The State of Washington requires that any individual arrested for vehicular assault must take a blood alcohol test. However, rules require that the individual must be given adequate warning regarding the test and informed that they have a right to select any qualified individual to perform further tests.

Jose Morales was arrested in 2004 following a vehicle collision in which he continued to drive for one mile after the wreck. The officer at the scene asked an interpreter to communicate the warning to Morales following discovery that he only spoke Spanish.

Morales contested his convictions for DUI and vehicular assault by means of driving a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor and in a reckless manner. He did not contest the convictions for hit and run nor vehicular assault by means of disregard for the safety of others. He further argued that the State failed in proving that he had actually received the necessary warning regarding alcohol testing.

The court referenced State v. Turpin in explaining the important obligation the state has in preserving the “protection of the subject’s right to fundamental fairness” regarding implied consent. This case had a similar precedent in which a subject had not been informed of the blood testing until after the testing had been completed, nor was Turpin informed of her rights for additional testing per RCW 46.20.308.

The court found that the State was incapable of proving whether Morales had in fact been read the “308 rule.” The only proof in the affirmative was the Trooper’s testimony that the interpreter had told him he had informed Morales of the rule, which the court called “classic hearsay.”

The court reversed the convictions for DUI and vehicular assault by driving under the influence, while affirming the hit and run convictions, and put on remand further proceedings consistent with that opinion.

Justice Jim Johnson, in dissent, claimed that the state did meet the preponderance of evidence burden in proving that the 308 warning had been given. Further, he claimed that even if the burden was not met, admitting the test results was a “harmless error.”

Hurst was found not competent to stand trial after a medical evaluation, resulting in two 90-day periods of “restoration” and “mental health treatment.” The issue in his case developed when the State pursued a third period of up to 180 days for treatment.

Hurst alleged that the State violated his right to due process under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, that the standard of proof required to be forced into treatment be “clear, cogent and convincing evidence.” He contested that the state’s standard of “preponderance of the evidence” was not satisfactory, that the Due Process Clause required “proof of a substantial probability of restoration of competency or dangerousness by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.”

In consulting case law, the court found that the U.S. Supreme Court case of Medina v. California was the most relevant authority on due process with a specific focus on competency hearings. In Medina, the court had found that placing the burden of proof on the defendant to demonstrate his incompetence was not a violation of the Due Process Clause. The court then applied the framework to 10.77 RCW to determine if the legislative standards for committing individuals not competent to stand trial are constitutional.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the burden of proof was on Hurst to advance argument demonstrating in what manner the “preponderance of the evidence” standard violates the constitution. Further, they found that the current standard sufficed and that a “substantial probability” standard was not necessary to be constitutional. Justice Susan Owens wrote the unanimous opinion.
 

City of Tacoma v. City of Bonney Lake

In 2008, the Supreme Court held that the Seattle Public Utility (SPU) could no longer charge the city’s ratepayers a fee for providing hydrants and that payment must come from the city’s general fund if at all. Lane v. City of Seattle. Following this decision, the city of Tacoma ended its policy of charging hydrant fees for ratepayers in Pierce County and the cities of Fircrest, University Place and Federal Way (whom Tacoma have franchise agreements with). To pay for the hydrant costs Tacoma sent the ensuing bill to the municipalities, who refused to pay. The core issue the court had to decide was whether the city of Tacoma was obliged to provide and maintain the hydrants under the franchise agreements.

The nature of Tacoma’s franchise agreements with the aforementioned communities obliges the Tacoma Public Utility (TPU) to provide them with a water system. In exchange, Tacoma enjoyed a larger base for utility payments.

The court held that the term “water system” under the contractual agreement did include providing and maintaining of fire hydrants, although the term “hydrant” was never mentioned in the agreement. The court also noted:

• The statutory term “water system” in public utilities fixtures and appliances per RCW 80.04.010;
• Municipalities must have fire hydrants, and hydrants need to have a water supply to be effective; and
• Most importantly, the course of dealings between the parties for several years saw that TPU provided fire hydrants, but contested the obligation following the Lane decision and the other municipality’s refusal to pay for the hydrants.

In the Lane decision, the municipality in question was forced to pay for the services rendered by SPU, however this was not governed by a franchise agreement. In this case the franchise agreement acted as a contract giving Tacoma the powers of right of way, planning and an expanded ratepayer base in exchange for providing a water system. The court upheld the trial judge’s opinion that Tacoma is obliged to bear the cost of fire hydrants. Interestingly, the court held that the Lane precedent does not apply to this case and refused to offer an opinion regarding whether Tacoma may charge the ratepayers for providing hydrants.

The Supreme Court reversed the earlier judge’s ruling that indemnification provisions in the contract precluded Tacoma from suing the municipalities. Owens wrote: “Concluding otherwise would produce the absurd result of precluding a party to a contract from disputing its obligations under that contract.”

