Humphrey Indus. LTD v. Clay St. Assocs. LLC, No. 82687-1. Humphrey Industries, Ltd. (through several business partners) created Clay Street Associates, LLC, to hold a single real estate asset located in Auburn, Washington. In order to break a deadlock with principal George Humphrey regarding the sale of the property, the other members of Clay Street agreed to merge the company into a new limited liability company to facilitate the sale. Humphrey dissented from the merger and demanded payment pursuant to the dissenters’ rights provisions of the Washington Limited Liability Company Act, chapter 25.15 RCW. Clay Street agreed to pay Humphrey the fair market value of his interest as of the merger date but did not pay until the property sold.

Humphrey rejected the value calculation and sued. The trial court found that the property was worth more than Clay Street had calculated, and awarded Humphrey the difference plus interest. However, the court awarded Clay Street attorneys fees, finding that the dissenting Humphrey had acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) affirmed.

The Supreme Court (Justice Jim Johnson writing) reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for reconsideration of the attorney fee award. The court held that the lower courts erred in finding that Clay Street “substantially complied” with the LLCA.

In re Custody of S.C.D.-L., No. 84186-1. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s order awarding custody of S.C.D-L. to her grandmother, Edna Littell. The court wrote that Ms. Littell failed to allege or offer facts at the show cause hearing conducted under RCW 26.10.030 that S.C.D-L. was not in the physical custody of one of her parents or that neither parent was a suitable custodian.

“A nonparent may petition for custody of a child if the child is not in the physical custody of a parent or if the petitioner alleges that neither parent is a suitable custodian. RCW 26.10.030(1). The trial court must deny a hearing on the petition unless the nonparent submits an affidavit (1) declaring that the child is not in the physical custody of one of the child’s parents or that neither parent is a suitable custodian and (2) setting forth facts supporting the requested custody order. S.C.D-L. was in [her father] Mr. Littell’s physical custody at the time Ms. Littell filed her petition, and the petition
does not allege that he is an unfit parent. Instead, the petition implies it would be in the child’s best interest to reside with Ms. Littell, but the ‘best interests of the child’ standard does not apply to nonparent custody actions."

State v. Patel, No. 82649-8. The Supreme Court upheld a conviction for attempted child rape where the “victim” was actually a police officer posing as a child.

Mitel Patel was caught in a police sting operation when he chatted with a detective pretending to be a 13-year-old girl and went to meet and have sex with “her.” He was convicted of second degree attempted rape of a child. Patel argues that the state did not offer proof that the intended victim (the detective) was underage, and thus did not prove an essential element of the attempted crime. The trial court and Court of Appeals disagreed, holding it sufficient that Patel believed his intended victim to be underage.

The Supreme Court (Justice Tom Chambers writing the four-vote lead opinion) agreed, holding that “a defendant may be convicted of attempted rape of a child where the alleged victim is a fictitious underage character created by the police.” The court reasoned that unlike convictions for actual child rape, which require a showing that the child was underage, attempt crimes do not depend on the ultimate harm that would have resulted from commission of the crime. Rather, the person is guilty of an attempt “if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he or she does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” RCW 9A.28.020(1).

Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Richard Sanders wrote separate concurring opinions.

Thomas Bernard hired Gloria as an operations manager for his company. Three years later, the two began dating. Thomas proposed to Gloria but said he would require a prenuptial agreement – he was 55 and worth $25 million; she was 49 and had a net worth of $8,000. In January 2000 Thomas and his attorney began working on the prenup, but did not provide Gloria with a copy. Despite several suggestions to Gloria that she obtain independent counsel, she never hired a lawyer. Then 18 days before the wedding, Gloria received a draft of the prenup. A few weeks later Gloria met with an attorney, but the two received a new draft of the agreement that was substantially different than the previous version. The day before the wedding, Gloria’s lawyer identified major concerns with the agreement, and outlined these concerns in a letter. Concerned that Thomas would call off the wedding, Gloria signed the prenup, and the two signed a “side letter” agreeing to renegotiate the areas addressed by Gloria’s lawyer. This amendment was finalized a year after the wedding. In 2005, Gloria filed for divorce, and challenged the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement.

The Supreme Court used the long-standing two part analysis. First, the court determined that the agreement was substantively fair—that is, where the agreement makes fair and reasonable provision for the spouse not seeking enforcement. The court determined that the amended prenup made inadequate provisions for Gloria relative to Thomas’ means. Second, the court reviewed the procedural fairness of the agreement—whether the spouses fully disclosed the value of their property and whether the agreement was entered into voluntarily. The court took note fo several factors: that Gloria never saw a draft until days before the wedding; and changes to the draft agreement at the last minute; and the pressure Gloria felt to sign an agreement in order to avoid the embarrassment of delaying the wedding. The court determined that the “side letter” amendment did not cure the defects of the prenup, and invalidated it.

Justices Sanders, Fairhurst, and J. Johnson dissented, saying that while the prenuptial may have been substantively unfair, Gloria entered the agreement voluntarily and intelligently.

• Community Care Coalition of Wash. v. Reed, No. 81857-6, regarding the Secretary of State's discretion in certifying an initiative.
• In re Custody of A.C., No. 79938-5, regarding out-of-state foster parents seeking custody.
• Michael v. Mosquera-Lacy, No. 80665-9, regarding a consumer protection claim against a dentist.
• Otis Housing Association v. Ha, No. 80626-8, regarding a real estate dispute.