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State v. Adams, No. 82210-7. A King County Sheriff's Deputy stopped a vehicle because the registered owner had an arrest warrant for driving with a revoked license. Coryell Adams, the registered owner, was the driver and sole occupant in the car. When stopped, he got out of the car, locked it, and walked several steps away, all in violation of the officers orders to get back into the vehicle. After Adams was arrested, officers searched the car and found cocaine. Adams moved to suppress that evidence; the trial court denied the motion and was affirmed on appeal.

While awaiting review, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gant, which limits searches incident to arrest. The State filed a supplemental brief conceding that Gant applies here, but arguing for the court to apply the "good faith" exception.

Today, in a unanimous opinion by the Chief Justice, the Court declines to apply the good faith exception. The Court puts itself in its place, reasoning that while reliance on statutes that are subsequently struck down may warrant a good faith exception, reliance on the Court's erstwhile case law does not. (briefs, argument)

State v. Turner, No. 81626-3 (consolidated with State v. Faagata, No. 82336-7). In these cases, each defendant was convicted of two charges stemming from a single event. The trial courts set aside the lesser conviction to avoid violating double jeopardy, but issued an order that if the remaining conviction was overturned on appeal, the lesser conviction could be reinstated. The trial courts were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In a unanimous opinion by Justice James Johnson, the Court first reviews federal case law, which holds that double jeopardy does allow trial and conviction on lesser included offenses and "does not require permanent, unconditional vacation of the lesser of two convictions for the same criminal conduct...." However, the Court today reverses the Court of Appeals, and holds that the trial courts conditional vacation of the lesser offenses violated double jeopardy.

... a trial court must avoid (i) entering judgment on a defendant's lesser conviction and (ii) referencing that conviction when sentencing a defendant convicted of multiple crimes for the same criminal conduct. This is precisely what Turner and Faagata demanded, but did not receive, at trial and on appeal -- vacation of their lesser convictions without reference to any validity attributable to those convictions.

The Court notes that convictions for lesser included offenses that have been vacated can later be revived.

However, the lesser conviction, once vacated, and prior to reinstatement, is not "a valid conviction" and is not "entitled to some weight," contrary to the trial courts' rulings in these cases. ... In the future, the better practice will be for trial courts to refrain from any reference to the possible reinstatement of a vacated lesser conviction.

(briefs, argument)

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Satomi Owners Ass'n v. Satomi, LLC, No. 80480-0 (consolidated with Blakely Commons Condominium Ass'n v. Blakely Commons, LLC, No. 80584-9 and The Pier at Leschi Condominium Owners Ass'n v. Leschi Corp., No. 81083-4). The issue common to these consolidated cases is "whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, preempts the judicial enforcement provision of the Washington Condominium Act (WCA), RCW 64.34.100(2)." The FAA is a federal law that requires federal and state courts to enforce arbitration agreements. The WCA is a state law that allows judicial review notwithstanding any "alternative methods of dispute resolution," including arbitration.

Each case began in 2005 or 2006 as a lawsuit by a condominium owners association alleging various construction defects and related claims. Most or all of the owners in each case had signed a warranty addendum containing an arbitration clause (either requiring arbitration for any construction defect claims or giving the seller the option of requiring arbitration).

In Satomi, the trial court quashed Satomi, LLC's motion to enforce the warranty addendum and compel arbitration, holding that (1) the FAA does not preempt the WCA, (2) all parties did not sign the warranty addendum, and (3) Satomi Association was not bound by the addendum. Satomi, LLC appealed, but then the parties settled. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals denied Satomi Association's motion to terminate review and decided the case. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's preemption ruling, but reversed as to the non-WCA claims (thus requiring arbitration of those claims). Satomi, LLC appealed the preemption ruling to the State Supreme Court. The Blakely and Leschi cases were subsequently consolidated with Satomi.