Governor Chris Gregoire
“Along with the Legislature, I’ve worked hard to ensure that every student across our state is afforded a quality education. It’s what our children deserve, and what our economy requires. I’m pleased today’s ruling by the Supreme Court recognizes our significant work to improve our education system, and acknowledges the critical reforms now being implemented.

“With that said, the Court ruled we must do more – and I agree. The Court made it clear – the Legislature, and all of us as a state, must provide dependable funding to implement the reforms we have worked so hard to develop. This ruling reinforces my call for a half-penny sales tax increase to invest in education. If we don’t, we take a step backward and not only threaten a violation of the court’s ruling, but make it more difficult for students to gain the skills and knowledge needed to compete in today’s global economy.”

Attorney General Rob McKenna (who defended the State)
“The state appealed this case to the Supreme Court to receive clarification and direction to guide the Legislature in meeting its constitutional duty — and this decision is helpful. We’re pleased the Court continues to recognize the primary role of the Legislature in determining how to meet its constitutional duty and that the Court recognizes the Legislature’s progress in fulfilling the state’s obligation in passing its 2009 education reforms.”

Washington Education Association (one of the plaintiffs in the case)
"Today, the Supreme Court reaffirmed what WEA and its partners in the Network for Excellence in Washington Schools (NEWS) have argued for so long: Public education in Washington is woefully underfunded. And this means students and schools can no longer bear the impact of further cuts to public education funding.

"The decision by the Court, coming just days before the start of the 2012 legislative session, clearly puts the responsibility for correcting the underfunding where it belongs: The state legislature. The legislature can no longer punt on full funding for public education. The legislature needs to act immediately to remedy this injustice against our children and students."

Rep. Marko Liias (D)
"It is appropriate that I was reading to a class of second graders at the same time the Supreme Court announced the state is not meeting our commitment to fully fund education. I look forward to working with my colleagues to raise the revenue it will take to give our kids the education they deserve!"

Rep. Cathy Dahlquist (R)
“As a member of the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee, there is an ongoing discussion about how much the state is spending on certain agencies. Most recently, the Puget Sound Partnership was the subject of our review. We have spent millions on this agency since its inception in 2007, which has not outlined or achieved a single benchmark to improve the water quality in the Puget Sound. Meanwhile, the governor and majority party are all too quick to cut education funding, then tell taxpayers they can ‘buy back’ their kids’ schooling through a $500 million dollar tax increase. These budget games are irresponsible and indefensible."

Sen. Rosemary McAuliffe (D)
“The Supreme Court has affirmed what we already knew, that we must reform basic education and pay for it,” said McAuliffe. “Through HB 2261 and HB 2776 the Legislature recognized society is demanding more from our students, so we created an enhanced program of basic education to provide them with the opportunities they need to succeed. However, we can’t reach this goal alone. We now need the public’s support of new revenue to achieve full implementation of these reforms.”

Rep. Glenn Anderson (R)
“I have been advocating for several years now that the state should fund education first in the budget. This court ruling goes right to the heart of the matter: If we do not fund education first, it becomes a political football. This is evident in the governor’s current budget proposal in which she cuts education then comes out telling taxpayers they can only ‘buy back’ her education funding cuts if they approve a half billion dollar tax hike. This approach is clearly emotional extortion to hold our children’s future hostage so other tough decisions don’t have to be made. When times are so tough and so many personal sacrifices are being made, it’s offensive to suggest such an alternative."

Yakima Herald-Republic Editorial Board
"The decision, and court oversight, may reflect not so much judicial activism as judicial impatience with a Legislature that has identified problems and enacted reforms but has not backed up its action with adequate funding. The state's increasing reliance on federal grants and local levy dollars has to stop, the justices said. The court didn't spell out what the Legislature has to do, only that lawmakers have to do something."

League of Education Voters
"The decision validates what parents, students, teachers and principals have known for a long time: The state is not meeting its duty to fund the basic education every student in Washington is entitled to."

Washington State Republican Party Chairman Kirby Wibur
“The state Supreme Court ruled this morning that the state is failing in its paramount duty to adequately and uniformly fund our schools. This fiasco comes after Democrats have controlled the governor’s office for 27 straight years, while also controlling the Senate and House for 18 and 20 of those years, respectively. Their failure to prioritize state spending on our kids and our future economic health is exactly why we need fresh thinking in Olympia, starting with Rob McKenna as our next governor.” 

Freedom Foundation Education Reform Fellow Jami Lund
"The Court has clearly concluded that the state has 'transitioned from a seat-based education system to a performance-based education system' and needs to do the same with the funding formulas.

"The Court appears to want to see a funding system which provides enough for the student learning targets the legislature has set, but also a system which shows a relationship between the results and the mechanisms used to fund those results.

"For those of us who seek varieties of approaches to meeting students’ needs, this finding is promising. If the state were to find ways to fund student success independent of the measures of bureaucracy (hours, ratios, staffing levels), then these ways would not violate the ruling.

