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The Supreme Court issued opinions in two cases today.

State v. Hecht, No. 86078-5. The Supreme Court rules that a former judge is entitled to public assistance in his appeal after he was convicted of patronizing a prostitute.

Shortly after being elected as a Pierce County Superior Court Judge, Michael Hecht was convicted of felony harassment and patronizing a prostitute. On appeal he requested an order of indigency in order to receive public funds for his representation on appeal. The trial court denied Hecht’s motion for an order of indigency. The Supreme Court, in an unsigned opinion, holds that Hecht is “presumptively indigent” because he receives food stamp benefits, and may be entitled to some assistance on appeal. RCW 10.101.010(1)(a). The court remanded the case to the trial court for further consideration.

In re the Detention of Danforth, No. 841527. Robert Danforth is a sex offender with a history of offenses against young boys, including rape. In 2006, he went to the King County Sheriff’s Office and said that he was going to reoffend unless he was taken into custody. He said that if he was not confined he would go to a bus stop and try to have sex with boys, and also that he would go to an arcade where young boys were and “rub up against them.” He was taken into custody and committed as a sexually violent predator. This required proof that he was currently dangerous “with evidence of a recent overt act.” Overt acts can include some threats.

Danforth argues that his statements were not “threats” because his motive was to prevent harm, not cause it, and that using his statements against him would violate his free speech rights under the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals held that his statements were a threat, irrespective of motive, and rejected his First Amendment argument.

In a three-vote lead opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. Justice James Johnson wrote: “A reasonable jury could find that Danforth committed a threat when he gave explicit descriptions of his plans to molest boys at a bus stop and have intercourse with a child at a mall video arcade. Danforth repeatedly said that he would act on his plan if not committed as a sex offender. Former RCW 71.09.030(5), as defined by former RCW 71.09.020(10), is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. Former RCW 71.09.030(5) satisfies our due process requirement that the State show an offender is presently dangerousness before he or she is involuntarily committed. We affirm the summary judgment here.”

Justice Tom Chambers concurred in part and dissented in part, while Justice Charles Wiggins wrote a dissenting opinion.

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Freeman v. Gregoire, No. 83349-4. A coalition of taxpayers petitioned the Supreme Court to issue either a writ of prohibition or a writ of mandamus against Gov. Christine Gregoire and Secretary of Transportation Paula Hammond, prohibiting them from taking any further actions to convert traffic lanes of the I-90 Lake Washington Bridge to light rail.

The Washington State Constitution, article II, section 40, creates a special fund related to motor vehicle transportation.

All fees collected by the State of Washington as license fees for motor vehicles and all excise taxes collected by the State of Washington on the sale, distribution or use of motor vehicle fuel and all other state revenue intended to be used for highway purposes, shall be paid into the state treasury and placed in a special fund to be used exclusively for highway purposes.

In 2009, the Legislature passed and Gov. Gregoire signed a transportation budget that included an appropriation of $300,000 from the motor vehicle fund to pay for a study "methodologies to value the reversible lanes on Interstate 90 to be used for [light rail]." The legislation also stated the legislature's commitment to "construction of sound transit's east link." Pursuant to the appropriation, DOT spent $250,000 of motor vehicle fund money to begin the process of appraising the existing lanes so that the ownership of those lanes can be transfered from the DOT to Sound Transit.

The taxpayer petitioners argue that the appropriation and expenditure violate article II, section 40. Because the legislature's intent is to proceed with the transfer of the highway lanes in order to build light rail, the motor vehicle funds are not being used for highway purposes. The DOT counters that the valuation study falls within "administration of the public highways," which is part of the constitutional definition of "highway purposes."

The Court yesterday sided with the Department of Transportation and refused to view the legislature's intent to proceed with light rail as a mandate on the Department.

The valuation allows DOT to explore the feasibility of transferring or leasing the center lanes of I-90 to accommodate light rail mass transit. And as noted above, DOT has specific statutory authority to transfer highway lands, and the decision of whether to transfer or lease lands is inherently a function of the administration of highway property. Since the expenditure serves an administrative function, the expenditure "indirectly benefits" our public highways and is lawful under article II, section 40.

The Court further holds that petitioners requested writ is too broad and that, as such, it would be impossible for the Court to ensure that it was enforced. Justice Charles Johnson wrote for the Court and was joined by the Chief Justice; Justices Chambers, Owens, and Stephens; and Justice Pro Tem. Karen Seinfeld. 

Justice Alexander authored a concurrence, which Justice Pro Tem. Seinfeld also signed, noting that while the constitutional protection is clear, the funds have also already been expended. The concurrence also agrees with the majority that the requested writ is too broad.

Justice James Johnson dissents and is joined by Justice Pro Tem. Saunders. The dissent points out that the constitutional provision here, both on its face and as interpreted in previous cases, prohibits expending motor vehicle funds on mass transit projects. Regardless of which entity is actually spending the money, if the money comes from the motor vehicle fund, its uses are proscribed; even the promise of future reimbursement is irrelevant.

The people adopted a constitutional provision in article II, section 40, prohibiting the use of vehicle fees and excise taxes for anything other than highway purposes. In the wake of this constitutional provision, gas taxes have continued to rise and license fees, though limited by initiative, raise millions of dollars for the state. The people have tolerated or authorized such taxes in the past predicated on the constitutional promise that the revenues collected by the state through such taxes and fees will be used exclusively for highway purposes. Because the legislature has broken that constitutional promise and the majority declines to enforce it, I dissent.

Justice Fairhurst and Justice Wiggins did not participate. (briefs, argument)

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Burton v. Twin Commander Aircraft, No. 83030-4. The Supreme Court ruled that an action against Twin Commander, an airplane manufacturer, was time barred. A crash occurred in Mexico in May 2004, killing seven government agents on board. Kenneth Burton, personal representative of the decedents’ estates, filed a wrongful death action against Twin Commander. Twin Commander moved to a decision on the basis of the General Aviation Revitalization Act. The law bars actions against aircraft manufacturers if the accident occurs 18 years after delivery of the aircraft to the first purchaser. The trial court ruled in Twin Commander’s favor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that Twin Commander has failed to prove that it is a “manufacturer” of the aircraft, and was thus covered by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Barbara Madsen writing, reversed the Court of Appeals. Justice Debra Stephens and two others dissent.

In re PRP of Carlos John Williams, No. 84711-8. Carlos Williams, an inmate at Monroe Correctional Center, filed two civil complaints for monetary damages against the Department of Corrections, claiming cruel and unusual punishment and racial discrimination. The superior court treated both actions as postconviction challenges and referred them to the Court of Appeals for consideration as personal restraint petitions. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions as improperly seeking monetary relief. The Supreme Court (in a per curiam decision) reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the trial court to treat Williams’ actions as civil complaints.

State v. Simms, No. 83826-7. Daniel Simms was convicted (among other things) of robbery, with sentence enhancement for use of a firearm. Because Simms had a previous conviction of assault with a firearm enhancement in 2000, the court doubled the firearm enhancements, adding 22 years to his sentence. Simms challenged the enhancement on appeal—specifically whether the state, in seeking a double firearm enhancement based on the prior imposition of a firearm enhancement, is required to allege in the information that the defendant has previously been sentenced to a firearm enhancement. The Court of Appeals held that the prior conviction was not essential to prove the enhancement itself, and that there is no requirement to give notice of a prior conviction “for purposes of a sentencing enhancement.” The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Court of Appeals. Justice James Johnson wrote the decision of the court.

State v. Weaver, No. 84982-0. The Supreme Court previously granted Oliver Weaver’s petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision that had affirmed his sentence for second degree child rape and second degree rape. The Supreme Court had ordered reconsideration by the Court of Appeals in light of State v. Mendoza (2009). On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals adhered to its original decision. Weaver again appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court holds today that Mendoza entitles Weaver to relief, reverses the Court of Appeals, and remand to the superior court for further proceedings.

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Bowie v. Wa Dept. of Revenue, No. 83426-1. Richard and Annette Bowie operate Val-Pak of Western Washington, which regularly distributes a pack of advertisements to homeowners in the region. This case involves the question of whether Val-Pak advertisement mailings should be considered a periodical under the B&O tax classifications.

In 2002 the company asked the Department of Revenue for guidance on how to classify their business, and were given a letter ruling saying they fell under the favorable “periodical” classification, with a tax rate of 0.484 percent, rather than the 1.5 percent that would otherwise apply. Valpak began filing under that status and claimed a refund for past taxes. The DOR later revoked its ruling stated that Valpak falls under a higher taxation rate. Valpak sued for a full refund.

Today the Supreme Court, with Justice Jim Johnson writing the unanimous opinion, held that Val-Pak envelopes are not periodicals or magazines and that the business is taxable under the general, higher rate of RCW 82.04.290(2).

State v. Grier, No. 83452-1. Kristina Grier and Gregory Owen were drinking with several other people at Grier’s house. During the evening Owen stole several items from Grier, including three guns, and got into several fights with Grier and her son. During the last fight a gun went off, killing Owen.

The state charged Grier with second degree murder. The defense requested jury instructions on lesser offenses included in the charge of murder, such as assault, but then withdrew the request, so the jury was not instructed on those offenses. The jury convicted Grier of murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the failure to request instructions on the lesser included offenses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and reversed the conviction.

The Supreme Court (Chief Justice Barbara Madsen writing) unanimously ruled that Grier’s agreement in the decision to withdraw the lesser included offense instructions did not bar her from raising an ineffective assistance claim. However, the court held that defense counsel’s “all or nothing” approach was a legitimate tactic and did not rise to the level of ineffective counsel. The court vacated the Court of Appeals decision that tossed Grier’s conviction and sent the case back for further consideration.

