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The Supreme Court today decisively ruled that sentencing enhancements for the possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime are not constitutionally prohibited. The case is State v. Aguirre, No. 82226-3 (briefs and argument).

Daniel Aguirre was convicted in Thurston County Superior Court of assault and rape. He unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeals (Div. 2), arguing that a number of errors occurred at trial. Aguirre argues the trial court committed a number of errors, and argues that the deadly weapon enhancement to his sentence for assault with a deadly weapon violates double jeopardy. The double jeopardy clauses of both the federal and state constitutions protect defendants from being twice put in jeopardy for the same crime.

The Supreme Court, with Justice James Johnson writing the unanimous opinion, rejected all of Aguirre’s claims. On the double jeopardy issue the Court said: “Washington courts repeatedly have held that double jeopardy is not offended by weapon enhancements even when being armed with the weapon is an element of the underlying crime.”

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Justice Jim Johnson announced his plan to seek a second term on the Supreme Court. Check out his campaign Facebook page here. The page describes Justice Johnson as "the state Supreme Court’s most ardent supporter of liberty and judicial restraint." At this time there are no challengers for his position.

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In re Custody of E.A.T.W. and E.Y.W., No. 81945-9. Was the superior court right to grant a hearing for a custody petition based only on the fact that the children had lived with the petitioning grandparents for several years? The Court of Appeals had overturned the superior court, and the Supreme Court today upholds the Court of Appeals. The High Court holds that RCW 26.10.032 imposes on third party petitioners the duty of setting forth facts that would show “that the parent is unfit or placement with the parent would result in actual detriment to the child's growth and development.”

The unanimous opinion, written by Justice James Johnson, goes on to hold that this standard is in accord with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville.

In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court affirmed this court's judgment in In re Custody of Smith that constitutionally protected parental rights were violated by a statute allowing a nonparent to wrest custody of a child from a parent based solely on the court's findings regarding the child's best interests. Something more is required than the court's judgment that it could make a better decision than parents concerning the upbringing of children.

(Briefs, Argument-May 28, 2009)

State v. Sibert, No. 79509-6. Richard Sibert was convicted by a jury in 2004 of four crimes related to the sale of methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, and Sibert appeals on three alleged errs:  1) failure of the trial court to include the identity of the “controlled substance” on part of the jury instructions; 2) failure to prove the identity of the controlled substance; 3) an inappropriate jury instruction on “knowledge.”

Today the Court upholds Sibert’s conviction and sentencing. It finds that throughout the trial, everyone involved understood that the controlled substance was methamphetamine. Further, the jury instructions incorporated by reference the charging documents that identified the substance as methamphetamine. It also upholds the instruction on “knowledge,” which the trial court took directly from the Washington Practice.

Justice James Johnson also wrote this majority opinion, but Justices Sanders and Alexander both authored dissents, the latter joined by Justices Charles Johnson and Debra Stephens. The Chief concurred with the majority, but as to the result only. The four dissenting justices would hold prosecutors to a higher standard, in this case requiring a more explicit and precise description of the controlled substance.

(Briefs, Argument-February 10, 2009)

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The Supreme Court issued rulings in seven cases this morning, including two highly-anticipated decisions dealing with whether an authorization to use medical marijuana is a defense to criminal possession, and whether the state's Consumer Protection Act allows out-of-state litigants to join a Washington class action lawsuit.

Clayton v. Wilson, No. 81920-3. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the unanimous ruling holding that a couple’s marital community is liable for the intentional wrongful sexual acts of one spouse. Without his wife’s knowledge, Mr. Wilson repeatedly sexually abused a neighbor boy, Andrew Clayton, whom he was paying to do yard work at the Wilson’s home. After Mr. Wilson was arrested the couple began dissolving the marriage and executed a property settlement transferring 90 percent of community assets to Mrs. Wilson (and theoretically insulating the funds from any potential lawsuit). Clayton sued, and the entire marital community was found liable because the assaults occurred while Clayton was working for the community. The trial court also found fraud in the extremely lopsided division of marital property, and voided the transfer. The Court of Appeals agreed and the Supreme Court upheld the decision.

