Opinions: claims for wrongful termination and discrimination in jury selection

Among the opinions released by the Supreme Court today:

Renner v. City of Marysville, No. 81959-9 (briefs and argument). Marc Renner was fired from his job as Network Administrator for the City of Marysville. The city cited misconduct and insubordination for the termination; Renner claimed he was fired for joining a union. Renner sued for wrongful termination, but failed to include 1) a specific damage amount, and 2) all of his addresses for the prior six months. The City successfully moved to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the filing requirements.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Charles Johnson writing, ruled in Renner’s favor and held that Renner “substantially complied” with the claim filing statute. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen filed a separate concurrence finding that Renner substantially complied in this particular case, but she cautioned that “in a given case simply stating the name of the claim without much more does not serve the purpose of former RCW 4.96.020(3).”

Justice Mary Fairhust dissented. “In the name of liberal construction and substantial compliance, the majority distorts the amount requirement of the claim filing statute,” she wrote. “By holding that it is sufficient to merely list all the available classes of damages, the majority undermines the legislature’s intent to encourage settlement.”

State v. Rhone, No. 80037-5 (briefs and argument). Theodore Rhone, an African-American, was charged with robbery, possession of a controlled substance, unlawful possession of a firearm, and bailjumping. During jury selection there were two African-Americans in the 41-member pool, one of whom was dismissed for cause. The other, “juror 19,” was removed by the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge. The question in the case is whether a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of the only African-American member in a trial of an African-American defendant amounts to a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial court concluded that Rhone had failed to establish a case of discrimination and did not require the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral explanation for his challenge of juror 19. Rhone was convicted on all counts.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Charles Johnson writing for a 4-vote lead opinion, upheld the conviction. The Court noted that under established case law, while a defendant has no right to a ‘jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race, the equal protection clause requires that a jury be composed of members who were selected by nondiscriminatory criteria.

The Court declined to recognize a bright line rule that a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose can be based on the mere dismissal of the only potential juror of the defendant’s race. The Court said Rhone could have presented a more complete argument to the trial court incorporating the totality of the circumstances involving the dismissal of juror 19, but that on appeal the Court will defer to the trial court’s ruling. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen filed a brief concurrence: “I agree with the lead opinion in this case. However, going forward, I agree with the rule advocated by the dissent.”

Justice Gerry Alexander, dissenting, wrote: “[W]e should adopt a bright line rule that a prima facie case of discrimination is established under [the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in] Batson when the sole remaining venire member of the defendant’s constitutionally cognizable racial group or the last remaining minority member of the venire is peremptorily challenged. I recognize that we have previously held that “a trial court is ‘not required to find a prima facie case [of discriminatory purpose] based on the dismissal of the only venire person from a constitutionally cognizable group, but they may, in their discretion, recognize a prima facie case in such instances.’” State v. Thomas, 166 Wn.2d 380, 397, 208 P.3d 1107 (2009) (quoting Hicks, 163 Wn.2d at 490) (alteration in original). Nevertheless, I am convinced that it makes sense to adopt the bright line rule ….”

Today's Arguments - October 22, 2009

Today the Court will hear oral argument in three cases, two in the morning and one in the afternoon. (Docket, briefs)

In the morning session, starting at 9:00 a.m., the Court will hear:

Shoemake v. Ferrer, No. 81812-6. On appeal from Division One Court of Appeals, this case originated in King County Superior Court. It concerns whether damages in a legal malpractice claim should be reduced because of a contingency fee agreement, and whether attorney fees can be awarded for acts of bad faith that happen prior to the start of litigation.

Andrea Shoemake was hit by a drunk driver and retained Douglas Ferrer to file a lawsuit for her, agreeing to give him a 40% contingency fee (i.e. Ferrer would get 40% of any damages). Ferrer filed the complaint, failed to appear for trial, and the case was dismissed. For eight years he told Shoemake that the case was simply backlogged in court. She eventually discovered the truth and sued for malpractice.

The Superior Court awarded damages to Shoemake for malpractice, but reduced the award by the 40% she would have paid to Ferrer. She also received attorney fees for the malpractice suit costs because Ferrer had acted in bad faith. The Court of Appeals reversed these two decisions, finding that Shoemake was not fully compensated if she had to pay Ferrer's 40% plus the costs for her new attorney, and finding that attorney fees cannot be awarded for bad faith acts that occur prior to the start of litigation.

Clayton v. Wilson, No. 81920-3. On appeal from Division One Court of Appeals, this case also originated in King County Superior Court. It concerns whether a couple's community property is liable for the intentional wrongful sexual acts of one spouse perpetrated on someone employed to take care of the community property.

Without his wife's knowledge, Mr. Wilson repeatedly sexually abused a neighbor boy, Andrew Clayton, whom he was paying to do yard work at the Wilson's home. When Mrs. Wilson found out she obtained a divorce and 90% of the community property. Clayton sued, and the entire community was found liable because the assaults occurred while Clayton was working for the community. 

The trial court also found evidence of fraud in the extremely lopsided division of marital property, and voided the transfer.

In the afternoon session, starting at 1:30 p.m., the Court will hear:

Renner v. City of Marysville, No. 81959-9. On appeal from Division One Court of Appeals, this case originated in Snohomish County Superior Court. The primary issue is whether a lawsuit can be dismissed if the originating party failed to include in his claim all the information required by the filing statute.

Renner was fired for misconduct from his job as Network Administrator for the City of Marysville. He sued for wrongful termination, but failed to include 1) a specific damage amount, and 2) his address for the prior six months. The City successfully moved to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the filing requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the Renner had substantially complied with the rules.