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State v. Lucero, No. 83777-5. David Lucero was convicted of second degree assault. At sentencing, he conceded that his offender score was six, which would include one of his two convictions from California. The Court included both convictions, sentencing Lucero based on an offender score of seven, and Lucero appealed.

The Supreme Court had already remanded this case for reconsideration based on their decision in State v. Mendoza (2009). The Court of Appeals then reissued their original decision upholding Lucero's sentence, adding a footnote claiming to distinguish Mendoza. Today the Supreme Court, in a short per curiam opinion, reverses the Court of Appeals and remands to the trial court.

State v. Peterson, No. 82089-9. Michael Peterson challenges his conviction for failing to register as a sex offender. On November 2, 2005, a police officer discovered that Peterson had moved out of the apartment where he had registered several months earlier. A month later, Peterson registered himself as homeless and was charged with failure to register. He challenged his conviction on two grounds, both related to the different deadlines set forth in the statute depending on whether an offender is becoming homeless, moving to a residence in the same county, or moving to a new county. He first contends that failure to register is an alternative means crime for which the state failed to bring forth "substantial evidence" for each alternative means. Secondly, Peterson argues that residential status is an element of the crime of failure to register and that the state failed to prove this element.

Today the Court holds that failure to register is not an alternative means crime. The Court further holds that "Peterson registered outside of any deadline contained in the statute. It was therefore unnecessary to show his particular residential status in order to prove a violation of the statute." Justice Stephens wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. (briefs and argument)

State v. Vance, No. 81393-1. Robert Vance challenges his exceptional consecutive sentences for multiple counts of child molestation and communicating with a minor for immoral purposes. Citing Blakely v. Washington, Vance argues that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the judge determined that allowing Vance to serve all of his sentences concurrently would be "clearly too lenient."

The Court had delayed hearing this case until the United States Supreme Court decided a similar case, Oregon v. Ice. Today, in another unanimous decision and with an opinion by Justice Sanders, the Court finds that Ice does control the application of Blakely and Apprendi v. New Jersey to these facts. The federal High Court was convinced by "considerations [of] historical practice and respect for state sovereignty" that "a sentencing judge does not run afould of the Sixth Amendment by finding facts necessary to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for discrete crimes." Vance's sentence, which had been set aside by the Court of Appeals, is reinstated. (briefs and argument)

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In re Pers. Restraint of Rainey, No. 81244-6. After convictions for first degree kidnapping and telephone harassment, Shawn Rainey's sentence included an order prohibiting him from any contact with his ex-wife and daughter for life. He appealed that order, challenging that it violates his rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington and his fundamental rights as a parent.

Justice Stephens writes for a unanimous Court, holding that RCW 9.94A.505(8) allows a sentence to include a no-contact order up to the statutory maximum "when the jury verdict reflects facts warranting the prohibition." Here, the judge found no facts beyond the jury verdict and so there is no violation of Apprendi or Blakely.

The right to parent, however, is a fundamental right. A sentence that infringes such a right must be "reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the State and public order." The Court finds the state interest here compelling, but notes that "the interplay of sentencing conditions to fundamental rights is delicate and fact-specific, not lending itself to broad statements and bright line rules." The Court expresses dissatisfaction with the sentencing court's failure to provide a rationale for the extreme duration of the no-contact order and on that basis strikes the order and remands for resentencing.

(Briefs, argument)

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In re the Personal Restraint Petition of Beito, No. 77973-2. Jessica Dawn Seim was 14 when she was raped and murdered by Corey Beito, who was arrested and charged with aggravated murder in the first degree. Beito eventually pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree and was given an "exceptional sentence" above the standard range of 291 to 388 months in prison. Beito had admitted to both the rape and the murder; the connection between them was the grounds for the above-range sentence. Beito challenges that sentence in light of Blakely, which was decided before Beito's sentence became final. The Court today, in an opinion by Justice Charles Johnson and joined by six other justices, reverses Beito's sentence and remands for sentencing within the standard range.

A review of the record shows Beito did not stipulate to the exceptional sentence or the fact that the rape was motive for and closely connected to the murder. Under Apprendi, without such an admission by Beito, a jury and not the trial court should have determined whether aggravating factors that support an exceptional sentence (if any) existed. We hold that, without more, the trial court violated Beito's Apprendi/Blakely Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

Justice James Johnson, joined by Justice Fairhurst, dissents and argues that Beito stipulated to all the relevant facts and avoided a jury trial and that any remaining error was harmless. (briefs and argument)

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Ambach v. French County, No. 81107-5. Teresa Ambach sued a doctor alleging, among other causes of action, that he performed an unnecessary surgery on her in violation of the Consumer Protection Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the doctor and imposed sanctions against Ambach's attorneys related to the CPA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, and is today overturned. Here, the Supreme Court holds that personal injury damages are not covered by the CPA because they "do not constitute injury to business or property" as required by the Act. Justice Madsen authored the majority opinion, which seven other justices signed. Justice Chambers concurred, stressing "that there is nothing in our jurisprudence that should prevent a patient from bringing a CPA claim against a doctor who falsely and deceptively prescribed unnecessary or unnecessarily expensive surgeries as part of a business strategy." (briefs and argument).

Noble v. Safe Harbor Family Preservation Trust, No. 80873-2. The Nobles own land on Hood Canal that is only accessible through land owned by others, including the Safe Harbor property and another parcel owned by Tillicum Beach, Inc. The Nobles sued Safe Harbor to condemn a private right of way of necessity. Safe Harbor defended that there were other possible routes, but did not name any other property owners. The Nobles amended their claim to add Tillicum as an alternate condemnee. The trial court granted the Nobles a right of way through the Safe Harbor land. The trial court also granted Tillicum's motion for attorney fees from Safe Harbor and the Noble's motion to decrease the attorney fee award from the Nobles to Safe Harbor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reverses the award of attorney fees to Tillicum but upholds the reduce the attorney fees due Safe Harbor from the Nobles. The Court holds that RCW 8.24.030 grants the trial court broad discretion in awarding attorney fees in condemnation actions, but does not permit a trial court to penalize a potential condemnee from raising the defense of a possible alternate route. Justice Charles Johnson authored the majority opinion and is joined by four other justices. The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Fairhurst, concur except that they would not remand to the trial court on the issue of whether the Nobles must pay attorney fees to Tillicum since the issue was not briefed. Justice Chambers dissents. (briefs and argument).

State v. Kilgore, No. 81020-6. Mark Kilgore was convicted by a jury of seven counts of sexual crimes against children. An "exceptional" sentence of 560 months was imposed. Two counts were reversed on appeal. After his direct appeal was over but before the trial court had corrected the judgment and sentence, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Blakely v. Washington. If Kilgore's case is considered final before that decision was issued, it does not apply retroactively to his sentence. He asserts that his case was not final and that he should be resentenced according to Blakely. Today, the Supreme Court upholds the lower courts and findes that Kilgore's case was final before Blakely. Justice Fairhurst authored the majority opinion. Justice Sanders, joined by Justice Madsen, dissent. (briefs and argument).

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