In 2006, the Federal Way School District, along with district employees, parents and students, sued the state, arguing that funding disparities violate the duty of a “general and uniform” school system. Education funding is a complex formula of federal, state, and local funds that are distributed to individual school districts, and employees in different districts are often paid different amounts. For example, the State allocation to districts for the 2007-08 school year ranged from $32,746 to $34,612 among teachers and from $54,405 to $80,807 for administrators.

King County Superior Court Judge Michael Heavey ruled that the state’s funding model violates the “general and uniform” duty, and violated the state’s equal protection clause by paying similarly-situated school employees differently.

There are two educational sections of the state constitution at play here. One requires the state to make “ample provision” for the education of all children (Art. IX, Sec. 1), while the other section mandates a “general and uniform system of public schools” (Art. IX, Sec. 2).

The plaintiffs argued that the “general and uniform” provision is violated when school employees are paid different amounts. They argue the state’s obligation is not just ample funding, but ample funding within a general and uniform system. In response, the state argued that where the “ample provision” for basic education is met, variances in school funding allocations are of no constitutional significance. The constitutional duty is to create a common education system (uniform academic learning requirements, graduation standards, teacher licensing standards, uniform discipline standards), not to guarantee precisely equal funding to every district.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Jim Johnson writing the unanimous decision, soundly rejected the school district’s case—ruling to uphold the existing funding allocation system.

The Court wrote that education funding has historically varied statewide, and that the legislature has attempted to shrink disparities over time. The uniformity requirement, according to the Court, means that every child has the same educational advantages. “Our cases discussing article IX, section 2 make it clear that the provision requires uniformity in the educational program provided, not the minutiae of funding.” The Court also ruled that the individuals parents, students, and teachers challenging the funding allocation model are unable to show any direct harm and therefore are not able to challenge the funding model.

The legislature’s use of the staff unit allocation system to fund education with differing salary allocations to school districts with historically disparate average salaries does not violate article IX, section 2, although there remains a slight gap between the highest and lowest salary funding statewide. There is no showing that the legislature’s funding allocations, including those for Federal Way School District, do not constitute “ample provision for the education of all children” as required under article IX, section 1. The legislature has acted well within its constitutional authority and its duty to make ample provision for the education of children and to provide for a general and uniform system of education under article IX. The individual respondents’ claims do not meet requirements for justiciability and should be dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse.

Federal Way School District 210 v. State, No. 80943-7 (briefs and argument). Whether salary disparities between school districts are unconstitutional. The Washington Constitution states that “The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.” Art. IX, § 2. Historically, the state pays different amounts per teacher to different school districts, based in part on the salary levels of those districts when the system was initiated. The Federal Way School District, individual teachers, and students sued the state, claiming that this unequal funding violates the constitution because it is not “general and uniform.” The King County Superior Court agreed, finding that the differences in funding had no relation to differences in education costs. The state counters that its constitutional duty is to create a common education system, not to guarantee precisely equal funding to every district. This case is on direct appeal from superior court.

This case has the potential of significantly altering school funding allocations. A ruling for the school district favor would have no immediate impact—the ruling would be declaratory in nature, and it would be up to the state legislature to respond and design a general and uniform education funding model within the guidelines of the ruling. During argument the justices seemed reluctant to meddle in the educational decisions of the legislature.

In re the Personal Restraint Petition of Beito, No. 77973-2 (briefs and argument). This case arises out of the Court of Appeals (Div. 2), and concerns whether it is a violation of due process for a trial court judge to set an exceptional sentence based on facts which were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.

Beito pleaded guilty to first degree murder of a 14-year-old girl, with a maximum penalty of 374 months in prison. The trial court sentenced him to 504 months after finding aggravating circumstances demonstrating he also committed third degree “rape of a child” in connection with the murder. The finding was based on factual statements that were agreed to by Beito, but he did not agree there was a connection between the rape and murder. That was determined by the judge. He filed a Personal Restraint Petition alleging due process and double jeopardy violations. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

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The question in this case, argued before the state Supreme Court yesterday, is whether the Legislature is constitutionally compelled to equalize state allocations to school districts for school employee salaries. In 2006, the Federal Way School District, along with district employees and students, sued the state, arguing that funding disparities violate the duty of a “general and uniform” school system.

Education funding is a complex formula of federal, state, and local funds that are distributed to individual school districts. King County Superior Court Judge Michael Heavey ruled that the state’s funding model violates the “general and uniform” duty, and violated the state’s equal protection clause by paying similarly-situated school employees differently. Judge Heavey pointed out the disparities of state allocations among districts for the 2007-08 school year:

• Classified staff: $30,111 to $35,227
• Administrative staff: $54,405 to $80,807
• Teaching staff: $32,746 to $34,612

Federal Way is at the bottom classification in all three salary allocation ranges.

There are two educational provisions of the state constitution at play here.

Art. IX, Sec. 1. PREAMBLE. It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.

Art. IX, Sec. 2. PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM. The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools. The public school system shall include common schools, and such high schools, normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter be established. But the entire revenue derived from the common school fund and the state tax for common schools shall be exclusively applied to the support of the common schools.