In re the Dependency of C.S., No. 81720-1. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the unanimous opinion holding that Amy Singleton’s parental rights had been improperly terminated. Singleton has a son diagnosed with ADHD and other behavioral problems. She has a history of drug and alcohol abuse and is under the supervision of social workers. She continues to have substance abuse issues, although evidence was introduced that she is improving. The state filed a third party custody action and the court terminated her parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed this order as the State had not offered Singleton required training that would allow her to rehabilitate.

Schnall, et al. v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., No. 80572-5. Should AT&T Wireless customers nationwide be allowed to pursue a class action under the WA Consumer Protection Act? Chief Justice Barbara Madsen, writing for a 5-4 majority, declined to make Washington “a locus of nationwide class action litigation.” The Court said the trial court was correct in declining to certify a nationwide class.

Drum v. State, No. 81498-8. Justice Debra Stephens, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed Patrick Drum’s conviction for burglary after he entered a house while high on spray paint. Drum entered a drug program and signed a Drug Court Contract, under which he agreed that the court would determine his guilt on the burglary charge if he was terminated from the program. As part of this contract, he waived various rights including the right to testify and the right to a jury trial. Drum left the drug program, and the court found him guilty of burglary. Drum appealed, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that the contract did not fulfill due process requirements for a guilty plea. The Jefferson County Superior Court found that Drum had stipulated that the evidence was sufficient, and that the contract did not violate due process because it was not a guilty plea.

State v. Erickson, No. 81594-1. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld an assault conviction, with Justice Tom Chambers writing the opinion. Anthony Erickson was convicted of fourth degree assault and released on probation, but his probation officer claimed that he violated the terms of his probation agreement. Erickson was summoned to a probation hearing, failed to appear, and an arrest warrant was issued. Upon arrest he was found with drugs on him and convicted of possession. He appealed, claiming the arrest warrant was invalid because there was no probable cause that he had violated probation (only the officer’s word). The Court wrote: “We conclude that the warrant was valid because it was supported by a well-founded suspicion that Erickson had violated the terms of his release.”

State v. Fry, No. 81210-1. Justice James Johnson writes a 4-vote lead opinion, with four other justices agreeing in a separate opinion, that rejected a defendant’s claim that he was qualified to use marijuana for medicinal purposes in defense to a charge of unlawful possession of marijuana. Two police officers were informed of a marijuana growing operation at the residence of Jason and Tina Fry. The officers smelled marijuana when they approached. Fry did not consent to a search, and presented a document purporting to be authorization for medical marijuana. The officers obtained a warrant and seized over two pounds of marijuana. At trial, Fry argued to suppress the marijuana because of his medical marijuana authorization. The judge denied the motion. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to allow the evidence seized at the Frys’ home, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

State v. Kelly, No. 82111-9. Dustin Kelly approached a couple, threatened to kill them both, and then shot at them, killing the man. In addition to murder, he was convicted of second degree assault (intentional assault with a deadly weapon). The court imposed firearm sentence enhancements on both crimes. Kelly argues that since the use of the firearm is already an element of second degree assault, imposing the sentence enhancement on the assault essentially punishes him twice for using the firearm—a claimed violation of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this argument, with Chief Justice Madsen writing the opinion.

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Alhadeff v. Kitsap Cmty. Fed. Credit Union d/b/a Kitsap Credit Union, No. 81833-9. A swanky condominium project, "The Meridian on Bainbridge [Island]," flopped, leaving the courts to sort through a letter of credit (LOC) controversy that the Supreme Court today deems "significantly more complex than a typical LOC transaction." 

Developer Meridian received a construction loan from Kitsap Credit Union for $4,500,000. The Credit Union required that Meridian contribute equity in the form of a $1,000,000 LOC. Meridian arranged for the LOC from investor Jack Alhadeff, who authorized his bank, Wells Fargo, to issue the LOC to Kitsap Credit Union. The terms of the LOC required the Credit Union to certify that Meridian was not in default before drawing on the LOC.

Kitsap Credit Union drew on the letter three times, in May, June, and July of 2004, exhausting the full $1,000,000. Despite the Credit Union's certification each time that Meridian was not in default, two "events of default" had already occurred: a tax deficiency and the imposition of a construction lien by a contractor. The Credit Union was also aware that Meridian was exceeding its budget. In September 2004, Meridian asked the Credit Union for a further loan. The Credit Union eventually declared Meridian in default in November 2006.