State v. Rodriguez Ramos, No. 84891-2. The Court of Appeals remanded a case to trial court to clarify the terms of community placement. The Supreme Court held in a per curiam opinion that this vested the trial court with discretion, triggering defendant Joel Ramos’s constitutional right to be present at sentencing.

State v. Tucker, No. 84952-8. The issue here was whether the State initiated a proceeding to revoke Natasha Tucker’s deferred disposition before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over her expired. Tucker was 14 years old when she got into an argument over an iPod and threw a rock through a friend’s living room window. Tucker was charged with residential burglary and malicious mischief. Tucker agreed to plead guilty, and she received a deferred disposition.

Tucker largely complied with the terms of supervision, but had not fully paid restitution. The court extended the deferred period for a year. Eventually, Tucker argued that the State had failed to move to revoke her deferred disposition before the deferral period ended, depriving the court of jurisdiction and requiring dismissal of the charges. The trial court ruled that an earlier report filed by the probation revocation properly initiated revocation proceedings before the end of the supervision period.

In a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court agreed with Tucker. “We disagree with the courts below that the November 7 report by Tucker’s community supervision officer properly instituted revocation proceedings against her. The report was plainly not a motion to adjudicate compliance with Tucker’s restitution obligation; it stated only that ‘should Natasha be unable to provide verification of payment of her remaining financial obligations, probation recommends that this matter be set out for revocation.’” The court vacated Tucker’s convictions and dismissed the case.

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The court issued two lawyer discipline rulings on Thursday.

In re Discipline of King, No. 200,761-9. In July 2008, Paul King was charged with five counts of mail fraud after helping an individual fraudulently obtain benefits from the Washington State Employment Security Department. King pled guilty and was sentenced to 10 months of imprisonment, and ordered to pay $44,858 in restitution.

The Washington State Bar Association Disciplinary Board recommended disbarment, noting that King had been suspended three times previous for acts of dishonesty. King appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the fairness of the disciplinary proceedings, arguing that disciplinary counsel should have been disqualified, and that the hearing officer failed to follow hearing rules. The Supreme Court, with Justice Debra Stephens writing the unanimous opinion, concluded that King’s disbarment was appropriate.

In re Discipline of Smith, No. 200,748-1. Attorney J. David Smith was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud. Rule 10.14(c) of the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct states that the court record of an attorney’s criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of his guilt at a disciplinary proceeding. After Smith’s federal conviction, a hearing officer concluded that Smith violated several provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) and recommended disbarment. The Washington State Bar Association Disciplinary Board agreed.

Smith appealed, arguing that the rule unconstitutionally denied him due process. The Supreme Court, with Justice Jim Johnson writing, disagreed and disbarred Smith.

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The inauguration ceremony for Chief Justice Barbara Madsen, Justice Jim Johnson, and Justice Charlie Wiggins is now available on TVW. 

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The Supreme Court issued opinions in three cases today.

Humphrey Indus. LTD v. Clay St. Assocs. LLC, No. 82687-1. Humphrey Industries, Ltd. (through several business partners) created Clay Street Associates, LLC, to hold a single real estate asset located in Auburn, Washington. In order to break a deadlock with principal George Humphrey regarding the sale of the property, the other members of Clay Street agreed to merge the company into a new limited liability company to facilitate the sale. Humphrey dissented from the merger and demanded payment pursuant to the dissenters’ rights provisions of the Washington Limited Liability Company Act, chapter 25.15 RCW. Clay Street agreed to pay Humphrey the fair market value of his interest as of the merger date but did not pay until the property sold.

Humphrey rejected the value calculation and sued. The trial court found that the property was worth more than Clay Street had calculated, and awarded Humphrey the difference plus interest. However, the court awarded Clay Street attorneys fees, finding that the dissenting Humphrey had acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) affirmed.

The Supreme Court (Justice Jim Johnson writing) reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for reconsideration of the attorney fee award. The court held that the lower courts erred in finding that Clay Street “substantially complied” with the LLCA.

In re Custody of S.C.D.-L., No. 84186-1. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s order awarding custody of S.C.D-L. to her grandmother, Edna Littell. The court wrote that Ms. Littell failed to allege or offer facts at the show cause hearing conducted under RCW 26.10.030 that S.C.D-L. was not in the physical custody of one of her parents or that neither parent was a suitable custodian.

“A nonparent may petition for custody of a child if the child is not in the physical custody of a parent or if the petitioner alleges that neither parent is a suitable custodian. RCW 26.10.030(1). The trial court must deny a hearing on the petition unless the nonparent submits an affidavit (1) declaring that the child is not in the physical custody of one of the child’s parents or that neither parent is a suitable custodian and (2) setting forth facts supporting the requested custody order. S.C.D-L. was in [her father] Mr. Littell’s physical custody at the time Ms. Littell filed her petition, and the petition
does not allege that he is an unfit parent. Instead, the petition implies it would be in the child’s best interest to reside with Ms. Littell, but the ‘best interests of the child’ standard does not apply to nonparent custody actions."

State v. Patel, No. 82649-8. The Supreme Court upheld a conviction for attempted child rape where the “victim” was actually a police officer posing as a child.

Mitel Patel was caught in a police sting operation when he chatted with a detective pretending to be a 13-year-old girl and went to meet and have sex with “her.” He was convicted of second degree attempted rape of a child. Patel argues that the state did not offer proof that the intended victim (the detective) was underage, and thus did not prove an essential element of the attempted crime. The trial court and Court of Appeals disagreed, holding it sufficient that Patel believed his intended victim to be underage.

The Supreme Court (Justice Tom Chambers writing the four-vote lead opinion) agreed, holding that “a defendant may be convicted of attempted rape of a child where the alleged victim is a fictitious underage character created by the police.” The court reasoned that unlike convictions for actual child rape, which require a showing that the child was underage, attempt crimes do not depend on the ultimate harm that would have resulted from commission of the crime. Rather, the person is guilty of an attempt “if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he or she does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” RCW 9A.28.020(1).

Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Richard Sanders wrote separate concurring opinions.

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State v. Ish, No. 83308-7. Nathaniel Ish beat his girlfriend to death and was convicted of second degree felony murder. He challenged his conviction on multiple grounds; it was upheld by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court accepted review only to consider whether the prosecution's reference to a witnesses agreement to testify truthfully constituted improper "prosecutorial vouching."

Improper vouching generally occurs (1) if the prosecutor expresses his or her personal belief as to the veracity of the witness or (2) if the prosecutor indicates that evidence not presented at trial supports the witness's testimony. United States v. Brooks, 508 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2007)

The Court today issues a lead opinion for four justices, a concurring opinion for another four justices, and a dissent by Justice Sanders. The lead opinion, by Justice Chambers, holds that the trial court did abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution to reference the witness agreement before the witness's credibility was challenged by the defense; the error, however, was harmless. Justice Stephens wrote the concurrence, finding no error. Justice Sanders agrees with the lead opinion that the trial court did err, but disagrees that the err was harmless and would have reversed the lower courts. (briefs, argument)

State v. Moeurn, No. 82995-1. Lauren Moeurn challenged his sentence for second degree assault with a deadly weapon enhancement, arguing that the trial court miscalculated his offender score. The trial court had treated an "attempt" offense as a completed offense, thus changing a class-C felony to a class-B felony and doubling the number of years (from 5 to 10) for it to "wash out" for the purposes of calculating Moeurn's offender score.

The state actually conceded the issue at the Court of Appeals, but the Court rejected the concession and upheld Moeurn's sentence. The Supreme Court today unanimously reverses the courts below, quoting at length from RCW 9.94A.525 to show that the rule for which offenses to include and the rule for how to score included offenses are different. While the latter requires treating attempt offenses as if completed, the former does not. Justice Alexander wrote for the Court; the case is remanded for resentencing.

State v. Stubbs, No. 81650-6. Troy Stubbs stabbed Ryan Goodwin in the neck, severing his spinal cord and paralyzing most of Goodwin's body. Stubbs was convicted and given an exceptional sentence due to his victim's injuries. Stubbs challenges the sentence, arguing that no injury short of death can exceed "great bodily harm" in RCW 9.94A.535(c)(y). Eight members of the Court today agree with Stubbs. The majority opinion is written by Justice Alexander, and the case is remanded for resentencing. Justice James Johnson dissents. (briefs, argument)

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Update: links to briefs and argument videos are now included.

Guillen v. Contreras, No. 82531-9. Jesus Jaime Torres was killed in a mysterious shootout in Sunyside, Washington, in 2005. From the bloody scene, police seized $57,990 "packaged to resemble a kilogram of cocaine" and Torres's car. They seized another $9,342 that was in Torres's possession when he was shot. Torres's infant son, through his mother, challenged the property seizures. The superior court overturned the seizures of the car and the $9,342. The family moved for attorney fees. The superior court, relying on "substantially prevailing party" analysis, declined to award fees. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court today considers only "the meaning of the attorney fee provision of the forfeiture statute." The Court adopts the reasoning from the dissenting opinion by Chief Judge John Schultheis of the Court of Appeals and quotes from his opinion.

