Supreme Court of Washington Blog : Supreme Court of Washington Blog : Washington Public Policy & Budget News : Freedom Foundation : WA State Tax & Labor Law Commentary & Updates

The Supreme Court issued two new decisions on teacher terminations and public records law.

Federal Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Vinson, No. 84243-4. The Supreme Court ruled favor of a former teacher who sought to overturn the district’s decision to terminate him. David Vinson, a teacher at Federal Way High School, was accused of verbally harassing a student. The school district terminated Vinson, citing his behavior and the dishonesty during the course of the investigation. A hearing officer ruled in Vinson’s favor, and a superior court affirmed the decision, ordering the district to pay Vinson’s attorneys fees.

The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 vote (Justice Charles Wiggins writing the majority), held that Federal Way School District did not have the right to appeal an adverse decision from a hearing officer. K&L Gates notes that this decision breaks new ground.

Significantly, the Supreme Court overruled several decisions in various divisions of the Court of Appeals that had determined sufficient cause could exist to discharge a teacher who had engaged in behavior that lacked any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose, without regard to whether the conduct was remediable or adversely affected the teacher’s performance.

The Supreme Court expressly reinstated the original Clark test, which held that sufficient cause for a teacher's discharge exists as a matter of law where the teacher's deficiency is not remediable and (1) materially and substantially affects the teacher's performance; or (2) lacks any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose.

Justice James Johnson dissented: “Today, this court’s majority makes it more difficult to discharge teachers and certificated employees than the legislature intended, even where clear cause for discharge exists.”

Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. County of Spokane, No. 84108-0. A nonprofit group, the Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County, requested public records from Spokane County, suspecting illegal hiring practices in Spokane County’s Building and Planning Department. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the county. On appeal, the Alliance argued that the County failed to conduct adequate searches for records responsive to both items, and that the trial court erred by limiting the scope of discovery. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court.

Justice Charles Johnson wrote the majority opinion in which the court held that discovery in a Public Records Act case is the same as in any other civil action and is therefore governed only by relevancy considerations. The court also adopted the standards for reasonableness regarding an adequate search from the federal Freedom of Information Act. Finally, the court held that harm to the requester occurs at the time the request is made and refused, and that a party may be entitled to recover costs and fees if the agency wrongfully fails to disclose documents in response to a request.

According to new reports, Spokane County’s violation of the public records law may cost more than $100,000 under the Supreme Court’s ruling.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

McAllister v. Bellevue Firemen’s Pension Board, No. 81187-3.  David and Ken McAllister were firefighters for the City of Bellevue. Both made pension contributions for many years under the Firefighters’ Relief and Pensions Act of 1955. When the men retired, the 1955 Act had been replaced by the Law Enforcement Officers’ and Fire Fighters’ System Pension Plan of 1970. Under the more recent 1970 plan, the city is required to pay the McAllisters the difference, if any, between their benefits under LEOFF and what their benefits would have been had they retired under the 1955 Act. The City later determined it had made an excess payment to the McAllisters of approximately $500,000 by relying on definitions contained in LEOFF, rather than the 1955 Act. Upon discovering this, the City began paying a reduced excess payment, but did not seek a reimbursement. The McAllisters challenged the reduced payment. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the City’s action, with Justice Debra Stephens writing the opinion. “The plain language of RCW 41.26.040(2) further requires that an excess payment be calculated under the prior retirement system, not under LEOFF,” she wrote. (briefs and argument).

State v. Engel, No. 81072-9. Roger Engel was convicted of second-degree burglary after stealing some wheels from a large private yard that was partially enclosed by a fence and partially bordered by sloping terrain. Burglary in the second degree requires entering or remaining in a “building.” RCW 9A.52.030. A “building” is defined to include a “fenced area.” RCW 9A.04.110(5). Engel challenged his conviction, claiming the yard was not a “fenced area” under the statute. The business premises Engel entered covered seven or eight acres and included several buildings and a large yard. The entrance to the property was gated. One-third of the property, including the side fronting the road, was fenced by chain link fence with barbed wire on the top. The rest of the property was not fenced, including the edge of the property near the stock piles. Beyond the gravel piles was is a “pretty sizeable drop-off, a hill that goes down.” Two-thirds of the property was encased by ‘banks, high banks, [and] sloping banks.” Directly adjacent to the property was a separate business, but no fence or gate separated the two properties.