In August 2006, Alhadeff sued Kitsap Credit Union alleging eight causes of action related to the LOC. The trial court granted the Credit Union's motion for summary judgment, finding the situation covered by U.C.C. Article 5 and the claims thus barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Alhadeff appealed, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and Kitsap Credit Union appealed.

Today, the Supreme Court unanimously reverses the Court of Appeals, holding that the U.C.C. Article 5 statute of limitations does apply and that none of Alhadeff's claims survive summary judgment. Justice James Johnson wrote the opinion, which includes a helpful Diagram of Letter of Credit Transaction. And somewhere in there, reversed Court of Appeals Judge Theodore Spearman administered this author's oath of attorney. (briefs and argument)

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The Supreme Court today says that education salary disparities between school districts do not violate the Washington Constitution. The case is Federal Way School District 210 v. State, No. 80943-7 (briefs and argument).

In 2006, the Federal Way School District, along with district employees, parents and students, sued the state, arguing that funding disparities violate the duty of a “general and uniform” school system. Education funding is a complex formula of federal, state, and local funds that are distributed to individual school districts, and employees in different districts are often paid different amounts. For example, the State allocation to districts for the 2007-08 school year ranged from $32,746 to $34,612 among teachers and from $54,405 to $80,807 for administrators.

King County Superior Court Judge Michael Heavey ruled that the state’s funding model violates the “general and uniform” duty, and violated the state’s equal protection clause by paying similarly-situated school employees differently.

There are two educational sections of the state constitution at play here. One requires the state to make “ample provision” for the education of all children (Art. IX, Sec. 1), while the other section mandates a “general and uniform system of public schools” (Art. IX, Sec. 2).

The plaintiffs argued that the “general and uniform” provision is violated when school employees are paid different amounts. They argue the state’s obligation is not just ample funding, but ample funding within a general and uniform system. In response, the state argued that where the “ample provision” for basic education is met, variances in school funding allocations are of no constitutional significance. The constitutional duty is to create a common education system (uniform academic learning requirements, graduation standards, teacher licensing standards, uniform discipline standards), not to guarantee precisely equal funding to every district.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Jim Johnson writing the unanimous decision, soundly rejected the school district’s case—ruling to uphold the existing funding allocation system.

The Court wrote that education funding has historically varied statewide, and that the legislature has attempted to shrink disparities over time. The uniformity requirement, according to the Court, means that every child has the same educational advantages. “Our cases discussing article IX, section 2 make it clear that the provision requires uniformity in the educational program provided, not the minutiae of funding.” The Court also ruled that the individuals parents, students, and teachers challenging the funding allocation model are unable to show any direct harm and therefore are not able to challenge the funding model.

The legislature’s use of the staff unit allocation system to fund education with differing salary allocations to school districts with historically disparate average salaries does not violate article IX, section 2, although there remains a slight gap between the highest and lowest salary funding statewide. There is no showing that the legislature’s funding allocations, including those for Federal Way School District, do not constitute “ample provision for the education of all children” as required under article IX, section 1. The legislature has acted well within its constitutional authority and its duty to make ample provision for the education of children and to provide for a general and uniform system of education under article IX. The individual respondents’ claims do not meet requirements for justiciability and should be dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse.

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In re Det. of Fair, No. 80498-2. David Tyler Fair was charged with molesting several young girls, plead guilty to one count of second degree child molestation, and was sentenced to 20 months in prison. The sentence was suspended as part of a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA). Fair failed to meet the requirements of that sentence, committed a robbery, then fled the state. Eventually, after being imprisoned in New Mexico, Fair was returned to Washington to serve his original sentence and the robbery sentence. In a treatment program, he admitted numerous other sexual contacts with children between 2 and 12 years old. The State petitioned to have Fair committed as a sexually violent predator.

Fair challenged his commitment, arguing that the State was required to "plead and prove a recent overt act." The Court today holds that the Sexually Violent Predator Act (RCW 71.09) only requires the state to prove a recent act if the person is not incarcerated. The Court further holds that this interpretation of the Act does not violate Fair's right to due process, in part because "due process does not require that the absurd be done before the compelling state interest can be vindicated." Justice Jim Johnson wrote the lead opinion, joined by Justices Madsen and Owens. Justice Fairhurst, joined by Justice Charles Johnson, concurs, but offers a slightly different analysis.