"[T]his forfeiture statute recognizes the success of only one party -- the claimant. What the seizing agency retains is not relevant. It will never be a substantially prevailing party or prevailing party under RCW 69.50.505(6)." Thus, he suggests, quantitative comparison is inappropriate as we are not balancing the comparative success of two parties with an equal statutory interest in attorney fees. We agree. This is an attorney fee provision designed to protect individuals against having their property wrongfully taken by the State. A bare mathematical approach is not appropriate. (citation removed; hyperlink inserted)

The case is remanded to the trial court to determine "the amount of attorney fees reasonably incurred by the respondents" for their successful claims. Justice Chambers wrote for the Court and was joined by seven other justices. Justice Sanders dissents because he believes the statute requires a recovery of all attorney fees rather than only those related to the successful claims. (briefs, argument)

Holden v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., No. 81487-2.  A fire in Laura Holden's rented home damaged and destroyed some of her possessions. Her rental insurance carrier, Farmers Insurance, sent her a check for the "cost of repair and replacement," but did not include Washington state sales tax in its calculations. Holden eventually brought this suit, "seeking a declaration that sales tax should be accounted for in the [actual cash value] calculation...." The Court today holds for Holden, finding the term "fair market value" as used in the insurance policy to be ambiguous. The Court thus interprets the term in favor of the insured. Justice Stephens writes for the majority, joined by five other justices. Justice James Johnson dissents, contending that "fair market value" is not ambiguous and does not include "a (theoretical) sales tax...." His opinion is joined by Justices Alexander and Owens. (briefs, argument)

In re Det. of Hawkins, No. 82907-1. As part of proceedings to determine whether Jake Hawkins is a sexually violent predator according to RCW 71.09, the trial court ordered Hawkins to submit to a polygraph examination. Hawkins refused and appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court accepted review to determine whether RCW 71.09.040(4) allows such an order.

The Supreme Court today reverses the lower courts, holding that the order requiring a polygraph examination was not permitted by the statute.

Because the legislature is undoubtedly aware of the inherent problems with polygraph examinations, it is fair to infer that the legislature intends to prohibit compulsory polygraph examinations unless it expressly allows for their use. ...

We are satisfied that professional evaluators will be able to reach conclusions without the use of such evidence.

Justice Owens writes for the six-member majority. Justice Stephens, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Fairhurst, disagree with the majority's interpretation of legislative intent and dissent. (briefs, argument)

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Scannell, No. 200,744-9. The Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) initiated an investigation of attorney John Scannell for conflicts of interest and assisting a suspended attorney to practice law. Scannell repeatedly and frivolously delayed the investigation, drawing it out from 2005 until today. The WSBA hearing officer found that Scannell had "negligently violated the conflict of interest rules--meriting minor sanctions--but that he had knowingly violated the rules requiring cooperation with disciplinary proceedings--meriting suspension." The disciplinary rule modified those findings, determining that Scannell's actions during the investigation were intentional and thus increasing the presumptive sanction to disbarment. The Board voted to disbar Scannell.

The Supreme Court today, in an opinion by Justice Stephens, exhaustively reviews the facts of the investigation and upholds the decision of the board. Three justices dissent, arguing in an opinion by Justice Alexander that the hearing officer's recommendation of suspension was the appropriate sanction. (briefs, argument)

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Shepard, No. 200,720-1.  Tacoma attorney Richard Shepard was found to have violated several Rules of Professional Conduct when he assisted a "living trust mill" that targeted seniors with unnecessary or improper financial products. The hearing officer recomended a six-month suspension, but the disciplinary board increased the recommendation to a two-year suspension. The Court today agrees with the board and suspends Shepard for two years. Justice Chambers writes for an almost-unanimous court. Justice Sanders dissents and would suspend Shepard for six months. (briefs, argument)

State v. Ervin, No. 83244-7.  James Ervin was convicted in 2006 of felony violation of a protective order. This appeal considers whether two earlier felony convictions should count toward Ervin's offender score at his sentencing. According to RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c), the two earlier felony convictions "washed out" if Ervin had subsequently been at least "five consecutive years in the community without committing any crime that subsequently results in a conviction." During a five year period, Ervin had not been convicted of any crimes but did spend 17 days in jail for violating probation. The State argued that the 17 days in jail restarted the five-year window. Ervin disagreed, arguing that only a conviction would reset the five years. While the Court finds the RCW somewhat ambiguous, it finds Ervin's reading more convincing. The lower courts are reversed and the case is remanded for resentencing with the lower offender score. The decision was unanimous, and Justice Owens wrote the opinion. (briefs, argument)

State v. Sanchez Valencia, No. 82731-1. Isidro Sanchez Valencia and Eduardo Chavez Sanchez were convicted of drug charges. Their sentences included community custody on the condition that they not use "items that could be used to ingest or process controlled substances, or to facilitate the sale or transfer of controlled substances." They appeal that provision as unconstitutionally vague, and the Court today unanimously agrees with the defendants. Justice Stephens wrote the Court's opinion. Justice James Johnson signed that opinion and added a concurrence pointing out that a simple change in language would allow a similar condition to stand. (briefs, argument)

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State v. Bunker, No. 81921-1. Three defendants, each convicted of violating a no-contact order, appeal those convictions. Looking to a "shall arrest" clause in the statute," defendants argue that the law (former RCW 26.50.110) "criminalizes only those contacts with a protected party that are violent, threaten violence, or occur in a specifically prohibited place."

The Court, in an opinion by Justice James Johnson and joined by seven other justices, holds that the plain language of the statute and the clear intent of the legislature is to criminalize all violations of a no-contact order. Justice Sanders dissents. (briefs, argument)

State v. Kintz, No. 81688-3. Clarence Kintz was convicted of two charges of misdemeanor stalking and appealed, challenging the trial court's interpretation of the statutory phrase "separate occasions" and the sufficiency of the evidence. In two incidents, one in December 2005 and the other in January 2006, Kintz frightened women by repeatedly and slowly driving past them and, in the latter case, offering the woman a ride and money. Both women called 911 and Kintz, who admitted some of the details of each incident, was eventually charged.

Kintz argues that "separate occasions" is ambiguous and that the Court should apply the rule of lenity to find that separate occasions must happen over a greater length of time than in these incidents. The Court of Appeals upheld the convictions and the Supreme Court sustains that decision, agreeing with the lower court that the plain meaning of "separate occasions" is "a distinct, individual, noncontinuous occurrence or incident." The Court also finds sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Justice Alexander authored the opinion for a majority of seven.

Justice Sanders dissents and would hold that the events leading to each of these stalking charges should be considered a single occasion, rather than "separate occasions," and thus do not meet the statutory definition of stalking. For related reasons, he would also find insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. Justice Chambers dissents separately in order to agree with Justice Sanders only as to the ambiguity in the term "separate occasions." (briefs, argument)

State v. Meneses, No. 83172-6. Andre Toi Meneses fathered a child by his then-girlfriend Jamila Willis. After they broke up, the child remained with Willis. Meneses began repeatedly calling Willis and leaving voice mail messages for her using "incredibly vile language, including racial slurs and descriptive obscenities," and threatening to kill Willis, her new boyfriend, and the new couple's infant. Willis eventually called the police, who recorded ten messages left by Meneses that became the basis for ten charges against him: four counts of felony telephone harassment, four counts of gross misdemeanor telephone harassment, and two counts of intimidating a witness. He was convicted by a jury on all counts.

The Court of Appeals sustained the convictions. The Supreme Court considered three issues raised by Meneses. First, the jury instruction on telephone harassment did not fail to specify that the criminal intent must have been formed before the call was placed. The instruction used the statutory language, and the Court has previously held that the meaning of the statute is clear on its face. Second, it did not violate double jeopardy for a count of telephone harassment and a count of intimidating a witness to arise from the same message because "each [conviction] required proof of a fact the other did not." Finally, because [n]o affirmative evidence supported the idea that Meneses committed witness tampering but not intimidating a witness," the trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense.

The Court, with an opinion by Justice Stephens, unanimously upholds the courts below. (briefs, argument)

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Two races decided, one to go. As of 10:19 p.m.:

Chief Justice Barbara Madsen (unopposed) and Justice Jim Johnson (running against Stan Rumbaugh) have won their races and will advance to the general election without an opponent.

Meanwhile, Justice Richard Sanders and Charlie Wiggins are both under the 50 percent vote threshold required to advance unopposed, with Sanders enjoying an 8-point lead. Judge Bryan Chushcoff trails with only 12 percent of the vote.

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The court issued rulings in three cases today. Here is a brief summary of each case:

In Re the Honorable Judith Raub Eiler, No. 200,701-5. Judge Judith Eiler is a district court judge in King County. Based on a number of complaints, disciplinary proceedings were brought against her for treating litigants in an “angry, abusive, and condescending manner.” Eiler argues that there was not enough evidence, that the penalty is too high, and that punishing her for her demeanor violates her freedom of speech. Eiler appeals a disciplinary recommendation that she be suspended for 90 days without pay. The Supreme Court, with Justice Jim Johnson writing the lead opinion, found that Judge Eiler’s behavior only violated the judicial cannon requiring that a judge be “patient, dignified, and courteous.” The court reduced her suspension to a 5-day period.

Kelley v. Centennial Contractors, No. 82474-6. Phillip and Monica Blackshear sued Centennial Contractors Enterprises for injuries caused when a steel beam was dropped on Phillip. After they won the suit, they filed a complaint for loss of consortium on behalf of their three children. The complaint stated that it would have been impractical to include their claims with their parents’ suit. George Kelly was appointed guardian ad litem for the children. At trial, the children’s case was dismissed because the court said their claims should have been joined with their parents’ claims. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) reversed, holding that since the children did not yet have a guardian ad litem it would have been impossible to join them to the suit, and that it would have been impractical for them to bring their claims until the results of their father’s surgery were known. The Supreme Court, with Justice Gerry Alexander writing the lead opinion, agreed, holding that there were general issues of material fact that precluded a summary dismissal of the claim.

