Today's arguments - November 16, 2010
Today the Court will hear four arguments, as normal. (Docket, briefs)
Morning session (9:00 a.m.)
Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. Puyallup, No. 82374-0 (consolidated w/82803-2). Whether a person can claim a privacy exemption to disclosure of records under the Public Records Act after not disputing an earlier disclosure of the same records to a media outlet.
Bainbridge Island police officer Steven Cain was accused of sexual misconduct after stopping a suspected DUI. The Puyallup and Mercer Island police departments investigated, and the accusation was found to be unsubstantiated.
The Kitsap Sun requested and received documents related to the investigation from the City of Puyallup. Later, Kim Koenig (the alleged victim) and Lawrence Koss also requested the documents. Officer Cain sued successfully to prevent Puyallup from releasing them based on his right to privacy. On appeal, Koenig and Koss argue that releasing the documents would not violate Cain's privacy since the information has already been made public, and that Cain waived his privacy interest by not objecting when Puyallup gave the documents to the Sun.
In re the Personal Restraint of Joshua Dean Scott, No. 82951-9. Whether a judge changing a sentence enhancement from a jury verdict of "armed with a deadly weapon" to "possessing a firearm" invalidates the sentence.
Joshua Scott was convicted of robbery and possession of stolen property. At trial, the jury was instructed on deadly weapon enhancements and returned special verdicts finding that Scott was armed with a deadly weapon (a rifle). In its ruling, the trial court indicated that the jury had found firearm enhancements (which increase the possible sentence) and sentenced accordingly. The court of appeals held that since the sentence misstated the jury's verdict, it was “facially invalid,” and sent it back to the trial court for resentencing.
The state argues that Scott was not entitled to relief (because Blakely v. Washington, a decision that requires enhancements to be submitted to the jury, had not been decided until after Scott's case), that the sentence was not facially invalid, and that the error was harmless.
Afternoon session (1:30 pm)
State v. Coucil, No. 83654-0. If a defendant jumps bail when he's charged with a felony, but that charge is later reduced to a misdemeanor, should he be charged with felony bail jumping?
Nikeemia Coucil was charged with felony harassment. When he failed to appear at his hearing, the state added a count of bail jumping. Coucil was eventually convicted of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor harassment, and of felony bail jumping.
The classification of bail jumping is based on the classification of the offense the defendant was “held for, charged with, or convicted of” when he jumped bail. Coucil argued on appeal that since he was convicted of misdemeanor harassment, the bail jumping should have been a misdemeanor as well. The appellate court disagreed, holding that bail jumping is classified “according to the nature of the underlying charge at the time the defendant jumps bail.” So since the underlying charge was a felony when Coucil jumped bail, it was proper to treat the bail jumping as a felony.
Coucil argues on appeal that the statute is ambiguous about whether bail jumping is classified based on the underlying charge or conviction.
ZDI Gaming, Inc., v. Washington Gambling Commission, No. 83745-7. Are cash cards a cash equivalent for purposes of pull tab gambling machines? And is Thurston County the proper venue for all cases involving the state gambling commission?
Washington State bans most forms of gambling, including slot machines, but allows pull-tabs. ZDI makes a pull-tab dispenser designed to mimic the sounds and display of a slot machine. They designed an updated version of the dispenser using special cash cards; players can use the cards to purchase pull tabs, and any winnings under $20 are automatically credited to the cards.
State law requires pull-tabs to be purchased with cash, check, or bank transfer, and prizes must be “cash or merchandise.” When ZDI sought approval from the Gambling Commission to sell the updated dispensers, the Commission denied approval because the cash cards don't count as “cash” or a “cash equivalent.” The superior and appellate courts disagreed, holding that the cash cards are a cash equivalent.
In addition to the cash equivalent issue, the Commission argues that the appellate court should be reversed on procedural grounds, regarding which is the proper superior court to hear the case.
