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In a brief opinion, the Supreme Court overturned a traffic conviction as the police officer had insufficient authority to issue a citation. State v. Magee, No. 81746-4.

Andrew Magee was cited for second degree negligent driving when the state patrol received reports from other drivers that a vehicle was traveling the wrong direction on the highway. A trooper was dispatched, and she found Magee parked nose-to-nose with a friend’s car, facing the wrong direction on the shoulder of the SR 512 on-ramp. The trooper assumed Magee had driven against traffic in order to get in this position, and cited him for negligent driving. Magee challenged the infraction. He contending the officer did not have the authority to issue a citation when she had not witnessed an infraction.

RCW 46.63.030 lists the instances where a law enforcement officer has the authority to issue a notice of traffic infraction:

(a) When the infraction is committed in the officer’s presence;

(b) When the officer is acting upon the request of a law enforcement officer in whose presence the traffic infraction was committed;

(c) If an officer investigating at the scene of a motor vehicle accident has reasonable cause to believe that the driver of a motor vehicle involved in the accident has committed a traffic infraction;

(d) When the infraction is detected through the use of a photo enforcement system under RCW 46.63.160; or

(e) When the infraction is detected through the use of an automated traffic safety camera under RCW 46.63.170.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Tom Chambers writing, overturned Magee’s conviction. “RCW 46.63.030 plainly requires us to conclude that an officer must either be present when the infraction occurs or meet one of the other statutory circumstances before issuing a ticket. There is no contention subsections (b) through (e) apply in this case. Instead, the State argues that the trooper actually witnessed the citable offense because the negligent behavior was "ongoing." But negligent driving in the second degree is a moving violation. For the infraction to be valid, the movement must have been made in the officer’s presence.

Justice Barbara Madsen filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with the result, but pointing out that the infraction could have been initiated by a prosecuting authority, in which case the limitations of RCW 46.63.030 would not apply. (Briefs and Argument)

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The Supreme Court will issue opinions in at least two cases.

State v. Magee, No. 81746-4 (briefs and argument). This case addresses whether a police officer had authority to issue a ticket for a traffic infraction that was not committed in the officer’s presence. In driving to help a friend whose car had stalled on a freeway, Andrew Magee made a U-turn on an on-ramp, parking his car backwards on the shoulder to be nose-to-nose with the other car. A state trooper responded to a report of a car driving backwards, and upon seeing Magee’s car she assumed it was him, issuing him a traffic citation. Magee argued there was insufficient evidence to prove the infraction, and that the trooper had no authority to issue the ticket because she didn’t see him driving backwards. Both the Superior Court and Appeals Court upheld the conviction.

State v. Winterstein, No. 80755-8 (briefs and argument). Can a probation officer conduct a warrantless search of a home if facts support the officer’s belief that the probationer lives in the home?

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Today the Court will hear arguments in four cases dealing with criminal procedure, public records, preemption, and the Growth Management Act. (docket, case briefs)

In the morning session, starting at 9:00 a.m., the Court will hear:

State v. Magee, No. 81746-4. On appeal from the Division Two Court of Appeals, this case originated in Pierce County Superior Court. The case concerns whether a police officer had authority to issue a ticket for a traffic infraction that was not committed in the officer's presence.

In driving to help a friend whose car had stalled on a freeway, Andrew Magee made a U-turn on an on-ramp, parking his car backwards on the shoulder to be nose-to-nose with the other car. A state trooper responded to a report of a car driving backwards, and upon seeing Magee's car she assumed it was him, issuing him a traffic citation. Magee argued there was insufficient evidence to prove the infraction, and that the trooper had no authority to issue the ticket because she didn't see him driving backwards. Both the Superior Court and Appeals Court upheld the conviction.

Yousoufian v. Ron Sims, No. 80081-2. An open records case that has gone up and down the court system for the past ten years, the final issue in Yousoufian was settled by the Court in January. But Justice Sanders, who wrote the majority opinion, was determined to have a conflict of interest and King County asked for this rehearing. Both Sanders and Justice Stephens are recused from the argument.

The Court will review the appropriate level of penalties for King County's gross negligence in providing public records to Yousoufian. Justice Sanders' original decision also provided a long-desired framework for how judges should set penalties in public records cases. He was joined by five other justices in this part of his decision.

In the afternoon session, starting at 1:30 p.m., the Court will hear:

Gold Star Resorts v. Futurewise and Whatcom County, No. 80810-4. This case is on appeal from Division One Court of Appeals, originating from a Growth Management Hearings Board decision reviewed by the Whatcom County Superior Court. The questions before the Court concern whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel (preventing litigation of the same question twice) apply in land use cases, and whether the Growth Management Board improperly established a bright-line rule about the density of homes allowed in rural residential areas.

Futurewise challenged Whatcom's land use plan as noncompliant with the Growth Management Act, arguing that the rural density levels were too high and that some limited areas of "intensive rural development" were too large. Gold Star would have been harmed if Futurewise won, so it intervened in the case, arguing that the "intensive rural development" issue had already been found to comply with the Growth Management Act in a prior Futurewise case, and that Futurewise was barred from re-litigating the same issue again (violating res judicata).

Gold Star also argues that the Growth Management Board cannot impose a bright-line standard for permissible rural densities, since local governments are given broad discretion in the Growth Management Act to tailor their plans to the particular needs of their communities.

Lawson v. City of Pasco, No. 81636-1. This case is on appeal from Division Three Court of Appeals, and arose in Franklin County Superior Court. The question before the Court is whether the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act preempts a city's ordinance banning the use of recreational vehicles as permanent homes in mobile home parks.

Paul Lawson owns a mobile home park in Pasco, and has at least one tenant who uses a fifth-wheel as a permanent home. Pasco has an ordinance preventing this use of a recreational vehicle, and ordered Lawson to evict all such tenants. Lawson defends on the basis that the Landlord-Tenant Act allows the use, and that the Act preempts the City's ordinance.

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