Supreme Court of Washington Blog : Supreme Court of Washington Blog : Washington Public Policy & Budget News : Freedom Foundation : WA State Tax & Labor Law Commentary & Updates

Today the Court is hearing four oral arguments, two this morning and two this afternoon. (Docket, briefs)

Morning session

State v. Jones, No. 83451-2. (consolidated with State v. Donaghe). These cases concern the issue of whether excess time spent in prison can offset the "community custody" portion of a sentence.

Cliff Jones was sentenced to 130 months of incarceration and 36 months of community custody for child molestation. He was later re-sentenced to only 51 months of incarceration. At the time of his re-sentencing Jones had already spent 81 months in custody. The trial court credited this time to his new prison sentence, but did not credit the remaining 30 months to offset the community custody portion of his sentence.

Sam Donaghe was sentenced to prison and community custody for multiple counts of rape. After the prison portion of his sentence, Donaghe was committed as a sexually violent predator. The trial court refused to issue certificate of discharge after a year (necessary for Donaghe to regain his voting rights) because Donaghe hadn't served his community custody.

Both Jones and Donaghe argue that the time they have spent in custody beyond their prison sentences should count toward their community custody time. The Court of Appeals disagreed in both cases, holding that the offender must be "in the community" for his community custody to commence.

Kittitas County & Central Washington Home Builders Assoc. v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board, No. 84187-0. This case concerns whether Kittitas County's comprehensive land use plan complies with the Growth Management Act.

Various environmental groups challenged Kittitas County’s Comprehensive Plan and the Hearings Board invalidated it on several grounds. It found that the county allowed rural densities of one unit per three acres and that it failed to provide for a variety of rural densities. The Central Washington Home Builders Association was joined as a party while the plan was still before the Hearings Board, and now both Kittitas County and the CWHBA are challenging the Board’s decision.

Afternoon session

State v. Robinson, No. 83444-0. Here the Court must determine whether changing the sentence for a conviction after uncovering previous past crimes invalidates a defendant's guilty plea, when that plea was made in reliance on the original sentencing terms.

Chucco Robinson pleaded guilty to rape and burglary charges as part of a plea agreement. Robinson's potential sentence was incorrectly calculated because the state was unaware of four juvenile convictions. Robinson did not reveal the convictions because he mistakenly believed that they would not affect his offender score.

When the state discovered the juvenile convictions, it modified Robinson's recommended sentence to take into account his actual offender score. Robinson argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, but the Court of Appeals held that he bore the risk of the prosecutor discovering his undisclosed criminal history.

Veit v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. No. 83385-1. Whether an excessive speed claim against a railroad company is preempted by federal law, or should be judged by internal speed limits.

Alizon Veit drove her car onto a railroad crossing, stopped on the track, and was hit by a train. She sued the railroad and the city, claiming that the crossing was improperly designed and that the train was going too fast. Before trial, the court held that the claims based on train speed were preempted by federal law, because under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) the type of track in question has a speed limit of 40 mph. and the train was going slower than that.

Veit argues that the FRSA requires railroads to maintain track to certain standards based on their own internal speed limits, rather than setting speed limits based on the track. She claims that because of this, evidence of the railroad's internal speed limits is not preempted by the FRSA.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Association, No. 81873-8. Woodcreek Condominiums feature units in both one- and two-story configurations. The Homeowners Association has over the years allowed some of the one-story owners to add a second story. When the Association allowed Glen Clausing to add a story to his one-story unit, his neighbor, Sandra Lake, sued both the Association and Clausing. She alleges violations of the Horizontal Property Regimes Act (HPRA) or Woodcreek's declaration (the legal  description of "the condominium properties and ... the covenants defining the property rights and legal obligations of the property owners").

Lake lost on summary judgment before the trial court, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the expansion of Clausing's unit encroached a common area (the air above his original unit) and thus required the unanimous consent of the condo owners. Today, the Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals and awards attorney fees to Clausing (the Association did not request attorney fees). The Court holds first that the HPRA does not require unanimous consent of the owners to allow part of a common area to be incorporated into a unit. It further holds that the HPRA does not require that the value of each unit stated in the declaration reflect fair market value, thus it was not necessary to amend the declaration when the size of Clausing's unit changed.

Justice Fairhurst wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. (briefs and argument)

The Court today grants a new trial to Christopher L. Jones on a charge of second degree rape. His 17-year-old niece accused him of forcible rape. The jury failed to return a verdict in his first trial, and before his second trial Jones requested to present evidence that the act was consensual during an "alcohol- and cocaine-fueled sex party" involving several other persons. The trial court ruled that the evidence was an attack on the alleged victim's credibility and so was prohibited by Washington's rape shield statute (

). The jury convicted Jones and he appealed.