"This ruling affirms notions of funding student success more directly, evaluating programs and employees in terms of student success, and even focusing on teacher performance incentives rather than teacher education."

State v. Hecht, No. 86078-5. The Supreme Court rules that a former judge is entitled to public assistance in his appeal after he was convicted of patronizing a prostitute.

Shortly after being elected as a Pierce County Superior Court Judge, Michael Hecht was convicted of felony harassment and patronizing a prostitute. On appeal he requested an order of indigency in order to receive public funds for his representation on appeal. The trial court denied Hecht’s motion for an order of indigency. The Supreme Court, in an unsigned opinion, holds that Hecht is “presumptively indigent” because he receives food stamp benefits, and may be entitled to some assistance on appeal. RCW 10.101.010(1)(a). The court remanded the case to the trial court for further consideration.

In re the Detention of Danforth, No. 841527. Robert Danforth is a sex offender with a history of offenses against young boys, including rape. In 2006, he went to the King County Sheriff’s Office and said that he was going to reoffend unless he was taken into custody. He said that if he was not confined he would go to a bus stop and try to have sex with boys, and also that he would go to an arcade where young boys were and “rub up against them.” He was taken into custody and committed as a sexually violent predator. This required proof that he was currently dangerous “with evidence of a recent overt act.” Overt acts can include some threats.

Danforth argues that his statements were not “threats” because his motive was to prevent harm, not cause it, and that using his statements against him would violate his free speech rights under the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals held that his statements were a threat, irrespective of motive, and rejected his First Amendment argument.

In a three-vote lead opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. Justice James Johnson wrote: “A reasonable jury could find that Danforth committed a threat when he gave explicit descriptions of his plans to molest boys at a bus stop and have intercourse with a child at a mall video arcade. Danforth repeatedly said that he would act on his plan if not committed as a sex offender. Former RCW 71.09.030(5), as defined by former RCW 71.09.020(10), is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. Former RCW 71.09.030(5) satisfies our due process requirement that the State show an offender is presently dangerousness before he or she is involuntarily committed. We affirm the summary judgment here.”

Justice Tom Chambers concurred in part and dissented in part, while Justice Charles Wiggins wrote a dissenting opinion.

Steven Beadle was convicted for child molestation in the first degree. At a pretrial child hearsay hearing, the alleged victim, four-year-old appeared to have an emotional breakdown and refused to testify.  The court nevertheless admitted the child's out-of-court disclosures to family members, mental health providers, a child protective services worker, and a law enforcement officer, pursuant to RCW 9A.44.120.

On appeal, Beadle argued the trial court erred in admitting the child hearsay statements, and that evidence of her breakdown was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The Supreme Court disagreed, upholding his conviction.

State v. McKague, No. 85657-5. The Supreme Court upholds a second degree assault conviction but clarifies the definition of “substantial bodily harm.” Jay McKague shoplifted a can of smoked oysters from Kee Ho Chang’s convenience store. Chang followed McKague out of the store and confronted him in the parking lot. A scuffle took place, during which McKague punched Chang in the head several times and pushed him to the ground, causing Chang’s head to strike the pavement. Chang was diagnosed with a concussion, a scalp contusion and lacerations, head and neck pain, and lacerations on his arm. Police photographs taken three days after the assault showed bruising around Chang’s eye.

McKague was eventually convicted of third degree theft and second degree assault. On appeal, a question was raised as to the sufficiency of the evidence of “substantial bodily harm” done to Chang. Second degree assault is defined as when the defendant intentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly causes “substantial bodily harm.” RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a). The Court of Appeal relied on to a dictionary definition of the term “substantial” as including “something having substance or actual existence.” The Supreme Court ruled that this definition would make practically any injury “substantial” no matter how minor. The Supreme Court indicated that substantial harm should be considerable. Nevertheless, the court upheld McKague’s conviction.

State v. Robinson, No. 83444-0. The Supreme Court allows a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon discovering that past offenses would count against his offender score. Chucco Robinson was charged with first degree attempted rape, burglary, and kidnapping. He erroneously believed that earlier juvenile convictions no longer counted toward his offender score. Based on this, he pleaded guilty. Later Robinson learned that his juvenile convictions would count toward his offender score and would increase the sentencing range. Robinson “immediately” sought to withdraw his plea. The trial court determined that Robinson’s plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, given his reasonable misunderstanding. The State contended on appeal that the trial court based her discretion by allowing the plea withdrawal. The Supreme Court held that the ruling was within the discretion of the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings.

Federal Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Vinson, No. 84243-4. The Supreme Court ruled favor of a former teacher who sought to overturn the district’s decision to terminate him. David Vinson, a teacher at Federal Way High School, was accused of verbally harassing a student. The school district terminated Vinson, citing his behavior and the dishonesty during the course of the investigation. A hearing officer ruled in Vinson’s favor, and a superior court affirmed the decision, ordering the district to pay Vinson’s attorneys fees.

