The court issued a lengthy opinion authored by Justice Debra Stephens. Justice Stephens summarized the major points of the ruling: 

• The judiciary has the primary responsibility for interpreting article IX, section 1 to give it meaning and legal effect.

• The legislature has the responsibility to augment the broad educational concepts under article IX, section 1 by providing the specific details of the constitutionally required “education.”

• Article IX, section 1 confers on children in Washington a positive constitutional right to an amply funded education.

• The word “education” under article IX, section 1 means the basic knowledge and skills needed to compete in today’s economy and meaningfully participate in this state’s democracy.

• The current substantive content of the requisite knowledge and skills for “education” comes from three sources: the broad educational concepts outlined in Seattle School District, the four learning goals in Engrossed Substitute House Bill (ESHB) 1209, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1993), and the State’s essential academic learning requirements (EALRs).

• The “education” required under article IX, section 1 consists of the opportunity to obtain the knowledge and skills described in Seattle School District, ESHB 1209, and the EALRs. It does not reflect a right to a guaranteed educational outcome.

• The program of basic education is not etched in constitutional stone. The legislature has an obligation to review the basic education program as the needs of students and the demands of society evolve.

• The word “ample” in article IX, section 1 provides a broad constitutional guideline meaning fully, sufficient, and considerably more than just adequate.

• Ample funding for basic education must be accomplished by means of dependable and regular tax sources.

• The State has not complied with its article IX, section 1 duty to make ample provision for the education of all children in Washington.

• The legislature recently enacted a promising reform package under ESHB 2261, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009), which if fully funded, will remedy deficiencies in the K-12 funding system.

• This court defers to the legislature’s chosen means of discharging its article IX, section 1 duty but retains jurisdiction over the case to help facilitate progress in the State’s plan to fully implement the reforms by 2018.

In a rare move, the Supreme Court retained jurisdiction of the case and gave the Legislature a six-year deadline to implement necessary reforms. 

Federal Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Vinson, No. 84243-4. The Supreme Court ruled favor of a former teacher who sought to overturn the district’s decision to terminate him. David Vinson, a teacher at Federal Way High School, was accused of verbally harassing a student. The school district terminated Vinson, citing his behavior and the dishonesty during the course of the investigation. A hearing officer ruled in Vinson’s favor, and a superior court affirmed the decision, ordering the district to pay Vinson’s attorneys fees.

The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 vote (Justice Charles Wiggins writing the majority), held that Federal Way School District did not have the right to appeal an adverse decision from a hearing officer. K&L Gates notes that this decision breaks new ground.

Significantly, the Supreme Court overruled several decisions in various divisions of the Court of Appeals that had determined sufficient cause could exist to discharge a teacher who had engaged in behavior that lacked any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose, without regard to whether the conduct was remediable or adversely affected the teacher’s performance.

The Supreme Court expressly reinstated the original Clark test, which held that sufficient cause for a teacher's discharge exists as a matter of law where the teacher's deficiency is not remediable and (1) materially and substantially affects the teacher's performance; or (2) lacks any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose.

Justice James Johnson dissented: “Today, this court’s majority makes it more difficult to discharge teachers and certificated employees than the legislature intended, even where clear cause for discharge exists.”

Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. County of Spokane, No. 84108-0. A nonprofit group, the Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County, requested public records from Spokane County, suspecting illegal hiring practices in Spokane County’s Building and Planning Department. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the county. On appeal, the Alliance argued that the County failed to conduct adequate searches for records responsive to both items, and that the trial court erred by limiting the scope of discovery. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court.

Justice Charles Johnson wrote the majority opinion in which the court held that discovery in a Public Records Act case is the same as in any other civil action and is therefore governed only by relevancy considerations. The court also adopted the standards for reasonableness regarding an adequate search from the federal Freedom of Information Act. Finally, the court held that harm to the requester occurs at the time the request is made and refused, and that a party may be entitled to recover costs and fees if the agency wrongfully fails to disclose documents in response to a request.

According to new reports, Spokane County’s violation of the public records law may cost more than $100,000 under the Supreme Court’s ruling.

The court found several problems with the Alliance’s accounting, and ruled that their arguments “do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt” that special education is underfunded. Accordingly, both the Thurston County Superior Court and the Court of Appeals found the funding statute to be constitutional.

The Supreme Court (Justice Susan Owens writing) agreed with the lower courts.

