New opinions: Releasing sex offenders and crossing state lines
In re Pers. Restraint of Mattson, No. 81324-8. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Madsen, the Court determined that the state law which allows criminals to be released early under an approved "community custody plan" does not create a due process liberty interest. Therefore, a Department of Corrections policy that no sexually violent predators can be released early under a community custody plan does not violate due process.
Mark Mattson had been convicted of multiple sexual crimes and sentenced to ten years in prison. During the latter half of his imprisonment, Mattson submitted six different community custody plans for his early release. The final such plan was denied by the Department of Corrections on the basis that there was simply no plan that could ensure the safety of the community against sexually violent predators. A DOC psychiatrist had concluded that Mattson fell into this category, so the DOC did not review the merits of his proposed plan.
The Court of Appeals ruled for Mattson, holding that the statute setting up the community plan option created a due process right, so his plan had to be reviewed on its merits. Madsen's decision reverses the Court of Appeals.
Chief Justice Alexander dissented, agreeing with the Court of Appeals that Mattson's plan should have been reviewed on its merits, and not rejected simply due to a broad policy directive. Justices Sanders and Chambers joined him.
The decision is one of public interest only, as Mattson has already served his maximum sentence, and therefore the case is moot as it relates to his incarceration.
State v. Rivera-Santos, No. 81445-7. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Fairhurst, the Court determined that the defendant, who drove under the influence of alcohol in both Washington and Oregon, could be convicted of a DUI in both states without violating his constitutional rights.
Rivera-Santos led police on a chase that started on the Washington side of I-5 and ended on the Oregon side. He was found to have a blood-alcohol content level of .17 percent, and convicted by an Oregon court of driving under the influence. He was also charged with a DUI in Clark County District Court, but Rivera-Santos argued that it should be dismissed under the constitutional protections against double-jeopardy (i.e. being punished twice for the same crime.
Fairhurst wrote that convicted Rivera-Santos in Washington would not be double-jeopardy, as it was a separate crime. He drove while drunk in Oregon, and was punished for that by an Oregon court. He also drove while drunk in Washington, and a Washington court could punish him for that separate crime.
