Today's Opinions: City of Aberdeen v. Regan

Posted on September 30, 2010 by Trent England

City of Aberdeen v. Regan, No. 82476-2. Francis Regan was convicted of fourth degree assault in Aberdeen Municipal Court. The Court sentenced him to 365 days in jail, but suspended 360 days of the sentence in favor of placing Regan on probation for 24 months. A condition of Regan's probation required that he have no "criminal violations of law...."

During his probation, Regan was charged, tried, and acquitted for fourth degree assault and criminal trespass. The city moved to revoke his probation; Regan argued that the city was collaterally estopped by the acquittal. The municipal court revoked 5 days of Regan's suspension. He appealed and the superior court reversed; the city appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the ruling of the municipal court.

The Supreme Court accepted review of the case to consider whether a probation condition requiring no "criminal violations of law" requires a court

to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed a crime or find that the defendant has been convicted of a crime before the court may revoke the suspension?

The Court today affirms the Court of Appeals. Probation is "not a 'matter of right but is a matter of grace, privilege, or clemency granted to the deserving.'" In Regan's case, his probation included a condition that "unambiguously restrict[ed him] from engaging in conduct that is proscribed by the criminal law." Because the standard in probation hearings is "reasonable satisfaction," the acquittal (based on the higher "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard) did not estop the city from finding Regan in violation of his probation. The majority opinion is written by Justice Fairhurst and joined by four other justices.

Justice Alexander, joined by Justices Chambers and James Johnson, finds the majority's position in agreement with the Court's precedent and reluctantly concurrs.

My aversion to the result stems from my view that it is somewhat unfair for a city to seek revocation of Francis Regan's probation for noncompliance with a condition that he have "[n]o criminal violations of law" when Regan was acquitted in that same court of criminal charges that arose from facts identical to those that led to revocation of his probation.

Justice Sanders dissents. He would find the language ambiguous, apply the rule of lenity, and reinstate the decision of the superior court. (briefs, argument)

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Today's Opinions: Lenity and Law Enforcement Officers

Posted on October 29, 2009 by Trent England

Seattle v. Winebrenner/Seattle v. Quezada, No. 81279-9. Both Scott Winebrenner and Jesus Quezada were arrested multiple times for driving under the influence. Each had a deferred prosecution agreement from one arrest which they violated with a subsequent arrest. The question is whether the subsequent offense constituted a "prior offense" at the time of sentencing. The Court holds that RCW 46.61.5055's use of "prior offense" is ambiguous because it is "subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." The rule of lenity requires "that an ambiguous criminal statute cannot be interpreted to increase the penalty imposed." The Court unanimously holds that offenses committed after the original offense are not "prior offenses" and cannot be considered at sentencing for the original offense. Justice Chambers wrote the lead opinion. Justice Madsen, joined by Justices Charles Johnson and Fairhurst, concurs in the result but believes the statute unambiguously requires it. (briefs and argument)

Kitsap County Deputy Sheriff's Guild, et al. v. Kitsap County, et al., No. 80720-5. Kitsap County Sheriff's Deputy Brian LaFrance was fired after he allegedly became unstable and dishonest with his superiors. The County had previously entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Deputy Sheriff's Guild that allowed the Guild to file a grievance and put the matter into binding arbitration. The arbitrator found that the county had proven the 29 charges against LaFrance but had not shown that dismissal was the appropriate remedy and ordered his reinstatement. It did not order back pay, but did require that he be provided retroactively the benefits that he would have received if he had remained a deputy and unemployment benefits.

The Guild alleges that because the arbitrator ordered LaFrance's reinstatement, the County is obligated to pay LaFrance's back pay. The County challenges that the arbitrator's order is unenforceable because it "violate[s] an explicit, well defined, and dominant public policy." The Court today, in an opinion by Justice Owens, holds that even if "the arbitrator's decision was not good public policy," the County failed to show that it contravened a clear public policy. Collective bargaining agreements and arbitration clauses, the Court suggested, should be deferred to where possible to protect parties' freedom of contract. The Court also upholds the arbitrator's refusal to provide back pay to LaFrance.

Justice James Johnson dissents, finding a sufficient public policy interest exemplified in the law enforcement officer's "oath to truly, faithfully, and impartially perform his duties," that he would overturn the arbitrator's decision to reinstate LaFrance. He is joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Pro Tem. Teresa Kulik. (briefs and argument)

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