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The Supreme Court issued opinions in three cases today.

Tobin v. Department of Labor and Industries, No. 81946-7. Jim Tobin was permanently disabled after being hit by a crane boom at work. He began collecting worker’s compensation benefits and sued the crane operator, settling for $1.4 million in damages, with about half of that amount being designated for pain and suffering. Under RCW 51.24.060, an injured worker is required to distribute a portion of a third-party recovery to the Department of Labor and Industries to reimburse the agency for worker’s compensation benefits. L&I informed Tobin that it would include the pain and suffering award he received in its calculation of what was owed the agency. Tobin argues the statute was designed to reimburse L&I for benefits paid, and L&I does not pay benefits for pain and suffering.

The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Barbara Madsen writing, agreed. The court held that chapter 51.24 RCW does not authorize L&I to seek reimbursement of damages awarded for pain and suffering. “[D]amages for ‘pain and suffering,’ like loss of consortium, constitute noneconomic damage that the workers’ compensation statutes do not compensate for. The Department did not pay out benefits for pain and suffering; therefore it cannot be ‘reimbursed’ from amounts recovered for pain and suffering. We hold that an award for pain and suffering may not be used by the Department in its distribution calculation.” Justice Mary Fairhurst dissented, arguing that the majority ignored the plain language of the recovery statute.

In Re Personal Restraint Petition of Cruze, No. 82567-0. Schawn James Cruze was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole under the “three strikes” provision of the Persistent Offender Accountability Act. Cruze filed a personal restraint petition arguing that the second conviction is not a most serious offense, or “strike.” However, Cruze filed his petition more than one year after his judgment and sentence became final, barring his claim unless the court could determine the sentencing was invalid on its face. The Supreme Court held that based on a plain reading of the statute, a deadly weapon verdict under the law includes a special verdict finding that a defendant was armed with a firearm. The court dismissed Cruze’s petition. Justice Susan Owens wrote the majority opinion. Justice Gerry Alexander wrote a dissent.

State v. Mitchell, No. 83169-6. This case hinges on the question of whether a child qualifies as a “dependent person” for purposes of the crime of criminal mistreatment. Marilea Mitchell and her boyfriend were charged with criminal mistreatment after starving the boyfriend’s four-year-old son almost to death. The statute refers to mistreatment of “a child or a dependent person,” and Mitchell was charged with mistreatment of a “dependent person.” Mitchell claims that the boy was a child, not a dependent person, and thus she was wrongly convicted. The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with Mitchell’s argument and upheld her conviction. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the opinion of the court.

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The Court will hear four arguments today, as usual. (Docket, briefs)

Morning session (9:00 a.m.)

State v. Mitchell, No. 83169-6. This case hinges on the question of whether a child qualifies as a "dependent person" for purposes of the crime of criminal mistreatment.

Marilea Mitchell and her boyfriend were charged with criminal mistreatment after starving the boyfriend's son almost to death. The statute refers to mistreatment of “a child or a dependent person,” and Mitchell was charged with mistreatment of a “dependent person.” Mitchell claims that the boy was a child, not a dependent person, and thus she was wrongly convicted.

But Division One Court of Appeals held that the boy was both a child and a dependent person, and upheld the conviction.

State v. Ervin, No. 83244-7. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, Class C felonies can be scrubbed from an individual's offender score if the person lives crime-free in society for five years. The question in this case is whether incarceration during the five-year period interrupts the countdown.

James Ervin was convicted of felony violation of a no-contact order in 2006. He had committed two previous felonies in 1991 and 1994, as well as other crimes between 1994 and 2006. During one five-year stretch he was not convicted of any crimes, but he was incarcerated during that time for a parole violation.

Ervin argues the five-year stretch without any crimes should cause his previous felony convictions to be scrubbed. But the King County Superior Court and Division One Court of Appeals held that while Ervin was in prison he was not “in the community,” and his imprisonment interrupted the five-year period.

Afternoon session (1:30 p.m.)

Forbes v. American Building Maintenance Company West, No. 82950-1. Whether the plaintiff has to pay prejudgment interest on attorney fees to her attorney, and whether a settlement was properly modified.

Attorney Mary Schultz represented Cheryl Forbes in an employment discrimination suit against American Building Maintenance. Schultz won the trial and the first appeal. Schultz and Forbes had a falling out, and while the case was on appeal to the Supreme Court Forbes fired Schultz and accepted a settlement offer by ABM. ABM deposited the settlement money in the court registry until the court could decide how much Schultz was entitled to.

The trial court awarded prejudgment interest on the attorney's fees, and Forbes challenges this award on two grounds.

First, she argues the claim for fees was unliquidated because there was disagreement over which terms of the fee agreement applied. Division Three Court of Appeals held that the amount “could be calculated with precision” even though there was disagreement on which terms to use, and thus the claim was liquidated.

Second, Forbes argues that the money was not under her control because it was in the court registry. The appellate court held that since Forbes instructed the court clerk to invest the money for her benefit, she still had “use of” the money, and thus prejudgment interest is appropriate.

In addition to the interest issue, the appellate court modified the settlement amount to match the satisfaction of judgment document. Forbes claims that the satisfaction of judgment was incorrect.

State v. Ish, No. 83308-7. Generally speaking, prosecutors are not allowed to vouch for the credibility of a witness. This case concerns whether informing the jury that a witness agreed to a plea bargain requiring truthful testimony constitutes vouching for his credibility.

Nathaniel Ish murdered his girlfriend and was arrested and imprisoned prior to trial. While in prison he talked to David Otterson, his cell mate, about the murder. The state made a plea agreement with Otterson which, in part, required him to testify truthfully at Ish's trial.

While examining Otterson at trial, the prosecutor brought out the information that the plea agreement required Otterson to testify truthfully and that it could be revoked if Otterson breached it. Ish claims this was vouching for the witness, but Division Two Court of Appeals disagreed, since the prosecutor did not express a personal opinion about Otterson's credibility.

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