State v. Tibbles, No. 80308-1. Micah Tibbles appealed his misdemeanor convictions for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. During a traffic stop of Tibbles, Trooper Norman Larsen detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from Tibbles’ car. The trooper did not arrest Tibbles or seek a warrant, but conducted an warrantless search of the car, whereupon he discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The district court, superior court, and Court of Appeals all upheld the search under the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement, which allows law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless searches when obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape, or allow destruction of evidence. Justice Debra Stephens, writing for the Supreme Court, said that the exigent circumstances exception would not apply in this case and that the search of Tibbles’ vehicle was unconstitutional under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

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Justice Jim Johnson earned a BA in economics from Harvard University and a JD from the University of Washington. After school he spent 2 years in the U.S. Army, and then became an Assistant Attorney General for Washington. During twenty years at the Attorney General’s office he headed the Fish and Wildlife Division, the Special Litigation Division, and served as Counsel for the Environment. In 1993 Johnson entered private practice, and continued to practice until he was elected to the Supreme Court in 2004.

Ratings

• King County Bar Association: Well Qualified
• Municipal League of King County: Very Good
• Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights: Outstanding

Notable Endorsements

Individuals

• Justice Tom Chambers
• Justice Charles Johnson
• Justice Susan Owens
• Justice Debra Stephens
• Former Chief Justice Gerry Alexander
• Attorney General Rob McKenna

Newspapers

• Seattle Times
• The Olympian
• Tacoma News Tribune
• Vancouver Columbian
• Spokane Spokesman-Review
• Yakima Herald
• Centralia Chronicle
• Everett Herald
• Tri-City Herald
• Walla Walla Union-Bulletin

Organizations

• Washington Association of Police and Sheriffs
• Association of Washington Business
• Building Industry Association of Washington
• Washington State Farm Bureau
• Washington State Republican Party
• Mainstream Republicans of Washington

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Newspaper endorsements are coming in fast now.

In the last week, Justice Jim Johnson has been endorsed for re-election by the Seattle Times, the Olympian, the Tri-City Herald, and the Yakima Herald.

Justice Richard Sanders has been endorsed by the Spokesman-Review.

Sanders’ opponent Charlie Wiggins has been endorsed by the Tri-City Herald and the Yakima Herald.

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More newspaper endorsements were released this morning. The Columbian endorses both Supreme Court incumbents Justice Jim Johnson and Justice Richard Sanders over their opponents.

Johnson has been a consistent protector of open government in his six years on the court and has earned the people’s confidence by defending our state’s superb primary system. He has a big advantage in experience; Rumbaugh has never served as a judge and is too closely tied to labor unions.

Sanders is another incumbent who has earned re-election, despite his maverick tendencies. He has both angered and drawn endorsements from Republicans and Democrats, proving his independence. He has served on the court since 1995. Controversial but brilliant and articulate, Sanders’ disregard for partisan influences, and his fierce defense of individual rights makes him a good fit for the court.

The Spokesman-Review also endorses Sanders. "We don’t always agree with him, but we know he is taking a principled stand."

Meanwhile, the Herald endorsed Johnson, but wants to see Sanders and challenger Charlie Wiggins advance to the general election for a more detailed debate.

We'd like to see the libertarian Sanders, a controversial but valuable member of the court, engage in a spirited contest with his strongest challenger, who we believe to be Bainbridge Island attorney Charlie Wiggins. An enlightening debate could ensue, spotlighting issues such as the rights of crime victims vs. the rights of the accused.

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Justice Jim Johnson earned another newspaper editorial over his opponent Stan Rumbaugh - the Spokesman-Review says he deserves another six years on the Supreme Court.

Before he was on the court, Johnson was a skilled lawyer, highly visible, helping to write initiatives and battling for them in court. He was an ally of anti-tax crusader Tim Eyman and the Washington State Grange. Now as then, his reading of the constitutions reveals strong recognition of private property rights, open government and the First Amendment.

We never expect to agree with every opinion handed down by any Supreme Court justice, but we appreciate the guidance such decisions provide for elected legislators whose proper job it is to enact laws that can survive judicial inspection.

In his six years on the job, Johnson has won the trust of fellow justices Tom Chambers, Susan Owens, Charles Johnson and Gerry Alexander – all now endorsing him from their positions to his political left. Republican Attorney General Rob McKenna and Democratic state Auditor Brian Sontag, both strong defenders of the state’s open public records law, have endorsed him, too.

Johnson has also been endorsed by The News Tribune.

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McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, No. 81896-7. When Chris and Anne McCurry paid off their mortgage with Chevy Chase Bank, the total amount as itemized by the Bank included a $20 fax fee and a $2 notary fee. After paying the full amount, they filed this class action lawsuit. The McCurrys allege breach of the terms of the deed of trust, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act. The Bank responded by arguing that federal regulations preempt these state law claims. The King County Superior Court agreed and dismissed the McCurry's complaint; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court today first addresses the standard necessary to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. While federal courts have recently made it more difficult for plaintiffs to survive motions to dismiss, the State Supreme Court refuses to follow that course here. The majority notes that "[t]he appropriate forum for revising the Washington rules is the rule-making process."

The Court holds that the McCurry's state contract law claims, including the unjust enrichment claim, are not preempted by federal lending laws or regulations.

State contract law does not purport to impose requirements on loan-related fees; state contract law instead requires parties to adhere to the terms of their contracts. Forcing Chevy Chase to adhere to the terms of its contract only incidentally affects the loan-related fees....

The Court further holds that the Consumer Protection Act claim survives to the extent that it relates to misrepresentation of the contract terms, but that it is preempted if the allegation is that the Act "regulates how or when fax or notary fees (loan-related fees) can be charged...."

The majority opinion is written by Justice Sanders and joined by five other justices. It strongly takes to task the dissent, authored by Justice James Johnson and joined by Justices Charles Johnson and Susan Owens, alleging that "the dissent's novel interpretation of preemption would prevent Washington consumers from enforcing contracts against federal savings associations."  (briefs and argument)

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In Re Discipline of Terry J. Preszler, No. 200,570-5. Attorney Terry Preszler represented a couple in a bankruptcy. He failed to navigate correctly some of the rules related to a personal injury settlement, and was not forthright when he discovered his mistakes. The Washington State Bar Association alleged 17 counts of misconduct by Preszler and the Association's Disciplinary Board found that he had violated five and recommended a three-year suspension from the practice of law. Preszler challenges the Board's determination on several issues.

The Court upholds the Board on most points and imposes the suspension. Justice Fairhurst writes for the majority and is joined by five other justices. Justice Sanders, joined by Justices Chambers and James Johnson, dissents and would give greater weight to the mitigating factors and reduce the suspension. (briefs and argument)

Kustura v. Department of Labor, No. 81478-3. Several persons with "limited English proficiency" appealed determinations by the Department of Labor and Industries, and included in their claims a demand that the Department provide them with interpreters for all interactions with the Department. RCW 2.43.040 grants persons with limited English proficiency the right to translation services paid for by taxpayers where the government has instituted a legal proceeding.

Here, the Court upholds the Court of Appeals, which determined that the Department did not initiate the proceedings. It further casts doubt on whether the Department's proceedings here qualify as legal proceedings under the RCW. Justice James Johnson authored the Court's opinion, in which six other justices concurred. Justice Chambers, joined by Justice Sanders, dissents. (briefs and argument)

State v. Grenning, No. 81449-0. Neil Grenning was charged with 72 sex crimes, including 20 counts of possession of child pornography related to pictures found on his computer hard drives. The trial judge, at the request of the prosecutors, issued a restrictive order preventing copies of the hard drives from being turned over to the defense, though the defense was provided with access to them. Potential defense expert witnesses apparently refused to investigate the hard drives without the ability to take them to their own computer laboratories, and the defense did not present an expert witness regarding the hard drives at trial.

Grenning was convicted on all but one of the charges, including all of the instances of child pornography, and sentenced to 117 years in prison. He appealed, challenging the limitations placed on the hard drive evidence. The Court of Appeals agreed with Grenning and ordered a new trial for the child pornography charges; the state appealed.

The Court here upholds the Court of Appeals. In an opinion by Justice Chambers and joined by five other justices, the Court finds that its decision in State v. Boyd, "which held that the defense was entitled to a mirror image copy of the defendant's computer hard drives," controls the outcome here. Justice Madsen, joined by Justices Alexander and James Johnson, dissent and "disagree with the majority's recitation of the facts, its legal analysis, and its result." (briefs and argument)

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With candidate filing week over, we now have a complete picture of this year’s races for seats on the Supreme Court of Washington.

Running for Position 1 are Justice Jim Johnson and challenger Stan Rumbaugh. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen is running unchallenged for Position 5. We previously reported that Justice Richard Sanders and Charlie Wiggins are running for Position 6, and another candidate has jumped into this race: Pierce County Superior Court Judge Bryan Chushcoff.

Because judicial offices are nonpartisan, the August 19 primary is a key date for judicial elections. If any candidate receives 50 percent of the primary vote, that candidate advances unchallenged to the general election.

Here at the Supreme Court of Washington Blog we will be reporting on each of these contested judicial races. Voting for judges is often difficult as candidates refrain from taking positions on specific public policy issues. The Supreme Court of Washington Blog will not endorse any candidate; our goal is to provide information about each candidate’s background, qualifications, and previous rulings (if available).

