Today's opinions: August 5, 2010

The court issued rulings in three cases today. Here is a brief summary of each case:

In Re the Honorable Judith Raub Eiler, No. 200,701-5. Judge Judith Eiler is a district court judge in King County. Based on a number of complaints, disciplinary proceedings were brought against her for treating litigants in an “angry, abusive, and condescending manner.” Eiler argues that there was not enough evidence, that the penalty is too high, and that punishing her for her demeanor violates her freedom of speech. Eiler appeals a disciplinary recommendation that she be suspended for 90 days without pay. The Supreme Court, with Justice Jim Johnson writing the lead opinion, found that Judge Eiler’s behavior only violated the judicial cannon requiring that a judge be “patient, dignified, and courteous.” The court reduced her suspension to a 5-day period.

Kelley v. Centennial Contractors, No. 82474-6. Phillip and Monica Blackshear sued Centennial Contractors Enterprises for injuries caused when a steel beam was dropped on Phillip. After they won the suit, they filed a complaint for loss of consortium on behalf of their three children. The complaint stated that it would have been impractical to include their claims with their parents’ suit. George Kelly was appointed guardian ad litem for the children. At trial, the children’s case was dismissed because the court said their claims should have been joined with their parents’ claims. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) reversed, holding that since the children did not yet have a guardian ad litem it would have been impossible to join them to the suit, and that it would have been impractical for them to bring their claims until the results of their father’s surgery were known. The Supreme Court, with Justice Gerry Alexander writing the lead opinion, agreed, holding that there were general issues of material fact that precluded a summary dismissal of the claim.

State v. Tibbles, No. 80308-1. Micah Tibbles appealed his misdemeanor convictions for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. During a traffic stop of Tibbles, Trooper Norman Larsen detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from Tibbles’ car. The trooper did not arrest Tibbles or seek a warrant, but conducted an warrantless search of the car, whereupon he discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The district court, superior court, and Court of Appeals all upheld the search under the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement, which allows law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless searches when obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape, or allow destruction of evidence. Justice Debra Stephens, writing for the Supreme Court, said that the exigent circumstances exception would not apply in this case and that the search of Tibbles’ vehicle was unconstitutional under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

Today's arguments, Jan. 14, 2010

The Supreme Court will hear arguments in four cases today.

In the morning session:

In Re the Honorable Judith Raub Eiler, No. 200,701-5 (briefs). Judge Judith Eiler is a district court judge in King County. Based on a number of complaints, disciplinary proceedings were brought against her for treating litigants in an “angry, abusive, and condescending manner.” Eiler argues that there was not enough evidence, that the penalty is too high, and that punishing her for her demeanor violates her freedom of speech. Eiler appeals a disciplinary recommendation that she be suspended for 90 days without pay.

South Tacoma Way v. State, No. 82212-3 (briefs).The State Department of Transportation (DOT) sold an alley to Sustainable Urban Development #1, LLC (Sustainable). DOT failed to notify other adjacent property owners as required by law. South Tacoma Way, LLC, which also owns property next to the alley, sued DOT and Sustainable to void the contract as an ultra vires act outside DOT's authority. The trial court held that DOT was authorized to sell the property and that the failure to give notice was merely a procedural error. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) reversed, holding that DOT is only authorized to sell property after giving notice.

In the afternoon session:

State v. Shultz, No. 80653-5 (briefs). Whether the warrantless search was justified as an “emergency.” Officers Malone and Hill went to an apartment to investigate a possible domestic disturbance. Outside, they heard a man and a woman speaking loudly. When they knocked on the door, Patricia Schultz answered. She initially told the officers that there was no one else in the apartment, but when pressed she called Sam Robertson to the door. Officer Hill took Robertson outside to question him, and Officer Malone went inside to question Shultz. Shultz did not give Malone permission to enter, but did not object either.

Shultz was moving around inside the apartment, and Malone threatened to handcuff her if she did not “sit still.” Shortly afterward, Officer Hill entered the apartment. Shultz moved something, uncovering a gun and a marijuana pipe, and Hill saw them. The officers searched the apartment, found drugs, and arrested Shultz.

Shultz unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. In upholding the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the “emergency exception” to the warrant requirement applied based on the argument, Shultz's appearance, and the fact that Shultz lied about Robertson's presence.

State v. Harvill, No. 82358-8 (briefs). Whether the trial court should have instructed the jury on duress. Joshua Harvill was caught selling drugs to an informer. At trial, he claimed that he sold the drugs because he was afraid of the informer. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the defense of duress because there was no evidence that the informer had threatened Harvill. The trial court did instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment, and the jury rejected the defense.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Div. 2) noted that if the elements of duress had been proved, then the contested elements of entrapment would also have been proved. Since the jury rejected entrapment, it would also have rejected duress even had the instruction been given. Thus, even if the lack of a duress instruction was in error, it did not prejudice Harvill.