The first question is whether a company like GCS is engaged in "debt adjusting" as defined in RCW 18.21.010. The Court holds that the statutory definition, which includes "receiving funds for the purposes of distributing said funds among creditors," unambiguously includes companies like GCS.

The second question is whether the exception for banks in RCW 18.21.010(2)(b) applies to GCS. The Court holds that it should construe the debt adjusting statute liberally in favor of consumers. It reads the exception narrowly and thus holds that it does not apply to GCS.

The district court's third question asks if the fee limits in RCW 18.28.080 apply to companies like Freedom, which do not operate as anticipated by the statute (for details on the business models involved, see the full opinion). The Court holds that the statute appears to apply to companies like Freedom, but recognizes that there are "factual questions the district court must resolve based on the exact nature of the debt settlement companies and the services they provide."

The final question is whether the statute provides an implied cause of action against an "aider and abettor" related to the misdemeanors created in RCW 18.28.190. However, the Court finds it unnecessary to create such an implied cause of action because RCW 18.28.185 makes all violations of the debt adjusting statute also violations of RCW 19.86, Washington's consumer protection law, which provides a civil remedy.

Justice Fairhurst wrote for a unanimous court. Justice Chambers signed that opinion, but also wrote an opinion-editorial about debt adjusting companies and business regulation that he issued as a concurrence. (briefs, argument)

Harris v. Charles, No. 83867-4. Petitioner Joshua Harris pleaded guilty to driving with a suspended license and driving without a required ignition interlock device, both misdemeanors. Prior to sentencing, Harris was required to wear an "electronic home monitoring" device. Harris wanted credit against his 90-day sentence for the time he wore the monitoring device, and the municipal court judge refused. Harris filed a writ of habeus corpus, alleging a violation of his right to equal protection because RCW 9.94A requires crediting felons, but not misdemeanants, for such time. The King County Superior Court agreed with Harris, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court's order.

The State Supreme Court today affirms the court of appeals, finds that the City's appeal was timely and thus not moot, and holds that there is a rational basis for the different treatment of felons and misdemeanants in this case. Justice Wiggins wrote for a unanimous court. (briefs, argument)

State v. Williams, No. 83992-1. Michael Williams gave police his brother's name instead of his own while being investigated for theft. He was eventually convicted of first degree theft, making a false statement to law enforcement, and obstructing a law enforcement officer. He appeals the last of these, arguing based on precedent and the State Constitution that obstruction requires conduct and not just a false statement.

Today, Justice Chambers writes for a unanimous court, agreeing with Williams and case law that the crime of obstructing a law enforcement officer cannot be predicated on speech alone. The opinion describes several earlier cases and Washington's strong constitutional protections of personal privacy and autonomy. The Court vacates Williams's conviction for obstruction. (briefs, argument)