Justice Sanders, joined by the Chief Justice, dissents, arguing that the statute plainly requires that a person must be in total and continuous confinement following the original sex offense. Because Fair was originally released and only later incarcerated, and because he was actually serving only the robbery sentence at the time of the commitment proceedings, the dissent would require the state to plead and prove a recent overt act. Justice Chambers joined the dissent, but only as to the result.

In re Pers. Restraint of Duncan, No. 81230-6. Bryan Duncan challenges his commitment as a sexually violent predator based on several evidentiary rulings of the trial court. Duncan was convicted of three counts of first degree child molestation in 1992 and 1993. The State moved to commit him in 1996 and he was finally committed in 2005 (the Court notes that the nine-year delay is troubling, but was mostly attributable to Duncan and was not raised as an issue). Duncan challenges the trial court's admission of evidence that he refused a psychological evaluation and its refusal to allow Duncan to present evidence about the treatment program at the Special Commitment Center and about his proposed roommate if he was released.

The Court today holds, in an opinion by Justice Chambers, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the evidentiary rulings. Justices Charles Johnson, Madsen, Owens, Fairhurst, and Jim Johnson and Justice Pro Tem. Philip Thompson joined the majority opinion.

Justice Sanders dissents, arguing that allowing the reference to Duncan's refusal to be reevaluated was "irrelevant and prejudicial." He would also find the refusal to allow Duncan's evidence about his proposed roommate after the state had introduce its evidence about the roommate to be reversible error. The Chief Justice, in a separate dissent, agrees with Sanders except that he would find the trial judge "impermissibly commented on the evidence by stating to the jury that Duncan 'did not wish' to be reevaluated."

State v. Patton, No. 80518-1. Randall Patton was wanted on a felony warrant when a Skamania County Sheriff Deputy spotted him. Patton was leaning into his own car through the window, rummaging with something on the seat. The Deputy told Patton he was under arrest and Patton fled, but was soon apprehended inside a trailer. Deputies searched the car and found methamphetamine. Patton challenged that the search violated his state and federal constitutional rights because it was not a valid search incident to arrest. The trial court suppressed the evidence but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously sides with Patton and the trial court.

The Court first disagrees with the trial court, which had found that Patton was not arrested until he was taken into custody in the trailer. He was arrested when the officer "manifest[ed] an intent to take [him] into custody" while Patton was standing by his car. Nevertheless, "the search incident to arrest exception is narrow and should be applied only in circumstances anchored to the justifications for its existence."

The question before us, then, is whether it would stretch the search incident to arrest exception beyond its justifications to apply it where the arrestee is not a driver or recent occupant of the vehicle, the basis for arrest is not related to the use of the vehicle, and the arrestee is physically detained and secured away from the vehicle before the search. We believe it would.

Justice Stephens wrote the majority opinion, joined by all other justices except for Justice Jim Johnson, who concurred but found the case identical to Arizona v. Gant, decided earlier this year by the United States Supreme Court.

Thompson v. Hanson, No. 81311-6. The Court resolves a dispute between the Courts of Appeals over Washington's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). Division Three had held that a creditor can only enforce their rights against a transferee who has received fraudulently conveyed property from a debtor if the transferee had "intent to hinder or delay [the] creditors." Today, the Court unanimously eschews that position and upholds a Division One ruling that no proof of intent is required by the UFTA. Justice Owens writes the main opinion and Justice Madsen concurs, but would not have reached one of the issues (the "offset" provision) addressed by Owens.

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Post v. City of Tacoma, No. 80684-5. The City of Tacoma levied hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines against Paul Post for multiple building code violations. Tacoma's procedures only allowed Post to appeal the initial fine for a particular violation and not subsequent fines issued for the same violation. He appealed many of the fines, losing at every level. The Court of Appeals held "that all Post's claims were barred because he failed to follow the procedures in the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA)."

Today, the Supreme Court overturns the Court of Appeals and holds that LUPA does not apply to the use of "civil infractions" that levy fines to enforce a building code. Further, the Court agrees with Post that due process requires that he "must have an opportunity to be heard on each separate infraction, even if they are issued (i.e., penalties are being assessed) daily for the same violation." Tacoma's process at issue here is held facially unconstitutional. Justice James Johnson wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Sanders, Chambers, Owens, and Stephens.

