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Parmelee v. O’Neel, No. 82128-3. The Court today unanimously holds that Allan Parmelee, a prisoner who successfully defended himself against an infraction based on Washington's criminal libel statute, is entitled to attorney fees.

Parmelee had written a letter making various accusations about the prison superintendant. Prison authorities refused to send the letter and found that Parmelee had committed a misdemeanor by violating the libel law. Parmelee defended and the Court of Appeals held the libel law unconstitutional, but refused to grant attorney fees. The Supreme Court holds that Parmelee is a prevailing party entitled to fees according to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (briefs and argument)

State v. Eaton, No. 81348-5. Thomas Eaton was stopped by Vancouver police for driving with his headlights off (presumably at night). He was arrested for DUI and taken to jail, where a bag of methamphetamine was discovered in his sock. He was convicted of DUI and possession of a controlled substance. He received a sentence enhancement (RCW 9.94A.533(5)) for the latter conviction because the drugs were discovered within the jail. The Court of Appeals overturned the enhancement, finding that Eaton was taken to jail against his will and that the statute "was not intended to punish defendants for their involuntary acts."

The Supreme Court begins its analysis with an attempt to describe the fundamental principles of criminal culpability. The effort is made difficult by past high courts' failures to enforce traditional protections against overreaching legislatures. The original common law definition of a crime required both an actus reus--literally, a "bad act"--with a corresponding mens rea--a "bad mind." There might be recovery in tort for a harmful act accomplished without mens rea, but it was not a crime. Additionally, an involuntary act was not considered an act at all. Punishment was meted out only where defendants were culpable--where they caused harm by choice and so might have chosen differently.

Today, the Court rejects the state's argument that the sentencing enhancement should apply without regard to the common law (or, some might believe, common sense) requirement of intent or at least volition. Justice Chambers, writing for the majority, reminds the state that statutes are construed "in a way that is consistent with their underlying purpose." The Court holds that the sentencing enhancement statute includes "a volitional element that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt."

Justice Fairhurst, joined by Justices Madsen, Owens, and Johnson, dissent. They would accept the state's argument and refuse to construe the statute according to the common law protections. (briefs and argument)

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Today the Supreme Court of Washington will hear four cases: two in the morning session and two in the afternoon. (Docket, case briefs)

In the morning session, starting at 9:00 a.m., the Court will hear:

McAllister v. Bellevue Firemen’s Pension Board, No. 81187-3. Whether the City of Bellevue properly calculated retiree’s pension benefits. David and Ken McAllister were firefighters in Bellevue, and contributed to a city pension plan. Under this plan, pension benefits were based on firefighters’ salaries, but when calculating benefits, the salaries were considered to be capped at the battalion chief level. David and Ken were Chief and Deputy Chief when they retired, so the pension cap would have applied to them. In 1969, Washington State replaced local pension plans with a single state plan for all firefighters and police. Under this plan salaries are not capped. The state plan provided that if a firefighter would have received higher benefits under a local plan, the local government was responsible to make up the difference.

In accordance with this provision, the City of Bellevue made additional payments to the McAllisters. But in calculating the McAllister’s benefits under the city plan, the city did not cap their salaries as the city plan required. When this was discovered, the city reduced its payments to match what the McAllisters should been receiving, but did not require back payments. The McAllisters sued, and lost at trial and on appeal.

Federal Way School District 210 v. State, No. 80943-7. Whether the Legislature is constitutionally compelled to equalize state allocations to school districts for school employee salaries. The Washington Constitution states that “The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.” Art. IX, § 2. Historically, the state pays different amounts per teacher to different school districts, based in part on the salary levels of those districts when the system was initiated. The Federal Way School District, individual teachers, and students sued the state, claiming that this unequal funding violates the constitution because it is not “general and uniform.” The King County Superior Court agreed, finding that the differences in funding had no relation to differences in education costs. The state counters that its constitutional duty is to create a common education system, not to guarantee precisely equal funding to every district. This case is on direct appeal from superior court.

In the afternoon session, starting at 1:00 p.m., the Court will hear:

In re Fiona A. Crinks Kennedy, No. 200,682-5. The Washington State Bar Association requests an interim suspension of attorney Fiona A. Crinks Kennedy pending cooperation with the Bar’s disciplinary investigation.

State v. Eaton, No. 81348-5. Thomas Eaton was arrested for DUI and taken to the Clark County jail. When he was searched at the jail, the officers found a bag of meth taped to his sock. At trial, Eaton was convicted of DUI and drug possession. The trial court gave him an enhanced sentence based on possession of drugs within a correctional facility. Eaton disputed this enhancement because he had not chosen to take the drugs to jail, but the trial court held that the statute does not require that the possession within prison be voluntary.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that an “element of volition” is required for crimes, and that punishing Eaton for involuntary possession within a prison would be absurd. The state counters that the statute should be read literally, and that volition is not necessary for a sentence enhancement. The state now appeals, and the Supreme Court will determine whether a defendant’s sentence can be enhanced for an involuntary act under RCW 9.94A.533(5)(c).

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