases accepted for review

The Supreme Court granted several petitions for review during its February 9 conference.

  • State v. Robinson, No. 83525-0
  • State v. Barber, No. 83640-0
  • State v. Coucil, No. 83654-0
  • Jackowski v. Hawkins Poe, Inc., No. 83660-4
  • Whatcom County Fire Dist. No. 21 v. Whatcom County, No. 83611-6
  • State v. Millan, No. 83613-2
  • State v. Ford, No. 83617-5
  • City of Seattle v. May, No. 83677-9
  • State v. Martin, No. 83709-1
  • Blair v. TA-Seattle East #176, No. 83715-5
  • Hardee v. DSHS, No. 83728-7

State v. Robinson, No. 83525-0. Michael Robinson was convicted of residential burglary, theft of a firearm, first degree unlawful possession of a firearm, first degree theft, and unlawful possession of methamphetamine while armed with a firearm. He appealed, and the Court of Appeals (Div. 2) reversed his conviction for unlawful possession of methamphetamine while armed with a firearm conviction, while affirming the remaining convictions. The Supreme Court has agreed to review only the issue of whether police conducted a lawful search.

State v. Barber, No. 83640-0. Danny Barber pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to felony driving under the influence of intoxicants. The trial court sentenced him to 51 months of confinement, with no community custody. Subsequently, the Department of Corrections informed the court that a mandatory term of 9 to 18 months of community custody applied to Barber’s crime of felony DUI, but DOC recommended no community custody. The court stated it was not bound by a plea agreement and modified Barber’s judgment and sentence to add a term of 9 to 18 months of community custody. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) held that the trial court had the authority to modify the sentence.

State v. Coucil, No. 83654-0. Nikeemia Coucil was arrested and charged with felony harassment after threatening to kill Paul Carlson. He failed to appear at a hearing on the charge. Eventually arrested and convicted of a lesser charge of misdemeanor harassment, Coucil was also convicted of bail jumping. Coucil argued that as he was convicted of a misdemeanor, his bail jumping conviction should have been sentenced as a misdemeanor. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) disagreed, holding that for sentencing purposes bail jumping is classified according to the underlying charge at the time the defendant jumps bail—not according to the ultimate conviction.

Jackowski v. Hawkins Poe, Inc., No. 83660-4. Timothy and Eri Jackowski purchased a waterfront home in Mason County in 2004. Following landslide damages to the house, the Jackowskis sued the seller, the seller’s agent, and their own real estate agent, alleging fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeal (Div. 2) affirmed in part and reversed in part, dismissing all claims against the seller’s real estate agency, reinstating the purchaser’s statutory and common law claims against their own agent, and reversomg dismissal of the breach of contract claims against the sellers as they were not properly before the trial court. The Supreme Court granted the petitions for review of both the sellers and the purchaser’s agent.

Whatcom County Fire Dist. No. 21 v. Whatcom County, No. 83611-6. Although a fire district asserted it was not equipped to serve more new structures, the county’s comprehensive development plan stated the fire district was able to provide adequate services based on its current taxing abilities. As a result, a hearing officer determined the fire district was precluded from asserting a lack of ability to do so on a project by project basis. The superior court reversed. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) ruled against the fire district and reinstated the permit approvals, holding that the evidence was substantial and sufficient to support the examiner’s finding that fire district had capacity to provide services to new developments.

State v. Millan, No. 83613-2. Defendant Francisco Millan was convicted of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Police had responded to a report that a man and woman were fighting in a car. The police arrested Millan and seized the firearm they found during the search of the vehicle incident to his arrest. On appeal, Millian argued that under Arizona v. Gant the search of his vehicle was unlawful. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) held that Millan had waived his right to appeal the adminssion of evidence seized during the search by failing to file a motion to suppress. The Supreme Court is consolidating this case with State v. Robinson, No. 83525-0.

State v. Ford, No. 83617-5. Tyrone Ford was convicted of second and third degree child rape. The different degrees reflected that the victim was 13 years old during the first incident and 14 years old during the second incident. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) reversed the first count but upheld the conviction for third degree child rape. The Court held that sending the jury back to the jury room to fill in a blank verdict form relating to second degree rape charge was manifest error affecting defendant’s right to fair trial; the trial court did not err by allowing state to amend alleged dates of charged incidents in information to conform to proof at trial; statements by two prospective jurors about their experiences with sexual abuse did not violate defendant’s right to impartial jury; and defense counsel did not perform deficiently in connection with prospective jurors’ discussions of those experiences.

City of Seattle v. May, No. 83677-9. Robert May was convicted for violation of a permanent domestic violence protection order. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) held the order was facially valid.

State v. Martin, No. 83709-1. Timothy Martin was convicted of kidnapping and robbery charges. On appeal, Martin argued that the prosecutor’s questions concerning his opportunity to tailor his testimony to the evidence introduced at trial infringed his rights under article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution to be present at trial, to meet witnesses face to face, and to testify in his behalf. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) disagreed, noting that the federal constitution permits a jury to consider a defendant’s opportunity to tailor testimony, and that the questions were allowable under the Washington Constitution.

Blair v. TA-Seattle East #176, No. 83715-5. Maureen Blair, a commercial truck driver, was injured when she slipped and fell in a puddle of spilled gasoline at truck stop. She sued the truck stop operator. The trial court struck several of Blair’s witnesses, including her expert medical witnesses, as a sanction for Blair’s willful violations of the trial court’s discovery orders. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) held that the trial court acted within its discretion. As causation could not be established without expert medical testimony, the trial court properly dismissed the case in the truck stop’s favor.

Hardee v. DSHS, No. 83728-7. The Department of Early Learning revoked Kathleen Hardee’s license to operate a home daycare after the Department learned that Hardee’s 19-year-old son was accused of molesting a child he was babysitting. (The child did not attend the daycare and the incident did not take place at the daycare.) In revoking Hardee’s license, the Department cited a number of other incidents involving her son. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) affirmed the revocation.