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One of our podcast listeners sent us a copy of a very interesting speech given by Justice Sanders back when he first joined the Court. In the podcast (Lies, Damn Lies & Statistics) Mike, Trent and I discussed the long wait times on court opinions. Sander's speech helps explain the time lag with a detailed behind-the-scenes look at the journey a case goes through from start to finish. It includes such salient tidbits as:

Who the assignment judge is [for a particular case], is a closely guarded secret of the court. To make attorney guesswork more difficult, law clerks in addition to the assignment justice’s law clerks typically attend the oral argument.

So clerk-counting is apparently pointless.

The speech is from 1996, so some procedures have likely changed. But I'm betting that much of the path a case takes is still the same today.

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In re Custody of E.A.T.W. and E.Y.W., No. 81945-9. Was the superior court right to grant a hearing for a custody petition based only on the fact that the children had lived with the petitioning grandparents for several years? The Court of Appeals had overturned the superior court, and the Supreme Court today upholds the Court of Appeals. The High Court holds that RCW 26.10.032 imposes on third party petitioners the duty of setting forth facts that would show “that the parent is unfit or placement with the parent would result in actual detriment to the child's growth and development.”

The unanimous opinion, written by Justice James Johnson, goes on to hold that this standard is in accord with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville.

In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court affirmed this court's judgment in In re Custody of Smith that constitutionally protected parental rights were violated by a statute allowing a nonparent to wrest custody of a child from a parent based solely on the court's findings regarding the child's best interests. Something more is required than the court's judgment that it could make a better decision than parents concerning the upbringing of children.

(Briefs, Argument-May 28, 2009)

State v. Sibert, No. 79509-6. Richard Sibert was convicted by a jury in 2004 of four crimes related to the sale of methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, and Sibert appeals on three alleged errs:  1) failure of the trial court to include the identity of the “controlled substance” on part of the jury instructions; 2) failure to prove the identity of the controlled substance; 3) an inappropriate jury instruction on “knowledge.”

Today the Court upholds Sibert’s conviction and sentencing. It finds that throughout the trial, everyone involved understood that the controlled substance was methamphetamine. Further, the jury instructions incorporated by reference the charging documents that identified the substance as methamphetamine. It also upholds the instruction on “knowledge,” which the trial court took directly from the Washington Practice.

Justice James Johnson also wrote this majority opinion, but Justices Sanders and Alexander both authored dissents, the latter joined by Justices Charles Johnson and Debra Stephens. The Chief concurred with the majority, but as to the result only. The four dissenting justices would hold prosecutors to a higher standard, in this case requiring a more explicit and precise description of the controlled substance.

(Briefs, Argument-February 10, 2009)

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Steve Miletich of the Seattle Times has an article about the campaign between Justice Richard Sanders and attorney Charlie Wiggins.

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The Supreme Court has issued its opinion in the thorny case of State v. Sieyes, No. 82154-2.

17-year-old Christopher Sieyes was charged and convicted for unlawfully possessing a loaded .380 semiautomatic handgun – a violation of RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(iii), which generally prohibits children under age 18 from possessing firearms. The questions in this case were whether the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution applies to the states, and if so, whether the state law banning possession by minors unconstitutionally infringes on the right to bear arms protected under the U.S. and Washington Constitutions.

In 2007, in Heller v. D.C., the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the District of Columbia’s handgun ban, holding that the Second Amendment guarantees the individual right to bear arms, rather than a collective militia right, as argued by D.C. The Court left for another day the question of whether the Second Amendment applies to the states. That question will be addressed later this year, as there has been some disagreement between federal circuits, but the Washington Supreme Court beat SCOTUS to the punch.

The Washington Supreme Court, with Justice Richard Sanders writing the majority, held that the Second Amendment applies to the states. “[T]he Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms from state interference through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This right is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty and fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” Justice Sanders also noted that the Washington Constitution explicitly guarantees the right to bear arms, though the Court has not determined the reach of Article I, Sec. 24 since the Heller ruling.

Turning to the question of whether RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(iii) is constitutional, the Court declined to apply the traditional levels of scrutiny to firearm regulation. The Court voiced agreement with Heller -- that strict scrutiny would invalidate most infringements on the Second Amendment, while a rational basis test would set too low a standard to protect the right to bear arms. “We follow Heller in declining to analyze RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(iii) under any level of scrutiny. Instead we look to the Second Amendment's original meaning, the traditional understanding of the right, and the burden imposed on children by upholding the statute.” Justice Sanders acknowledged the Court's "occasional rhetoric" about the "reasonable regulation" of firearms, but argued the Court has never settled on a precise standard of review.

However, the Court found that Christopher Sieyes made inadequate arguments on whether the law was unconstitutional. “In sum appellant offers no convincing authority supporting his argument that Washington's limit on childhood firearm possession violates the United States or Washington Constitutions. Accordingly we keep our powder dry on this issue for another day.” The Supreme Court held that Sieyes failed to demonstrate that the statute was an unconstitutional violation of his right to possess a gun. The case was remanded for consideration of additional issues.

Gun rights advocates will see this as a partial missed opportunity. After the landmark ruling in Heller, the Washington Supreme Court asked the parties in Sieyes to address whether the Second Amendment applies to the states and the appropriate standard of scrutiny for evaluating firearm regulations. Justice Sanders has long railed against the Court’s reliance on “reasonable regulation” of gun rights, and no doubt wanted to go further in clarifying the court’s jurisprudence. Thus his criticisms of the appellant for inadequately briefing some of these constitutional issues. Even so, the Court firmly holds that the Washington Constitution protects the individual right to bear arms.

Justice Debra Stephens concurred in the result, but wrote that as Sieyes failed to analyze how the state statute violated the constitution the court could stop there and should not have conducted an  "extended exploration of the unsettled question of federal incorporation of the Second Amendment." Meanwhile, Justice James Johnson dissented, writing that "the majority disregards our long-standing national tradition allowing younger citizens to bear arms," and he argued strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for a challenge to a statute restricting one's constitutional rights.

(briefs and argument).

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As we reported last week, attorney Charlie Wiggins announced his candidacy for Position 6 of the Washington Supreme Court, currently held by Justice Richard Sanders.