The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 vote (Justice Charles Wiggins writing the majority), held that Federal Way School District did not have the right to appeal an adverse decision from a hearing officer. K&L Gates notes that this decision breaks new ground.

Significantly, the Supreme Court overruled several decisions in various divisions of the Court of Appeals that had determined sufficient cause could exist to discharge a teacher who had engaged in behavior that lacked any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose, without regard to whether the conduct was remediable or adversely affected the teacher’s performance.

The Supreme Court expressly reinstated the original Clark test, which held that sufficient cause for a teacher's discharge exists as a matter of law where the teacher's deficiency is not remediable and (1) materially and substantially affects the teacher's performance; or (2) lacks any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose.

Justice James Johnson dissented: “Today, this court’s majority makes it more difficult to discharge teachers and certificated employees than the legislature intended, even where clear cause for discharge exists.”

Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. County of Spokane, No. 84108-0. A nonprofit group, the Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County, requested public records from Spokane County, suspecting illegal hiring practices in Spokane County’s Building and Planning Department. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the county. On appeal, the Alliance argued that the County failed to conduct adequate searches for records responsive to both items, and that the trial court erred by limiting the scope of discovery. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court.

Justice Charles Johnson wrote the majority opinion in which the court held that discovery in a Public Records Act case is the same as in any other civil action and is therefore governed only by relevancy considerations. The court also adopted the standards for reasonableness regarding an adequate search from the federal Freedom of Information Act. Finally, the court held that harm to the requester occurs at the time the request is made and refused, and that a party may be entitled to recover costs and fees if the agency wrongfully fails to disclose documents in response to a request.

According to new reports, Spokane County’s violation of the public records law may cost more than $100,000 under the Supreme Court’s ruling.

The "prongs" should be approached with this principle in mind. The test, simply stated, is that (1) the defendant must show actual prejudice from the delay; (2) if the defendant shows prejudice, the court must determine the reasons for the delay; (3) the court must then weigh the reasons and the prejudice to determine whether fundamental conceptions of justice would be violated by allowing prosecution.

The Court holds that Oppelt has not shown a due process violation and that the Criminal Rules did not require the trial judge to dismiss the case. All justices signed the opinion, which was written by Justice Chambers. (briefs, argument)

In re the Dependency of K.N.J., No. 83516-1. Generally speaking, before a trial court terminates a parent-child relationship, the court must determine that the child has been found to be a dependent child.

K.N.J., a minor child, was placed in foster care after it was discovered that she severely abused by her mother. A dependency petition was filed by the state and ordered by a judge pro tempore. Michael Jenkins, the father of K.N.J., was not present at the hearing and the judge entered a default order despite his lack of consent.

Later the state filed for termination of Jenkins' parental rights, and he moved to vacate the original dependency order due to lack of his consent. The state argued the subsequent dependency review hearings cured any defect in the original order. The Court of Appeals found that the original dependency order was invalid, but that the subsequent hearings cured the defect.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Charlie Wiggins writing, affirmed the Court of Appeals by a 6-3 vote, and upheld termination of Jenkins' parent-child relationship with K.N.J., on the grounds that his dependency was proved at the termination trial.

Justice Gerry Alexander dissented: “Because family relationships are exalted, they should be nurtured. Therefore, this court should not promote or countenance shortcuts in the process of terminating the relationship between parent and child. Unfortunately, this is what the majority does here. Thus, I dissent.” Justice Debra Stephens filed a dissent as well.

Michaels v. CH2M Hill, Inc., No. 84168-3. A horrific accident at the Spokane wastewater treatment plant killed one man and injured two others. The survivors successfully sued CH2M, the engineering firm that was working with the city at the time. The question for the Supreme Court was whether CH2M enjoys immunity from suit under the Industrial Insurance Act. The Act immunizes a design professional performing professional services “on a construction project” or any employee of a design professional assisting or representing the design professional performing professional services on the “site of the construction project.” RCW 51.24.035.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Tom Chambers writing, concluded that the immunity clause did not apply to CH2M. The court further determined CH2M’s negligence caused the accident: “[H]ad CH2M not breached its duty, and had it performed the engineering analysis, the city employees would not have been confused and the collapse would not have occurred.” Chief Justice Barbara Madsen concurred separately.

Samantha A v. WA Dept. of Social & Health Services, No. 84325-2. The Supreme Court holds that a Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) regulation that reduces the financial assistance payable for in-home personal care services violates federal Medicaid law.

As part of Medicaid, DSHS provides paid personal care for disabled individuals. The extent of the care is based on a variety of eligibility factors that are re-evaluated periodically. A “children’s personal care rule” reduces the amount of paid care a child can receive based on the child’s age or if the child is living with parents (who already have a duty to care for the child).