In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Owens, the Court holds that the trial court violated Jones's right to present his defense.

This is not marginally relevant evidence that a court should balance against the State's interest in excluding the evidence. Instead, it is evidence of extremely high probative value; it is Jones's entire defense. Jones's evidence, if believed, would prove consent and would provide a defense to the charge of second degree rape. Since no State interest can possibly be compelling enough to preclude the introduction of evidence of high probative value, the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment when it barred such evidence.

The Court further holds that the rape shield statute applies only to past, not contemporary, acts and so does not apply here (though if it did, it still would not overcome Jones's Sixth Amendment rights). Because the error was not harmless, Jones must have a new trial. The Court also identifies two statements in the prosecutor's closing argument that violated Jones's Fifth Amendment rights. (briefs and argument)

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Supreme Court is scheduled to issue opinions in several cases tomorrow morning: 

Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Association, No. 81873-8 (briefs and argument). Sandra Lake and Glen Clausing are neighbors at Woodcreek Condominiums. Clausing, with Woodcreek’s approval, built a “bonus room” over his garage. This converted common area (the airspace over the garage) into apartment area. It also interfered with Lake’s view. Lake sued Clausing and Woodcreek, claiming that the law requires unanimous consent by the condominium owners to convert common area to apartment. Woodcreek and Clausing argue that unanimous consent is only required if the condominium declaration is amended, which did not happen here.

Lawson v. City of Pasco, No. 81636-1 (briefs and argument). The question before the Court is whether the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act preempts a city’s ordinance banning the use of recreational vehicles as permanent homes in mobile home parks. Lawson owns a mobile home park in Pasco, and has at least one tenant who uses a fifth-wheel as a permanent home. Pasco has an ordinance preventing this use of a recreational vehicle, and ordered Lawson to evict all such tenants. Lawson defends on the basis that the Landlord-Tenant Act allows the use, and that the Act preempts the City’s ordinance.

Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, No. 81590-9 (briefs and argument). Alex Salas, a construction worker, fell off a scaffolding ladder and sued the company that set up the scaffold. At trial, the court allowed evidence that Salas is an undocumented alien. The jury did not find Hi-Tech Erectors liable for the injury. On appeal Salas argues the trial court abused its discretion. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence about Salas’ immigration status was irrelevant and prejudicial, but affirmed the lower court.

State v. Jones, No. 82613-7 (briefs and argument). Whether the rape shield statute bars testimony about contemporaneous sexual behavior for the purpose of proving consent. Kashauna Dixon claimed that she was raped by her uncle, Christopher Jones. Jones admitted to having sex with her, but claimed that she consented. According to Jones, they were having a party with several others that included alcohol, sex, and drugs.

Based on Washington’s rape shield statute, the trial court barred Jones from testifying about the party. Jones appealed, arguing that the statute only prohibits testimony about “past sexual behavior,” and that he wanted to testify about sexual behavior contemporaneous with the alleged rape. The Court of Appeals held that past behavior can refer even to the very recent past, and that even if the rape shield statute didn’t apply the evidence would have been inadmissible because it would have unduly prejudiced the jury against Dixon.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Today the Court will hear its normal four arguments, two in the morning and two in the afternoon. (Docket, briefs)

Morning session

Hudson v. Hapner, No. 82409-6. At what point can a party withdraw a request for a civil trial? That's the procedural question before the Court in this case.

Clifford Hapner rear-ended Lea Hudson, and Hudson sued for damages. The case went to mandatory arbitration where Hudson was awarded $14,538. After mandatory arbitration a party can request a trial before the superior court, which Hapner did. But the jury awarded Hudson $292,298. Hapner appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case for a new trial.

After discovery for the second trial, but before the trial took place, Hapner filed a notice of withdrawal of his motion for a trial. This would allow him to pay only the arbitration award, plus Hapner's court costs. The trial court struck the withdrawal at Hudson's request, but the Division Two Court of Appeals reversed, disagreeing with Hudson's argument that court rules include a time limit for withdrawal after a trial takes place.

State v. Osman, No. 82671-4. The question before the Court is what legal standard superior courts should use to review lower court rulings on the importance of missing trial records.

Abdinasir Osman was arrested and convicted for DUI. After the trial, Osman's attorney discovered that part of the trial had not been recorded. The missing portion included part of Osman's cross examination, objections to an exhibit, attorney arguments, and the judge's findings and conclusions.

A party in a district court is entitled to a new trial if a “significant or material portion” of the electronic recording is lost. Osman appealed to the superior court for a new trial, which remanded the question of whether the missing record was material back to the district court. The district court found that the missing portion was not material.

