Today's Opinions: Third-party custody petitions and describing meth

Posted on February 25, 2010 by Trent England

In re Custody of E.A.T.W. and E.Y.W., No. 81945-9. Was the superior court right to grant a hearing for a custody petition based only on the fact that the children had lived with the petitioning grandparents for several years? The Court of Appeals had overturned the superior court, and the Supreme Court today upholds the Court of Appeals. The High Court holds that RCW 26.10.032 imposes on third party petitioners the duty of setting forth facts that would show “that the parent is unfit or placement with the parent would result in actual detriment to the child's growth and development.”

The unanimous opinion, written by Justice James Johnson, goes on to hold that this standard is in accord with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville.

In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court affirmed this court's judgment in In re Custody of Smith that constitutionally protected parental rights were violated by a statute allowing a nonparent to wrest custody of a child from a parent based solely on the court's findings regarding the child's best interests. Something more is required than the court's judgment that it could make a better decision than parents concerning the upbringing of children.

(Briefs, Argument-May 28, 2009)

State v. Sibert, No. 79509-6. Richard Sibert was convicted by a jury in 2004 of four crimes related to the sale of methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, and Sibert appeals on three alleged errs:  1) failure of the trial court to include the identity of the “controlled substance” on part of the jury instructions; 2) failure to prove the identity of the controlled substance; 3) an inappropriate jury instruction on “knowledge.”

Today the Court upholds Sibert’s conviction and sentencing. It finds that throughout the trial, everyone involved understood that the controlled substance was methamphetamine. Further, the jury instructions incorporated by reference the charging documents that identified the substance as methamphetamine. It also upholds the instruction on “knowledge,” which the trial court took directly from the Washington Practice.

Justice James Johnson also wrote this majority opinion, but Justices Sanders and Alexander both authored dissents, the latter joined by Justices Charles Johnson and Debra Stephens. The Chief concurred with the majority, but as to the result only. The four dissenting justices would hold prosecutors to a higher standard, in this case requiring a more explicit and precise description of the controlled substance.

(Briefs, Argument-February 10, 2009)

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Today's Opinion: A squeeze too far

Posted on May 28, 2009 by Trent England

State v. Garvin, No. 80941-1. His car had seen better days when, on October 21, 2005, Anthony Garvin was pulled over for a shattered windshield and inoperable brake lights. During the stop, Union Gap Police Officer Gregory Cobb noticed that the car's ignition was broken; Garvin had a knife on the passenger seat that he was using in place of a key. Officer Cobb and his partner removed Cobb from the car and performed a "pat-down" search, ostensibly a "Terry stop" according to Terry v. Ohio (a 1968 U.S. Supreme Court case permitting police to conduct a cursory, warantless search of a person who is believed to be "armed and presently dangerous.")

During the search, a "dime bag" of methamphetamine was found in the coin pocket of Garvin's jeans. He was arrested and subsequently convicted for drug possession. Garvin appealed, challenging the legality of the search; the Court of Appeals held that the search was a legal Terry stop and affirmed the conviction.

Justice Sanders, for a unanimous Court, holds that the search "exceeded the permissible scope of a limited Terry stop-and-frisk" and reverses the conviction.

We hold it is unlawful for officers to continue squeezing -- whether in one slow motion or several -- after they have determined a suspect does not have a weapon, to find whether the suspect is carrying drugs or other contraband. If that were permissible, there would be little to distinguish a frisk incident to a Terry stop from a general search for contraband, and we strongly disapprove of such legal fiction. Indeed, one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement would swallow the rule.

(case briefs and argument)

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