Today's opinions: July 22, 2010

Broom v. Morgan Stanley, No. 82311-1 (briefs and argument). The Supreme Court held that an arbitration panel erred by applying state statutes of limitations to bar the a claim. Michael, Kevin, and Andrea Broom sued Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. for mismanaging an investment account. Their claims were rejected by an arbitration panel because they were barred by the statute of limitations. The Brooms appealed to King County Superior Court, and the court held that statute of limitations in Washington do not apply to claims in arbitration. The court vacated the arbitration panel’s decision as an error of law. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) affirmed. Morgan Stanley argues both that statutes of limitations do apply to arbitration, and that courts cannot vacate arbitration decisions because of “errors of law.” The Supreme Court, with Justice Charles Johnson writing, affirmed the Court of Appeals. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen dissented.

Little Mtn. Estates Tenants Ass’n v. Little Mtn. Estates MHC LLC, No. 82574-2 (briefs and argument). The Supreme Court held that under the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA), chapter 59.20 RCW, a landlord and tenant can lawfully agree to a 25-year lease that will convert to a one-year lease if the tenant assigns it. Mobile home tenants and association brought an action against the mobile home park, alleging that leases violated the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA) and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The trial court ruled for the park. Writing for the majority, Justice Richard Sanders said that the MHLTA preserves the right of a landlord and tenant to negotiate and agree to the term of a rental agreement and thus the provision does not violate the MHLTA. Justice Gerry Alexander wrote a dissenting opinion.

Sound Infiniti v. Snyder, No. 81923-8 (briefs and argument). Richard Snyder, David Hannah, and Afshin Pisheyar were joint owners (as shareholders) of Sound Infiniti and Infiniti of Tacoma. They had a falling out, and Pisheyar sued the others individually and on behalf of the corporation (a derivative suit). Snyder and Hannah set up a reverse stock split to take away all of Pisheyar's stocks. The trial court allowed the split to proceed after an initial injunction, and dismissed Pisheyar's derivative suit because he was no longer a shareholder. The Court of Appeals confirmed the ruling, and found that the sole remedy for all Pisheyar's claims is the appraisal process, in which he can obtain fair market value for the shares that were taken away. The Supreme Court agreed, with Justice Susan Owens writing the majority opinion. The court held: (1) that the appraisal proceeding in RCW 23B.13.020 is a dissenting shareholder’s exclusive remedy unless a corporate action is procedurally defective or fraudulent and (2) that a divested shareholder does not have standing in a derivative suit. Justice Sanders wrote a dissenting opinion.

State v. Harvill, No. 82358-8 (briefs and argument). At trial, Joshua Harvill claimed that he sold the drugs because he was afraid of the informer. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the defense of duress because there was no evidence that the informer had threatened Harvill. The trial court did instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment, and the jury rejected the defense. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the duress defense. The court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Justice Debra Stephens wrote the opinion.

State v. Nonog, No. 82094-5 (briefs and argument). Cipriano Bahit Nonog was convicted in King County Superior Court of felony violation of a domestic violence protection order, residential burglary-domestic violence, and interfering with domestic violence reporting. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) upheld the conviction, and ruled that the information charging the defendant sufficiently defined the charges. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision below, with Justice Debra Stephens writing the unanimous opinion.

Tomorrow's opinions: July 22, 2010

The Supreme Court will issue opinions in several cases tomorrow.

Broom v. Morgan Stanley, No. 82311-1 (briefs and argument). Michael, Kevin, and Andrea Broom sued Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. for mismanaging an investment account. Their claims were rejected by an arbitration panel because they were barred by the statute of limitations. The Brooms appealed to King County Superior Court, and the court held that statute of limitations in Washington do not apply to claims in arbitration. The court vacated the arbitration panel’s decision as an error of law. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) affirmed. Morgan Stanley argues both that statutes of limitations do apply to arbitration, and that courts cannot vacate arbitration decisions because of “errors of law.”

Little Mtn. Estates Tenants Ass’n v. Little Mtn. Estates MHC LLC, No. 82574-2 (briefs and argument). Mobile home tenants and association brought an action against the mobile home park, alleging that leases violated the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA) and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The trial court ruled for the park. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) affirmed the ruling in part, and reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Sound Infiniti v. Snyder, No. 81923-8 (briefs and argument). This case concerns what remedies are available to a minority shareholder whose shares are taken away, and whether that shareholder can bring a derivative suit against the corporation after he has lost his shareholder status. Richard Snyder, David Hannah, and Afshin Pisheyar were joint owners (as shareholders) of Sound Infiniti and Infiniti of Tacoma. They had a falling out, and Pisheyar sued the others individually and on behalf of the corporation (a derivative suit). Snyder and Hannah set up a reverse stock split to take away all of Pisheyar's stocks. The trial court allowed the split to proceed after an initial injunction, and dismissed Pisheyar's derivative suit because he was no longer a shareholder. The Court of Appeals confirmed the ruling, and found that the sole remedy for all Pisheyar's claims is the appraisal process, in which he can obtain fair market value for the shares that were taken away. The Association of Washington Businesses filed an amicus brief supporting Snyder.

