Today's opinions: July 22, 2010

Broom v. Morgan Stanley, No. 82311-1 (briefs and argument). The Supreme Court held that an arbitration panel erred by applying state statutes of limitations to bar the a claim. Michael, Kevin, and Andrea Broom sued Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. for mismanaging an investment account. Their claims were rejected by an arbitration panel because they were barred by the statute of limitations. The Brooms appealed to King County Superior Court, and the court held that statute of limitations in Washington do not apply to claims in arbitration. The court vacated the arbitration panel’s decision as an error of law. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) affirmed. Morgan Stanley argues both that statutes of limitations do apply to arbitration, and that courts cannot vacate arbitration decisions because of “errors of law.” The Supreme Court, with Justice Charles Johnson writing, affirmed the Court of Appeals. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen dissented.

Little Mtn. Estates Tenants Ass’n v. Little Mtn. Estates MHC LLC, No. 82574-2 (briefs and argument). The Supreme Court held that under the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA), chapter 59.20 RCW, a landlord and tenant can lawfully agree to a 25-year lease that will convert to a one-year lease if the tenant assigns it. Mobile home tenants and association brought an action against the mobile home park, alleging that leases violated the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA) and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The trial court ruled for the park. Writing for the majority, Justice Richard Sanders said that the MHLTA preserves the right of a landlord and tenant to negotiate and agree to the term of a rental agreement and thus the provision does not violate the MHLTA. Justice Gerry Alexander wrote a dissenting opinion.

Sound Infiniti v. Snyder, No. 81923-8 (briefs and argument). Richard Snyder, David Hannah, and Afshin Pisheyar were joint owners (as shareholders) of Sound Infiniti and Infiniti of Tacoma. They had a falling out, and Pisheyar sued the others individually and on behalf of the corporation (a derivative suit). Snyder and Hannah set up a reverse stock split to take away all of Pisheyar's stocks. The trial court allowed the split to proceed after an initial injunction, and dismissed Pisheyar's derivative suit because he was no longer a shareholder. The Court of Appeals confirmed the ruling, and found that the sole remedy for all Pisheyar's claims is the appraisal process, in which he can obtain fair market value for the shares that were taken away. The Supreme Court agreed, with Justice Susan Owens writing the majority opinion. The court held: (1) that the appraisal proceeding in RCW 23B.13.020 is a dissenting shareholder’s exclusive remedy unless a corporate action is procedurally defective or fraudulent and (2) that a divested shareholder does not have standing in a derivative suit. Justice Sanders wrote a dissenting opinion.

State v. Harvill, No. 82358-8 (briefs and argument). At trial, Joshua Harvill claimed that he sold the drugs because he was afraid of the informer. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the defense of duress because there was no evidence that the informer had threatened Harvill. The trial court did instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment, and the jury rejected the defense. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the duress defense. The court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Justice Debra Stephens wrote the opinion.

State v. Nonog, No. 82094-5 (briefs and argument). Cipriano Bahit Nonog was convicted in King County Superior Court of felony violation of a domestic violence protection order, residential burglary-domestic violence, and interfering with domestic violence reporting. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) upheld the conviction, and ruled that the information charging the defendant sufficiently defined the charges. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision below, with Justice Debra Stephens writing the unanimous opinion.

Tomorrow's opinions: July 22, 2010

The Supreme Court will issue opinions in several cases tomorrow.

Broom v. Morgan Stanley, No. 82311-1 (briefs and argument). Michael, Kevin, and Andrea Broom sued Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. for mismanaging an investment account. Their claims were rejected by an arbitration panel because they were barred by the statute of limitations. The Brooms appealed to King County Superior Court, and the court held that statute of limitations in Washington do not apply to claims in arbitration. The court vacated the arbitration panel’s decision as an error of law. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) affirmed. Morgan Stanley argues both that statutes of limitations do apply to arbitration, and that courts cannot vacate arbitration decisions because of “errors of law.”

Little Mtn. Estates Tenants Ass’n v. Little Mtn. Estates MHC LLC, No. 82574-2 (briefs and argument). Mobile home tenants and association brought an action against the mobile home park, alleging that leases violated the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA) and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The trial court ruled for the park. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) affirmed the ruling in part, and reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Sound Infiniti v. Snyder, No. 81923-8 (briefs and argument). This case concerns what remedies are available to a minority shareholder whose shares are taken away, and whether that shareholder can bring a derivative suit against the corporation after he has lost his shareholder status. Richard Snyder, David Hannah, and Afshin Pisheyar were joint owners (as shareholders) of Sound Infiniti and Infiniti of Tacoma. They had a falling out, and Pisheyar sued the others individually and on behalf of the corporation (a derivative suit). Snyder and Hannah set up a reverse stock split to take away all of Pisheyar's stocks. The trial court allowed the split to proceed after an initial injunction, and dismissed Pisheyar's derivative suit because he was no longer a shareholder. The Court of Appeals confirmed the ruling, and found that the sole remedy for all Pisheyar's claims is the appraisal process, in which he can obtain fair market value for the shares that were taken away. The Association of Washington Businesses filed an amicus brief supporting Snyder.