While recognizing the mootness of Satomi, the Court here "choose[s] to review the preemption question" because "it is one of 'continuing and substantial public interest.'" The Court reviews de novo both a trial court's decision to compel or deny arbitration and its determination of whether a state statute is preempted by federal law.

The FAA "simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms" (Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees). It's scope extends to "the full reach of the Commerce Clause." Here, the questions are whether the sale and warranting of the condominiums were transactions reached by the Commerce Clause and, if so, whether the WCA conflicts with the FAA and is therefore preempted in these three cases.

The State Supreme Court holds, per Katzenbach v. McClung and Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, "that the commerce clause necessarily reaches the warranting and sale of the condominiums in Satomi because 'such goods' [that came from out of state] amount to more than 70 percent of the component parts." Because the WCA would interfere with the arbitration agreements in these cases, it is preempted by the FAA. The Court upholds the Court of Appeals that the arbitration agreements signed by condominium purchasers applies to Blakeley Association because it only asserts claims on behalf of those purchasers. The Court finds that Blakeley Association has failed to prove that the arbitration clauses were either procedural or substantive unconscionable. The Court declines to decide a number of factual and other issues, and remands Blakeley and Leschi to the trial courts.

The Chief Justice wrote the majority opinion, joined by five other justices. Justice Chambers, joined by Justices Charles Johnson and Richard Sanders, dissents with a strong argument for federalism.

The majority incorrectly frames the issue, answers the wrong question, and ignores the nature of the homeowners' claims. The issue before us is whether a claim for breach of implied warranty, established by Washington statute after consultation with the stakeholders, imposed on Washington state builders, to protect condominium purchasers in Washington State, is preempted by federal laws because some of the materials used in building condominiums came from across the border. The answer is no....

(briefs, argument)

After the jump, search incident to arrest (State v. Buelna Valdez) and attorney discipline (In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanai).

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In re Det. of Fair, No. 80498-2. David Tyler Fair was charged with molesting several young girls, plead guilty to one count of second degree child molestation, and was sentenced to 20 months in prison. The sentence was suspended as part of a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA). Fair failed to meet the requirements of that sentence, committed a robbery, then fled the state. Eventually, after being imprisoned in New Mexico, Fair was returned to Washington to serve his original sentence and the robbery sentence. In a treatment program, he admitted numerous other sexual contacts with children between 2 and 12 years old. The State petitioned to have Fair committed as a sexually violent predator.

Fair challenged his commitment, arguing that the State was required to "plead and prove a recent overt act." The Court today holds that the Sexually Violent Predator Act (RCW 71.09) only requires the state to prove a recent act if the person is not incarcerated. The Court further holds that this interpretation of the Act does not violate Fair's right to due process, in part because "due process does not require that the absurd be done before the compelling state interest can be vindicated." Justice Jim Johnson wrote the lead opinion, joined by Justices Madsen and Owens. Justice Fairhurst, joined by Justice Charles Johnson, concurs, but offers a slightly different analysis.

Justice Sanders, joined by the Chief Justice, dissents, arguing that the statute plainly requires that a person must be in total and continuous confinement following the original sex offense. Because Fair was originally released and only later incarcerated, and because he was actually serving only the robbery sentence at the time of the commitment proceedings, the dissent would require the state to plead and prove a recent overt act. Justice Chambers joined the dissent, but only as to the result.

In re Pers. Restraint of Duncan, No. 81230-6. Bryan Duncan challenges his commitment as a sexually violent predator based on several evidentiary rulings of the trial court. Duncan was convicted of three counts of first degree child molestation in 1992 and 1993. The State moved to commit him in 1996 and he was finally committed in 2005 (the Court notes that the nine-year delay is troubling, but was mostly attributable to Duncan and was not raised as an issue). Duncan challenges the trial court's admission of evidence that he refused a psychological evaluation and its refusal to allow Duncan to present evidence about the treatment program at the Special Commitment Center and about his proposed roommate if he was released.