The Supreme Court agreed with Engel’s argument, with Justice James Johnson writing the unanimous opinion. “Upholding an overly broad definition of ‘fenced area’ would extend criminal liability beyond what is warranted by the plain language of the statute, as understood in the context of the common law. Therefore, the Court of Appeals decision affirming Engel’s conviction is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and dismiss the charge.” (briefs and argument).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Petitioners in SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, No. 82551-3, sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court ordering Governor Gregoire to resubmit a budget to the legislature that included the union's pay increases, which were the result of an arbitrated award. The governor had declined to request funding for the increases ($100 million) in the December 2008 budget proposal.

SEIU 775NW was granted an expedited hearing on March 10, and  requested an expedited order, with an opinion to follow. The union hoped to win an order in time for the legislature to entertain the funding proposal.

It seems the union has run out of racetrack -- at least for the current session. The Washington Legislature adjurned on April 26. There are, however, two scenarios where the union could still get its award inserted into the 2009-11 budget, assuming the court rules in SEIU's favor. The court could order the governor to advance the contracts to the 2010 legislature when a supplemental budget is adopted. There is also talk of the legislature going into special session, and the court could order consideration of the union's arbitration award during the special session.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Last week during oral arguments in SEIU 775NW v. Gregoire, Justice James Johnson asked if the Judiciary's budget could be cut as a consequence of ruling in favor of SEIU. This question seemed to send chills down several judicial spines, and prompted this exchange between Chief Justice Alexander and Solicitor General Hart. 

The discussion prompted an obvious question: what is the Judiciary's budget? The Office of Financial Management has the proposed 2009-10 Judiciary budget. The Supreme Court's proposed budget (.pdf) is $15,652,000 -- a 6.4% increase over last year.

Separate from the budgeting process, judicial salaries are set by the Washington Citizens' Commission on Salaries for Elected Officials. Supreme Court Justices make $164,221, and are not getting a raise in the 2009-10 biennium.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

“Counsel, in this case, isn’t the focus really on what does ‘must’ mean?” Justice Mary Fairhurst’s question gets to the heart of SEIU 775NW v. Gregoire.

Petitioners SEIU 775NW claims that state law requires the governor to include in her budget a request for funds any negotiated union contract (if certified as financially feasible) or any award resulting from interest arbitration. SEIU 775NW and the governor’s office were unable to reach an agreement for the 2009-11 budget, and an arbitrator awarded the union’s workers a raise and fringe benefits amounting to $87 million. The governor failed to include the amount in her budget, something the union says the governor “must” do. Arguments yesterday focused on whether “must” in the statute is a mandatory obligation upon the governor, or if it is a permissive suggestion, subject to the governor’s discretion.

The justices are wrestling with the real-world consequences of ruling for either party. If the court rules for SEIU, the court is ordering the governor to return to the drawing board and make significant cuts to her budget. Not only that, but such an order seems to invade the governor’s duties and could be a violation of separation of power. But if the court rules for Gregoire, the plain reading of a statute is muddied.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Supreme Court of Washington ruled this morning on a salary dispute involving teachers from the Washington State School of the Blind (WSSB). The case is Delyria v. State.

State law requires that WSSB teacher salaries "conform to and be contemporary with" salaries of local school district teachers. The state sets a salary schedule, but local districts can provide supplemental pay to teachers for "additional time, additional responsibilities, or incentives" -- known as TRI pay.

Cheryl Delyria and Judy Koch are certificated teachers at the WSSB in Vancouver. They are paid a base salary according to the state salary schedule. Under their collective bargaining agreement, they can earn additional pay if allowed by the WSSB's financial resources, but the WSSB teachers do not receive TRI pay. These teachers argued they are entitled to TRI payments similar to the payments made by the Vancouver School District to its teachers.

Justice Charles Johnson, writing the majority opinion, says the legislature enacted two separate provisions regarding supplemental pay: one for local district teachers, and other for WSSB. Because of this, the court held today that a school district's TRI pay is not part of the teacher's salary, and WSSB teachers are not entitled to an similar supplement.

Chief Justice Alexander and Justice Madsen and Fairhurst filed a concurring opinion.

Obviously this is a loss for WSSB teachers, but what do other education folks think about the ruling? School districts often face incredible pressure during contract negotiations to boost teacher income through TRI payments. The ruling clarifies that TRI is merely supplemental and not part of a teacher's salary. What impact will that have on teacher/district negotiations?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link