Justice Sanders was expected to run for another term on the court, and he recently filed the necessary candidate registration form with the Public Disclosure Commission. Justice Sanders won a special election in 1995 and was re-elected for two six-year terms in 1998 and 2004. He describes his understanding of the job on his campaign website: 

These have been good years on the court. It is a great privilege and joy to attempt to protect and maintain the individual legal rights of every single individual who comes to court. That, in my opinion, is the job description of a judge, and, as it says in Article 1, Section 1 of our state constitution, the purpose of state government as well.

Stay tuned. We'll continue to bring news and information about the various candidates for the Supreme Court.

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We have our first challenger in a state Supreme Court race.

Bainbridge Island attorney Charlie Wiggins has officially thrown his hat into the ring, filing a candidate registration form with the Public Disclosure Commission. He is running against Justice Richard Sanders.

Wiggins’ campaign website can be found here, where Wiggins states he is running against Sanders because of violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct  and because "his decisions are not fair and impartial, and he opposes positive reforms to improve the process of electing judges." Should be a colorful campaign.

Chief Justice Barbara Madsen and Justice James Johnson are also up for re-election this year.

As election season approaches, this blog will provide information about candidates for the Supreme Court, including links to the evaluations and endorsements of other organizations.

UPDATE: The race is covered by the Olympian, Seattlepi.com, and the Kitsap Sun.

Note: The Supreme Court of Washington Blog neither endorses nor supports any candidate for judicial office.

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The Supreme Court issued rulings in seven cases this morning, including two highly-anticipated decisions dealing with whether an authorization to use medical marijuana is a defense to criminal possession, and whether the state's Consumer Protection Act allows out-of-state litigants to join a Washington class action lawsuit.

Clayton v. Wilson, No. 81920-3. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the unanimous ruling holding that a couple’s marital community is liable for the intentional wrongful sexual acts of one spouse. Without his wife’s knowledge, Mr. Wilson repeatedly sexually abused a neighbor boy, Andrew Clayton, whom he was paying to do yard work at the Wilson’s home. After Mr. Wilson was arrested the couple began dissolving the marriage and executed a property settlement transferring 90 percent of community assets to Mrs. Wilson (and theoretically insulating the funds from any potential lawsuit). Clayton sued, and the entire marital community was found liable because the assaults occurred while Clayton was working for the community. The trial court also found fraud in the extremely lopsided division of marital property, and voided the transfer. The Court of Appeals agreed and the Supreme Court upheld the decision.

In re the Dependency of C.S., No. 81720-1. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the unanimous opinion holding that Amy Singleton’s parental rights had been improperly terminated. Singleton has a son diagnosed with ADHD and other behavioral problems. She has a history of drug and alcohol abuse and is under the supervision of social workers. She continues to have substance abuse issues, although evidence was introduced that she is improving. The state filed a third party custody action and the court terminated her parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed this order as the State had not offered Singleton required training that would allow her to rehabilitate.

Schnall, et al. v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., No. 80572-5. Should AT&T Wireless customers nationwide be allowed to pursue a class action under the WA Consumer Protection Act? Chief Justice Barbara Madsen, writing for a 5-4 majority, declined to make Washington “a locus of nationwide class action litigation.” The Court said the trial court was correct in declining to certify a nationwide class.

Drum v. State, No. 81498-8. Justice Debra Stephens, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed Patrick Drum’s conviction for burglary after he entered a house while high on spray paint. Drum entered a drug program and signed a Drug Court Contract, under which he agreed that the court would determine his guilt on the burglary charge if he was terminated from the program. As part of this contract, he waived various rights including the right to testify and the right to a jury trial. Drum left the drug program, and the court found him guilty of burglary. Drum appealed, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that the contract did not fulfill due process requirements for a guilty plea. The Jefferson County Superior Court found that Drum had stipulated that the evidence was sufficient, and that the contract did not violate due process because it was not a guilty plea.

State v. Erickson, No. 81594-1. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld an assault conviction, with Justice Tom Chambers writing the opinion. Anthony Erickson was convicted of fourth degree assault and released on probation, but his probation officer claimed that he violated the terms of his probation agreement. Erickson was summoned to a probation hearing, failed to appear, and an arrest warrant was issued. Upon arrest he was found with drugs on him and convicted of possession. He appealed, claiming the arrest warrant was invalid because there was no probable cause that he had violated probation (only the officer’s word). The Court wrote: “We conclude that the warrant was valid because it was supported by a well-founded suspicion that Erickson had violated the terms of his release.”

State v. Fry, No. 81210-1. Justice James Johnson writes a 4-vote lead opinion, with four other justices agreeing in a separate opinion, that rejected a defendant’s claim that he was qualified to use marijuana for medicinal purposes in defense to a charge of unlawful possession of marijuana. Two police officers were informed of a marijuana growing operation at the residence of Jason and Tina Fry. The officers smelled marijuana when they approached. Fry did not consent to a search, and presented a document purporting to be authorization for medical marijuana. The officers obtained a warrant and seized over two pounds of marijuana. At trial, Fry argued to suppress the marijuana because of his medical marijuana authorization. The judge denied the motion. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to allow the evidence seized at the Frys’ home, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

State v. Kelly, No. 82111-9. Dustin Kelly approached a couple, threatened to kill them both, and then shot at them, killing the man. In addition to murder, he was convicted of second degree assault (intentional assault with a deadly weapon). The court imposed firearm sentence enhancements on both crimes. Kelly argues that since the use of the firearm is already an element of second degree assault, imposing the sentence enhancement on the assault essentially punishes him twice for using the firearm—a claimed violation of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this argument, with Chief Justice Madsen writing the opinion.

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Lallas v. Skagit County, No. 81672. When a court security guard is injured by a fleeing prisoner, does judicial immunity shield the deputy sheriff and the county from negligence liability?

A Skagit County District Judge directed a deputy sheriff to take the prisoner from the court room to jail. On the way, the unrestrained prisoner fled, knocking down and injuring a private security guard. The guard sued the deputy, the county, and the prisoner; the trial court granted summary judgment for the deputy and the county on the theory that they were protected by judicial immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed.