The Washington Constitution provides that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders.” Special education in Washington is funded by three sources: 1) the Basic Education Allotment (BEA), which the State provides to school districts based on an enrollment average; 2) special education excess funding from the State if a school district cannot provide an appropriate education for special education students; and 3) “safety net” funds where the State provides additional funding to districts with demonstrated needs for special education funding.

The Alliance sued, arguing that the State was underfunding special education. However, in presenting evidence of underfunding, the Alliance omitted funding that came from the BEA, arguing that BEA funds for special education students goes toward basic education classrooms.

The Supreme Court first addressed the proper standard of review. Justice Owens wrote: “In Washington, it is well established that statutes are presumed constitutional and that a statute’s challenger has a heavy burden to overcome that presumption; the challenger must prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” (The Alliance had argued a lower threshold of proof should apply.)

The Supreme Court also rejected the key argument that special education funding should be calculated without including the BEA. The Court noted that the Alliance’s own expert found that a special education student costs 190 percent of a basic education student. The State, when including the BEA and additional special education funding into the formula, allocates 193.09 percent of basic education costs for each special education student.

“For us to conclude that the BEA should not be included in calculations of how much funding goes to special education, we would have to agree with the Alliance’s contention that basic education and special education are in entirely separate realms. The Alliance attempts to differentiate between basic education and special education services, but the law does not support this distinction.”

“The legislature has consistently made it clear that special education students are also basic education students and that the additional special education funding is in addition to, and takes into account, the BEA. We therefore disagree with the Alliance’s contention that basic education and special education are entirely separate. We affirm the trial court and Court of Appeals and hold that the BEA must be included in the calculations when deciding if special education is adequately funded.”

Justice Debra Stephens concurred separately in the result. Justice Tom Chambers also wrote a concurring opinion, but dissented as to the requirement that a party arguing an statute is unconstitutional must prove the case “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Justice Richard Sanders dissented entirely, also disagreeing with the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. He argued this placed too great a burden on any party challenging a legislative enactment. “The judiciary cannot protect against an overreaching legislature if every enactment is presumed constitutional unless proved otherwise ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ giving the legislature, simply because it is the legislature, an advantage against any challenger’s assertion to the contrary.” Justice Sanders also argued that the legislature was underfunding special education when basic and special education funding are analyzed separately.

In 2006, the Federal Way School District, along with district employees, parents and students, sued the state, arguing that funding disparities violate the duty of a “general and uniform” school system. Education funding is a complex formula of federal, state, and local funds that are distributed to individual school districts, and employees in different districts are often paid different amounts. For example, the State allocation to districts for the 2007-08 school year ranged from $32,746 to $34,612 among teachers and from $54,405 to $80,807 for administrators.

King County Superior Court Judge Michael Heavey ruled that the state’s funding model violates the “general and uniform” duty, and violated the state’s equal protection clause by paying similarly-situated school employees differently.

There are two educational sections of the state constitution at play here. One requires the state to make “ample provision” for the education of all children (Art. IX, Sec. 1), while the other section mandates a “general and uniform system of public schools” (Art. IX, Sec. 2).

The plaintiffs argued that the “general and uniform” provision is violated when school employees are paid different amounts. They argue the state’s obligation is not just ample funding, but ample funding within a general and uniform system. In response, the state argued that where the “ample provision” for basic education is met, variances in school funding allocations are of no constitutional significance. The constitutional duty is to create a common education system (uniform academic learning requirements, graduation standards, teacher licensing standards, uniform discipline standards), not to guarantee precisely equal funding to every district.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Jim Johnson writing the unanimous decision, soundly rejected the school district’s case—ruling to uphold the existing funding allocation system.

The Court wrote that education funding has historically varied statewide, and that the legislature has attempted to shrink disparities over time. The uniformity requirement, according to the Court, means that every child has the same educational advantages. “Our cases discussing article IX, section 2 make it clear that the provision requires uniformity in the educational program provided, not the minutiae of funding.” The Court also ruled that the individuals parents, students, and teachers challenging the funding allocation model are unable to show any direct harm and therefore are not able to challenge the funding model.