Just click on the “Judicial Elections” category to the left to read each article we’ve written about the various judicial races. You can also sort articles by individual candidate using the tags below.

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Today the Supreme Court issued decisions in three cases.

In Re Discipline of Paul H. King, No. 200,681-7 (briefs). The Supreme Court adopted a Disciplinary Board recommendation to disbar Paul H. King for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct by representing a client while suspended from the practice of law. Justice James Johnson wrote the opinion, while Justice Richard Sanders concurred separately.

In re the Welfare of A.B., No. 80759-1 (briefs and argument). The Supreme Court overturned a trial court decision to terminate the parent-child relationship between Rogelio Salas and his daughter, A.B. The child was born in 2001 with cocaine in her system. The Department of Social Health Services (DSHS) removed A.B. from the custody of the mother and placed her in a foster home. The mother’s parental rights were terminated and the child was eventually placed in a home with a distant cousin of the mother. Having never been married to the mother, Salas was living in Las Vegas when A.B. was born. His paternity was confirmed but because of his own substance abuse history he was only granted visitation rights. He later completed a recovery program. The State eventually filed a petition for termination of parental rights which a trial court granted, though the court never entered a finding that Salas was an unfit parent.

The Supreme Court today rules that a parent has a due process right not to have the State terminate his or her relationship with a natural child in the absence of a finding that he or she, at the time of trial, is currently unfit to parent the child. The Court directed the trial court to supervise the “prompt but orderly” transfer of A.B. to Salas’ home unless the parties agree otherwise. The majority was written by Judge J. Dean Morgan, who served as justice pro tempore. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen concurred separately.

Justice Tom Chambers wrote a strong dissent. “The court’s order today also confounds me. A.B. is living with her family. She has been raised by her mother’s cousin almost since birth. Her mother’s cousin has also adopted A.B.’s younger half brother, who has lived with his eldest sister his entire life. The ‘prompt but orderly transfer’ ordered by the court today will wrench this child out of the only home she has ever known and deprive a brother of his sister. Even if the trial judge did err by following this court’s well settled case law, the proper remedy would be remand for further proceedings.”

(Parenthetically, I am surprised at the delay between oral argument and this decision. The case was argued on June 24, 2008. Given the profound impact this decision will have on a child's life, a two-year delay is an inordinate amount of time.)

State v. Nason, No. 82333-2 (briefs and argument). Spokane County has a policy of imposing jail time on offenders who fail to pay court costs. James Nason was convicted of burglary, sentenced to community service, and ordered to pay certain court costs. He did not pay, and the court subsequently modified his sentence to impose jail time. Nason argues this “auto-jail” provision violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed, with Justice Mary Fairhurst writing the opinion. The Court held that before sanctions are imposed on an offender for failure to pay a legal financial obligation, the trial court must inquire into the offender’s ability to pay when sanctions are sought. “To the extent that an auto-jail provision calls for incarceration without a contemporaneous inquiry into the offender’s ability to pay, it is void. Because the trial court in this case sentenced Nason to 30 days in jail for failure to report to jail under the auto-jail provision, Nason needs to be resentenced.”

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Pierce County trial attorney Stan Rumbaugh has announced he will challenge Justice Jim Johnson, who is running for reelection. The Bellingham Herald has the story here.  State Representative Brendan Williams was also reported to be interested in the position but has yet to file candidate papers.

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SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, No. 82551-3 (briefs and argument). In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice James Johnson, the Supreme Court has ruled against SEIU 775NW and declines to order the governor to insert a $87 million arbitration award in her budget proposal to the legislature.

SEIU 775NW represents approximately 25,000 individual health providers who negotiated with the state for wages and benefits. During 2008 negotiations, SEIU 775NW and the governor’s office were unable to reach an agreement for the 2009-11 budget, and an arbitrator awarded the workers a raise and fringe benefits amounting to $87 million. Gov. Gregoire, however, did not include the arbitrated award in the budget proposal that she sent to the legislature, arguing it was not financially feasible. SEIU 775NW argues that the law governing labor relations for these employees (RCW 74.39A.300) states that the governor must include arbitrated awards in her budget.

The question for the court has been whether “must” in the statute is a mandatory obligation upon the governor, or if it is a permissive suggestion. At argument the justices clearly wrestled with the real-world consequences of ruling for either party. A ruling for the workers sends the governor back to the budget planning stage and would result in other cuts to the budget. But a ruling for Gregoire seems to muddy the plain reading of a statute.

Justice Johnson wrote that writs of mandamus ordering a state official to take action are only appropriate when the ordered action is mandatory, rather than discretionary. “Deciding the allocation of limited state funds in order to achieve the statutorily required balanced budget necessarily involves the exercise of the governor’s discretion,” he wrote. “It is difficult to imagine an act more essentially a policy decision for the governor than the submission to the legislature of a budget during an economic downturn. The creation and submission of a budget proposal is clearly one of those discretionary acts that are ‘in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive,’ and inappropriate for mandamus.”

The court said it would decline to order the governor to make budget changes even if mandamus were appropriate. “[T] the court may refuse to grant relief where private rights would be unwisely advanced at the expense of public interests. The recent severe economic difficulties faced by our state present circumstances dictating such judicial restraint.”

Alternatively, the court said it would rule against the union as the remedy it sought was no longer available. “Similarly, because the relief sought by the petitioner here—a change in a budget proposal long since submitted for a budget already adopted by the legislature—is no longer available, this case runs afoul of our mootness doctrine.”

Chief Justice Madsen dissented, arguing that the law mandates inclusion of arbitrated awards in the governor’s budget, regardless of the state’s economic picture. “There is, of course, a fixed amount of funding available to achieve a balanced budget and one budget request included in a proposed budget means that there is less money remaining for other proposed requests. But this fact does not turn a mandatory duty into a discretionary one. Pursuant to a state law duly enacted by the legislature, the governor had a mandatory duty to include in the proposed 2009-2010 budget a request to fund the arbitration award in this case.”

Justice Richard Sanders signed Madsen’s dissent and filed his own brief dissent, writing: “This case deserved swift action to protect the rights of these workers and their union. I have signed the dissent but would have preferred to initially decide this case by order with opinion to follow.”

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Brad Shannon at the Olympian has this story about Rep. Brendan Williams considering a run against Justice Jim Johnson, who is up for re-election. Williams is leaving the state legislature this year after three terms. Here is what he had to say about a Supreme Court bid: 

Here are Williams' comments:

There has been a draft effort that some of my colleagues put together. Candidly, it's not something I had thought of prior to their efforts. However, having clerked at the Supreme Court for 2 1/2 years and being very familiar with the work of justice, it's something I'll look into.

I think I'm going to consult with some folks who are interesting in reforming the court and who are frustrated with the fact that there is at least one member of the court who is beholden to special interests and see what their thoughts are about my getting into a race.

I think there are a lot of people who observe the court's work and are frustrated with the rulings by some members regarding consumer protection and looking out for people's interests instead of special interests that fund people’s campaigns.

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Two more decisions from the Supreme Court today:

State v. Madsen, No. 81450-3. The question in this case was whether the trial court properly denied a defendant's request to represent himself. Kurt Madsen was charged with three felony counts after he violated a no-contact order. At trial Madsen repeatedly requested to represent himself. The trial court denied his motion, stating he had been “extremely disruptive,” “repeatedly addressed the court at inopportune times,” and “consistently showed an inability to follow or respect the court’s directions.”

The Supreme Court, with Justice Jim Johnson writing the opinion, held that the Washington Constitution explicitly guarantees criminals the right to self-representation. The right is not absolute, however, and trial courts may determine whether a request for self-representation was made properly. The Court found that Madsen’s request had been “unequivocal, timely, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” and Madsen had repeatedly cited article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution. The Court held the trial court’s decision was in error, and remanded for further proceedings. 

Justice Mary Fairhurst concurred separately with the outcome, but expressed concerns about whether Madsen made a timely, knowing, and intelligent waiver of counsel.

State v. Osman, No. 82671-4. The question before the Court is what legal standard superior courts should use to review lower court rulings on the importance of missing trial records.

Abdinasir Osman was arrested and convicted for DUI. After the trial, Osman's attorney discovered that part of the trial had not been recorded. The missing portion included part of Osman's cross examination, objections to an exhibit, attorney arguments, and the judge's findings and conclusions. Osman appealed to the superior court for a new trial, which remanded the question of whether the missing record was material back to the district court. The district court found that the missing portion was not material.On appeal, the Court of Appeals held the standard of review is abuse of discretion rather than reviewing the question of materiality.

Justice Richard Sanders, writing for a unanimous court, wrote that as the missing portion of the electronic record is significant and material to the appeal, Osman is entitled to a new trial.
 

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The Supreme Court today decisively ruled that sentencing enhancements for the possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime are not constitutionally prohibited. The case is State v. Aguirre, No. 82226-3 (briefs and argument).

Daniel Aguirre was convicted in Thurston County Superior Court of assault and rape. He unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeals (Div. 2), arguing that a number of errors occurred at trial. Aguirre argues the trial court committed a number of errors, and argues that the deadly weapon enhancement to his sentence for assault with a deadly weapon violates double jeopardy. The double jeopardy clauses of both the federal and state constitutions protect defendants from being twice put in jeopardy for the same crime.

The Supreme Court, with Justice James Johnson writing the unanimous opinion, rejected all of Aguirre’s claims. On the double jeopardy issue the Court said: “Washington courts repeatedly have held that double jeopardy is not offended by weapon enhancements even when being armed with the weapon is an element of the underlying crime.”