In an opinion by Justice Fairhurst the Supreme Court unanimously holds that escorting a prisoner is a ministerial rather than a judicial duty and therefore judicial immunity does not protect the deputy or the county from negligence liability. (briefs, argument, previous post)

State v. Pugh, No. 80850-3. Bridgette Pugh called 911 and reported that her husband, defendant Timothy Pugh, "was beating me up really bad." Police responded and arrested Timothy Pugh. Mrs. Pugh failed to show up and testify, but the recording of her 911 call was allowed as evidence. Timothy Pugh was convicted of  felony violation of a court order, domestic violence. He challenges that the admission of the recorded 911 call violated his right to confront the witnesses against him according to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 22 of the State Constitution.

Today, the Court holds that Mrs. Pugh's statements on the 911 recording were admissible: that they were nontestimonial excited utterances not prohibited by the Sixth Amendment and that they "qualify as res gestae [and as such] do not implicate Article I, section 22." Justice Madsen wrote the majority opinion and was joined by all the other justices except for Justice Chambers, who concurs while expressing "serious reservations about the broadest applications of the excited utterance rule being made in the wake of Crawford v. Washington," and Justice Sanders, who dissents. (briefs, argument)

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Magana v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 80922-4. In a 7-2 vote, the Washington Supreme Court  reinstated an $8 million default judgment against the Hyundai Motor Company for its “willful efforts” to undermine pretrial discovery in a personal injury lawsuit brought against the company.

Jesse Magaña was riding in a 1996 Hyundai Accent, driven by Ricky Smith. They saw an oncoming truck driven by Dennis Nylander that appeared to be in their lane. Smith swerved, driving the car off the road. Magaña was thrown out of the rear window and was rendered a paraplegic due to his injuries.

Magaña filed suit against Hyundai Motor America and Hyundai Motor Company, the Smiths, and the Nylanders. At trial one of Magaña’s expert witnesses testified that a different seat belt design would have prevented Magaña’s injuries. Magaña prevailed at trial and was awarded over $8,000,000 in damages. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling as it applied to Hyundai, and remanded for a retrial to address the issue of liability.

Prior to the retrial, Magaña moved for a default judgment against Hyundai. He argued it was impossible to prepare a case based on Hyundai’s responses to discovery in the original trial and in preparation for the retrial. The trial court agreed, and imposed a default judgment against Hyundai. The court found there was no agreement between the parties to limit discovery, that Hyundai falsely responded to Magaña’s interrogatories, that Magaña was substantially prejudiced in preparing for trial, and that evidence was spoiled and forever lost. The trial court decided the only suitable remedy was a default judgment.

The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling, writing that there was “no prejudice to Magaña’s ability to retry his case resulting from Hyundai’s discovery violations” and that lesser sanctions would have been appropriate.

Today the Supreme Court, with Justice Richard Sanders writing for the majority, overturns the Court of Appeals and reinstates the $8 million default judgment. Court rules authorize a trial court to impose sanctions when a party fails to satisfy discovery requests, which can range from exclusion of evidence to default judgment. Harsh sanctions are justified when: “(1) one party willfully or deliberately violated the discovery rules and orders, (2) the opposing party was substantially prejudiced in its ability to prepare for trial, and (3) the trial court explicitly considered whether a lesser sanction would have sufficed.”

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had correctly found Hyundai’s responses to Magaña’s request for production and interrogatory “false, misleading, and evasive,” and that these actions substantially prejudiced Magaña’s ability to prepare for trial. The Court reinstated the default judgment, and awarded Magaña reasonable attorney fees and costs.

Justice James Johnson (joined by Chief Justice Gerry Alexander) dissents, writing that while Hyundai willfully violated discovery rules, the record did support the “substantial prejudice” and “lesser sanctions” prongs are not established on this record.

(Briefs & Argument)

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State v. Webb, No. 81314-1 (briefs and argument). Seattle radio personality Mike Webb was convicted of filing a fraudulent insurance claim in 2007 and was ordered to pay certain financial penalties. He filed a timely notice of appeal. While the appeal was pending Mr. Webb was tragically murdered and his body was discovered in the crawl space under his home about two months after his death. Mr. Webb’s attorney filed a motion in the Court of Appeals to abate the appeal and the underlying conviction and financial obligations. The Court of Appeals denied the motion, relying on past cases that dealt with the death of a criminal defendant.

The Supreme Court reviewed the question to determine whether the deceased defendant’s right to appeal requires that the conviction be abated. The Court held that appellate rules allow for the substitution of parties on appeal, which would be the appropriate method for heirs to challenge any financial obligations imposed on the defendant. Consequently, the Court ruled that as Mr. Webb died during his appeal, his heirs could be substituted. If no motion for substitution is filed, the Court directed that the appeal be dismissed and the conviction and all financial obligations shall remain in effect. 

The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to allow for a substitution of parties. Justice Barbara Madsen wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Richard Sanders dissented, criticizing the practical difficulties the decision created. “Obviously the substituted heir would not be subject to the same criminal penalties of the deceased defendant, and therefore, it is a stretch to say that ‘the interest of a party in the subject matter of the review has been transferred.’”

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State v. King, No. 80948-8. Tyler King was riding his motorcycle southbound on Interstate 5 north of Vancouver city limits when he was stopped and issued a criminal citation for reckless driving by Vancouver police officer Jeff Starks. King had stood up on the pegs of his motorcycle, looked at the vehicle he was approaching, and  accelerated to pass the vehicle. King and Starks both testified at the trial, offering different interpretations of the facts. Starks offered opinion testimony that King's driving had been reckless, which King's attorney did not object to at trial but then raised on appeal. King also challenged that the officer was outside of his jurisdiction without an interlocal agreement and without satisfying the statutory emergency exception.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court sided with King and held that Starks did not have jurisdiction to issue the criminal citation. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Sanders and joined by four other justices, determines that Stark's  interpretation of King's actions would not have constituted "an emergency involving an immediate threat to human life or property."

King did not nearly hit another car, nor run a light, nor weave across traffic lanes. He did not pop a wheelie, cut off another car, nor, for that matter, drive in reverse along the shoulder. At most, King glared at the driver of the large truck, stood on his foot pegs for three to five seconds, and accelerated at high speed past the truck. As aforementioned, Starks could not verify that King accelerated away at what he thought was 100 m.p.h. Even so, the officer testified King slowed down as he approached other traffic and pulled over immediately when Starks signaled him to do so.

