Today's Two Unanimous Opinions

Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Association, No. 81873-8. Woodcreek Condominiums feature units in both one- and two-story configurations. The Homeowners Association has over the years allowed some of the one-story owners to add a second story. When the Association allowed Glen Clausing to add a story to his one-story unit, his neighbor, Sandra Lake, sued both the Association and Clausing. She alleges violations of the Horizontal Property Regimes Act (HPRA) or Woodcreek's declaration (the legal  description of "the condominium properties and ... the covenants defining the property rights and legal obligations of the property owners").

Lake lost on summary judgment before the trial court, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the expansion of Clausing's unit encroached a common area (the air above his original unit) and thus required the unanimous consent of the condo owners. Today, the Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals and awards attorney fees to Clausing (the Association did not request attorney fees). The Court holds first that the HPRA does not require unanimous consent of the owners to allow part of a common area to be incorporated into a unit. It further holds that the HPRA does not require that the value of each unit stated in the declaration reflect fair market value, thus it was not necessary to amend the declaration when the size of Clausing's unit changed.

Justice Fairhurst wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. (briefs and argument)

State v. Jones, No. 82613-7.

The Court today grants a new trial to Christopher L. Jones on a charge of second degree rape. His 17-year-old niece accused him of forcible rape. The jury failed to return a verdict in his first trial, and before his second trial Jones requested to present evidence that the act was consensual during an "alcohol- and cocaine-fueled sex party" involving several other persons. The trial court ruled that the evidence was an attack on the alleged victim's credibility and so was prohibited by Washington's rape shield statute (

RCW 9A.44.020(2)

). The jury convicted Jones and he appealed.


In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Owens, the Court holds that the trial court violated Jones's right to present his defense.

This is not marginally relevant evidence that a court should balance against the State's interest in excluding the evidence. Instead, it is evidence of extremely high probative value; it is Jones's entire defense. Jones's evidence, if believed, would prove consent and would provide a defense to the charge of second degree rape. Since no State interest can possibly be compelling enough to preclude the introduction of evidence of high probative value, the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment when it barred such evidence.

The Court further holds that the rape shield statute applies only to past, not contemporary, acts and so does not apply here (though if it did, it still would not overcome Jones's Sixth Amendment rights). Because the error was not harmless, Jones must have a new trial. The Court also identifies two statements in the prosecutor's closing argument that violated Jones's Fifth Amendment rights. (briefs and argument)