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Justice Jim Johnson announced his plan to seek a second term on the Supreme Court. Check out his campaign Facebook page here. The page describes Justice Johnson as "the state Supreme Court’s most ardent supporter of liberty and judicial restraint." At this time there are no challengers for his position.

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In re Custody of E.A.T.W. and E.Y.W., No. 81945-9. Was the superior court right to grant a hearing for a custody petition based only on the fact that the children had lived with the petitioning grandparents for several years? The Court of Appeals had overturned the superior court, and the Supreme Court today upholds the Court of Appeals. The High Court holds that RCW 26.10.032 imposes on third party petitioners the duty of setting forth facts that would show “that the parent is unfit or placement with the parent would result in actual detriment to the child's growth and development.”

The unanimous opinion, written by Justice James Johnson, goes on to hold that this standard is in accord with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville.

In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court affirmed this court's judgment in In re Custody of Smith that constitutionally protected parental rights were violated by a statute allowing a nonparent to wrest custody of a child from a parent based solely on the court's findings regarding the child's best interests. Something more is required than the court's judgment that it could make a better decision than parents concerning the upbringing of children.

(Briefs, Argument-May 28, 2009)

State v. Sibert, No. 79509-6. Richard Sibert was convicted by a jury in 2004 of four crimes related to the sale of methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, and Sibert appeals on three alleged errs:  1) failure of the trial court to include the identity of the “controlled substance” on part of the jury instructions; 2) failure to prove the identity of the controlled substance; 3) an inappropriate jury instruction on “knowledge.”

Today the Court upholds Sibert’s conviction and sentencing. It finds that throughout the trial, everyone involved understood that the controlled substance was methamphetamine. Further, the jury instructions incorporated by reference the charging documents that identified the substance as methamphetamine. It also upholds the instruction on “knowledge,” which the trial court took directly from the Washington Practice.

Justice James Johnson also wrote this majority opinion, but Justices Sanders and Alexander both authored dissents, the latter joined by Justices Charles Johnson and Debra Stephens. The Chief concurred with the majority, but as to the result only. The four dissenting justices would hold prosecutors to a higher standard, in this case requiring a more explicit and precise description of the controlled substance.

(Briefs, Argument-February 10, 2009)

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The Supreme Court issued rulings in seven cases this morning, including two highly-anticipated decisions dealing with whether an authorization to use medical marijuana is a defense to criminal possession, and whether the state's Consumer Protection Act allows out-of-state litigants to join a Washington class action lawsuit.

Clayton v. Wilson, No. 81920-3. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the unanimous ruling holding that a couple’s marital community is liable for the intentional wrongful sexual acts of one spouse. Without his wife’s knowledge, Mr. Wilson repeatedly sexually abused a neighbor boy, Andrew Clayton, whom he was paying to do yard work at the Wilson’s home. After Mr. Wilson was arrested the couple began dissolving the marriage and executed a property settlement transferring 90 percent of community assets to Mrs. Wilson (and theoretically insulating the funds from any potential lawsuit). Clayton sued, and the entire marital community was found liable because the assaults occurred while Clayton was working for the community. The trial court also found fraud in the extremely lopsided division of marital property, and voided the transfer. The Court of Appeals agreed and the Supreme Court upheld the decision.

In re the Dependency of C.S., No. 81720-1. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the unanimous opinion holding that Amy Singleton’s parental rights had been improperly terminated. Singleton has a son diagnosed with ADHD and other behavioral problems. She has a history of drug and alcohol abuse and is under the supervision of social workers. She continues to have substance abuse issues, although evidence was introduced that she is improving. The state filed a third party custody action and the court terminated her parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed this order as the State had not offered Singleton required training that would allow her to rehabilitate.

Schnall, et al. v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., No. 80572-5. Should AT&T Wireless customers nationwide be allowed to pursue a class action under the WA Consumer Protection Act? Chief Justice Barbara Madsen, writing for a 5-4 majority, declined to make Washington “a locus of nationwide class action litigation.” The Court said the trial court was correct in declining to certify a nationwide class.

Drum v. State, No. 81498-8. Justice Debra Stephens, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed Patrick Drum’s conviction for burglary after he entered a house while high on spray paint. Drum entered a drug program and signed a Drug Court Contract, under which he agreed that the court would determine his guilt on the burglary charge if he was terminated from the program. As part of this contract, he waived various rights including the right to testify and the right to a jury trial. Drum left the drug program, and the court found him guilty of burglary. Drum appealed, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that the contract did not fulfill due process requirements for a guilty plea. The Jefferson County Superior Court found that Drum had stipulated that the evidence was sufficient, and that the contract did not violate due process because it was not a guilty plea.

State v. Erickson, No. 81594-1. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld an assault conviction, with Justice Tom Chambers writing the opinion. Anthony Erickson was convicted of fourth degree assault and released on probation, but his probation officer claimed that he violated the terms of his probation agreement. Erickson was summoned to a probation hearing, failed to appear, and an arrest warrant was issued. Upon arrest he was found with drugs on him and convicted of possession. He appealed, claiming the arrest warrant was invalid because there was no probable cause that he had violated probation (only the officer’s word). The Court wrote: “We conclude that the warrant was valid because it was supported by a well-founded suspicion that Erickson had violated the terms of his release.”

State v. Fry, No. 81210-1. Justice James Johnson writes a 4-vote lead opinion, with four other justices agreeing in a separate opinion, that rejected a defendant’s claim that he was qualified to use marijuana for medicinal purposes in defense to a charge of unlawful possession of marijuana. Two police officers were informed of a marijuana growing operation at the residence of Jason and Tina Fry. The officers smelled marijuana when they approached. Fry did not consent to a search, and presented a document purporting to be authorization for medical marijuana. The officers obtained a warrant and seized over two pounds of marijuana. At trial, Fry argued to suppress the marijuana because of his medical marijuana authorization. The judge denied the motion. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to allow the evidence seized at the Frys’ home, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

State v. Kelly, No. 82111-9. Dustin Kelly approached a couple, threatened to kill them both, and then shot at them, killing the man. In addition to murder, he was convicted of second degree assault (intentional assault with a deadly weapon). The court imposed firearm sentence enhancements on both crimes. Kelly argues that since the use of the firearm is already an element of second degree assault, imposing the sentence enhancement on the assault essentially punishes him twice for using the firearm—a claimed violation of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this argument, with Chief Justice Madsen writing the opinion.

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Alhadeff v. Kitsap Cmty. Fed. Credit Union d/b/a Kitsap Credit Union, No. 81833-9. A swanky condominium project, "The Meridian on Bainbridge [Island]," flopped, leaving the courts to sort through a letter of credit (LOC) controversy that the Supreme Court today deems "significantly more complex than a typical LOC transaction." 

Developer Meridian received a construction loan from Kitsap Credit Union for $4,500,000. The Credit Union required that Meridian contribute equity in the form of a $1,000,000 LOC. Meridian arranged for the LOC from investor Jack Alhadeff, who authorized his bank, Wells Fargo, to issue the LOC to Kitsap Credit Union. The terms of the LOC required the Credit Union to certify that Meridian was not in default before drawing on the LOC.

Kitsap Credit Union drew on the letter three times, in May, June, and July of 2004, exhausting the full $1,000,000. Despite the Credit Union's certification each time that Meridian was not in default, two "events of default" had already occurred: a tax deficiency and the imposition of a construction lien by a contractor. The Credit Union was also aware that Meridian was exceeding its budget. In September 2004, Meridian asked the Credit Union for a further loan. The Credit Union eventually declared Meridian in default in November 2006.

In August 2006, Alhadeff sued Kitsap Credit Union alleging eight causes of action related to the LOC. The trial court granted the Credit Union's motion for summary judgment, finding the situation covered by U.C.C. Article 5 and the claims thus barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Alhadeff appealed, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and Kitsap Credit Union appealed.

Today, the Supreme Court unanimously reverses the Court of Appeals, holding that the U.C.C. Article 5 statute of limitations does apply and that none of Alhadeff's claims survive summary judgment. Justice James Johnson wrote the opinion, which includes a helpful Diagram of Letter of Credit Transaction. And somewhere in there, reversed Court of Appeals Judge Theodore Spearman administered this author's oath of attorney. (briefs and argument)

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The Supreme Court today says that education salary disparities between school districts do not violate the Washington Constitution. The case is Federal Way School District 210 v. State, No. 80943-7 (briefs and argument).

In 2006, the Federal Way School District, along with district employees, parents and students, sued the state, arguing that funding disparities violate the duty of a “general and uniform” school system. Education funding is a complex formula of federal, state, and local funds that are distributed to individual school districts, and employees in different districts are often paid different amounts. For example, the State allocation to districts for the 2007-08 school year ranged from $32,746 to $34,612 among teachers and from $54,405 to $80,807 for administrators.

King County Superior Court Judge Michael Heavey ruled that the state’s funding model violates the “general and uniform” duty, and violated the state’s equal protection clause by paying similarly-situated school employees differently.

There are two educational sections of the state constitution at play here. One requires the state to make “ample provision” for the education of all children (Art. IX, Sec. 1), while the other section mandates a “general and uniform system of public schools” (Art. IX, Sec. 2).

The plaintiffs argued that the “general and uniform” provision is violated when school employees are paid different amounts. They argue the state’s obligation is not just ample funding, but ample funding within a general and uniform system. In response, the state argued that where the “ample provision” for basic education is met, variances in school funding allocations are of no constitutional significance. The constitutional duty is to create a common education system (uniform academic learning requirements, graduation standards, teacher licensing standards, uniform discipline standards), not to guarantee precisely equal funding to every district.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Jim Johnson writing the unanimous decision, soundly rejected the school district’s case—ruling to uphold the existing funding allocation system.

