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In re Detention of Post, No. 83023-1. Charles Post was convicted in 1987 for first degree burglary and rape. Before his scheduled release from prison in 2003, King County petitioned for Post's civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP). The first commitment trial led to a hung jury; after the second trial, the jury found that Post was an SVP. At the second trial, but not the first, prosecutors had introduced evidence about the treatment that would be available to Post if he was committed. Post objected, but the trial court denied his motions. The trial court also refused to allow Post to introduce evidence that, if he was released, he could be subject to a later SVP commitment petition for a "recent overt act."

Post appealed these determinations of the trial court and a divided Court of Appeals reversed his commitment and remanded for a new trial. Today, the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Owens agrees with the Court of Appeals and with Post. Evidence of possible future treatment was irrelevant and was not harmless error. Furthermore, evidence that Post could later be subject to an SVP commitment petition was relevant and should have been admitted. Six other justices signed the majority opinion.

Justice Stephens concurs with the outcome but offers a more limited rationale. The Chief Justice concurs in part and dissents in part. She would exclude the state's treatment program evidence, but would also exclude Post's evidence of the possibility of a later petition. (briefs, argument)

Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 82741-9. Tracfone, which sells prepaid wireless phone service, sued the Department for a refund of the enhanced 911 excise tax. A bare majority of the Court today upholds the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the Department, holding that RCW 82.14B.030 applies to prepaid wireless phone service as it does to any other wireless phone service.

In effect, TracFone is seeking a decision that whether the tax is owed depends upon how a company decides to market and charge for its service or, to put it another way, whether the tax must be paid depends entirely upon the individual company's business model.

The Chief Justice writes for the majority. Justice Chambers, joined by three other justices, dissents. He argues that tax statutes must be narrowly construed and, where there is ambiguity, construed in favor of taxpayers. Looking beyond the statutory description of the tax to the statutory language that governs how the tax is collected, the dissent finds that the legislature did not anticipate the tax applying to pre-paid wireless services. (briefs, argument)

Summaries of today's three unanimous decisions will be posted soon.

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City of Bellevue v. Lee, et al., No. 81473-2. The nine respondents in this case each had his or her drivers license suspended after failing to pay a traffic citation fine. The Department of Licencing notified each person of the pending suspension and offered each an administrative review. This current process for license suspensions is the result of the Court's 2004 decision in City of Redmond v. Moore, where it invalidated an earlier drivers license suspension procedure for failing to satisfy due process requirements. Applying the three-pronged test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court today holds that Washington's current process for suspending drivers licenses does provide due process and upholds these license suspensions. Susan Owens writes the majority opinion and is joined by all of the other justices except Justice Sanders, who dissents. (briefs and argument)

In re Detention of Anderson, No. 79111-2. As a teenager, John Charles Anderson raped two two-year-old boys and a 13-year-old boy and then sexually abused his roommated in a juvenile rehabilitation center. He was voluntarily committed to Western State Hospital, where he had sexual relationships with at least eight patients; four of these patients were considered particularly vulnerable persons. Anderson decided to leave Western State and the State petitioned to commit him as a sexually violent predator. Anderson refused to use the expert witness provided to him by the state and requested a different expert, Dr. Richard Wollert. The State objected and the trial court denied Anderson's request. At the conclusion of the trial, the court ordered Anderson's commitment and Anderson appealed. He argued that the State had not proved the requisite "recent overt act" and that it wrongly denied his request for a different expert witness. The Court of Appeals sided with the state on the first of these and with Anderson on the second.

Here the Court of Appeals is upheld and the matter remanded for a new trial. Justice James Johnson writes for five members of the Court. Justice Sanders dissents and would dismiss. Justice Fairhurst, joined by Justices Chambers and Stephens, dissents. Both dissenting opinions would find insufficient evidence of a "recent overt act" to justify civil committment. (briefs and argument)

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Sanders v. State, No. 80393-5. In a 5-4 decision by a panel of pro tem justices (judges drawn from lower appellate courts to act as State Supreme Court justices in this case only), the Court upholds an appeals court decision that the State is not obligated to pay for a judge's defense in an ethics case if the judge "knows or should know that the conduct of which he or she is accused is unethical and therefore not an official act."

In 2003, Justice Richard Sanders visited the Special Commitment Center (SCC) on McNeil Island, a State facility where certain convicted sex offenders were being held. A complaint was filed with the Commission on Judicial Conduct alleging that Justice Sanders talked with SCC residents who had cases pending before the Washington State Supreme Court. In 2005, the Commission held that Justice Sanders had violated Canons 1 and 2(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

During the Commission's investigation, Justice Sanders asked the attorney general to provide him with a defense at public expense, citing RCW 43.10.030 and .040, which charges the attorney general with the duty to defend state officers in their official capacity. The attorney general refused, and Justice Sanders filed suit. A superior court judge dismissed the action, was upheld on appeal, and is upheld today. One dissent challenges that the majority fails to enforce the plain meaning of the statute or to create a workable framework for deciding future cases; a second dissent faults the majority for "improperly rel[ying] on the outcome of the underlying case as the basis for its decision." (case briefs and argument)

Chadwick Farms Owners Association v. FHC, LLC, No. 80450-8 and Emily Lane Homeowners Ass’n v. Colonial Dev., LLC, No. 80459-1 (consolidated). Can a Limited Liability Corporation sue or be sued after its certificate of formation is canceled? No, says the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Madsen, after cancellation an LLC ceases to exist as a legal entity and can neither sue nor be sued. These consolidated cases arose when homeowners associations sued the LLCs that had built their communities but had subsequently been canceled. While the LLCs no longer exist, however, the Court holds that the LLC members may be sued based on the same veil-piercing provisions that would apply while the LLC remained in existance. Justice Charles Johnson, joined by three other justices, dissents. (case briefs and argument)

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