The majority concludes that the trial court was wrong to simply take the definition of reckless driving and assume that it "automatically fit within the emergency exception." The majority also suggests that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the opinion testimony issue was foreclosed by the lack of an objection at trial. Justice Chambers, who signed the majority opinion, wrote separately to respond to the dissent. Justice Fairhurst, joined by Justice Madsen, concurrs while arguing that "it is unnecessary to discuss, even as dicta, the officer's opinion testimony."

The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Owens, dissents.

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State v. Kenyon, No. 81374-4. On February 15, 2006, James Ryan Kenyon was charged with six counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and was incarcerated while awaiting. After multiple delays his case eventually went to trial in August—well beyond the time limits provided by the speedy trial rule (CrR 3.3).

A defendant who is detained in jail must have a trial set within 60 days of arraignment. If a defendant is not brought to trial within the rule’s time limits, the court must dismiss the charges with prejudice so long as the defendant objects within 10 days after notice of trial date is mailed. Some periods of time are excluded when computing the date for trial. For example, continuances granted by the court are excluded, as well as “unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances” that are beyond the control of the court or of the parties.

Kenyon argues his right to a speedy trial was violated as no court was available to hear his case. The State argues the trial court properly followed the scheduled and that his attorney asked for many continuances. The trial court held the delay was “unavoidable” as the judge was presiding over another case and the other judge was on vacation. The Supreme Court however, has said that courtroom congestion—as opposed to scheduling conflicts or trial preparation—is not a valid reason for delay.

The Court determined that despite the allowance for “unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances,” the speedy trial rule still requires trial courts to document the details of unavailable judges and courtrooms. The failure to do so in this case violated Kenyon’s right to a speedy trial and the Court dismissed the charges with prejudice.

Justice Richard Sanders wrote the majority opinion. Justice Tom Chambers filed a separate opinion concurring with the result.

State v. O'Hara, No. 81062-1. Ryan O’Hara was charged with second degree assault after getting into a fight with an acquaintance, Jeffrey Loree. O’Hara argued that he acted in self defense. Loree had gained possession of the keys to O’Hara’s car. At trial, O’Hara argued he acted in self-defense. O’Hara testified that he repeatedly asked Loree for the keys to the car. He attempted to reach for the keys and Loree punched him in the forehead, at which point the two began exchanging blows.

At trial the court provided the jury with instructions regarding second degree assault, with additional details about the definition of “malice.” O’Hara was convicted as charged.

On appeal, O’Hara challenged his conviction, arguing that the trial court provided the jury with an incomplete definition of “malice.” O’Hara had failed to object to this instruction at trial and raised the issue for the first time on appeal. A party on appeal is permitted to raise new issues of “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”

The Supreme Court, with Justice Mary Fairhurst writing the opinion, said that O’Hara could not demonstrate that the trial court’s alleged error was not of a constitutional magnitude or manifest. By failing to object to the instruction he failed to preserve the issue for review, and could not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Justice Sanders filed a dissent. While he agreed that a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right" should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, he argued that O’Hara’s constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s jury instruction.

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State v. Eriksen, No. 80653-5 (briefs and arguments). The state Supreme Court says that tribal police officers can pursue motorists beyond the limits of tribal lands after having observed them commit a traffic infraction on the reservation.

A Lummi Nation Police Department officer witnessed a motorist on the reservation driving at night with high beams and drifting across the center divider. He began following the vehicle and activated his emergency lights. After traveling a quarter mile the car pulled into a gas station located off the reservation. The police officer witnessed the driver, Loretta Eriksen, hop over the car’s center console and into the passenger’s seat. The officer detained Eriksen until a Whatcom County police deputy arrived, who arrested her for DUI.

Ms. Eriksen was convicted for DUI. The trial court said Lummi Nation’s inherent sovereign power authorizes tribal police to continue in “fresh pursuit” of offenders who drive off the reservation. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve this issue of first impression.

The Supreme Court said that the Lummi Nation is a sovereign nation with inherent authority to enforce its laws and detain Indians or non-Indians who violate those laws. Courts have long recognized the right of law enforcement officers to cross jurisdictional lines when in hot pursuit of a violator. The court said this doctrine should apply to sovereign tribal nations as well. “The Lummi Nation Police Department has authority under the Lummi Nation’s sovereign authority and under the Washington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers Act of 1985, chapter 10.93 RCW, to enforce its laws by continuing the ‘fresh pursuit’ of suspects off the reservation and then detaining these suspects until authorities with jurisdiction arrive.”

Justice Richard Sanders wrote the unanimous opinion of the court.

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Armantrout v. Carlson & Cascade Orthopaedics, No. 81195-4. Eighteen-year-old Kristen Armantrout lived with her blind and diabetic mother. Kristen provided care and assistance to her mother and gave her Social Security check to the family. Kristen died due to a complication following ankle surgery. Her parents sued for wrongful death, claiming they were financially dependent on Kristen. The trial court agreed with the parents, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that economically valuable services cannot be considered to assess a claim of financial dependence. Here, the Supreme Court unanimously reverses the Court of Appeals. The opinion by Justice Madsen distinguishes between "everyday services a child would routinely provide," and the kind of unique and potentially expensive services that had been provided by Kristen to her mother. (briefs and argument)

Seattle v. Robert St. John, No. 81992-1. After crashing his motorcycle in Seattle, Robert St. John was investigated for driving under the influence of alcohol. A police officer asked St. John to consent to a blood alcohol test, and when St. John refused, the officer obtained a warrant for the test. The results were suppressed in municipal court based on a broad interpretation of a provision of the Implied Consent law (RCW 46.20.308(1)) that prohibits performing the test once consent has been refused. The superior court reversed and the Court of Appeals certified three questions to the Supreme Court

1. Does the implied consent statute allow the State to administer a blood alcohol test pursuant to a warrant after a driver has declined a voluntary blood alcohol test?

2. Does an implied consent warning violate due process if it does not inform drivers that an officer may seek a warrant for a blood alcohol test even if the driver declines the voluntary blood alcohol test?

3. Does the doctrine of equitable estoppel bar the State from seeking a warrant for a blood alcohol test after informing drivers that they may refuse the voluntary blood alcohol test?

The Court today in an opinion by Justice Owens and joined by six other justices upholds the superior court and allows the blood test evidence. The Implied Consent law restricts performing a blood test pursuant to that law, but does not prohibit performing a blood test pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant (RCW 46.20.308). Similarly, the officer's statements about the Implied Consent law did not foreclose his obtaining the warrant. Justice Sanders, joined by Justice James Johnson, dissents. (briefs and argument).