The Court wrote that education funding has historically varied statewide, and that the legislature has attempted to shrink disparities over time. The uniformity requirement, according to the Court, means that every child has the same educational advantages. “Our cases discussing article IX, section 2 make it clear that the provision requires uniformity in the educational program provided, not the minutiae of funding.” The Court also ruled that the individuals parents, students, and teachers challenging the funding allocation model are unable to show any direct harm and therefore are not able to challenge the funding model.

The legislature’s use of the staff unit allocation system to fund education with differing salary allocations to school districts with historically disparate average salaries does not violate article IX, section 2, although there remains a slight gap between the highest and lowest salary funding statewide. There is no showing that the legislature’s funding allocations, including those for Federal Way School District, do not constitute “ample provision for the education of all children” as required under article IX, section 1. The legislature has acted well within its constitutional authority and its duty to make ample provision for the education of children and to provide for a general and uniform system of education under article IX. The individual respondents’ claims do not meet requirements for justiciability and should be dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse.

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In re Det. of Fair, No. 80498-2. David Tyler Fair was charged with molesting several young girls, plead guilty to one count of second degree child molestation, and was sentenced to 20 months in prison. The sentence was suspended as part of a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA). Fair failed to meet the requirements of that sentence, committed a robbery, then fled the state. Eventually, after being imprisoned in New Mexico, Fair was returned to Washington to serve his original sentence and the robbery sentence. In a treatment program, he admitted numerous other sexual contacts with children between 2 and 12 years old. The State petitioned to have Fair committed as a sexually violent predator.

Fair challenged his commitment, arguing that the State was required to "plead and prove a recent overt act." The Court today holds that the Sexually Violent Predator Act (RCW 71.09) only requires the state to prove a recent act if the person is not incarcerated. The Court further holds that this interpretation of the Act does not violate Fair's right to due process, in part because "due process does not require that the absurd be done before the compelling state interest can be vindicated." Justice Jim Johnson wrote the lead opinion, joined by Justices Madsen and Owens. Justice Fairhurst, joined by Justice Charles Johnson, concurs, but offers a slightly different analysis.

Justice Sanders, joined by the Chief Justice, dissents, arguing that the statute plainly requires that a person must be in total and continuous confinement following the original sex offense. Because Fair was originally released and only later incarcerated, and because he was actually serving only the robbery sentence at the time of the commitment proceedings, the dissent would require the state to plead and prove a recent overt act. Justice Chambers joined the dissent, but only as to the result.

In re Pers. Restraint of Duncan, No. 81230-6. Bryan Duncan challenges his commitment as a sexually violent predator based on several evidentiary rulings of the trial court. Duncan was convicted of three counts of first degree child molestation in 1992 and 1993. The State moved to commit him in 1996 and he was finally committed in 2005 (the Court notes that the nine-year delay is troubling, but was mostly attributable to Duncan and was not raised as an issue). Duncan challenges the trial court's admission of evidence that he refused a psychological evaluation and its refusal to allow Duncan to present evidence about the treatment program at the Special Commitment Center and about his proposed roommate if he was released.

The Court today holds, in an opinion by Justice Chambers, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the evidentiary rulings. Justices Charles Johnson, Madsen, Owens, Fairhurst, and Jim Johnson and Justice Pro Tem. Philip Thompson joined the majority opinion.

Justice Sanders dissents, arguing that allowing the reference to Duncan's refusal to be reevaluated was "irrelevant and prejudicial." He would also find the refusal to allow Duncan's evidence about his proposed roommate after the state had introduce its evidence about the roommate to be reversible error. The Chief Justice, in a separate dissent, agrees with Sanders except that he would find the trial judge "impermissibly commented on the evidence by stating to the jury that Duncan 'did not wish' to be reevaluated."

State v. Patton, No. 80518-1. Randall Patton was wanted on a felony warrant when a Skamania County Sheriff Deputy spotted him. Patton was leaning into his own car through the window, rummaging with something on the seat. The Deputy told Patton he was under arrest and Patton fled, but was soon apprehended inside a trailer. Deputies searched the car and found methamphetamine. Patton challenged that the search violated his state and federal constitutional rights because it was not a valid search incident to arrest. The trial court suppressed the evidence but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously sides with Patton and the trial court.

The Court first disagrees with the trial court, which had found that Patton was not arrested until he was taken into custody in the trailer. He was arrested when the officer "manifest[ed] an intent to take [him] into custody" while Patton was standing by his car. Nevertheless, "the search incident to arrest exception is narrow and should be applied only in circumstances anchored to the justifications for its existence."

The question before us, then, is whether it would stretch the search incident to arrest exception beyond its justifications to apply it where the arrestee is not a driver or recent occupant of the vehicle, the basis for arrest is not related to the use of the vehicle, and the arrestee is physically detained and secured away from the vehicle before the search. We believe it would.

Justice Stephens wrote the majority opinion, joined by all other justices except for Justice Jim Johnson, who concurred but found the case identical to Arizona v. Gant, decided earlier this year by the United States Supreme Court.

Thompson v. Hanson, No. 81311-6. The Court resolves a dispute between the Courts of Appeals over Washington's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). Division Three had held that a creditor can only enforce their rights against a transferee who has received fraudulently conveyed property from a debtor if the transferee had "intent to hinder or delay [the] creditors." Today, the Court unanimously eschews that position and upholds a Division One ruling that no proof of intent is required by the UFTA. Justice Owens writes the main opinion and Justice Madsen concurs, but would not have reached one of the issues (the "offset" provision) addressed by Owens.

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Post v. City of Tacoma, No. 80684-5. The City of Tacoma levied hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines against Paul Post for multiple building code violations. Tacoma's procedures only allowed Post to appeal the initial fine for a particular violation and not subsequent fines issued for the same violation. He appealed many of the fines, losing at every level. The Court of Appeals held "that all Post's claims were barred because he failed to follow the procedures in the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA)."

Today, the Supreme Court overturns the Court of Appeals and holds that LUPA does not apply to the use of "civil infractions" that levy fines to enforce a building code. Further, the Court agrees with Post that due process requires that he "must have an opportunity to be heard on each separate infraction, even if they are issued (i.e., penalties are being assessed) daily for the same violation." Tacoma's process at issue here is held facially unconstitutional. Justice James Johnson wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Sanders, Chambers, Owens, and Stephens.

The Chief Justice concurs as to the result, arguing that the court should have avoided the constitutional question and struck down Tacoma's process as a regulation "in conflict with general laws." Justice Sanders, who joins the lead opinion, also writes separately to concur with the Chief. Justice Madsen writes a vigorous dissent, joined by Justices Fairhurst and Charles Johnson, arguing that LUPA does apply.

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In re Detention of Moore, No. 81201-2. The trial court granted a state petition for Moore to be declared a sexually violent predator and confined in a mental facility (civilly committed). The Supreme Court reviewed (1) whether the trial court erred in accepted the State's set of facts as accurate without checking to see if Moore knowingly waived his right to contest the facts, (2) whether Moore's attorney was ineffective for not contesting the State's facts and (3) if the State has to prove that Moore is likely to reoffend in order to prove he is currently dangerous.

In an 8-1 decision the Court affirmed the lower court. Justice Fairhurst wrote that courts do not have to ensure a party understands the impact of agreeing (stipulating) to facts, unless that agreement is tantamount to an admission of guilt. She also found nothing in the record to show that Moore was incompetent at the time of trial. In addition, Moore's attorney was not ineffective because there were tactical and strategic reasons for his actions. Finally, Fairhurst wrote that the elements which had to be proven to declare Moore a sexually violent predator were sufficient to show he is currently dangerous.

Justice Sanders filed the lone dissent, arguing that the State should have "to prove Moore will reoffend in the near future to establish he is currently dangerous," rather than the stated standard of reoffending at some point during the rest of his life.

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, No. 200577-2. The Court unanimously affirmed the State Bar's decision to disbar Marshall, due to a number of deceptive practices in his dealings with clients and his failure to change his practices after prior discipline by the Bar. Justice Jim Johnson wrote the opinion.

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Kappelman v. Lutz, No. 80996-8. Theodore Lutz took Amber Kappleman for a ride on his motorcycle even though he had only an instructional permit which did not allow him to carry passengers. They crashed when a deer ran out in front of them on the highway. Kappleman was injured, sued Lutz, and lost at the trial court. She appealed, citing the judge's refusal to allow evidence that Lutz lacked a motorcycle endorsement and his instructions to the jury on the "sudden emergency doctrine" (which says that a person in danger cannot be expected to "act as prudently as one might have had there been time for deliberation"). The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court and today the Supreme Court unanimously affirms that decision in an opinion by Justice James Johnson. (briefs and arguments)

Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, et al., No. 80888-1. Kimme Putman sued the Medical Center and several of its medical staff, alleging negligent failure to diagnose her ovarian cancer. The trial court dismissed because Putman failed to file a "certificate of merit" as required by RCW 7.70.150. Here, the Supreme Court reverses and holds that the statute violates the State Constitution because it "unduly burdens the right of access to courts" and violates the separation of powers. According to the majority opinion by Justice Owens, "Requiring plaintiffs to submit evidence supporting their claims prior to the discovery process violates the plaintiffs' right to access to courts." Justice Madsen, joined by Justice James Johnson, concurs as to separation of powers, but disagrees that the statute unduly interferes with access to the courts. (briefs and arguments).

