More opinions: Irrigation district okayed, step parent told "three's a crowd"
Carlisle v. Columbia Irrigation District, No. 82035-0. The Court today unanimously upholds summary judgment in favor of the Columbia Irrigation District (CID).
In 2007 CID expanded, adding new lands and then establishing a local improvement district (LID) on them to allow future special assessment levies to pay for improvements. 
Thirty-four landowners sued, alleging that CID's expansion violated due process (article I, section 3) and failed to receive valid petitions representing at least one-half of the land area (RCW 87.03.560). They further alleged that the statute authorizing creation of the LID violates on its face the guarantee of equal elections (article I, section 19) and that notice of the hearing for formation of the LID also violated due process.
The Court first considers whether expansion of the irrigation district boundaries constituted a deprivation of property. The constitutional guaranty of due process only applies where a person is "deprived of life, liberty, or property...." The guaranty of due process does not apply to government decisions or actions that only create or increase the likelihood of a future deprivation. The Court holds that while CID's expansion made future assessments on plaintiffs' lands possible, "increased probability of an assessment was not a deprivation of property within the meaning of article I, section 3."
The Court further explains "that a democratically elected legislature has the prerogative to establish the procedures by which a local government entity is created or its boundaries expanded." This is because local governments are creations of the state government, receiving delegated state powers. Local governments have no authority not already present in state governments, thus there is no additional need for consent. "A person does not have the constitutional right to notice, a hearing, or the right to object." .jpg)
The Court adds in a footnote that "plaintiffs' real complaint is with the legislature," which has increased the notice requirements for road improvement districts, but not irrigation districts.
As to the question of the validity of certain petitions, the Court rejects the argument that petitions are invalid if the signer subsequently sold the property or if the petitions were submitted after an arbitrary, non-statutory deadline. Because including the petitions in those categories brings the total over the required threshold, the Court declines to address additional issues related to other challenged petitions.
The Court finds that the formation of an LID by implied-consent (RCW 87.03.485) is not an "election" and therefore cannot violate the article I, section 19, and does not violate article 1, section 3. Justice Fairhurst wrote the Court's opinion. Justice Alexander did not participate and was replaced by Justice Pro Tem. Karen Seinfeld. (briefs and argument)
In re Parentage of M.F., No. 81043-5. In the 2005 case In re Parentage of L.B., the Court created a new status of "de facto parent," "to correct a specific statutory shortcoming." The legislature had not created a legal framework for a person who was not a biological parent, was not married to a biological parent, and was not asserting that the biological parents were unfit, but who nevertheless wanted rights as a parent, so the Court "fill[ed] this statutory gap." Today, the Court refuses to extend that doctrine.
M.F.'s natural parents divorced a few years after she was born and thereafter shared custody of her. The mother's next marriage lasted for about seven years, and her husband from that marriage here asks the courts to 
declare him M.F.'s de facto (third) parent. The Court declines. The majority explains that there is no need for the Court to expand its earlier invention to these facts, presumably because L.B. involved two persons of the same sex whereas this case involves three people and includes both sexes. The Court also says that its de facto parent doctrine would too easily apply to step-parent relationships.
Justice Chambers, joined by Justics Owens and Fairhurst, dissent and contest two "assumptions" of the majority: "first, that a child can have no more than two parents; second, that both of M.F.'s parents are fit." All three dissenters were members of the In re Parentage of L.B. majority, while the majority here contains the other three members of that majority and the two justices who dissented. (briefs and argument)