The Chief Justice concurs as to the result, arguing that the court should have avoided the constitutional question and struck down Tacoma's process as a regulation "in conflict with general laws." Justice Sanders, who joins the lead opinion, also writes separately to concur with the Chief. Justice Madsen writes a vigorous dissent, joined by Justices Fairhurst and Charles Johnson, arguing that LUPA does apply.

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In re Detention of Moore, No. 81201-2. The trial court granted a state petition for Moore to be declared a sexually violent predator and confined in a mental facility (civilly committed). The Supreme Court reviewed (1) whether the trial court erred in accepted the State's set of facts as accurate without checking to see if Moore knowingly waived his right to contest the facts, (2) whether Moore's attorney was ineffective for not contesting the State's facts and (3) if the State has to prove that Moore is likely to reoffend in order to prove he is currently dangerous.

In an 8-1 decision the Court affirmed the lower court. Justice Fairhurst wrote that courts do not have to ensure a party understands the impact of agreeing (stipulating) to facts, unless that agreement is tantamount to an admission of guilt. She also found nothing in the record to show that Moore was incompetent at the time of trial. In addition, Moore's attorney was not ineffective because there were tactical and strategic reasons for his actions. Finally, Fairhurst wrote that the elements which had to be proven to declare Moore a sexually violent predator were sufficient to show he is currently dangerous.

Justice Sanders filed the lone dissent, arguing that the State should have "to prove Moore will reoffend in the near future to establish he is currently dangerous," rather than the stated standard of reoffending at some point during the rest of his life.

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, No. 200577-2. The Court unanimously affirmed the State Bar's decision to disbar Marshall, due to a number of deceptive practices in his dealings with clients and his failure to change his practices after prior discipline by the Bar. Justice Jim Johnson wrote the opinion.

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Kappelman v. Lutz, No. 80996-8. Theodore Lutz took Amber Kappleman for a ride on his motorcycle even though he had only an instructional permit which did not allow him to carry passengers. They crashed when a deer ran out in front of them on the highway. Kappleman was injured, sued Lutz, and lost at the trial court. She appealed, citing the judge's refusal to allow evidence that Lutz lacked a motorcycle endorsement and his instructions to the jury on the "sudden emergency doctrine" (which says that a person in danger cannot be expected to "act as prudently as one might have had there been time for deliberation"). The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court and today the Supreme Court unanimously affirms that decision in an opinion by Justice James Johnson. (briefs and arguments)

Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, et al., No. 80888-1. Kimme Putman sued the Medical Center and several of its medical staff, alleging negligent failure to diagnose her ovarian cancer. The trial court dismissed because Putman failed to file a "certificate of merit" as required by RCW 7.70.150. Here, the Supreme Court reverses and holds that the statute violates the State Constitution because it "unduly burdens the right of access to courts" and violates the separation of powers. According to the majority opinion by Justice Owens, "Requiring plaintiffs to submit evidence supporting their claims prior to the discovery process violates the plaintiffs' right to access to courts." Justice Madsen, joined by Justice James Johnson, concurs as to separation of powers, but disagrees that the statute unduly interferes with access to the courts. (briefs and arguments).

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City of Spokane v. Rothwell, No. 81271-3. Two men convicted of DUI in the city of Spokane appeal and challenge that the judge who presided over their cases lacked jurisdiction. Although the city operated a municipal court, all of their judges were borrowed from Spokane County District Court. Defendants allege that RCW 3.46.050 and 070 (repealed in 2008) required that municipal court judges be elected from within the city limits. The Court of Appeals overturned the convictions. Here, the Court unanimously reverses the court below and reads the conflicting statutes to require that the election be limited to the city only for full-time and not part-time municipal court judges. The latter must be elected, but from what district is not specified by statute. Justice Jim Johnson wrote the Court's opinion. (briefs and argument)

In Re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chev. Chevelle and One 2004 Nissan Sentra, No. 81116-4. Thomas Roos was using both of his parents' cars for trafficking illegal drugs, presumably to cut overhead costs and pass the savings on to his customers. During one of four arrests in the summer of 2005, police seized the vehicles pursuant to RCW 69.50.505. His parents appeal the seizure based on the "innocent owner" exception. That provision allows a property owner to prevent seizure upon showing that the crime was done "without the owner's knowledge." The courts below rejected this argument, but the Court today reverses those decisions and sides with the parents. The majority opinion by Justice Charles Johnson and joined by four other justices notes that statutes often use language like "actual or constructive knowledge" or "knows or has reason to know." The Legislature did not extend "knowledge" in this statute, thus a property owner is not required to show that he had no reason to know of the illegal activity, only that he actually did not know.