This rule was challenged on behalf of a child named Samantha A. Samantha is cared for by a single mother but is eligible for 24-hour institutional care. The challenge claims (and the trial court agreed) that the children’s personal care rule violates Federal Medicaid law “requiring comparability of amount, duration, and scope of services among all recipients.” In other words, the rule treats disabled children differently based on their ages and on their relation to their caregivers.

Writing for the majority, Justice Charles Johnson affirmed the trial court. Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Stephens each wrote dissents.

The Washington Supreme Court disagrees with the Court of Appeals Gunwall analysis and thus with their reliance on Portundo. However, the Court agrees with the result reached by the Court of Appeals. When a defendant chooses to testify, prosecutors are free to challenge the defendant's credibility as with any other witness. Even Justice Ginsberg's dissent in Portundo indicated that she would allow such questions during cross examination (in Portundo, the suggestion that the defendant had tailored his testimony was made during the prosecution's closing argument).

The Court affirms the result reached by the Court of Appeals and embraces Justice Ginsberg's position in Portundo. Justice Alexander wrote for the Court, and the opinion was signed by four other Justices. Justice Stephens, with Justices Chambers and Fairhurst, concurs in the result, but only because she would find the prosecutor's questions here to have been harmless error. Justice Pro Tem. Sanders dissents and would put this area of the defendant's credibility beyond the reach of cross examination. (briefs, argument)

Washington Imaging Servs., LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, No. 84101-2. Washington Imaging is a medical imaging company that contracts with Overlake Imaging Associates, whose doctors interpret the images. Washington Imaging challenges a Department of Revenue decision that Washington Imaging owes Business and Occupation taxes on the money it receives from patients and then pays to Overlake Imaging Associates. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Department. It found that Washington Imaging was not acting as the agent of its patients in paying Overlake Imaging Associates, thus the payments in question were revenue subject to B&O tax. The Court of Appeals reversed that decision. The Supreme Court reinstates the trial court's grant of summary judgment. The Chief Justice wrote for a unanimous Court. (briefs, argument)

[t]echnical violations of the governing statutes are not fatal, so long as the charges, read as a whole, give the elected official enough information to respond to the charges and the voters enough information to evaluate them. (In re Recall of West (2005))

Considering the specific allegations against Washam, the Court notes that many of Washam's responses were conclusory.

Washam contends that he had "a legally cognizable justification for discretionary personnel decisions," Opening Br. at 30, but he does not further elaborate what that cognizable justification might have been. While our review is de novo, mere invocation of a legally cognizable justification is not enough.

 The Court unanimously affirms the trial court. Justice Chambers wrote the opinion.

The first question is whether a company like GCS is engaged in "debt adjusting" as defined in RCW 18.21.010. The Court holds that the statutory definition, which includes "receiving funds for the purposes of distributing said funds among creditors," unambiguously includes companies like GCS.

The second question is whether the exception for banks in RCW 18.21.010(2)(b) applies to GCS. The Court holds that it should construe the debt adjusting statute liberally in favor of consumers. It reads the exception narrowly and thus holds that it does not apply to GCS.

The district court's third question asks if the fee limits in RCW 18.28.080 apply to companies like Freedom, which do not operate as anticipated by the statute (for details on the business models involved, see the full opinion). The Court holds that the statute appears to apply to companies like Freedom, but recognizes that there are "factual questions the district court must resolve based on the exact nature of the debt settlement companies and the services they provide."

The final question is whether the statute provides an implied cause of action against an "aider and abettor" related to the misdemeanors created in RCW 18.28.190. However, the Court finds it unnecessary to create such an implied cause of action because RCW 18.28.185 makes all violations of the debt adjusting statute also violations of RCW 19.86, Washington's consumer protection law, which provides a civil remedy.

Justice Fairhurst wrote for a unanimous court. Justice Chambers signed that opinion, but also wrote an opinion-editorial about debt adjusting companies and business regulation that he issued as a concurrence. (briefs, argument)

Harris v. Charles, No. 83867-4. Petitioner Joshua Harris pleaded guilty to driving with a suspended license and driving without a required ignition interlock device, both misdemeanors. Prior to sentencing, Harris was required to wear an "electronic home monitoring" device. Harris wanted credit against his 90-day sentence for the time he wore the monitoring device, and the municipal court judge refused. Harris filed a writ of habeus corpus, alleging a violation of his right to equal protection because RCW 9.94A requires crediting felons, but not misdemeanants, for such time. The King County Superior Court agreed with Harris, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court's order.

The State Supreme Court today affirms the court of appeals, finds that the City's appeal was timely and thus not moot, and holds that there is a rational basis for the different treatment of felons and misdemeanants in this case. Justice Wiggins wrote for a unanimous court. (briefs, argument)

State v. Williams, No. 83992-1. Michael Williams gave police his brother's name instead of his own while being investigated for theft. He was eventually convicted of first degree theft, making a false statement to law enforcement, and obstructing a law enforcement officer. He appeals the last of these, arguing based on precedent and the State Constitution that obstruction requires conduct and not just a false statement.

