More of Today's Opinions: Wrongful death and blood tests

Armantrout v. Carlson & Cascade Orthopaedics, No. 81195-4. Eighteen-year-old Kristen Armantrout lived with her blind and diabetic mother. Kristen provided care and assistance to her mother and gave her Social Security check to the family. Kristen died due to a complication following ankle surgery. Her parents sued for wrongful death, claiming they were financially dependent on Kristen. The trial court agreed with the parents, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that economically valuable services cannot be considered to assess a claim of financial dependence. Here, the Supreme Court unanimously reverses the Court of Appeals. The opinion by Justice Madsen distinguishes between "everyday services a child would routinely provide," and the kind of unique and potentially expensive services that had been provided by Kristen to her mother. (briefs and argument)

Seattle v. Robert St. John, No. 81992-1. After crashing his motorcycle in Seattle, Robert St. John was investigated for driving under the influence of alcohol. A police officer asked St. John to consent to a blood alcohol test, and when St. John refused, the officer obtained a warrant for the test. The results were suppressed in municipal court based on a broad interpretation of a provision of the Implied Consent law (RCW 46.20.308(1)) that prohibits performing the test once consent has been refused. The superior court reversed and the Court of Appeals certified three questions to the Supreme Court

1. Does the implied consent statute allow the State to administer a blood alcohol test pursuant to a warrant after a driver has declined a voluntary blood alcohol test?

2. Does an implied consent warning violate due process if it does not inform drivers that an officer may seek a warrant for a blood alcohol test even if the driver declines the voluntary blood alcohol test?

3. Does the doctrine of equitable estoppel bar the State from seeking a warrant for a blood alcohol test after informing drivers that they may refuse the voluntary blood alcohol test?

The Court today in an opinion by Justice Owens and joined by six other justices upholds the superior court and allows the blood test evidence. The Implied Consent law restricts performing a blood test pursuant to that law, but does not prohibit performing a blood test pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant (RCW 46.20.308). Similarly, the officer's statements about the Implied Consent law did not foreclose his obtaining the warrant. Justice Sanders, joined by Justice James Johnson, dissents. (briefs and argument).

More of Today's Opinions: Borrowed judges, borrowed cars

City of Spokane v. Rothwell, No. 81271-3. Two men convicted of DUI in the city of Spokane appeal and challenge that the judge who presided over their cases lacked jurisdiction. Although the city operated a municipal court, all of their judges were borrowed from Spokane County District Court. Defendants allege that RCW 3.46.050 and 070 (repealed in 2008) required that municipal court judges be elected from within the city limits. The Court of Appeals overturned the convictions. Here, the Court unanimously reverses the court below and reads the conflicting statutes to require that the election be limited to the city only for full-time and not part-time municipal court judges. The latter must be elected, but from what district is not specified by statute. Justice Jim Johnson wrote the Court's opinion. (briefs and argument)

In Re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chev. Chevelle and One 2004 Nissan Sentra, No. 81116-4. Thomas Roos was using both of his parents' cars for trafficking illegal drugs, presumably to cut overhead costs and pass the savings on to his customers. During one of four arrests in the summer of 2005, police seized the vehicles pursuant to RCW 69.50.505. His parents appeal the seizure based on the "innocent owner" exception. That provision allows a property owner to prevent seizure upon showing that the crime was done "without the owner's knowledge." The courts below rejected this argument, but the Court today reverses those decisions and sides with the parents. The majority opinion by Justice Charles Johnson and joined by four other justices notes that statutes often use language like "actual or constructive knowledge" or "knows or has reason to know." The Legislature did not extend "knowledge" in this statute, thus a property owner is not required to show that he had no reason to know of the illegal activity, only that he actually did not know.

Justice Madsen, joined by Justices Owens, Fairhurst, and Jim Johnson, concurs as to the Sentra and dissents on the Chevelle. "Because the Rooses did not take steps to prevent Thomas' use of the second car, the Chevelle, even after they knew of his arrest in the Nissan with a 110-gram brick of cocaine, I would uphold the hearing officer's forfeiture of the Chevelle."(briefs and argument).

Opinion: Jury award reinstated for serving alcohol to drunk driver

Faust v. Albertson, No. 81356-6. Hawkeye Kinkaid was extremely drunk when his car crossed the center line and struck a car driven by Bianca Faust. Kinkaid died and Faust and her passengers were injured, including one who was rendered paraplegic. Faust sued the Moose Lodge where Kinkaid had been drinking and Alexis Chapman, Kinkaid's girlfriend who had also been serving him drinks. A jury found the Lodge and Chapman liable for negligent overservice according to RCW 66.44.200 and awarded Faust a $14 million judgment. The trial court denied defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law.

The Division One Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the judgment, believing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to show that Kinkaid was "apparently under the influence of liquor" as required by the statute. Here, in an opinion by Justice Owens, the Court unanimously overturns the Court of Appeals decision and reinstates the jury verdict. The Court also rejects the arguments of amici Mothers Against Drunk Driving and the Washington State Association of Justice Foundation (trial lawyers) that the threshold for plaintiffs in these cases should be lowered. (briefs, argument, AP story)