Three Unanimous Opinions: Offender scores, failure to register, and exceptional consecutive sentences
State v. Lucero, No. 83777-5. David Lucero was convicted of second degree assault. At sentencing, he conceded that his offender score was six, which would include one of his two convictions from California. The Court included both convictions, sentencing Lucero based on an offender score of seven, and Lucero appealed.
The Supreme Court had already remanded this case for reconsideration based on their decision in State v. Mendoza (2009). The Court of Appeals then reissued their original decision upholding Lucero's sentence, adding a footnote claiming to distinguish Mendoza. Today the Supreme Court, in a short per curiam opinion, reverses the Court of Appeals and remands to the trial court.
State v. Peterson, No. 82089-9. Michael Peterson challenges his conviction for failing to register as a sex offender. On November 2, 2005, a police officer discovered that Peterson had moved out of the apartment where he had registered several months earlier. A month later, Peterson registered himself as homeless and was charged with failure to register. He challenged his conviction on two grounds, both related to the different deadlines set forth in the statute depending on whether an offender is becoming homeless, moving to a residence in the same county, or moving to a new county. He first contends that failure to register is an alternative means crime for which the state failed to bring forth "substantial evidence" for each alternative means. Secondly, Peterson argues that residential status is an element of the crime of failure to register and that the state failed to prove this element.
Today the Court holds that failure to register is not an alternative means crime. The Court further holds that "Peterson registered outside of any deadline contained in the statute. It was therefore unnecessary to show his particular residential status in order to prove a violation of the statute." Justice Stephens wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. (briefs and argument)
State v. Vance, No. 81393-1. Robert Vance challenges his exceptional consecutive sentences for multiple counts of child molestation and communicating with a minor for immoral purposes. Citing Blakely v. Washington, Vance argues that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the judge determined that allowing Vance to serve all of his sentences concurrently would be "clearly too lenient."
The Court had delayed hearing this case until the United States Supreme Court decided a similar case, Oregon v. Ice. Today, in another unanimous decision and with an opinion by Justice Sanders, the Court finds that Ice does control the application of Blakely and Apprendi v. New Jersey to these facts. The federal High Court was convinced by "considerations [of] historical practice and respect for state sovereignty" that "a sentencing judge does not run afould of the Sixth Amendment by finding facts necessary to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for discrete crimes." Vance's sentence, which had been set aside by the Court of Appeals, is reinstated. (briefs and argument)