Today, Justice Chambers writes for a unanimous court, agreeing with Williams and case law that the crime of obstructing a law enforcement officer cannot be predicated on speech alone. The opinion describes several earlier cases and Washington's strong constitutional protections of personal privacy and autonomy. The Court vacates Williams's conviction for obstruction. (briefs, argument)

In re Detention of Gale West, No. 82568-8. Gale West was found by a jury to be a sexually violent predator (SVP), and the trial court entered a civil commitment order which the Court of Appeals upheld. West challenges the ruling, saying he was prejudiced by the trial court’s rulings on evidence in the trial, and that he was entitled to discovery of the SVP evaluations done for other persons by the State’s expert witness. The Supreme Court (Justice Mary Fairhurst writing), upholds West’s conviction, rejecting his argument that witness testimony about the conditions and treatment phases at the Special Commitment Center was inadmissible. The court agrees in part that the court wrongfully denied West’s request for the State’s expert witness work product. But because this error was harmless, the Supreme Court upholds the decisions below. Justice Pro Tem Richard Sanders dissents.

State v. Sims, No. 83779-1. Jack Irvin Sims directly appealed to the Supreme Court to challenge only a particular condition of his sentence while not challenging his underlying conviction.
Sims pleaded guilty to one count of first degree molestation of a child.

The trial court imposed imposing a sentence of 60 months to life to be suspended after 180 days of confinement as long as Sims followed all the sentencing conditions. The judge imposed a lifetime no-contact order and, over Sims’ objection, ordered him not to reside in Cowlitz County and to not never enter the city limits of Castle Rock, where the incident took place and the victim continued to reside.

Sims appealed, challenging only the condition banning him from Cowlitz County and Castle Rock. The State conceded that the condition Sims challenged was unconstitutional and then argued that his entire sentence should be invalided and remanded to trial court for reconsideration. The Supreme Court (Justice Susan Owens writing) ruled on the proper scope of remand:

The proper remedy in this case is resentencing for the limited purpose of narrowly tailoring the geographic condition of Sims’s SSOSA sentence that currently banishes him from Cowlitz County. A broader remedy was not properly before the Court of Appeals because such a remedy is affirmative relief for the State, for which the State did not file a cross appeal and which is not demanded by the necessities of the case. We remand to the trial court for resentencing for the purpose of making the vacated banishment condition constitutionally sound.

Justice Debra Stephens dissents, arguing the majority decision “wholly discounts the trial court’s discretion” for resentencing.

Whatcom County Fire Dist. No. 21 v. Whatcom County, No. 83611-6. Writing for the majority of the court, Justice Owens observed: “At bottom, this case is a dispute between two independent municipal corporations over whether completion of the proposed developments would reduce fire protection services below an adequate level of service.”

In 2006, Whatcom County approved three land use applications for development in the Birch Bay urban growth area. Whatcom County Fire District No. 211 filed a land use petition challenging the approvals. The fire district asserted that it was not equipped to provide adequate services with the arrival of additional structures.

The superior court granted the fire district’s petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the County’s comprehensive plan had established the adequacy and availability of fire protection. The appeals court reinstated the approvals.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the approval of the land use applications. The court determined that had Whatcom County assigned responsibility for assessing the adequacy of fire protection services to the Fire District by adopting a county code prohibits approval of certain land uses without a letter of adequacy from the fire district. Justice Tom Chambers dissents.

When Martinez was arrested after a foot chase, he was wearing an empty knife sheath. The knife was recovered along the route of the chase and Martinez acknowledged that it was his and had been in the sheath. Conviction for first degree burglary requires proof that the defendant either committed an accompanying assault or, as prosecutors alleged in Martinez's case, was "armed" with a "deadly weapon." The burglary statute, RCW 9A.04.110(6), defines a "deadline weapon" as

any explosive or loaded or unloaded firearm, and ... any other weapon, ... which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm.

The Court unanimously reverses the court of appeals, holding first that Martinez's personal restraint petition challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is properly before the Court. The Court further holds that the statute is unambiguous as it applies to this case--it requires more than simply possessing a knife. The state failed to offer any evidence at trial to indicate how Martinez used or intended to use the knife, thus the Court vacates Martinez's conviction. The Chief Justice wrote for the Court. (briefs, argument)

In re Pers. Restraint of Nichols, No. 83742-2. A drug informant provided Seattle Police with evidence that cocaine was being sold out of room 56 at a particular Travelodge hotel. Police obtained Glenn Nichols's name from the hotel register. Using a patrol car computer, they determined that Nichols's driver's license was suspended. Soon thereafter, officers witnessed Nichols drive into the Travelodge complex, arrested him for driving on a suspended license, and found drugs and police "buy" money in Nichols's possession. Nichols was convicted on drug charges. During his appeal and for the first time, Nichols alleged that the search of the hotel register violated article I, section 7, of the Washington State Constitution. The court of appeals found that Nichols waived the issue by failing to raise it at trial and dismissed the petition.