Justice Madsen, joined by Justices Owens, Fairhurst, and Jim Johnson, concurs as to the Sentra and dissents on the Chevelle. "Because the Rooses did not take steps to prevent Thomas' use of the second car, the Chevelle, even after they knew of his arrest in the Nissan with a 110-gram brick of cocaine, I would uphold the hearing officer's forfeiture of the Chevelle."(briefs and argument).

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Briggs, et. al. v. Nova Services, et. al., No. 79615-7. A group of employees of Nova Services, including several managers, objected to their new executive director. They complained to the nonprofit's board of directors. The board investigated the objections, determined that the issues stemmed from "personal animosity," and three of the employees were fired. Six others refused to come to work and were considered as having quit their employment. Eight of the employees filed a complaint alleging several causes of action including violations of RCW 49.32.020, a Depression-era statute protecting workers in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protections...." The trail court granted Nova Services' motion for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court, finding that RCW 49.32.020 did not apply "because the Employees' concerns did not relate to a term or condition of employment. It also held that the statute does not protect management-level employees. The Supreme Court today upholds the lower courts with a lead opinion by Justice Jim Johnson and concurrences by Justices Charles Johnson and Madsen. Justice Owens, joined by Justices Chambers, Fairhurst, and Stephens, dissent, arguing for a much broader exception to at-will employment, including protection for "employee protests over management personnel decisions ... when the decision relates to the employees' working conditions." Congratulations to the Pacific Legal Foundation, which filed an amicus brief explaining the importance of at-will employment. (Briefs, Argument)

In re Discipline of Hicks, No. 200,606-0. Attorney Richard S. Hicks appeals a recommendation of the Washington State Bar Association Disciplinary Board. The Board recommends that he be suspended from the practice of law for two years for failing to properly manage client funds. The Bar Association also challenges that the sanction here is too mild. The Court unanimously upholds the Board's recommendation. (Briefs, Argument)

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In City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ (No. 80588-1), the Court was asked whether a city violated a church's religious liberty by preventing it from applying for a temporary permit to host a tent city. The Court of Appeals sided with the City.

In an opinion written by Justice Jim Johnson, the Court overturned the lower court, holding that the City's denial of the permit application violated Article I, Section 11 of the state constitution.

In the summer of 2006 the tent city organizers approached Northshore United about residing on church land. The church agreed, and submitted an application for a temporary permit to the City. At that time a short-term moratorium on temporary use permits was in place, which the City used to justify its refusal to process the church's application. The church allowed the tent city to come onto its property anyway, and the City sued for a restraining order and injunction.

Justice Johnson, joined by six other justices, held that the city's use of a moratorium to deny the church's permit application violated the state constitutional guarantee to "[a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship." (Article I, Section 11) There was no question of the City's sincere religious beliefs or that the moratorium was not in place to further a "compelling interest" of the City. So the primary question for the Court was "whether the City's actions substantially burden the free exercise of the Church's religious...worship."

The Court held that while incidental burdens on religion, such as requiring a permit, are not unconstitutional, refusing to process the church's permit application entirely was a substantial burden on religion. Since it reached this conclusion based on the state constitution, which the Court found to have greater protection than the federal bill of rights, the opinion did not address  federal claims.

The majority opinion also addressed the question of the tent city being a possible nuisance to the church's neighbors, but found that while the city might have the ability to regulate the manner in which this type of activity is conducted, it cannot simply deny any consideration of the permit.

Justice Sanders, joined by Justice Chambers, filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the result but took issue with the majority's holding that general permitting requirements for churches are an incidental (i.e. constitutional) burden. Sanders focused on the constitution's "absolute freedom" language, and argued that allowing the "licensing of religion" is inconsistent with this broad constitutional protection.

