The court found several problems with the Alliance’s accounting, and ruled that their arguments “do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt” that special education is underfunded. Accordingly, both the Thurston County Superior Court and the Court of Appeals found the funding statute to be constitutional.

The Supreme Court (Justice Susan Owens writing) agreed with the lower courts.

The Washington Constitution provides that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders.” Special education in Washington is funded by three sources: 1) the Basic Education Allotment (BEA), which the State provides to school districts based on an enrollment average; 2) special education excess funding from the State if a school district cannot provide an appropriate education for special education students; and 3) “safety net” funds where the State provides additional funding to districts with demonstrated needs for special education funding.

The Alliance sued, arguing that the State was underfunding special education. However, in presenting evidence of underfunding, the Alliance omitted funding that came from the BEA, arguing that BEA funds for special education students goes toward basic education classrooms.

The Supreme Court first addressed the proper standard of review. Justice Owens wrote: “In Washington, it is well established that statutes are presumed constitutional and that a statute’s challenger has a heavy burden to overcome that presumption; the challenger must prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” (The Alliance had argued a lower threshold of proof should apply.)

The Supreme Court also rejected the key argument that special education funding should be calculated without including the BEA. The Court noted that the Alliance’s own expert found that a special education student costs 190 percent of a basic education student. The State, when including the BEA and additional special education funding into the formula, allocates 193.09 percent of basic education costs for each special education student.

“For us to conclude that the BEA should not be included in calculations of how much funding goes to special education, we would have to agree with the Alliance’s contention that basic education and special education are in entirely separate realms. The Alliance attempts to differentiate between basic education and special education services, but the law does not support this distinction.”

“The legislature has consistently made it clear that special education students are also basic education students and that the additional special education funding is in addition to, and takes into account, the BEA. We therefore disagree with the Alliance’s contention that basic education and special education are entirely separate. We affirm the trial court and Court of Appeals and hold that the BEA must be included in the calculations when deciding if special education is adequately funded.”

Justice Debra Stephens concurred separately in the result. Justice Tom Chambers also wrote a concurring opinion, but dissented as to the requirement that a party arguing an statute is unconstitutional must prove the case “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Justice Richard Sanders dissented entirely, also disagreeing with the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. He argued this placed too great a burden on any party challenging a legislative enactment. “The judiciary cannot protect against an overreaching legislature if every enactment is presumed constitutional unless proved otherwise ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ giving the legislature, simply because it is the legislature, an advantage against any challenger’s assertion to the contrary.” Justice Sanders also argued that the legislature was underfunding special education when basic and special education funding are analyzed separately.

Morning session (9:00 a.m.)

Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. No. 822646. This case concerns whether a defense of comparative negligence based on the way a woman worked while pregnant is impermissibly discriminatory, and whether the Frye test for expert witnesses is still appropriate.

Julie Anderson worked for the auto paint company Akzo Nobel Coatings, where she mixed paint as part of her job. Anderson continued her job after becoming pregnant, and gave birth to a son with brain damage. She believes the damage was caused by exposure to paint fumes, and sued Akzo for inadequate safety procedures.

At trial, Akzo raised a comparative fault defense based on the fact that Anderson continued to mix paint during her pregnancy, contrary to the advice of her supervisor. Anderson moved for summary judgment to dismiss the defense as discriminatory against her for working while pregnant. But the King County Superior Court allowed Akzo to present the defense.

Testimony by Anderson's expert witness was excluded under Frye v. United States (293 F. 1013), which requires scientific theories and methodologies to be “generally accepted in the scientific community” in order to be admissible. Anderson wants Washington to stop using the Frye test, and says that it was incorrectly applied.

Finally, the court dismissed a wrongful discharge claim by Anderson because she failed to pursue a statutory remedy.

State v. Meneses, No. 831726. Whether charging someone with both harassment and intimidation of a witness due to the same phone call is double jeopardy.

As part of a visiting dispute, Andre Meneses called his ex-girlfriend several times, cursing her and threatening to kill her. He was charged and convicted of multiple counts of telephone harassment and intimidating a witness.

The court instructed the jury that the defendant commits telephone harassment if he makes a telephone call with intent to harass someone. Meneses claims that this did not inform the jury that the intent to harass must be formed before the call is made, but the court disagreed.

The harassment and intimidation charges are based on the same phone call, which Meneses claims is double-jeopardy. But the court held the two crimes are different because each requires the state to prove a different purpose for the threat.

Meneses also asks the court to review the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of attempted intimidating a witness and witness tampering.

Afternoon session (1:30 p.m.)

School District Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Education v. State, No. 829616. Whether the state's funding mechanism for special education violates the state constitution.

Article 9, Section 1 of the state constitution says, “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders.” The School District Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Education challenged the constitutionality of Washington's special education funding system under Article 9 as inadequate to completely provide for the education of special needs students, requiring some districts to rely on levies for special education funding.

The court found several problems with the Alliance's accounting, and ruled that their arguments “do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt” that special education is under funded. Accordingly, both a Thurston County Superior Court and Division Two Court of Appeals found the funding statute to be constitutional.

State v. Webb, No. 831777. This case presents the question of whether the burden of proving a child witness incompetent to testify is on the party calling the witness.

Samuel Webb, a minor, was convicted of raping another minor. At trial, the court required Webb to prove that the victim was incompetent to testify. Webb failed to do so.

Webb appealed, claiming the burden should have been on the state to prove his victim's competency. Division One Court of Appeals agreed, but found that the state met its burden and upheld the conviction.

The state now appeals the appellate court's finding that the burden of proof as to a child witness's competency is on the party calling the witness.