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Proctor v. Huntington, No. 82326-0. Dusty Moss subdivided his property into a 27-acre parcel purchased by the Huntingtons and an adjacent 30-acre parcel purchased by Proctor. Both parties were confused about their common boundary line, partly because they relied on the word of a surveyor who was apparently mistaken. The Huntingtons eventually built a house, garage, and well--all on Proctor's land. They have lived there since 1996.

In 2004, Proctor had his parcel surveyed because he was concerned that a different neighbor was encroaching on his land. Because of this survey, both Proctor and the Huntingtons came to realize that the Huntington improvements were on Proctor's side of their boundary line. After unsuccessful negotiations, Proctor sued to quiet title and to eject the Huntingtons. The Huntingtons counterclaimed for adverse possession and estoppel in pais. The trial court declined to decide for either party, instead crafting an equitable remedy that required Proctor to sell the one acre containing the Huntingtons' improvements to the Huntingtons for the fair market value of the land ($25,000). Both parties appealed.

The Court, with an opinion by Justice Stephens and joined by Justices Owens, Fairhurst, Chambers, and Charles Johnson, upholds the decision below.

The trial court's equitable approach in this case fits comfortably within the good-faith-mistake line of cases, including Arnold and Bufford, in which equity allows a court to apply a liability rule in lieu of rote application of a property rule. Because the trial court's chosen remedy was proper under Bufford and Arnold, the Court of Appeals was right to affirm it.
...
In upholding the equitable remedy imposed by the trial court, we recognize the evolution of property law in Washington away from rigid adherence to an injunction rule and toward a more reasoned, flexible approach.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sanders, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alexander and James Johnson, accuses the majority of overruling Arnold and violating protections of private property rights. The dissent looks to the Arnold decision's five-part test and would find that the Huntingtons could not satisfy two of those elements and thus were not entitled to their equitable relief. (briefs, argument)

Segaline v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., No. 81931-9. The Court addresses whether a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was time barred and whether a state agency is a "person" under RCW 4.24.510. While the Court unanimously determines that the 1983 claim was time barred, it fractures over the state law issue.

Michael Segaline is an electrician whose behavior shocked, offended, and possibly frightened staff at the L&I office where Segaline obtained electrical permits. L&I staff tried several times to reach an understanding with Segaline about his behavior, but finally told him that he was no longer allowed in the office. Segaline was subsequently arrested for criminal trespass when he refused to leave the office; the charge was later dropped. Segaline sued, alleging negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, negligent supervision, and civil rights violations. He later moved to add the 1983 claim.

The trial court dismissed all Segaline's claims. It held the 1983 claim untimely filed and and determined that RCW 4.24.510, which protects "persons" who report information to government agencies, provided immunity to L&I. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The lead opinion, by Justice Sanders and joined by three other justices, finds the meaning of the word "person" ambiguous in the statute. However, because the purpose of the statute is to protect freedom of speech, and because government agencies have no such protection,

[i]t makes little sense to interpret "person" here so that an immunity, which the legislature enacted to protect one's free speech rights, extends to a government agency that has no such rights to protect.

The Chief Justice, in a written concurrence, disagrees with the lead opinion's rationale. She would instead reach the same result by looking to the history of anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statutes. Justice Charles Johnson, joined by three other justices, dissents and would hold that the immunity does extend to government agencies. (briefs, argument)

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Gold Star Resorts v. Futurewise and Whatcom County, No. 80810-4. Pursuant to the Growth Management Act (GMA), Whatcom County adopted a "comprehensive plan" in 1997. Two months after the plan was adopted, the legislature amended the GMA to include "limited areas of more intensive rural development" (LAMIRDs). The County revised its plan seven years later as required by the GMA. On March 25, 2005, the anti-growth organization Futurewise commenced this litigation by appealing the County's plan and related ordinances to the Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board.

Futurewise challenged that the plan violated the GMA by protecting the rights of certain rural private property owners to develop their land.

[Futurewise] argued that the County failed to update its comprehensive plan to bring it into conformity with the GMA's LAMIRD amendments in three ways: (1) the County adopted comprehensive plan policies that allow and encourage expansion of areas of more intensive growth in rural areas; (2) the plan contains descriptors for areas of more intensive rural development that do not comply with the GMA; and (3) the County established zoning designations ... that improperly apply beyond the logical boundaries of valid LAMIRDs.

Gold Star Resorts intervened because Futurewise's challenge might diminish Gold Star's property rights on a parcel Gold Star owns in Whatcom County adjacent to Interstate 5. The Hearings Board upheld five of the County's policies, but overturned a sixth because it allowed designating town boundaries "based on 'existing development'" in 2004 rather than being "restricted to the built environment as of July 1990." The Hearings Board also found that the County's criteria and analysis for determining the boundaries of LAMIRDs failed to satisfy the mandates of the GMA.