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In City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ (No. 80588-1), the Court was asked whether a city violated a church's religious liberty by preventing it from applying for a temporary permit to host a tent city. The Court of Appeals sided with the City.

In an opinion written by Justice Jim Johnson, the Court overturned the lower court, holding that the City's denial of the permit application violated Article I, Section 11 of the state constitution.

In the summer of 2006 the tent city organizers approached Northshore United about residing on church land. The church agreed, and submitted an application for a temporary permit to the City. At that time a short-term moratorium on temporary use permits was in place, which the City used to justify its refusal to process the church's application. The church allowed the tent city to come onto its property anyway, and the City sued for a restraining order and injunction.

Justice Johnson, joined by six other justices, held that the city's use of a moratorium to deny the church's permit application violated the state constitutional guarantee to "[a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship." (Article I, Section 11) There was no question of the City's sincere religious beliefs or that the moratorium was not in place to further a "compelling interest" of the City. So the primary question for the Court was "whether the City's actions substantially burden the free exercise of the Church's religious...worship."

The Court held that while incidental burdens on religion, such as requiring a permit, are not unconstitutional, refusing to process the church's permit application entirely was a substantial burden on religion. Since it reached this conclusion based on the state constitution, which the Court found to have greater protection than the federal bill of rights, the opinion did not address  federal claims.

The majority opinion also addressed the question of the tent city being a possible nuisance to the church's neighbors, but found that while the city might have the ability to regulate the manner in which this type of activity is conducted, it cannot simply deny any consideration of the permit.

Justice Sanders, joined by Justice Chambers, filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the result but took issue with the majority's holding that general permitting requirements for churches are an incidental (i.e. constitutional) burden. Sanders focused on the constitution's "absolute freedom" language, and argued that allowing the "licensing of religion" is inconsistent with this broad constitutional protection.

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Estate of Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice Arena, Inc, No. 80411-7. In 2002, the City entered into a concession agreement with Bremerton Ice Arena (BIA) to build and operate an ice arena on public land. The Haselwoods loaned $3,775,000 to BIA for the project, and BIA gave the Haselwoods a promissory note and a deed of trust. The project failed shortly after it began, and the excavation contractor, "RV" recorded a mechanics lien against BIA and the proposed facility in July 2003. A month later, BIA defaulted on the Haselwood loan and the Haselwoods brought a foreclosure action against BIA and its other creditors. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for RV, finding that the mechanics lien had attached only "to certain improvements to the facility," but not to the land or BIA itself. It eventually found that the Haselwood's deed of trust was superior to the claims of all of the other creditors.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, but found that the mechanic's lien related back to RV's first delivery of equipment and was superior to the Haselwoods' deed of trust. It also reversed an award of attorney fees to the Haselwoods. In an opinion by Justice Sanders and signed by four other Justices, the Court today upholds the Court of Appeals. Justices Stephens and Madsen concur, but would not foreclose RV's request for attorney fees. Chief Justice Alexander, joined by Justice Charles Johnson, dissents and would find RV's lien inferior to the Haselwoods' deed of trust. (briefs and argument)

 Torgerson v. One Lincoln Tower, LLC, No. 80623-3. The Court of Appeals is affirmed in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sanders. Three real estate agents, Michael Miller, Vicki Ringer, and Joanne Faye Torgerson, were seller's agents for condominiums in One Lincoln Tower, then under construction. Each also contracted to purchase a unit, and their contracts included a provision limiting their remedies for sellers' breach. After some delays in the project and a change of ownership, the seller did breach and the agents sued, asking the court to strike down the remedy-limiting provision. The trial court entered summary judgment for the seller, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and is affirmed here as well, with attorneys fees also awarded to the seller. (briefs and argument)

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Homestreet, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 80544-0 (briefs and argument). HomeStreet, Inc., is a residential mortgage lender that services loans it sells or securitizes to secondary lenders. It received tax deductions for the interest retained from these loans under RCW 82.04.4292 until the Department of Revenue (DOR) issued an order requiring HomeStreet to pay business and occupation (B&O) taxes. HomeStreet paid the taxes but then sued DOR for a refund. The trial court ruled for DOR, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered DOR to refund the taxes to HomeStreet. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the majority with five other justices joining. Justices Madsen and Chambers dissent (Justice Fairhurst did not participate).

State v. Koslowski, No. 80427-3 (briefs and argument). Duane Koslowski was convicted of first degree robbery, first degree burglary, and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm as a result of the robbery at Ms. Violet Alvarez’s home. Ms. Alvarez died before trial from causes unrelated to this case, but at trial the prosecution introduced statements Ms. Alvarez made to police officers investigating the break-in. Mr. Koslowski argues that his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment is violated by the admission of Ms. Alvarez’s statements. The U.S. Supreme Court has said this “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

Statements to police are “testimonial” when there is no ongoing emergency, and the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish past events related to a later criminal prosecution. “Nontestimonial” statements are made in the course of a police interrogation to enable the police to address an ongoing emergency—for example, attempting to apprehend a suspect in the immediate vicinity.

In this case, the Washington State Supreme Court reasoned that although the police responded to Alvarez’s 911 call immediately, and although she was clearly frightened, the immediate danger had passed. The crime had been completed, and the burglars had left the area. Accordingly, the court decided Alvarez’s statements were testimonial in nature.

Writing for the majority, Justice Barbara Madsen said: “The confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who does not appear at trial, unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Because Mr. Koslowski had no prior opportunity for cross-examination, the admission of Ms. Alvarez’s statements was constitutional error. This error was not harmless because without admission of these statements, there is not overwhelming, untainted evidence that Koslowski was armed at the time he committed the offenses involving Ms. Alvarez.” Justice Richard Sanders filed an opinion concurring in the result, while Chief Justice Alexander dissented, along with both Justice Johnsons.

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The Washington Supreme Court has withdrawn its landmark public records ruling in Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims, after King County's motion that Justice Richard Sanders, who wrote the majority opinion, stood to benefit from the ruling.  (Court order here and Seattle Times story here.)

The court says it will schedule arguments “in due course.”

The Yousoufian ruling provided guidelines for assessing the severity of penalties when a public agency violates the state's Public Records Act. 

