Today's per curiam opinions

West v. Reed, No. 83612-4. Arthur West sued Secretary of State Sam Reed, challenging his certification of Referendum 71 for the 2009 general election ballot. West's action was dismissed by the Thurston County Superior Court. Today, the Supreme Court dismisses his appeal as moot because the election was held and the referendum defeated by the voters.

State v. Gudgel, No. 83821-6. Gerald Gudgel was convicted of several crimes in 2002. In 2009, he filed a motion alleging that the state withhold evidence in his trial and challenging his conviction. The superior court dismissed the motion as time-barred and today the Supreme Court upholds that dismissal. 

Court: Legislature provides enough money for special education

School District Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Education v. State, No. 82961-6. The School District Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Education challenged the constitutionality of Washington’s special education funding system as inadequate to completely provide for the education of special needs students, forcing some districts to rely on levies for special education funding.

The court found several problems with the Alliance’s accounting, and ruled that their arguments “do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt” that special education is underfunded. Accordingly, both the Thurston County Superior Court and the Court of Appeals found the funding statute to be constitutional.

The Supreme Court (Justice Susan Owens writing) agreed with the lower courts.

The Washington Constitution provides that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders.” Special education in Washington is funded by three sources: 1) the Basic Education Allotment (BEA), which the State provides to school districts based on an enrollment average; 2) special education excess funding from the State if a school district cannot provide an appropriate education for special education students; and 3) “safety net” funds where the State provides additional funding to districts with demonstrated needs for special education funding.

The Alliance sued, arguing that the State was underfunding special education. However, in presenting evidence of underfunding, the Alliance omitted funding that came from the BEA, arguing that BEA funds for special education students goes toward basic education classrooms.

The Supreme Court first addressed the proper standard of review. Justice Owens wrote: “In Washington, it is well established that statutes are presumed constitutional and that a statute’s challenger has a heavy burden to overcome that presumption; the challenger must prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” (The Alliance had argued a lower threshold of proof should apply.)

The Supreme Court also rejected the key argument that special education funding should be calculated without including the BEA. The Court noted that the Alliance’s own expert found that a special education student costs 190 percent of a basic education student. The State, when including the BEA and additional special education funding into the formula, allocates 193.09 percent of basic education costs for each special education student.

“For us to conclude that the BEA should not be included in calculations of how much funding goes to special education, we would have to agree with the Alliance’s contention that basic education and special education are in entirely separate realms. The Alliance attempts to differentiate between basic education and special education services, but the law does not support this distinction.”

“The legislature has consistently made it clear that special education students are also basic education students and that the additional special education funding is in addition to, and takes into account, the BEA. We therefore disagree with the Alliance’s contention that basic education and special education are entirely separate. We affirm the trial court and Court of Appeals and hold that the BEA must be included in the calculations when deciding if special education is adequately funded.”

Justice Debra Stephens concurred separately in the result. Justice Tom Chambers also wrote a concurring opinion, but dissented as to the requirement that a party arguing an statute is unconstitutional must prove the case “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Justice Richard Sanders dissented entirely, also disagreeing with the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. He argued this placed too great a burden on any party challenging a legislative enactment. “The judiciary cannot protect against an overreaching legislature if every enactment is presumed constitutional unless proved otherwise ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ giving the legislature, simply because it is the legislature, an advantage against any challenger’s assertion to the contrary.” Justice Sanders also argued that the legislature was underfunding special education when basic and special education funding are analyzed separately.

New petitions for review

The Supreme Court has agreed to hear several new cases, including a major challenge to the adequacy of the state's funding of public education.

  • McCleary, et al. v. State, No. 84362-7
  • Five Corners Family Farmers, et al. v. State, et al., No. 84632-4
  • State v. Sublett, et al., No. 84856-4
  • State v. Saenz, No. 84949-8
  • Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, et al., No. 84998-6
  • Weismann v. Safeco Insurance Co., No. 85012-7
  • State v. Rodriguez, No. 83275-7
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Court: Jails must protect inmates from suicide

The Supreme Court issued opinions in one case today: Gregoire v. Oak Harbor, No. 81253-5.

This action for wrongful death was brought by the estate of an inmate who hung himself in the Oak Harbor jail. The question before the court is whether a city can use the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk to defend against a wrongful death action for a jailhouse suicide.

Edward Gregoire, the deceased, exhibited erratic emotional behavior while he was being transported to jail, tried to run, and shortly after being placed in his cell hung himself. Tanya Gregoire, as the personal representative of Gregoire’s estate, sued Oak Harbor for negligence.

The jury found for Oak Harbor after being instructed on the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Contributory negligence is a defense that while a defendant may have failed in its duty of care, the plaintiff contributed to his injury through his own negligence. Assumption of risk allows a defendant to assert that while a duty of care may have existed toward the plaintiff, the plaintiff assumed voluntarily and knowingly assumed the risks inherent in his behavior.

The Supreme Court issued a fractured decision today, reversing the Court of Appeals. The four-vote lead opinion, written by Justice Richard Sanders holds that jailors owe a special duty of care to their inmates, and that jury instructions regarding assumption of risk and contributory negligence are inappropriate in cases of inmate suicide—a new rule for Washington State.

The Court observed the long-standing principle that jailors owe a special duty to inmates, particularly to ensure their health, safety and welfare. Additionally, the legislature has subjected municipal jails to regulation and duties toward inmates. This special-relationship duty extends to self-inflicted harm. Given that Oak Harbor had a nondelegable duty to protect the inmate from himself, the Court determined that both contributory negligence and assumption of risk defenses were inappropriate and that the jury instructions in Gregoire’s case misinformed the jury. The Court sent the case back down for a new trial.

Justice Tom Chambers signed the lead opinion but wrote a separate concurrence clarifying the distinctions between express and implied assumption of risk.

Chief Justice Barbara Madsen concurred with the lead opinion’s assumption of risk analysis, but dissented on the comparative negligence question. “A jail has a duty to provide health screenings and health care if necessary, and to protect an inmate from injury by third parties and jail employees, but it has no freestanding duty to prevent inmate self-inflicted harm. That duty arises only when specifically articulated by law or if the jail affirmatively assumes the inmate’s duty of self-care. Even if this duty arises, it would not necessarily eliminate the inmate’s duty of self-care.”

Justice Gerry Alexander, meanwhile, wrote a separate dissent. “The lead opinion does not mention that the jury in this case never reached the questions of whether Edward Gregoire was contributorially negligent or assumed a risk of harm. In my view, it was unnecessary for the jury to do so because it found that the city of Oak Harbor’s negligence was not a proximate cause of Mr. Gregoire’s death. That being the case, even if we assume that the trial court’s instructions on contributory negligence and assumption of risk were erroneous, their submission to the jury was harmless error.”