State v. Harvill, No. 82358-8 (briefs and argument). At trial, Joshua Harvill claimed that he sold the drugs because he was afraid of the informer. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the defense of duress because there was no evidence that the informer had threatened Harvill. The trial court did instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment, and the jury rejected the defense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Div. 2) noted that if the elements of duress had been proved, then the contested elements of entrapment would also have been proved. Since the jury rejected entrapment, it would also have rejected duress even had the instruction been given. Thus, even if the lack of a duress instruction was in error, it did not prejudice Harvill.

State v. Nonog, No. 82094-5 (briefs and argument). Cipriano Bahit Nonog was convicted in King County Superior Court of felony violation of a domestic violence protection order, residential burglary-domestic violence, and interfering with domestic violence reporting. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) upheld the conviction, and ruled that the information charging the defendant sufficiently defined the charges.

New cases accepted UPDATED

The Washington Supreme Court has agreed to review several new cases.

  • Little Mtn. Estates Tenants Ass’n v. Little Mtn. Estates MHC LLC, No. 82574-2
  • State v. Afana, No. 82600-5
  • State v. Osman, No. 82671-4
  • State v. Hall, No. 82558-1
  • State v. Jones, No. 82613-7
  • State v. Patel, No. 82649-8
  • McGuire v. Bates, No. 82659-5

Case details after the jump:

Little Mtn. Estates Tenants Ass’n v. Little Mtn. Estates MHC LLC, No. 82574-2. Mobile home tenants and association brought an action against the mobile home park, alleging that leases violated the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA) and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The trial court ruled for the park. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) affirmed the ruling in part, and reversed in part, and remanded the caes for further proceedings.

State v. Afana, No. 82600-5. The question here is whether a police officer unconstitutionally seized a driver and passenger in a legally parked car when the officer approached and requested identification. Here, Deputy Miller approached Joseph Afana's car and asked Mr. Afana and his passenger, Jennifer Bergeron, what they were doing and requested identification. After Mr. Afana began to drive away, Deputy Miller discovered a warrant for Ms. Bergeron and stopped the car. A search incident to Ms. Bergeron's arrest uncovered illegal drugs. The trial court suppressed this evidence, concluding that Ms. Bergeron was unlawfully seized when Deputy Miller asked for identification. The Court of Appeals (Div. 3) disagreed, ruling that the officer’s request for identification did not constitute a seizure. The appeals court reversed the suppression of the drug evidence.

State v. Osman, No. 82671-4. Abdinasir Osman was convicted in a jury trial of driving while under the influence of alcohol. In preparing Osman's appeal, his attorney discovered that a portion of the electronic record from the pretrial hearing was missing. Osman argued he was entitled to a new trial because of the missing portion of the record. The Superior Court ordered a new trial. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals (Div. I) held the missing portion of the record was not so significant as to warrant a new trial.

State v. Hall, No. 82558-1. Whether convictions for tampering with a witness violate double jeopardy.  Isiah Hall was initially charged with burglary and assault. The prosecution later amended the charging document to add several counts of tampering with a witness, when it was discovered that Hall attempted to convince his girlfriend to either refuse to testify or to testify falsely. Hall was convicted of several crimes including three counts of tampering with a witness. Hall appealed, arguing that multiple counts of tampering with a witness violated the double jeopardy clause. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) affirmed the convictions, holding that the unit of prosecution for tampering with a witness is any one instance of attempting to induce a witness or a person to do any of the actions set forth in RCW 9A.72.120.

State v. Jones, No. 82613-7. Christopher Jones was convicted of the second degree rape of his niece, K.D. The trial court imposed an exceptional minimum term sentence based on a jury finding that Mr. Jones abused a position of trust to commit the offense. The Court of Appeals (Div. III) upheld the conviction, but reversed the exceptional minimum sentence because of errors on the jury instruction form. The court ordered a new sentencing proceeding.

State v. Patel, No. 82649-8. Mitel Patel challenged his conviction for attempted second degree rape of a child. On appeal, Mr. Patel contended that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress transcripts of his instant messaging conversations with an undercover detective posing as a fictitious 13-year-old girl, and (2) denying his motion to dismiss for failure to prove an essential element of the crime. The Court of Appeals (Div. III) affirmed Mr. Patel's conviction.

McGuire v. Bates, No. 82659-5. Whether attorneys fees can be recovered in addition to a settlement amount. In May 2005, Julianne McGuire hired Robert Bates, B & H Construction Services, Inc. to remodel her kitchen. Bates completed the work in September 2005. A few months later, McGuire noticed water stains and other problems resulting from the remodel. McGuire reported the defects to Bates who denied any responsibility after inspecting the property. McGuire hired another contractor who repaired the defects for $2,166.00. After the matter was transferred to mandatory arbitration, Bates offered in writing to settle “all claims” for $2,180.00 pursuant to RCW 4.84.250-.280. McGuire accepted. McGuire then moved for attorney fees, claiming she was entitled to such an award as the prevailing party under RCW 18.27.040. The arbitrator denied the motion, ruling that the parties' agreement to settle “all claims” necessarily included attorney fees. On appeal, the trial court ruled in McGuire’s favor, awarding her attorneys fees, and the Court of Appeals (Div. I) affirmed the ruling.