Today's Opinions: Counsel's bad immigration advice prejudiced defendant

State v. Sandoval, No. 82175-5. Valentin Sandoval is a noncitizen resident alien who was charged with rape in the second degree. Prosecutor's offered to reduce the charge to rape in the third degree if Sandoval would plead guilty. Sandoval was concerned about deportation, but his attorney advised him to accept the plea agreement and assured him that "he would not be immediately deported" and that he could challenge "any potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea." Sandoval accepted the plea deal, served his jail sentence. When he was then held pending deportation proceedings, Sandoval appealed and filed a personal restrain petition (PRP), alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and arguing that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had been properly advised by his attorney. The court of appeals consolidated the two actions and denied both. The Washington State Supreme Court accepted review and, subsequently, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a similar case, Padilla v. Kentucky.

Today, the State Supreme Court holds that the advice given to Sandoval by his attorney was objectively unreasonable in light of Padilla. In that case, a drug trafficking defendant had pleaded guilty after his attorney had downplayed the likelihood of deportation even though deportation was required by law. The Supreme Court of the United States held that, contrary to most previous case law, immigration consequences are so closely connected to the criminal process that advice about these consequences is within "the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."

The State Supreme Court further holds that the advice prejudiced Sandoval because "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty...." The Court reverses the court of appeals, vacates Sandoval's conviction, and remands to the trial court. Justice Fairhurst writes for the Court, joined by Justices Charles Johnson, Alexander, and Owens, and Justice Pro Tem. Sanders.

Justice Stephens concurs in the result but writes a separate opinion, signed also by the Chief Justice and Justice Chambers, to emphasize that the appropriate test for the advice of counsel is "whether his advice, taken as a whole, was objectively reasonable under prevailing professional norms," and not simply whether on examination it was mistaken. Justice James Johnson also concurs but writes separately because he finds the immigration law in this case "not 'succinct or straightforward,'" and so he would apply a different standard even though the result would remain the same. (briefs, argument)

Today's Opinions: No to judicial immunity, yes to res gestae

Lallas v. Skagit County, No. 81672. When a court security guard is injured by a fleeing prisoner, does judicial immunity shield the deputy sheriff and the county from negligence liability?

A Skagit County District Judge directed a deputy sheriff to take the prisoner from the court room to jail. On the way, the unrestrained prisoner fled, knocking down and injuring a private security guard. The guard sued the deputy, the county, and the prisoner; the trial court granted summary judgment for the deputy and the county on the theory that they were protected by judicial immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed.

In an opinion by Justice Fairhurst the Supreme Court unanimously holds that escorting a prisoner is a ministerial rather than a judicial duty and therefore judicial immunity does not protect the deputy or the county from negligence liability. (briefs, argument, previous post)

State v. Pugh, No. 80850-3. Bridgette Pugh called 911 and reported that her husband, defendant Timothy Pugh, "was beating me up really bad." Police responded and arrested Timothy Pugh. Mrs. Pugh failed to show up and testify, but the recording of her 911 call was allowed as evidence. Timothy Pugh was convicted of  felony violation of a court order, domestic violence. He challenges that the admission of the recorded 911 call violated his right to confront the witnesses against him according to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 22 of the State Constitution.

Today, the Court holds that Mrs. Pugh's statements on the 911 recording were admissible: that they were nontestimonial excited utterances not prohibited by the Sixth Amendment and that they "qualify as res gestae [and as such] do not implicate Article I, section 22." Justice Madsen wrote the majority opinion and was joined by all the other justices except for Justice Chambers, who concurs while expressing "serious reservations about the broadest applications of the excited utterance rule being made in the wake of Crawford v. Washington," and Justice Sanders, who dissents. (briefs, argument)