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City of Spokane v. Rothwell, No. 81271-3. Two men convicted of DUI in the city of Spokane appeal and challenge that the judge who presided over their cases lacked jurisdiction. Although the city operated a municipal court, all of their judges were borrowed from Spokane County District Court. Defendants allege that RCW 3.46.050 and 070 (repealed in 2008) required that municipal court judges be elected from within the city limits. The Court of Appeals overturned the convictions. Here, the Court unanimously reverses the court below and reads the conflicting statutes to require that the election be limited to the city only for full-time and not part-time municipal court judges. The latter must be elected, but from what district is not specified by statute. Justice Jim Johnson wrote the Court's opinion. (briefs and argument)

In Re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chev. Chevelle and One 2004 Nissan Sentra, No. 81116-4. Thomas Roos was using both of his parents' cars for trafficking illegal drugs, presumably to cut overhead costs and pass the savings on to his customers. During one of four arrests in the summer of 2005, police seized the vehicles pursuant to RCW 69.50.505. His parents appeal the seizure based on the "innocent owner" exception. That provision allows a property owner to prevent seizure upon showing that the crime was done "without the owner's knowledge." The courts below rejected this argument, but the Court today reverses those decisions and sides with the parents. The majority opinion by Justice Charles Johnson and joined by four other justices notes that statutes often use language like "actual or constructive knowledge" or "knows or has reason to know." The Legislature did not extend "knowledge" in this statute, thus a property owner is not required to show that he had no reason to know of the illegal activity, only that he actually did not know.

Justice Madsen, joined by Justices Owens, Fairhurst, and Jim Johnson, concurs as to the Sentra and dissents on the Chevelle. "Because the Rooses did not take steps to prevent Thomas' use of the second car, the Chevelle, even after they knew of his arrest in the Nissan with a 110-gram brick of cocaine, I would uphold the hearing officer's forfeiture of the Chevelle."(briefs and argument).

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Briggs, et. al. v. Nova Services, et. al., No. 79615-7. A group of employees of Nova Services, including several managers, objected to their new executive director. They complained to the nonprofit's board of directors. The board investigated the objections, determined that the issues stemmed from "personal animosity," and three of the employees were fired. Six others refused to come to work and were considered as having quit their employment. Eight of the employees filed a complaint alleging several causes of action including violations of RCW 49.32.020, a Depression-era statute protecting workers in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protections...." The trail court granted Nova Services' motion for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court, finding that RCW 49.32.020 did not apply "because the Employees' concerns did not relate to a term or condition of employment. It also held that the statute does not protect management-level employees. The Supreme Court today upholds the lower courts with a lead opinion by Justice Jim Johnson and concurrences by Justices Charles Johnson and Madsen. Justice Owens, joined by Justices Chambers, Fairhurst, and Stephens, dissent, arguing for a much broader exception to at-will employment, including protection for "employee protests over management personnel decisions ... when the decision relates to the employees' working conditions." Congratulations to the Pacific Legal Foundation, which filed an amicus brief explaining the importance of at-will employment. (Briefs, Argument)

In re Discipline of Hicks, No. 200,606-0. Attorney Richard S. Hicks appeals a recommendation of the Washington State Bar Association Disciplinary Board. The Board recommends that he be suspended from the practice of law for two years for failing to properly manage client funds. The Bar Association also challenges that the sanction here is too mild. The Court unanimously upholds the Board's recommendation. (Briefs, Argument)

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In City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ (No. 80588-1), the Court was asked whether a city violated a church's religious liberty by preventing it from applying for a temporary permit to host a tent city. The Court of Appeals sided with the City.

In an opinion written by Justice Jim Johnson, the Court overturned the lower court, holding that the City's denial of the permit application violated Article I, Section 11 of the state constitution.

In the summer of 2006 the tent city organizers approached Northshore United about residing on church land. The church agreed, and submitted an application for a temporary permit to the City. At that time a short-term moratorium on temporary use permits was in place, which the City used to justify its refusal to process the church's application. The church allowed the tent city to come onto its property anyway, and the City sued for a restraining order and injunction.

Justice Johnson, joined by six other justices, held that the city's use of a moratorium to deny the church's permit application violated the state constitutional guarantee to "[a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship." (Article I, Section 11) There was no question of the City's sincere religious beliefs or that the moratorium was not in place to further a "compelling interest" of the City. So the primary question for the Court was "whether the City's actions substantially burden the free exercise of the Church's religious...worship."

The Court held that while incidental burdens on religion, such as requiring a permit, are not unconstitutional, refusing to process the church's permit application entirely was a substantial burden on religion. Since it reached this conclusion based on the state constitution, which the Court found to have greater protection than the federal bill of rights, the opinion did not address  federal claims.

The majority opinion also addressed the question of the tent city being a possible nuisance to the church's neighbors, but found that while the city might have the ability to regulate the manner in which this type of activity is conducted, it cannot simply deny any consideration of the permit.

Justice Sanders, joined by Justice Chambers, filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the result but took issue with the majority's holding that general permitting requirements for churches are an incidental (i.e. constitutional) burden. Sanders focused on the constitution's "absolute freedom" language, and argued that allowing the "licensing of religion" is inconsistent with this broad constitutional protection.

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City of Bellevue v. Lee, et al., No. 81473-2. The nine respondents in this case each had his or her drivers license suspended after failing to pay a traffic citation fine. The Department of Licencing notified each person of the pending suspension and offered each an administrative review. This current process for license suspensions is the result of the Court's 2004 decision in City of Redmond v. Moore, where it invalidated an earlier drivers license suspension procedure for failing to satisfy due process requirements. Applying the three-pronged test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court today holds that Washington's current process for suspending drivers licenses does provide due process and upholds these license suspensions. Susan Owens writes the majority opinion and is joined by all of the other justices except Justice Sanders, who dissents. (briefs and argument)

In re Detention of Anderson, No. 79111-2. As a teenager, John Charles Anderson raped two two-year-old boys and a 13-year-old boy and then sexually abused his roommated in a juvenile rehabilitation center. He was voluntarily committed to Western State Hospital, where he had sexual relationships with at least eight patients; four of these patients were considered particularly vulnerable persons. Anderson decided to leave Western State and the State petitioned to commit him as a sexually violent predator. Anderson refused to use the expert witness provided to him by the state and requested a different expert, Dr. Richard Wollert. The State objected and the trial court denied Anderson's request. At the conclusion of the trial, the court ordered Anderson's commitment and Anderson appealed. He argued that the State had not proved the requisite "recent overt act" and that it wrongly denied his request for a different expert witness. The Court of Appeals sided with the state on the first of these and with Anderson on the second.

Here the Court of Appeals is upheld and the matter remanded for a new trial. Justice James Johnson writes for five members of the Court. Justice Sanders dissents and would dismiss. Justice Fairhurst, joined by Justices Chambers and Stephens, dissents. Both dissenting opinions would find insufficient evidence of a "recent overt act" to justify civil committment. (briefs and argument)

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McAllister v. Bellevue Firemen’s Pension Board, No. 81187-3.  David and Ken McAllister were firefighters for the City of Bellevue. Both made pension contributions for many years under the Firefighters’ Relief and Pensions Act of 1955. When the men retired, the 1955 Act had been replaced by the Law Enforcement Officers’ and Fire Fighters’ System Pension Plan of 1970. Under the more recent 1970 plan, the city is required to pay the McAllisters the difference, if any, between their benefits under LEOFF and what their benefits would have been had they retired under the 1955 Act. The City later determined it had made an excess payment to the McAllisters of approximately $500,000 by relying on definitions contained in LEOFF, rather than the 1955 Act. Upon discovering this, the City began paying a reduced excess payment, but did not seek a reimbursement. The McAllisters challenged the reduced payment. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the City’s action, with Justice Debra Stephens writing the opinion. “The plain language of RCW 41.26.040(2) further requires that an excess payment be calculated under the prior retirement system, not under LEOFF,” she wrote. (briefs and argument).

State v. Engel, No. 81072-9. Roger Engel was convicted of second-degree burglary after stealing some wheels from a large private yard that was partially enclosed by a fence and partially bordered by sloping terrain. Burglary in the second degree requires entering or remaining in a “building.” RCW 9A.52.030. A “building” is defined to include a “fenced area.” RCW 9A.04.110(5). Engel challenged his conviction, claiming the yard was not a “fenced area” under the statute. The business premises Engel entered covered seven or eight acres and included several buildings and a large yard. The entrance to the property was gated. One-third of the property, including the side fronting the road, was fenced by chain link fence with barbed wire on the top. The rest of the property was not fenced, including the edge of the property near the stock piles. Beyond the gravel piles was is a “pretty sizeable drop-off, a hill that goes down.” Two-thirds of the property was encased by ‘banks, high banks, [and] sloping banks.” Directly adjacent to the property was a separate business, but no fence or gate separated the two properties.

The Supreme Court agreed with Engel’s argument, with Justice James Johnson writing the unanimous opinion. “Upholding an overly broad definition of ‘fenced area’ would extend criminal liability beyond what is warranted by the plain language of the statute, as understood in the context of the common law. Therefore, the Court of Appeals decision affirming Engel’s conviction is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and dismiss the charge.” (briefs and argument).

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On March 12 the Supreme Court issued an order staying the execution of convicted murderer Cal Coburn Brown, by a 5-4 vote. Justice James Johnson, one of the dissenting justices, has filed an opinion in support of his vote, writing that in the 18 years since Brown murdered his victim, he has been given ample opportunity for judicial review.

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