Today the Court will hear arguments in four cases dealing with criminal procedure, public records, preemption, and the Growth Management Act. (docket, case briefs)
In the morning session, starting at 9:00 a.m., the Court will hear:
State v. Magee, No. 81746-4. On appeal from the Division Two Court of Appeals, this case originated in Pierce County Superior Court. The case concerns whether a police officer had authority to issue a ticket for a traffic infraction that was not committed in the officer's presence.
In driving to help a friend whose car had stalled on a freeway, Andrew Magee made a U-turn on an on-ramp, parking his car backwards on the shoulder to be nose-to-nose with the other car. A state trooper responded to a report of a car driving backwards, and upon seeing Magee's car she assumed it was him, issuing him a traffic citation. Magee argued there was insufficient evidence to prove the infraction, and that the trooper had no authority to issue the ticket because she didn't see him driving backwards. Both the Superior Court and Appeals Court upheld the conviction.
Yousoufian v. Ron Sims, No. 80081-2. An open records case that has gone up and down the court system for the past ten years, the final issue in Yousoufian was settled by the Court in January. But Justice Sanders, who wrote the majority opinion, was determined to have a conflict of interest and King County asked for this rehearing. Both Sanders and Justice Stephens are recused from the argument.
The Court will review the appropriate level of penalties for King County's gross negligence in providing public records to Yousoufian. Justice Sanders' original decision also provided a long-desired framework for how judges should set penalties in public records cases. He was joined by five other justices in this part of his decision.
In the afternoon session, starting at 1:30 p.m., the Court will hear:
Gold Star Resorts v. Futurewise and Whatcom County, No. 80810-4. This case is on appeal from Division One Court of Appeals, originating from a Growth Management Hearings Board decision reviewed by the Whatcom County Superior Court. The questions before the Court concern whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel (preventing litigation of the same question twice) apply in land use cases, and whether the Growth Management Board improperly established a bright-line rule about the density of homes allowed in rural residential areas.
Futurewise challenged Whatcom's land use plan as noncompliant with the Growth Management Act, arguing that the rural density levels were too high and that some limited areas of "intensive rural development" were too large. Gold Star would have been harmed if Futurewise won, so it intervened in the case, arguing that the "intensive rural development" issue had already been found to comply with the Growth Management Act in a prior Futurewise case, and that Futurewise was barred from re-litigating the same issue again (violating res judicata).
Gold Star also argues that the Growth Management Board cannot impose a bright-line standard for permissible rural densities, since local governments are given broad discretion in the Growth Management Act to tailor their plans to the particular needs of their communities.
Lawson v. City of Pasco, No. 81636-1. This case is on appeal from Division Three Court of Appeals, and arose in Franklin County Superior Court. The question before the Court is whether the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act preempts a city's ordinance banning the use of recreational vehicles as permanent homes in mobile home parks.
Paul Lawson owns a mobile home park in Pasco, and has at least one tenant who uses a fifth-wheel as a permanent home. Pasco has an ordinance preventing this use of a recreational vehicle, and ordered Lawson to evict all such tenants. Lawson defends on the basis that the Landlord-Tenant Act allows the use, and that the Act preempts the City's ordinance.
Lawson v. City of Pasco, No. 81636-1. Paul Lawson owns and operates a mobile home park in the City of Pasco. The City issued Lawson a citation for permitting one of his tenants to live in an RV, which violated a city ordinance. Lawson challenged that the ordinance was preempted by state law, specifically the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA, RCW 59.20). The trial court found for Lawson, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