The legislature’s use of the staff unit allocation system to fund education with differing salary allocations to school districts with historically disparate average salaries does not violate article IX, section 2, although there remains a slight gap between the highest and lowest salary funding statewide. There is no showing that the legislature’s funding allocations, including those for Federal Way School District, do not constitute “ample provision for the education of all children” as required under article IX, section 1. The legislature has acted well within its constitutional authority and its duty to make ample provision for the education of children and to provide for a general and uniform system of education under article IX. The individual respondents’ claims do not meet requirements for justiciability and should be dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse.

The question in this case, argued before the state Supreme Court yesterday, is whether the Legislature is constitutionally compelled to equalize state allocations to school districts for school employee salaries. In 2006, the Federal Way School District, along with district employees and students, sued the state, arguing that funding disparities violate the duty of a “general and uniform” school system.

Education funding is a complex formula of federal, state, and local funds that are distributed to individual school districts. King County Superior Court Judge Michael Heavey ruled that the state’s funding model violates the “general and uniform” duty, and violated the state’s equal protection clause by paying similarly-situated school employees differently. Judge Heavey pointed out the disparities of state allocations among districts for the 2007-08 school year:

• Classified staff: $30,111 to $35,227
• Administrative staff: $54,405 to $80,807
• Teaching staff: $32,746 to $34,612

Federal Way is at the bottom classification in all three salary allocation ranges.

There are two educational provisions of the state constitution at play here.

Art. IX, Sec. 1. PREAMBLE. It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.

Art. IX, Sec. 2. PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM. The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools. The public school system shall include common schools, and such high schools, normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter be established. But the entire revenue derived from the common school fund and the state tax for common schools shall be exclusively applied to the support of the common schools.

Senior Assistant Attorney General David Stolier, arguing for the State, said that where the “ample provision” for basic education is met, variances in school funding allocations are of no constitutional significance. The constitutional duty is to create a common education system, not to guarantee precisely equal funding to every district. The “general and uniform” requirement, he argues, deals with the structure of education: uniform academic learning requirements, graduation standards, teacher licensing standards, uniform discipline standards, and other elements. “We’ve got a structure so that a student in Nine Mile Falls, who transfers to Olympia, is going to get reasonably the same education.”

Interestingly, despite the funding disparities, student performance in Federal Way is well above the state average, which Justice James Johnson took note of. Mr. Stolier pointed out that there is great debate within the education community about the correlation between funding and educational opportunity.

Justice Debra Stephens, who mentioned that she served on a school board for 12 years, asked Mr. Stolier where the trial judge went wrong. “I think the trial court saw something that needed fixing, and did not trust the legislature to do it,” he said.

Buzz Porter, arguing for the school district, asked the court to uphold Judge Heavey’s order. “Then what?” asked Justice Stephens. She cited separation of powers concerns, and objected to a school system run by the courts, so if the court were to rule for the district, what would the remedy be? Mr. Porter said it’s not the job of the court to tell the legislature how to run schools. Only if the legislature failed to act would the court be required to provide a remedy. But it is within the court’s duty, he said, to explain what the state constitution means and requires.

Responding to the state’s argument, Mr. Porter argued that “you can’t divorce” Sections 1 and 2 of Article IX of the state constitution. The state’s obligation, he said, is not just ample funding, but ample funding within a general and uniform system. Noting the complexity of school funding formulas, Justice Stephens asked if it was a mistake to simply focus on per-pupil spending or district salaries, which are pieces of the entire school funding pie. “I wonder if your argument robs from Peter to pay Paul – if we equalize this, aren’t we creating non-uniformity in other categories of state funding because of the variances in district size? … We’re really talking about putting the entire system of educational funding on the table, aren’t we?”

Justice Madsen asked what would happen to local control. “There are wealthier districts that want to have enhancements for their schools. If we put too fine a point on uniformity, don’t we take that option away?” She also asked about whether students have standing to sue in this case, wondering what harm the students have experienced when test results show the Federal Way School District outperforms many other districts in the state. Mr. Porter said the court shouldn’t confuse results versus opportunity. The state’s obligation, he said, is to provide an equal educational system and opportunity to thrive. Results don’t necessarily discount differential treatment.

Justice James Johnson referred to past education cases and said, “It seems to me you’re seeking to accomplish a continuing judicial oversight in the way that was rejected in the [case of] Seattle School District.”

A ruling from the Supreme Court in the district's favor would have no immediate impact -- the ruling would be declaratory in nature, and it would be up to the state legislature to then go and design a general and uniform education funding model within the guidelines of the ruling.