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City of Bellevue v. Lee, et al., No. 81473-2. The nine respondents in this case each had his or her drivers license suspended after failing to pay a traffic citation fine. The Department of Licencing notified each person of the pending suspension and offered each an administrative review. This current process for license suspensions is the result of the Court's 2004 decision in City of Redmond v. Moore, where it invalidated an earlier drivers license suspension procedure for failing to satisfy due process requirements. Applying the three-pronged test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court today holds that Washington's current process for suspending drivers licenses does provide due process and upholds these license suspensions. Susan Owens writes the majority opinion and is joined by all of the other justices except Justice Sanders, who dissents. (briefs and argument)

In re Detention of Anderson, No. 79111-2. As a teenager, John Charles Anderson raped two two-year-old boys and a 13-year-old boy and then sexually abused his roommated in a juvenile rehabilitation center. He was voluntarily committed to Western State Hospital, where he had sexual relationships with at least eight patients; four of these patients were considered particularly vulnerable persons. Anderson decided to leave Western State and the State petitioned to commit him as a sexually violent predator. Anderson refused to use the expert witness provided to him by the state and requested a different expert, Dr. Richard Wollert. The State objected and the trial court denied Anderson's request. At the conclusion of the trial, the court ordered Anderson's commitment and Anderson appealed. He argued that the State had not proved the requisite "recent overt act" and that it wrongly denied his request for a different expert witness. The Court of Appeals sided with the state on the first of these and with Anderson on the second.

Here the Court of Appeals is upheld and the matter remanded for a new trial. Justice James Johnson writes for five members of the Court. Justice Sanders dissents and would dismiss. Justice Fairhurst, joined by Justices Chambers and Stephens, dissents. Both dissenting opinions would find insufficient evidence of a "recent overt act" to justify civil committment. (briefs and argument)

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McAllister v. Bellevue Firemen’s Pension Board, No. 81187-3.  David and Ken McAllister were firefighters for the City of Bellevue. Both made pension contributions for many years under the Firefighters’ Relief and Pensions Act of 1955. When the men retired, the 1955 Act had been replaced by the Law Enforcement Officers’ and Fire Fighters’ System Pension Plan of 1970. Under the more recent 1970 plan, the city is required to pay the McAllisters the difference, if any, between their benefits under LEOFF and what their benefits would have been had they retired under the 1955 Act. The City later determined it had made an excess payment to the McAllisters of approximately $500,000 by relying on definitions contained in LEOFF, rather than the 1955 Act. Upon discovering this, the City began paying a reduced excess payment, but did not seek a reimbursement. The McAllisters challenged the reduced payment. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the City’s action, with Justice Debra Stephens writing the opinion. “The plain language of RCW 41.26.040(2) further requires that an excess payment be calculated under the prior retirement system, not under LEOFF,” she wrote. (briefs and argument).

State v. Engel, No. 81072-9. Roger Engel was convicted of second-degree burglary after stealing some wheels from a large private yard that was partially enclosed by a fence and partially bordered by sloping terrain. Burglary in the second degree requires entering or remaining in a “building.” RCW 9A.52.030. A “building” is defined to include a “fenced area.” RCW 9A.04.110(5). Engel challenged his conviction, claiming the yard was not a “fenced area” under the statute. The business premises Engel entered covered seven or eight acres and included several buildings and a large yard. The entrance to the property was gated. One-third of the property, including the side fronting the road, was fenced by chain link fence with barbed wire on the top. The rest of the property was not fenced, including the edge of the property near the stock piles. Beyond the gravel piles was is a “pretty sizeable drop-off, a hill that goes down.” Two-thirds of the property was encased by ‘banks, high banks, [and] sloping banks.” Directly adjacent to the property was a separate business, but no fence or gate separated the two properties.

The Supreme Court agreed with Engel’s argument, with Justice James Johnson writing the unanimous opinion. “Upholding an overly broad definition of ‘fenced area’ would extend criminal liability beyond what is warranted by the plain language of the statute, as understood in the context of the common law. Therefore, the Court of Appeals decision affirming Engel’s conviction is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and dismiss the charge.” (briefs and argument).

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On March 12 the Supreme Court issued an order staying the execution of convicted murderer Cal Coburn Brown, by a 5-4 vote. Justice James Johnson, one of the dissenting justices, has filed an opinion in support of his vote, writing that in the 18 years since Brown murdered his victim, he has been given ample opportunity for judicial review.

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