After the ruling issued, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer reported that Justice Sanders had his own separate, long-running public records case. Justice Sanders says he cleared his involvement in Yousoufian with the court's ethics expert, and that recusal was not required in this situation. King County lawyers asked the Supreme Court to vacate the Yousoufian ruling and provide for new argument.

In April we wrote about the outcome of a possible rehearing: 

What would happen if the court grants King County’s motion for a rehearing?

Hard to say. Sanders wrote the majority, which was signed by Justices Charles Johnson, James Johnson, and Fairhurst. Justice Chambers concurred with the majority’s analytical guidelines, but disagreed over whether the trial court judges abused their discretion as related to the penalty awarded Mr. Yousoufian. In addition to signing the majority, Justice James Johnson filed a concurrence, which Justice Sanders signed. Chief Justice Alexander separately concurred with the analytical guidelines, but dissented to the extent that Sanders ordered the trial court to impose penalty “at the high end of the penalty range.” Finally, Justices Owens and Madsen dissented, along with Justice Pro Tem Karen Seinfeld, protesting the “cumbersome multifactor test.” Justice Stephens did not participate.

Given the kaleidoscope of opinions, it’s difficult to predict an outcome if the Supreme Court granted a rehearing. Replacing Sanders, and assuming all other members ruled similarly, there are still five votes to uphold Yousoufian's analytical framework. And as I've noted elsewhere, Justice Stephens, who did not participate, seems to line up on the side of open government.

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In Re Stephen Eugster, No. 200,568-3. Attorney Stephen Eugster got caught up in a dispute between his elderly client and her son. The Washington State Bar Association filed a complaint against Eugster alleging multiple ethical violations, including failure to abide by his client's objectives, disclosure of confidential information, and wrongfully filing a petition for guardianship. A hearing officer determined that "Eugster acted knowingly and intentionally" and that his actions caused financial and other harm. The findings were unanimously approved by the Disciplinary Board, which recommended disbarment. In an opinion by Justice Chambers and joined by four other justices, the Court declines to disbar Eugster and instead suspends him for 18 months. Justice Fairhurst, with three other justices, filed a strong dissent arguing for disbarment. (Briefs, argument).

State v. Riofta, No. 79407-3. Ten people were gunned down, five of them killed, in Tacoma's "Trang Dai massacre" on July 5, 1998. One of the suspects, Veasna Sok, had agreed to testify against the other defendants. On January 27, 2000, Veasna's brother Ratthana was confronted near his home by a man he recognized as "Alex," someone he had known in the neighborhood for several years and who was associated with some of the Trang Dai defendants. Alex pulled out a revolver and fired multiple shots at close range at Ratthana, who escaped uninjured. Ratthana identified Alex Riofta from a photograph at the police station, and Riofta was convicted of first degree assault with a firearm. Riofta subsequently sought DNA testing of a white hat found at the crime scene.

Here, the Court upholds the decisions below and declines to order a DNA hat test per RCW 10.73.170. The majority holds that Riofta failed to show that the results of a DNA test on the hat (which had been stolen the day before Ratthana was shot at) "would demonstrated innocence on a more probable than not basis." Justice Madsen penned the opinion and was joined by five other justices. Justice Charles Johnson authored a dissent joined by Justices Sanders and Chambers, and Justice Chambers wrote a separate dissent calling on the legislature to provide greater clarity. (2003 appeal, 2006 appeal, briefs, argument)

State v. Thomas, No. 80643-8. Covell Paul Thomas robbed and murdered Richard Geist, gunning the small business owner down at close range in order to steal about $5000 in cash. Thomas was originally sentenced to die; that sentence was overturned due to an improper jury instruction on the aggravating factors. On remand, the state sought only life imprisonment. A jury found that Thomas had committed four aggravating factors and the trial judge sentenced Thomas to life without the possibility of parole. Thomas again challenges the jury instructions and also brings due process, Double Jeopardy, Batson v. Kentucky, and other claims. The Court rejects them all, with Justice Madsen writing for a majority of seven. Justice Sanders, joined by Justice Stephens, dissents. (Earlier opinion, briefs, argument)

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State v. Garvin, No. 80941-1. His car had seen better days when, on October 21, 2005, Anthony Garvin was pulled over for a shattered windshield and inoperable brake lights. During the stop, Union Gap Police Officer Gregory Cobb noticed that the car's ignition was broken; Garvin had a knife on the passenger seat that he was using in place of a key. Officer Cobb and his partner removed Cobb from the car and performed a "pat-down" search, ostensibly a "Terry stop" according to Terry v. Ohio (a 1968 U.S. Supreme Court case permitting police to conduct a cursory, warantless search of a person who is believed to be "armed and presently dangerous.")

During the search, a "dime bag" of methamphetamine was found in the coin pocket of Garvin's jeans. He was arrested and subsequently convicted for drug possession. Garvin appealed, challenging the legality of the search; the Court of Appeals held that the search was a legal Terry stop and affirmed the conviction.

Justice Sanders, for a unanimous Court, holds that the search "exceeded the permissible scope of a limited Terry stop-and-frisk" and reverses the conviction.

We hold it is unlawful for officers to continue squeezing -- whether in one slow motion or several -- after they have determined a suspect does not have a weapon, to find whether the suspect is carrying drugs or other contraband. If that were permissible, there would be little to distinguish a frisk incident to a Terry stop from a general search for contraband, and we strongly disapprove of such legal fiction. Indeed, one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement would swallow the rule.

(case briefs and argument)

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Sanders v. State, No. 80393-5. In a 5-4 decision by a panel of pro tem justices (judges drawn from lower appellate courts to act as State Supreme Court justices in this case only), the Court upholds an appeals court decision that the State is not obligated to pay for a judge's defense in an ethics case if the judge "knows or should know that the conduct of which he or she is accused is unethical and therefore not an official act."