The superior court fully reviewed the district court's decision, concluded that the missing portion was material, and ordered a new trial. The state appealed, and the Division One Court of Appeals reversed the superior court, concluding that the superior court should only have looked at whether the district court overstepped its bounds in making the decision (abuse of discretion), rather than taking a whole new look at the question of materiality.

Afternoon session

State v. Hall, No. 82558-1. This case concerns whether multiple attempts to tamper with a witness can be prosecuted as multiple crimes.

Isiah Hall was charged with burglary, and Desirae Aquiningoc was called as a witness. Before the trial, Hall called Aquiningoc several times from prison and tried to get her to lie at the trial or to go into hiding. Hall was convicted of multiple counts of witness tampering.

Hall argues on appeal that all of his calls were part of a single case of witness tampering, and that convicting him multiple times violates double jeopardy. The Division One Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that each attempt to get Aquiningoc to lie or hide was a separate case of tampering.

State v. Jones, No. 82613-7. In this case, the Court will consider whether the rape shield statute bars testimony about contemporaneous sexual behavior for the purpose of proving consent.

Kashauna Dixon claimed that she was raped by her uncle, Christopher Jones. Jones admitted to having sex with her, but claimed that she consented. According to Jones, they were having a party with several others that included alcohol, sex, and drugs.

Based on Washington's rape shield statute, the trial court barred Jones from testifying about the party. Jones appealed, arguing that the statute only prohibits testimony about “past sexual behavior,” and that he wanted to testify about sexual behavior contemporaneous with the alleged rape. The Division Three Court of Appeals held that past behavior can refer even to the very recent past, and that even if the rape shield statute didn't apply the evidence would have been inadmissible because it would have unduly prejudiced the jury against Dixon.

Jones also appealed on other due process grounds, including the prosecutor's statement to the jury that Jones refused to submit to warrantless DNA testing.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Washington Supreme Court has agreed to review several new cases.

• Little Mtn. Estates Tenants Ass’n v. Little Mtn. Estates MHC LLC, No. 82574-2
• State v. Afana, No. 82600-5
• State v. Osman, No. 82671-4
• State v. Hall, No. 82558-1
• State v. Jones, No. 82613-7
• State v. Patel, No. 82649-8
• McGuire v. Bates, No. 82659-5

Case details after the jump:

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Washington Supreme Court will hear three cases today. (Docket, case briefs)

In the morning session, starting at 9:00 a.m., the court will hear:

In re the Detention of Moore, No. 81201-2. Paul Moore was committed as a sexually violent predator in Snohomish County Superior Court. During the hearing, the parties stipulated to much of the State's evidence. In the present case, Moore was judged marginally competent, but the doctor evaluating him said that his competence could change over time.

The trial court committed Moore as a sexually violent predator. At issue is (1) whether the trial court denied Moore due process by accepting a stipulation of certain fact without conducting an inquiry to determine if he knowingly waived his right to contest the State’s case, (2) whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, and (3) whether due process requires the State to prove Moore would reoffend within the foreseeable future.

State v. Jones, No. 81236-5. Defendant, a twelve-year-old boy, was convicted of first degree child molestation. He pleaded guilty after telling the court that his attorney had read the plea statement to him, he understood it, and he had no questions about it. He is now attempting to withdraw his plea.

Defendant’s appeals team argues he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Prior to the trial, his public defender spent less than two hours with him. The lawyer allowed the boy’s parents to be present at the meetings, potentially interfering with a confidential attorney-client relationship. Finally, the lawyer failed to investigate the case and inadequately advised the boy of the consequences of a plea bargain.

In the afternoon session, starting at 1:30 p.m., the Court will hear:

Spokane v. Rothwell, No. 81271-3. The question in this case is whether a district court judge had jurisdiction over municipal court criminal trials. The City of Spokane had a system where, instead of electing separate municipal judges, they “borrowed” judges from Spokane County District Court. These judges were elected as district court judges, and citizens from the entire county voted on their elections. But under Washington law, only city voters may vote for municipal judges.

Henry Smith and Lawrence Rothwell were charged in municipal court with DUI-related offenses. They moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, because Judge Patti Walker was elected in a county-wide election in violation of state law. Judge Walker denied these motions, and was upheld by the superior court.

On appeal, the City argued that it “substantially complied” with the statute because a majority of city voters voted for Judge Walker. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that “RCW 3.46.070 is clear and unambiguous. Only city voters shall vote for municipal judges designated as such by the county auditor. We must read the statute literally.” The Court of Appeals overturned the lower court decisions and reversed the convictions. The City now appeals to the Supreme Court.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link