The Court today holds, in an opinion by Justice Chambers, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the evidentiary rulings. Justices Charles Johnson, Madsen, Owens, Fairhurst, and Jim Johnson and Justice Pro Tem. Philip Thompson joined the majority opinion.

Justice Sanders dissents, arguing that allowing the reference to Duncan's refusal to be reevaluated was "irrelevant and prejudicial." He would also find the refusal to allow Duncan's evidence about his proposed roommate after the state had introduce its evidence about the roommate to be reversible error. The Chief Justice, in a separate dissent, agrees with Sanders except that he would find the trial judge "impermissibly commented on the evidence by stating to the jury that Duncan 'did not wish' to be reevaluated."

State v. Patton, No. 80518-1. Randall Patton was wanted on a felony warrant when a Skamania County Sheriff Deputy spotted him. Patton was leaning into his own car through the window, rummaging with something on the seat. The Deputy told Patton he was under arrest and Patton fled, but was soon apprehended inside a trailer. Deputies searched the car and found methamphetamine. Patton challenged that the search violated his state and federal constitutional rights because it was not a valid search incident to arrest. The trial court suppressed the evidence but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously sides with Patton and the trial court.

The Court first disagrees with the trial court, which had found that Patton was not arrested until he was taken into custody in the trailer. He was arrested when the officer "manifest[ed] an intent to take [him] into custody" while Patton was standing by his car. Nevertheless, "the search incident to arrest exception is narrow and should be applied only in circumstances anchored to the justifications for its existence."

The question before us, then, is whether it would stretch the search incident to arrest exception beyond its justifications to apply it where the arrestee is not a driver or recent occupant of the vehicle, the basis for arrest is not related to the use of the vehicle, and the arrestee is physically detained and secured away from the vehicle before the search. We believe it would.

Justice Stephens wrote the majority opinion, joined by all other justices except for Justice Jim Johnson, who concurred but found the case identical to Arizona v. Gant, decided earlier this year by the United States Supreme Court.

Thompson v. Hanson, No. 81311-6. The Court resolves a dispute between the Courts of Appeals over Washington's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). Division Three had held that a creditor can only enforce their rights against a transferee who has received fraudulently conveyed property from a debtor if the transferee had "intent to hinder or delay [the] creditors." Today, the Court unanimously eschews that position and upholds a Division One ruling that no proof of intent is required by the UFTA. Justice Owens writes the main opinion and Justice Madsen concurs, but would not have reached one of the issues (the "offset" provision) addressed by Owens.

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The Court today issued opinions in two criminal cases and will hear argument in two cases.

Opinions

State v. Kirwin, No. 80113-4. Police arrested Dennis Kirwin for littering (he tossed a beer can out his truck window), then searched Kirwin's truck and found meth. State law makes littering only a civil infraction, which cannot result in an arrest, but Olympia deems it a misdemeanor. Kirwin challenged the city littering ordinance, arguing that it was unconstitutionally in conflict with the state statute. In a majority opinion by Justice Fairhurst and signed by Justices Alexander, C. Johnson, Chambers, Owens, and J. Johnson, the court upholds the ordinance and hence the arrest and the search. In a concurrence, Justice Madsen suggests that the ordinance may well be invalid under Article I, section 12, of the Washington State Constitution, but would not reach the question because it was not raised by Kirwin. Justice Sanders dissents, agreeing in part with Justice Madsen and disagreeing that the search was a lawful search incident to arrest. (Case briefs and argument.)

State v. Wright, No. 78465-5, & State v. Bryant, No. 78788-3 (consolidated). Justice Madsen writes for a six-member majority and holds that retrying defendants Wright and Bryant for murder is not barred by double jeopardy. "Because the defendants' convictions were reversed on grounds other than insufficient evidence, and because they have not been expressly or impliedly acquitted of intentional murder, they remain in the same jeopardy as attached at the first trial." Justice Sanders dissents, joined by Alexander and Chambers, arguing for a stronger interpretation of the double jeopardy clause. (Case briefs and arguments.)

Oral Arguments (briefs)

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