Gold Star petitioned for review and prevailed in superior court. The court determined that the Hearings Board had "improperly used a bright line rule of one residence per five acres" and that some of the issues had been litigated in a 1998 case. Futurewise appealed. The Court of Appeals overturned the lower court, holding that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied and that the Hearings Board had not used an impermissible "bright line rule."

Today, the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Madsen unanimously reaffirms its earlier decision in Thurston County v. Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (2008).

First.... Futurewise could challenge the portions of the County's comprehensive plan affected by the GMA amendments pertaining to LAMIRDs but, contrary to Futurewise's argument, could not challenge any and all aspects of the plan alleged to be noncompliant with the GMA.

The second holding in Thurston County that applies here is that when differentiating between urban and rural densities, the Board cannot employ bright line rules. Thus, the Board improperly relied in this case on a "one residence per five acre" rule.

The Court remands the case to the Hearings Board to reconsider Futurewise's claims without applying a bright line rule. The Court also requires Whatcom County to update its rural development criteria based on the LAMIRD provisions of GMA and to revise its comprehensive plan. Congratulations to the Pacific Legal Foundation, which filed an amicus brief in this case against the Hearings Board's use of a bright line rule. (argument and briefs)

After the jump: Ducote v. DSHS, No. 81714-6.

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Abbey Road Group, LLC, et al. v. City of Bonney Lake, No. 80878-3. Abbey Road Group intended to build a 575-unit condominium complex in Bonney Lake. On October 12, 2005, Abbey Road filed a site plan application ("Commercial or Multi-family Site Plan Review Application Form Type 3 Permit"). Later that day, the City passed an ordinance down-zoning Abbey Road's property from commercial to "Residential/Conservation District." Abbey Road appealed, alleging that their development rights had vested with the filing of the site plan application. The hearing examiner disagreed, finding that development rights could not vest until the filing of a building permit application (RCW 19.27.095). The Superior Court reversed and then the Court of Appeals reinstated the hearing examiner's ruling in favor of Bonney Lake.

The Court today upholds the Court of Appeals with a lead opinion by Justice Charles Johnson, joined by Justices Owens and Stephens. The opinion upholds the statutory rule and refuses to allow development rights to vest before the filing of a building permit. A concurrence by Justice Madsen, joined by Justice Fairhurst, suggests that Abbey Road should have prevailed if it had filed a building permit application at the same time it filed the site plan application, even though Bonney Lake indicates that a building permit application is only complete if it includes an approved site plan.

Justice Sanders dissents, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Chambers and James Johnson.

The problem with the lead and concurring opinions is not only that they come to the wrong conclusion, but they muddle and finesse an area of the law where certainty is critical. The State and localities have a great deal of discretion to determine by ordinance what the rules shall be. But the property owner has a constitutional right to proceed under current ordinances by submitting a complete building permit application to vest its rights at any time of its choosing. When the government prevents him from doing this, it deprives the developer of his property without due process of law.

(briefs and arguments, LibertyLive.org: Is land development really against the "public interest"?)

In Re Detention of Strand, No. 80570-9. In 1992, John Strand was convicted of first degree child molestation and resisting arrest and sentenced to 150 months imprisonment and 36 months in community placement. Prior to his release, the state conducted a mental health evaluation that was subsequently used as evidence to commit Strand under the State's sexually violent predator statute (RCW 71.09.025). Strand challenged the use of the mental health evaluation, alleging violations of the statute, violations of his right to counsel, and that the State failed to prove his statements were voluntary. The Court, in an opinion by Owens and joined by four other justices, rejects all of Strand's claims and upholds his commitment. Sanders, joined by three other justices, strongly dissents. (briefs and arguments).

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In 2004, King County adopted a "Clearing and Grading Critical Areas Ordinance" pursuant to Washington's Grown Management Act. The Ordinance would prevent the use of up to 65% of individual parcels of rural-zoned property. Five King County landowners and the Citizens Alliance for Property Rights (CAPR) sued the County and lost at the trial court.

On appeal, Division I Judge Ronald Cox reversed the trial court and held that King County's ordinance "imposes clearing requirements that are an in kind indirect tax, fee, or charge on development," falling afoul of RCW 82.02.020 and violating the proportionality requirement of Dolan v. City of Tigard.

Amidst yesterday's orders, the Supreme Court denied King County's appeal. The Seattle Times headline: "Big court victory for rural property owners."

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