State v. Engel, No. 81072-9. Roger Engel was convicted of second-degree burglary after stealing some wheels from a large private yard that was partially enclosed by a fence and partially bordered by sloping terrain. Burglary in the second degree requires entering or remaining in a “building.” RCW 9A.52.030. A “building” is defined to include a “fenced area.” RCW 9A.04.110(5). Engel challenged his conviction, claiming the yard was not a “fenced area” under the statute. The business premises Engel entered covered seven or eight acres and included several buildings and a large yard. The entrance to the property was gated. One-third of the property, including the side fronting the road, was fenced by chain link fence with barbed wire on the top. The rest of the property was not fenced, including the edge of the property near the stock piles. Beyond the gravel piles was is a “pretty sizeable drop-off, a hill that goes down.” Two-thirds of the property was encased by ‘banks, high banks, [and] sloping banks.” Directly adjacent to the property was a separate business, but no fence or gate separated the two properties.

The Supreme Court agreed with Engel’s argument, with Justice James Johnson writing the unanimous opinion. “Upholding an overly broad definition of ‘fenced area’ would extend criminal liability beyond what is warranted by the plain language of the statute, as understood in the context of the common law. Therefore, the Court of Appeals decision affirming Engel’s conviction is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and dismiss the charge.” (briefs and argument).

In re Detention of Anderson, No. 79111-2 (briefs and argument). John Charles Anderson was committed as a sexually violent predator based on his conduct while at Western State Hospital, and he appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it (1) admitted statements he made during his treatment at Western State Hospital; (2) found he committed a recent "overt act"; and (3) refused to allow his chosen expert's testimony. The Court of Appeals (Div. II) reversed the commitment and ordered a new trial.

McAllister v. Bellevue Firemen’s Pension Board, No. 81187-3 (briefs and argument). David and Ken McAllister were firefighters in Bellevue, and contributed to a city pension plan. Under this plan, pension benefits were based on firefighters’ salaries, but when calculating benefits, the salaries were considered to be capped at the battalion chief level. David and Ken were Chief and Deputy Chief when they retired, so the pension cap would have applied to them. In 1969, Washington State replaced local pension plans with a single state plan for all firefighters and police. Under this plan salaries are not capped. The state plan provided that if a firefighter would have received higher benefits under a local plan, the local government was responsible to make up the difference. In accordance with this provision, the City of Bellevue made additional payments to the McAllisters. But in calculating the McAllister’s benefits under the city plan, the city did not cap their salaries as the city plan required. When this was discovered, the city reduced its payments to match what the McAllisters should been receiving, but did not require back payments. The McAllisters sued, and lost at trial and on appeal.

State v. Engel, No. 81072-9 (briefs and argument). Roger Engel was convicted of second-degree burglary. After the Court of Appeals (Div. I) upheld his conviction, he appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that to support a conviction for burglary, the State had to prove that Mr. Engel unlawfully entered a building, which is defined to include a “fenced area.” Mr. Engel was convicted for unlawfully entering the yard of Western Asphalt Company, which was only fenced on one-third of its border. Mr. Engel argues that a yard only partially enclosed by a fence cannot be a “building” as defined by the burglary statutes. See RCW 9A.04.110(5).

In the morning session, starting at 9:00 a.m., the Court will hear:

McAllister v. Bellevue Firemen’s Pension Board, No. 81187-3. Whether the City of Bellevue properly calculated retiree’s pension benefits. David and Ken McAllister were firefighters in Bellevue, and contributed to a city pension plan. Under this plan, pension benefits were based on firefighters’ salaries, but when calculating benefits, the salaries were considered to be capped at the battalion chief level. David and Ken were Chief and Deputy Chief when they retired, so the pension cap would have applied to them. In 1969, Washington State replaced local pension plans with a single state plan for all firefighters and police. Under this plan salaries are not capped. The state plan provided that if a firefighter would have received higher benefits under a local plan, the local government was responsible to make up the difference.

In accordance with this provision, the City of Bellevue made additional payments to the McAllisters. But in calculating the McAllister’s benefits under the city plan, the city did not cap their salaries as the city plan required. When this was discovered, the city reduced its payments to match what the McAllisters should been receiving, but did not require back payments. The McAllisters sued, and lost at trial and on appeal.

Federal Way School District 210 v. State, No. 80943-7. Whether the Legislature is constitutionally compelled to equalize state allocations to school districts for school employee salaries. The Washington Constitution states that “The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.” Art. IX, § 2. Historically, the state pays different amounts per teacher to different school districts, based in part on the salary levels of those districts when the system was initiated. The Federal Way School District, individual teachers, and students sued the state, claiming that this unequal funding violates the constitution because it is not “general and uniform.” The King County Superior Court agreed, finding that the differences in funding had no relation to differences in education costs. The state counters that its constitutional duty is to create a common education system, not to guarantee precisely equal funding to every district. This case is on direct appeal from superior court.

In the afternoon session, starting at 1:00 p.m., the Court will hear:

In re Fiona A. Crinks Kennedy, No. 200,682-5. The Washington State Bar Association requests an interim suspension of attorney Fiona A. Crinks Kennedy pending cooperation with the Bar’s disciplinary investigation.

State v. Eaton, No. 81348-5. Thomas Eaton was arrested for DUI and taken to the Clark County jail. When he was searched at the jail, the officers found a bag of meth taped to his sock. At trial, Eaton was convicted of DUI and drug possession. The trial court gave him an enhanced sentence based on possession of drugs within a correctional facility. Eaton disputed this enhancement because he had not chosen to take the drugs to jail, but the trial court held that the statute does not require that the possession within prison be voluntary.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that an “element of volition” is required for crimes, and that punishing Eaton for involuntary possession within a prison would be absurd. The state counters that the statute should be read literally, and that volition is not necessary for a sentence enhancement. The state now appeals, and the Supreme Court will determine whether a defendant’s sentence can be enhanced for an involuntary act under RCW 9.94A.533(5)(c).