In 2003, Justice Richard Sanders visited the Special Commitment Center (SCC) on McNeil Island, a State facility where certain convicted sex offenders were being held. A complaint was filed with the Commission on Judicial Conduct alleging that Justice Sanders talked with SCC residents who had cases pending before the Washington State Supreme Court. In 2005, the Commission held that Justice Sanders had violated Canons 1 and 2(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

During the Commission's investigation, Justice Sanders asked the attorney general to provide him with a defense at public expense, citing RCW 43.10.030 and .040, which charges the attorney general with the duty to defend state officers in their official capacity. The attorney general refused, and Justice Sanders filed suit. A superior court judge dismissed the action, was upheld on appeal, and is upheld today. One dissent challenges that the majority fails to enforce the plain meaning of the statute or to create a workable framework for deciding future cases; a second dissent faults the majority for "improperly rel[ying] on the outcome of the underlying case as the basis for its decision." (case briefs and argument)

Chadwick Farms Owners Association v. FHC, LLC, No. 80450-8 and Emily Lane Homeowners Ass’n v. Colonial Dev., LLC, No. 80459-1 (consolidated). Can a Limited Liability Corporation sue or be sued after its certificate of formation is canceled? No, says the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Madsen, after cancellation an LLC ceases to exist as a legal entity and can neither sue nor be sued. These consolidated cases arose when homeowners associations sued the LLCs that had built their communities but had subsequently been canceled. While the LLCs no longer exist, however, the Court holds that the LLC members may be sued based on the same veil-piercing provisions that would apply while the LLC remained in existance. Justice Charles Johnson, joined by three other justices, dissents. (case briefs and argument)

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We'll have a more detailed review up shortly, but the Supreme Court has ruled that the attorney general had no duty to defend Justice Richard Sanders, at public expense, before the Commission on Judicial Conduct. At issue is whether the State, under RCW 43.10.030(3) is required to defend a judge who is alleged to have committed an ethics violation while otherwise within the purview of his or her official duties.

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The Supreme Court will issue rulings in two cases tomorrow.

Sanders v. State, No. 80393-5 (case briefs and argument). It’s not often that a seated Supreme Court justice has his own case before the court, but tomorrow the court will rule in a case brought by Justice Richard Sanders. The question here is whether the State has a duty to defend a judge in disciplinary proceedings.

On January 27, 2003, Justice Sanders visited the Special Commitment Center (SCC) on McNeil Island. Following that visit, a complaint was filed with the Commission on Judicial Conduct alleging that Justice Sanders had had contact with SCC residents who had cases pending before the Washington State Supreme Court. The Commission investigated the complaint and in 2005 held  that Justice Sanders had violated Canons 1 and 2(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. (The state Supreme Court eventually upheld this ruling. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders, 159 Wash.2d 517 (2006).)

During the Commission investigation, Justice Sanders asked the attorney general to provide him with a defense at public expense, citing RCW 43.10.030 and .040, which charges the attorney general with the duty to defend state officers in their official capacity. The attorney general declined. Justice Sanders sued, and a superior court judge dismissed the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the attorney general acted within its discretion.

This case was heard by an panel of pro tem justices.

Chadwick Farms Owners Association v. FHC, LLC, No. 80450-8 and Emily Lane Homeowners Ass’n v. Colonial Dev., LLC, No. 80459-1 (consolidated). The question addressed in these cases is whether limited liability companies can continue to sue and to be sued after they are cancelled in accordance with the Washington Limited Liability Companies Act. (case briefs and argument)

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In Powell the Court focused on whether the trial court's admission of evidence of drug use by the defendant, without parallel testimony explaining the effect of the drug, was an error requiring reversal. Writing for a plurality, Justice Mary Fairhurst determined that because the defendant's attorney failed to raise this issue at the trial court and because there was no "manifest constitutional error," the trial court's guilty verdict should be upheld.

Jason Powell was convicted of attempted burglary in the first degree for trying to break into his girlfriend's home while carrying a loaded gun. The prosecution called Powell's roommate to testify that he had seen Powell take methamphetamine right before he went to his girlfriend's house. Testimony about past crimes or bad acts are generally inadmissible to directly prove that a person was likely to commit the crime in question, as they are highly likely to prejudice a jury against the defendant. But they can be used to show things like a person's state of mind or intent. In this case, the State was attempting to show Powell's state of mind at the time he went to his girlfriend's house. The Court found that Powell's attorney objected to the credibility of the witness, but didn't preserve on the record a concern about its prejudicial effect.

The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, saying the State should have provided expert testimony to explain the likely effects of meth, but the Supreme Court disagreed because the need for such a procedure was not raised at the trial court. As it was an "uncontested issue." Fairhurst wrote that the Court therefore could not review it unless they determined it constituted a manifest error of constitutional magnitude. It did not, as there was no evidence showing the roommate's testimony had practical and identifiable consequences on the outcome of the trial.

Justice Stephens wrote a concurring opinion in which she agreed that the error was harmless, but disagreed that the objection had not been preserved at trial court. Justices Alexander and Chambers signed her concurrence.

Justice Sanders dissented, joined by Justice Charles Johnson. He argued that the objection to the prejudicial nature of the testimony was preserved at the trial court, and that the testimony should not have been allowed because it was prejudicial, misleading, and of no value to the jury.

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Justice Richard Sanders has proposed new court rules for appointing counsel for indigent defendants. 

The proposed rules provide minimal standards to be satisfied before a judicial officer may appoint an attorney to render services to an indigent person. These standards are contained in the Standards for Indigent Defense Services as endorsed by the Washington State Bar Association.

In a Seattle Times opinion column, Justice Sanders argues that a public defender's high caseload, minimal support staff, low compensation and other factors can result in a violation of a defendant's constitutional right to effective counsel.

Although this is a national problem, here in Washington it is particularly acute since our state constitution in Article I, Section I, plainly states it is the very purpose of our government to "protect and maintain individual rights."

When judges appoint lawyers who can't get the job done, the fundamental purpose of our government is defeated. Unfortunately, our Supreme Court has set no standards to guide the trial court in making these appointments other than he or she be a lawyer.

The comment period for the proposed rules is open until April 30, 2009.

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In January the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims, in which Justice Richard Sanders chastized King County for its failure to comply with the Public Records Act, and provided guidelines for assessing the severity of penalties when a violation occurs.

Last month the Seattle Post-Intelligencer reported that Justice Sanders had his own separate, long-running public records case. Justice Sanders says he cleared his involvement in Yousoufian with the court's ethics expert, and that recusal was not required in this situation.

King County lawyers are now asking the Supreme Court to vacate the Yousoufian ruling. In a motion filed this morning, King County alleges that Justice Sanders “stood to personally gain” from that decision, and asks the court to replace Justice Sanders with a temporary justice to rehear the case.