A splintered Supreme Court partly reverses the court of appeals, holding that "a petitioner can raise an article I, section 7, claim for the first time in a PRP." The Court emphasizes its divergence from federal courts on the meaning of the exclusionary rule.

We have consistently rejected the sort of balancing test that federal courts apply in applying the exclusionary rule, and we have done so because we view our exclusionary rule as "constitutionally mandated, exist[ing] primarily to vindicate personal privacy rights," rather than simply as a "judicially-created prophylactic measure designed to deter police misconduct." State v. Chenoweth (2007).

Nevertheless, the Court holds that "because the questioning of the desk clerk at the Travelodge was not random and was conducted only because the police officers had individualized suspicion ... the examination of the registry that took place shortly thereafter did not violate article I, section 7 of our state constitution." Justice Alexander, joined by Justice Charles Johnson, James Johnson, and Stephens, wrote the lead opinion. The Chief Justice concurred separately and very briefly, incorporating her dissent in State v. Jorden (2007). Justice Fairhust, joined by Justices Chambers and Owens and Justice Pro Tem. Sanders, dissents and argues that "the lead opinion contravenes the structure of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, undermines its protections, and attempts to circumvent the warrant requirement." (briefs, argument)

The Supreme Court reverses the courts below. It holds that the trial court abused its discretion when it struck the witnesses because it did not set forth its reasons for the sanctions in the record. And because those actions were improper, the summary judgment order must be reversed as well. Justice Stephens wrote for the Court. The holding was unanimous, but Justice James Johnson wrote a concurrence to emphasize that this decision does not limit the sanctions that can be imposed by trial courts. (briefs, argument)

Schnall v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., No. 80572-5. The federal government, through the Federal Communications Commission, requires AT&T and other telecommunications companies to pay into the Universal Service Fund, which subsidizes telecommunications services in certain areas. The government expressly permits companies to recover these funds from customers, which AT&T does as a "Universal Connectivity Charge" line item on customers' bills. An AT&T Wireless customer, Martin Schnall, sued, alleging that this practice by AT&T violates the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and the terms of AT&T's customer contract. Schnall asked the trial court to certify a nationwide class; the trial court denied class certification; Schnall appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court and certified the class.

AT&T's customer contracts include a choice of law provision requiring customers to litigate contract issues in the jurisdiction where the contract was signed. The trial court found no reason to invalidate this contract term, thus it declined to certify a nationwide class on Schnall's contract claim. The Supreme Court agrees with the trial court and reverses the court of appeals. On the state CPA claim, the Court affirms the court of appeals, noting that the trial court's decision predated the Supreme Court's opinion in Indoor Billboard/Washington, Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Washington, Inc. The case is remanded to the trial court.

The Chief Justice wrote for the Court and was joined by four other justices. Justice chambers wrote a concurrence in part, but also agreed with Justice Pro Tem. Sanders's dissent that the majority failed to consider factors weighing in favor of certifying the national class. Justice Owens and Stephens also signed the dissent. (briefs, argument)

State v. Robinson, No. 83525-0. In these consolidated appeals, two criminal defendants challenged the admissibility of evidence used against them at trial. Both defendants first raised the issue on appeal after the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Arizona v. Gant. That case narrowed the exception to the warrant requirement for automobile searches incident to an arrest. The State Supreme Court holds for both defendants and remands their cases.

We hold that principles of issue preservation, as embodied in RAP 2.5(a), do not apply where (1) a court issues a new controlling constitutional interpretation material to the defendant's case, (2) that interpretation overrules an existing controlling interpretation, (3) the new interpretation applies retroactively to the defendant, and (4) the defendant's trial was completed prior to the new interpretation. As these criteria are met in both Millan's and Robinson's cases, their raising the admissibility of evidence under Gant and Patton for the first time before the Court of Appeals and this court, respectively, are permissible.

Justice Owens wrote for the seven-member majority. The Chief Justice wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justice James Johnson. (briefs, argument)

The Washington State Constitution, article II, section 40, creates a special fund related to motor vehicle transportation.

All fees collected by the State of Washington as license fees for motor vehicles and all excise taxes collected by the State of Washington on the sale, distribution or use of motor vehicle fuel and all other state revenue intended to be used for highway purposes, shall be paid into the state treasury and placed in a special fund to be used exclusively for highway purposes.

In 2009, the Legislature passed and Gov. Gregoire signed a transportation budget that included an appropriation of $300,000 from the motor vehicle fund to pay for a study "methodologies to value the reversible lanes on Interstate 90 to be used for [light rail]." The legislation also stated the legislature's commitment to "construction of sound transit's east link." Pursuant to the appropriation, DOT spent $250,000 of motor vehicle fund money to begin the process of appraising the existing lanes so that the ownership of those lanes can be transfered from the DOT to Sound Transit.

