Today's Opinions: Lenity and Law Enforcement Officers

Posted on October 29, 2009 by Trent England

Seattle v. Winebrenner/Seattle v. Quezada, No. 81279-9. Both Scott Winebrenner and Jesus Quezada were arrested multiple times for driving under the influence. Each had a deferred prosecution agreement from one arrest which they violated with a subsequent arrest. The question is whether the subsequent offense constituted a "prior offense" at the time of sentencing. The Court holds that RCW 46.61.5055's use of "prior offense" is ambiguous because it is "subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." The rule of lenity requires "that an ambiguous criminal statute cannot be interpreted to increase the penalty imposed." The Court unanimously holds that offenses committed after the original offense are not "prior offenses" and cannot be considered at sentencing for the original offense. Justice Chambers wrote the lead opinion. Justice Madsen, joined by Justices Charles Johnson and Fairhurst, concurs in the result but believes the statute unambiguously requires it. (briefs and argument)

Kitsap County Deputy Sheriff's Guild, et al. v. Kitsap County, et al., No. 80720-5. Kitsap County Sheriff's Deputy Brian LaFrance was fired after he allegedly became unstable and dishonest with his superiors. The County had previously entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Deputy Sheriff's Guild that allowed the Guild to file a grievance and put the matter into binding arbitration. The arbitrator found that the county had proven the 29 charges against LaFrance but had not shown that dismissal was the appropriate remedy and ordered his reinstatement. It did not order back pay, but did require that he be provided retroactively the benefits that he would have received if he had remained a deputy and unemployment benefits.

The Guild alleges that because the arbitrator ordered LaFrance's reinstatement, the County is obligated to pay LaFrance's back pay. The County challenges that the arbitrator's order is unenforceable because it "violate[s] an explicit, well defined, and dominant public policy." The Court today, in an opinion by Justice Owens, holds that even if "the arbitrator's decision was not good public policy," the County failed to show that it contravened a clear public policy. Collective bargaining agreements and arbitration clauses, the Court suggested, should be deferred to where possible to protect parties' freedom of contract. The Court also upholds the arbitrator's refusal to provide back pay to LaFrance.

Justice James Johnson dissents, finding a sufficient public policy interest exemplified in the law enforcement officer's "oath to truly, faithfully, and impartially perform his duties," that he would overturn the arbitrator's decision to reinstate LaFrance. He is joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Pro Tem. Teresa Kulik. (briefs and argument)

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Today's Arguments - June 30, 2009

Posted on June 29, 2009 by Jonathan Bechtle

Today the Court will hear just three opinions, two in the morning and one in the afternoon. Two of the cases involve criminal procedure questions, and one is about whether a juvenile has the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. (Docket, case briefs)

In the morning session, starting at 9:00 a.m., the Court will hear:

Seattle v. Winebrenner/Seattle v. Quezada, No. 81279-9.  These consolidated cases are up on appeal from Division One Court of Appeals, and concern the question of whether current law allows DUI sentences to be increased based on multiple offenses committed within seven years of the present offense, or just those committed in the prior seven years. Both Winebrenner and Quezada had multiple DUI incidents within a seven year period, and their level of sentencing depends on how the law requiring increased sentences for "prior offenses within seven years" is applied.

State v. Christopher Sieyes, No. 82154-2. This case is on appeal from Division Two Court of Appeals, and arose out of Kitsap County Superior Court. Argument will be on the question of whether the Washington law prohibiting minors from possessing guns (with various exceptions) is a violation of the state and federal constitutional rights to keep and bear arms.

Mr. Sieyes was pulled over for speeding, and found to have a gun under the front seat of his car. Being only 17-years-old at the time, Sieyes was charged and convicted of criminal possession of a firearm.

The Wa Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed an amicus brief in this case asking the Court to find that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution applies to states via the Fourteenth Amendment.

In the afternoon session, starting at 1:30 p.m., the Court will hear:

State v. Jacob Gamble, No. 80131-2. This case is on appeal from Second Division Court of Appeals, and was consolidated with four other cases with a similar question. Defendant Gamble hosted a party for his high school friends, during which a fight broke out. During the fight Gamble struck one of the other kids, who later died as a result of his injuries. Gamble was convicted of first degree felony murder and second degree murder, both of which were later reversed. The state then filed a charge against Gamble for first degree manslaughter.

The question before the Court is whether allowing the state to file manslaughter charges after the murder convictions had been reversed violates the mandatory joinder rule (which requires that related offenses be tried together) and/or Gamble's double jeopardy rights.

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