We hope Yousoufian does not become an unfortunate casualty. The ruling has been hailed by open government experts for providing a much-needed analytical framework for reviewing government responses to citizen records requests. Mr. Yousoufian has been battling King County since the late 1990's, with two Supreme Court rulings to his name already. (Note: We filed an amicus brief in support of Mr. Yousoufian at an earlier stage of the case.)

What would happen if the court grants King County’s motion for a rehearing?

Hard to say. Sanders wrote the majority, which was signed by Justices Charles Johnson, James Johnson, and Fairhurst. Justice Chambers concurred with the majority’s analytical guidelines, but disagreed over whether the trial court judges abused their discretion as related to the penalty awarded Mr. Yousoufian. In addition to signing the majority, Justice James Johnson filed a concurrence, which Justice Sanders signed. Chief Justice Alexander separately concurred with the analytical guidelines, but dissented to the extent that Sanders ordered the trial court to impose penalty “at the high end of the penalty range.” Finally, Justices Owens and Madsen dissented, along with Justice Pro Tem Karen Seinfeld, protesting the “cumbersome multifactor test.” Justice Stephens did not participate.

Given the kaleidoscope of opinions, it’s difficult to predict an outcome if the Supreme Court granted a rehearing. Replacing Sanders, and assuming all other members ruled similarly, there are still five votes to uphold Yousoufian's analytical framework. And as I've noted elsewhere, Justice Stephens, who did not participate, seems to line up on the side of open government.

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The Court today issued opinions in two criminal cases and will hear argument in two cases.

Opinions

State v. Kirwin, No. 80113-4. Police arrested Dennis Kirwin for littering (he tossed a beer can out his truck window), then searched Kirwin's truck and found meth. State law makes littering only a civil infraction, which cannot result in an arrest, but Olympia deems it a misdemeanor. Kirwin challenged the city littering ordinance, arguing that it was unconstitutionally in conflict with the state statute. In a majority opinion by Justice Fairhurst and signed by Justices Alexander, C. Johnson, Chambers, Owens, and J. Johnson, the court upholds the ordinance and hence the arrest and the search. In a concurrence, Justice Madsen suggests that the ordinance may well be invalid under Article I, section 12, of the Washington State Constitution, but would not reach the question because it was not raised by Kirwin. Justice Sanders dissents, agreeing in part with Justice Madsen and disagreeing that the search was a lawful search incident to arrest. (Case briefs and argument.)

State v. Wright, No. 78465-5, & State v. Bryant, No. 78788-3 (consolidated). Justice Madsen writes for a six-member majority and holds that retrying defendants Wright and Bryant for murder is not barred by double jeopardy. "Because the defendants' convictions were reversed on grounds other than insufficient evidence, and because they have not been expressly or impliedly acquitted of intentional murder, they remain in the same jeopardy as attached at the first trial." Justice Sanders dissents, joined by Alexander and Chambers, arguing for a stronger interpretation of the double jeopardy clause. (Case briefs and arguments.)

Oral Arguments (briefs)

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Washington Supreme Court Justice Richard Sanders has responded to the Seattle Post-Intelligencer's article that said he could benefit from his ruling in Yousoufian v. Sims. Justice Sanders disputes the article's implications.

The truth, however, is another matter. I will not gain from the decision; the Court’s own ethics advisor advised I need not recuse myself on public record act cases and my vote was not determinative.

. . . As the court’s ethics advisor told me, just because a judge is getting a divorce is no reason for him to be disqualified on all divorce cases. And there is another ethical provision not mentioned which states it is the ethical duty of the judge to hear cases properly before him when disqualification is not required. In general recusals are discouraged except in clear instances where recusal is required. I have recused in many cases where I thought the rules required it, but didn’t need to here.

UPDATE: I'm a day late posting this, but the Court of Appeals hearing Justice Sanders' case says it does not have the authority to apply the Yousoufian ruling to his own case.

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In January, Justice Richard B. Sanders authored an opinion that provided trial courts guidelines for assessing the severity of penalties when public agencies violate the Public Records Act. Yousoufian v. Office of Sims, 200 P.3d 232 (2009).

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer reports today that Justice Sanders could benefit from the ruling in his own public records lawsuit. Experts are mixed on whether this is appropriate. Several law professors say Sanders should not have participated in the Yousoufian case. Sanders says the law applies equally to all people, even judges. Sanders also said the Supreme Court’s ethics expert told him in May 2006 it was not necessary to recuse himself from public records cases.

I’ll let other folks comment on the ethical implications, but it’s worth noting that Sanders has been a consistent advocate for open, transparent government, so it’s hard to say his opinion in Yousoufian was a departure motivated out of personal gain. For example:

• Hangartner v. City of Seattle, 151 Wash.2d 439 (2004). Supreme Court ruled that records requests can be overbroad, and attorney-client privilege applies to records requests. (Sanders dissented.)
• Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims, 152 Wash.2d 421 (2004). Supreme Court ruled trial courts must assess a per-day (but not per-record) penalty for each day a record is wrongfully withheld. (Sanders dissented, calling for per-record penalty.)
• Koenig v. City of Des Moines, 158 Wash.2d 173 (2006). Supreme Court ruled the father of a child victim of sexual assault was entitled to police department records related to victim's case. (Sanders wrote majority.)
• Soter v. Cowles Pub. Co., 162 Wash.2d 716 (2007) Supreme Court ruled a school district's investigation of a student death not subject to the Public Records Act (Sanders dissented.)
• Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue School Dist. #405, 164 Wash.2d 199 (2008). Supreme Court ruled the names of teachers alleged to have committed sexual misconduct against students are not subject to disclosure. (Sanders dissented.)

 UPDATE: Justice Sanders has responded to the P-I.

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Washington Supreme Court Justice Richard B. Sanders has an opinion piece in today's Seattle Times where he offers some words of advice to Attorney General Eric Holder. He urges Mr. Holder to respect the rule of law, and has some harsh words for the Bush Administration.

If the rule of law means anything, it must mean at least this: Those who act or are in positions of authority in our government are subject to the same laws as everyone else. This has been the American tradition, the crown jewel of a free society, a government of laws, not of men.

The Times editor notes that Justice Sanders made national headlines last year when he yelled "Tyrant!" at then-U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey during a dinner in Washington, D.C.

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