The taxpayer petitioners argue that the appropriation and expenditure violate article II, section 40. Because the legislature's intent is to proceed with the transfer of the highway lanes in order to build light rail, the motor vehicle funds are not being used for highway purposes. The DOT counters that the valuation study falls within "administration of the public highways," which is part of the constitutional definition of "highway purposes."

The Court yesterday sided with the Department of Transportation and refused to view the legislature's intent to proceed with light rail as a mandate on the Department.

The valuation allows DOT to explore the feasibility of transferring or leasing the center lanes of I-90 to accommodate light rail mass transit. And as noted above, DOT has specific statutory authority to transfer highway lands, and the decision of whether to transfer or lease lands is inherently a function of the administration of highway property. Since the expenditure serves an administrative function, the expenditure "indirectly benefits" our public highways and is lawful under article II, section 40.

The Court further holds that petitioners requested writ is too broad and that, as such, it would be impossible for the Court to ensure that it was enforced. Justice Charles Johnson wrote for the Court and was joined by the Chief Justice; Justices Chambers, Owens, and Stephens; and Justice Pro Tem. Karen Seinfeld. 

Justice Alexander authored a concurrence, which Justice Pro Tem. Seinfeld also signed, noting that while the constitutional protection is clear, the funds have also already been expended. The concurrence also agrees with the majority that the requested writ is too broad.

Justice James Johnson dissents and is joined by Justice Pro Tem. Saunders. The dissent points out that the constitutional provision here, both on its face and as interpreted in previous cases, prohibits expending motor vehicle funds on mass transit projects. Regardless of which entity is actually spending the money, if the money comes from the motor vehicle fund, its uses are proscribed; even the promise of future reimbursement is irrelevant.

The people adopted a constitutional provision in article II, section 40, prohibiting the use of vehicle fees and excise taxes for anything other than highway purposes. In the wake of this constitutional provision, gas taxes have continued to rise and license fees, though limited by initiative, raise millions of dollars for the state. The people have tolerated or authorized such taxes in the past predicated on the constitutional promise that the revenues collected by the state through such taxes and fees will be used exclusively for highway purposes. Because the legislature has broken that constitutional promise and the majority declines to enforce it, I dissent.

Justice Fairhurst and Justice Wiggins did not participate. (briefs, argument)

Burton v. Twin Commander Aircraft

In re PRP of Carlos John Williams, No. 84711-8. Carlos Williams, an inmate at Monroe Correctional Center, filed two civil complaints for monetary damages against the Department of Corrections, claiming cruel and unusual punishment and racial discrimination. The superior court treated both actions as postconviction challenges and referred them to the Court of Appeals for consideration as personal restraint petitions. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions as improperly seeking monetary relief. The Supreme Court (in a per curiam decision) reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the trial court to treat Williams’ actions as civil complaints.

State v. Simms, No. 83826-7. Daniel Simms was convicted (among other things) of robbery, with sentence enhancement for use of a firearm. Because Simms had a previous conviction of assault with a firearm enhancement in 2000, the court doubled the firearm enhancements, adding 22 years to his sentence. Simms challenged the enhancement on appeal—specifically whether the state, in seeking a double firearm enhancement based on the prior imposition of a firearm enhancement, is required to allege in the information that the defendant has previously been sentenced to a firearm enhancement. The Court of Appeals held that the prior conviction was not essential to prove the enhancement itself, and that there is no requirement to give notice of a prior conviction “for purposes of a sentencing enhancement.” The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Court of Appeals. Justice James Johnson wrote the decision of the court.

State v. Weaver, No. 84982-0. The Supreme Court previously granted Oliver Weaver’s petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision that had affirmed his sentence for second degree child rape and second degree rape. The Supreme Court had ordered reconsideration by the Court of Appeals in light of State v. Mendoza (2009). On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals adhered to its original decision. Weaver again appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court holds today that Mendoza entitles Weaver to relief, reverses the Court of Appeals, and remand to the superior court for further proceedings.

Today, a splintered Supreme Court reverses the court of appeals and reinstates Ford's conviction. The lead opinion, written by Justice Charles Johnson and signed by Justices Alexander, Owens, and James Johnson, finds that Ford has not met the threshold requirement of "establish[ing] a reasonably substantial possibility that the verdict was improperly influenced by the trial court's intervention" (quoting State v. Watkins (1983)). Because Ford first raised this issue on appeal and because the record suggests that the jury had already completed deliberations and reached a unanimous verdict as to count one before the judge's instruction, Ford cannot meet the threshold test to raise the constitutional issue.

The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Fairhurst, concurred. They would not rely on the assumption that the jury had finished deliberating, but find the jury's quick return and confirmed unanimity convincing that there was no improper influence on the jury. Justice Stephens authored a dissent, which was also signed by Justice Chambers and Justice Pro Tem. Sanders. Justice Wiggins did not participate. (briefs, argument)