Today's arguments - Jan. 20, 2011
The Supreme Court will hear arguments in four cases today (briefs, docket).
Morning session (starting at 9 a.m.)
State v. Posey, No. 82957-8. The issue here is whether the superior court had jurisdiction to sentence an offender for a juvenile offense after the offender had turned twenty-one years old. Daniel Posey, a 16-year-old, was charged with three counts of second degree rape and one count of first degree assault with a firearm. Since the assault was a “serious violent offense,” the juvenile court was required to decline jurisdiction and Posey was tried in superior court. He was convicted of two rape charges, but not the assault, and sentenced as an adult.
Posey appealed the adult sentence, since he had not been convicted of the assault, which is the crime that put him in superior court in the first place. The Supreme Court agreed, and Posey’s case was remanded to juvenile court for sentencing. However, by the time he got back to juvenile court Posey had turned 21.
Posey claimed that the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction to sentence him, and the trial court agreed. The trial judge adjourned juvenile court and reconvened as an adult court, sentenced Posey, and entered a protection order. Posey appeals, claiming that the adult court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the adult court had “residual jurisdiction” once the juvenile court’s jurisdiction ended.
In Re PRP of Flint, No. 83815-1. Whether the rule returning a criminal to prison after his third community custody violation hearing is ex post facto law when applied to a prisoner convicted before the law was passed. Eric Flint pleaded guilty to robbery, served time in prison, and was released to community custody. He was brought to three community custody violation hearings, at each of which he was found guilty of various community custody violations. The law at that time (RCW 9.94A.737) required him to be returned to prison after his third violation hearing, and he was.
The rule sending him back to prison had been passed into law after Flint’s conviction. Flint argues that the rule as applied to him is “ex post facto law” because it imposes a more severe punishment on him. The appellate court dismissed the petition as frivolous.
Afternoon session (starting at 1:30 p.m.)
State v. Simms, No. 83826-7. Whether the state must give notice of a prior firearm conviction in order to double the term for a firearm sentencing enhancement. Daniel Simms was convicted (among other things) of robbery with a firearm enhancement. The trial court doubled the length of confinement for the enhancement because Simms had a previous firearm conviction.
An information must include all the essential facts for the charged crime, including enhancements. The information with which Simms was charged did not mention his previous conviction. Simms claims that this conviction was an essential fact to the doubling of his firearm enhancement, and appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the prior conviction was not essential to prove the enhancement itself, and that there is no requirement to give notice of a prior conviction “for purposes of a sentencing enhancement.”
In Re PRP of Coats, No. 83544-6. Jeffrey Coats pleaded guilty to robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and conspiracy to commit murder. Both his judgment and his plea statement listed incorrect maximum penalties for the conspiracy to commit robbery charge; both were too high. Although Coats’ conviction has been final for more than a year, he argues that the incorrect maximum makes his judgment facially invalid, allowing him to bring a personal restraint petition after the normal time limit. He seeks to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that it was involuntary because he did not know the actual maximum penalty.
The Court of Appeals held that since Coats received a standard range sentence, the incorrect maximum penalty was a “technical misstatement that had no actual effect on the rights of the petitioner.” Thus, the court held that the judgment was not facially invalid and Coats’ petition was time barred.
The Supreme Court will review the question of whether the judgment and sentence are facially invalid.