State v. Harvill, No. 82358-8 (briefs and argument). At trial, Joshua Harvill claimed that he sold the drugs because he was afraid of the informer. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the defense of duress because there was no evidence that the informer had threatened Harvill. The trial court did instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment, and the jury rejected the defense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Div. 2) noted that if the elements of duress had been proved, then the contested elements of entrapment would also have been proved. Since the jury rejected entrapment, it would also have rejected duress even had the instruction been given. Thus, even if the lack of a duress instruction was in error, it did not prejudice Harvill.

State v. Nonog, No. 82094-5 (briefs and argument). Cipriano Bahit Nonog was convicted in King County Superior Court of felony violation of a domestic violence protection order, residential burglary-domestic violence, and interfering with domestic violence reporting. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) upheld the conviction, and ruled that the information charging the defendant sufficiently defined the charges.

Supreme Court orders for 3/3/09

The Supreme Court granted review in seven cases yesterday. Orders here.

  • Momah v. Bharti, No. 82059-7
  • State v. Peterson, No. 82089-9
  • State v. Nonog, No. 82094-5
  • State v. Kelley, No. 82111-9
  • Waples v. Yi, No. 82142-9
  • State v. Sandoval, No. 82175-5
  • State v. Sanchez, No. 82180-1

Details after the jump.

Department One granted review in four cases.

Momah v. Bharti, No. 82059-7
Dennis Momah and his twin brother, Charles Momah are both physicians. Charles Momah was accused and subsequently convicted of rape and sexual abuse of several patients in his OB/GYN practice. In addition, several of those patients brought civil suits against Charles. Harish Bharti is the attorney who filed these civil suits.

Harish Bharti alleged that in addition to Charles' wrongdoing, Dennis Momah had sexually assaulted patients and had been charged with criminal offenses. Dennis Momah filed a defamation action against Bharti. A King County Superior Court judge granted summary judgment for the attorney, and Dr. Momah appealed. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) vacated the award of summary judgment and attorney Harish Bharti appealed.

This case has already attracted significant national attention.

State v. Peterson, No. 82089-9
Michael Peterson was convicted in Snohomish County Superior Court of failure to register as sex offender. In September 2005 Peterson registered at an apartment in Everett. During a routine verification in November 2005 an Everett police officer was unable to find Peterson, who had moved out four days earlier. Peterson did not register again until December 6, when he registered as homeless.

A sex offender has a statutory duty to register with the sheriff of the county of residence. The statute establishes different timelines for changing registration if the offender has a fixed address or is homeless. The State could not determine Peterson's whereabouts after he left the Everett address, and charged him with a general violation of the law, rather than specifying whether Peterson moved to a new address or became homeless. A jury found Peterson guilty of failure to register, and he appealed.

The Court of Appeals (Div. I) reversed the conviction. The Court ruled that the State’s charging document was defective because it omitted the essential element that the crime was committed “knowingly.” An insufficient charging document requires reversal and dismissal of charges without prejudice. The Court also ruled that failure to register as a sex offender does not require State to prove whether defendant moved to fixed address or was homeless.

State v. Nonog, No. 82094-5
Cipriano Bahit Nonog was convicted in King County Superior Court of felony violation of a domestic violence protection order, residential burglary-domestic violence, and interfering with domestic violence reporting. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) upheld the conviction, and ruled that the information charging the defendant sufficiently defined the charges.

State v. Kelley, No. 82111-9
Dustin Kelly was convicted in Pierce County Superior Court of first degree murder, second degree unlawful firearm possession, and second degree assault with firearm sentence enhancements. Defendant Kelly appealed to the Court of Appeals (Div. II), arguing that the firearm sentence enhancement on his second degree assault conviction violates double jeopardy. Kelley conceded that Division I of the Court of Appeals previously rejected this double-jeopardy argument in State v. Nguyen (2006), but he argued that Division I incorrectly applied the law. Division II disagreed and embraced State v. Nguyen.

Department Two granted review for three cases.

Waples v. Yi, No. 82142-9
Nancy Waples brought a negligence action against her dentist, Peter Yi, alleging the dentist's employee injured her by negligently injecting anesthetic. The Pierce County Superior Court, and the Court of Appeals (Div. II) affirmed the dismissal, ruling the patient failed to provide a mandatory 90-day written notice of intention to sue.

State v. Sandoval, No. 82175-5
Valentin Sandoval was pled guilty to a third-degree rape conviction. He seeks to vacate this conviction by challenging his trial counsel's effectiveness, who misadvised him of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty. The Court of Appeals (Div. III) affirmed Sandoval's conviction and guilty plea.

State v. Sanchez, No. 82180-1
Francisco Sanchez challenged a drug conviction, contending that the prosecutor committed misconduct by cross examining him concerning the testimony of a codefendant. The Court of Appeals (Div. III) affirmed. The Supreem Court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.