Senior Assistant Attorney General David Stolier, arguing for the State, said that where the “ample provision” for basic education is met, variances in school funding allocations are of no constitutional significance. The constitutional duty is to create a common education system, not to guarantee precisely equal funding to every district. The “general and uniform” requirement, he argues, deals with the structure of education: uniform academic learning requirements, graduation standards, teacher licensing standards, uniform discipline standards, and other elements. “We’ve got a structure so that a student in Nine Mile Falls, who transfers to Olympia, is going to get reasonably the same education.”

Interestingly, despite the funding disparities, student performance in Federal Way is well above the state average, which Justice James Johnson took note of. Mr. Stolier pointed out that there is great debate within the education community about the correlation between funding and educational opportunity.

Justice Debra Stephens, who mentioned that she served on a school board for 12 years, asked Mr. Stolier where the trial judge went wrong. “I think the trial court saw something that needed fixing, and did not trust the legislature to do it,” he said.

Buzz Porter, arguing for the school district, asked the court to uphold Judge Heavey’s order. “Then what?” asked Justice Stephens. She cited separation of powers concerns, and objected to a school system run by the courts, so if the court were to rule for the district, what would the remedy be? Mr. Porter said it’s not the job of the court to tell the legislature how to run schools. Only if the legislature failed to act would the court be required to provide a remedy. But it is within the court’s duty, he said, to explain what the state constitution means and requires.

Responding to the state’s argument, Mr. Porter argued that “you can’t divorce” Sections 1 and 2 of Article IX of the state constitution. The state’s obligation, he said, is not just ample funding, but ample funding within a general and uniform system. Noting the complexity of school funding formulas, Justice Stephens asked if it was a mistake to simply focus on per-pupil spending or district salaries, which are pieces of the entire school funding pie. “I wonder if your argument robs from Peter to pay Paul – if we equalize this, aren’t we creating non-uniformity in other categories of state funding because of the variances in district size? … We’re really talking about putting the entire system of educational funding on the table, aren’t we?”

Justice Madsen asked what would happen to local control. “There are wealthier districts that want to have enhancements for their schools. If we put too fine a point on uniformity, don’t we take that option away?” She also asked about whether students have standing to sue in this case, wondering what harm the students have experienced when test results show the Federal Way School District outperforms many other districts in the state. Mr. Porter said the court shouldn’t confuse results versus opportunity. The state’s obligation, he said, is to provide an equal educational system and opportunity to thrive. Results don’t necessarily discount differential treatment.

Justice James Johnson referred to past education cases and said, “It seems to me you’re seeking to accomplish a continuing judicial oversight in the way that was rejected in the [case of] Seattle School District.”

A ruling from the Supreme Court in the district's favor would have no immediate impact -- the ruling would be declaratory in nature, and it would be up to the state legislature to then go and design a general and uniform education funding model within the guidelines of the ruling.

In the morning session, starting at 9:00 a.m., the Court will hear:

McAllister v. Bellevue Firemen’s Pension Board, No. 81187-3. Whether the City of Bellevue properly calculated retiree’s pension benefits. David and Ken McAllister were firefighters in Bellevue, and contributed to a city pension plan. Under this plan, pension benefits were based on firefighters’ salaries, but when calculating benefits, the salaries were considered to be capped at the battalion chief level. David and Ken were Chief and Deputy Chief when they retired, so the pension cap would have applied to them. In 1969, Washington State replaced local pension plans with a single state plan for all firefighters and police. Under this plan salaries are not capped. The state plan provided that if a firefighter would have received higher benefits under a local plan, the local government was responsible to make up the difference.

In accordance with this provision, the City of Bellevue made additional payments to the McAllisters. But in calculating the McAllister’s benefits under the city plan, the city did not cap their salaries as the city plan required. When this was discovered, the city reduced its payments to match what the McAllisters should been receiving, but did not require back payments. The McAllisters sued, and lost at trial and on appeal.

Federal Way School District 210 v. State, No. 80943-7. Whether the Legislature is constitutionally compelled to equalize state allocations to school districts for school employee salaries. The Washington Constitution states that “The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.” Art. IX, § 2. Historically, the state pays different amounts per teacher to different school districts, based in part on the salary levels of those districts when the system was initiated. The Federal Way School District, individual teachers, and students sued the state, claiming that this unequal funding violates the constitution because it is not “general and uniform.” The King County Superior Court agreed, finding that the differences in funding had no relation to differences in education costs. The state counters that its constitutional duty is to create a common education system, not to guarantee precisely equal funding to every district. This case is on direct appeal from superior court.

In the afternoon session, starting at 1:00 p.m., the Court will hear:

In re Fiona A. Crinks Kennedy, No. 200,682-5. The Washington State Bar Association requests an interim suspension of attorney Fiona A. Crinks Kennedy pending cooperation with the Bar’s disciplinary investigation.

State v. Eaton, No. 81348-5. Thomas Eaton was arrested for DUI and taken to the Clark County jail. When he was searched at the jail, the officers found a bag of meth taped to his sock. At trial, Eaton was convicted of DUI and drug possession. The trial court gave him an enhanced sentence based on possession of drugs within a correctional facility. Eaton disputed this enhancement because he had not chosen to take the drugs to jail, but the trial court held that the statute does not require that the possession within prison be voluntary.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that an “element of volition” is required for crimes, and that punishing Eaton for involuntary possession within a prison would be absurd. The state counters that the statute should be read literally, and that volition is not necessary for a sentence enhancement. The state now appeals, and the Supreme Court will determine whether a defendant’s sentence can be enhanced for an involuntary act under RCW 9.94A.533(5)(c).