Opinions for May 21, 2009
The court today released three opinions in two cases.
In re F5 Networks, Inc., No. 81817-7 Justice Chambers writes for a unanimous Court, answering two questions certified from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Shareholders of F5, a Washington-based technology company, sued alleging improper backdating of stock options. The questions both revolve around the plaintiff's failure to first demand action by the corporate board. Does Washington law require such a demand before commencing litigation (a "universal demand" requirement), or does it allow plaintiff's to proceed in litigation if such a demand would have been futile (the "demand futility standard")? The Court today holds that, "until the legislature says otherwise, Washington follows Delaware's demand futility standard and the reasoning of Ryan [a similar case from Delaware where such a suit was allowed to proceed]." (case briefs, argument, "F5 Networks to restate financials back to 2001", "State Ruling Could Blunt Backdating Litigation Wave")
State v. Elmi, No. 80380-3 Justice Charles Johnson writes for a six-member majority, upholding Ali Elmi's convictions for first degree assault with a firearm. Elmi fired multiple gunshots into a house after he saw his estranged wife look out the window. The shots missed his wife and three young children who, unbeknownst to Elmi, were with her in the room. The question here was whether Elmi had the criminal intent necessary for the assault convictions against the three children. The Court holds that he did.
Where a defendant intends to shoot into and to hit someone occupying a house, a tavern, or a car, she or he certainly bears the risk of multiple convictions when several victims are present, regardless of whether the defendant knows of their presence. And, because the intent is the same, criminal culpability should be the same where a number of persons are present but physically unharmed.
Justice Madsen, joined by Justices Sanders and Fairhurst, dissent, arguing that the legislature's statutory doctrine of transfered intent was not intended to be and is not broader than the common law doctrine. At common law, the doctrine provides that "a defendant who shoots at B but misses and hits C instead" may be punished as he had intended to shoot C. The dissent challenges that "Using the transferred intent doctrine to hold a defendant liable for inchoate crimes like attempted battery criminalizes the unintended and unaccomplished potential consequences of a defendant's actions." (case briefs and argument).
