What does a Sanders-less Supreme Court look like?

After 14 years on the bench, Justice Richard Sanders will relinquish his seat to Justice-elect Charlie Wiggins—one of the most significant upsets at the Washington State Supreme Court.

So what does the court look like without Justice Sanders?

Justice Richard Sanders certainly presented a strong libertarian viewpoint on the Supreme Court. Quoting the Washington Constitution, he frequently stressed that the role of government is to “protect and maintain individual rights.” He was a passionate advocate for the rights of individuals: the right to maintain oversight of government agencies, the freedom of expression, the freedom of religion, the right to enjoy private property, the freedom to bear arms, and the rights of the accused. He is perhaps best known for his colorful and frequent dissents. In 2009 he wrote more than twice as many dissenting opinions as any other justice. He is again the leading dissenter in 2010.

Of course, replacing a Sanders dissent with another vote wouldn’t necessarily change the outcome in any case. Perhaps the best way to measure the impact of his absence is to review recent 5-4 decisions where Sanders was in the majority.

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Last week's opinions

The Supreme Court issued several opinions last week, but my schedule (not to mention the weather) prevented a timely write-up. Here are summaries of the cases.

Advocates for Responsible Dev. v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., No. 84501-8. Advocates for Responsible Development, a nonprofit organization, challenged land use ordinances adopted by Mason County. The Court of Appeals held that the association’s president, John Diehl, did not have standing to appeal the ordinances to the Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board and that as a nonattorney he could not represent the association before the courts. The Court of Appeals also awarded attorney fees against Diehl as a sanction for filing a frivolous appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney fees, finding that the appeal was not “so totally devoid of merit as to be frivolous.”

In re Pers. Restraint of Adolph, No. 82868-7. In 2003 Vincent Adolph was driving under the influence of alcohol and struck the vehicle of Loretta Aguilar, killing Aguilar and injuring her passenger. Adolph was charged and convicted of vehicular homicide and vehicular assault. In vehicular homicide convictions involving alcohol, the law imposes two-year sentence enhancements for each prior DUI conviction (RCW 46.61.520(2)). The State presented evidence that Adolph had three prior DUIs. Two Okanogan County DUI convictions were supported by a certified docket. Adolph objected to the sufficiency of the record for the third DUI conviction from, which was supported by a certified copy of Adolph’s Department of Licensing (DOL) driving record abstract and a copy of a defendant case history from the District and Municipal Court Information System. The trial court concluded the State had met its burden and imposed three two-year sentence enhancements.

The Supreme Court (Justice Mary Fairhurst writing) held that Adolph’s personal restraint petition (PRP) was not procedurally barred and was properly before the court, but the Court determined that sufficient evidence supported the Lincoln County DUI conviction. Justice Richard Sanders dissented.

In re Pers. Restraint of Francis, No. 82619-6. The Supreme Court (Justice Richard Sanders writing) ruled that double jeopardy protections were violated in the prosecution of Shawn Francis. Francis pleaded guilty to felony murder of Jason Lucas, first degree attempted robbery of D’Ann Jacobsen, and the second degree assault of D’Ann Jacobsen, all arising from the same set of events. The State, however, relied on the second degree assault conduct to elevate the attempted robbery to the first degree when it charged the crimes. The Court held that multiple convictions for the same offense violates double jeopardy. The Court vacated second degree assault charge and remanded for resentencing.

Seattle Times Co. v. Serko, No. 84691-0. The Seattle Times sought a writ of mandamus vacating two trial court orders—one that exempted documents gathered during a criminal investigation from production under the Public Records Act, and one that sealed trial exhibits in a subsequent hearing.

After the 2009 tragedy where Maurice Clemmons shot and killed four Lakewood police officers, the Seattle Times filed several public records requests seeking documents. The State filed charges against seven alleged accomplices of Maurice Clemmons. Several of these defendants sought to prohibit the Pierce County Sheriff’s Office from producing any documents in response to the Times’ request. Judge Susan Serko ruled that the rights of the accused to a fair trial would be compromised by the release of the records.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that a writ of mandamus, while an extraordinary remedy, would be appropriate in this case. The Court (Justice Debra Stephens writing) held that a “categorical” denial of records is not appropriate and that any nondisclosure requires a record-by-record analysis.

State v. Hirschfelder, No. 82744-3. Matthew Hirschfelder was a choir teacher at Hoquiam High School. He had sexual intercourse in his office with a student in 2006. Hirschfelder was 33 and the student was 18. Hirschfelder was charged with sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree under former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b).

Hirschfelder filed a motion to dismiss the charge. He argued the law criminalized sexual intercourse with “minors,” and that he had committed no crime as he had intercourse with an 18-year-old. He also argued the statute was unconstitutionally vague and violated equal protection. The trial judge denied the motion but allowed the case to go up on appeal. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hirschfelder, holding that the statute was ambiguous and that the legislature only meant to prohibit sexual intercourse between school employees and students who were 16 or 17.

Before the Supreme Court, Hirschfelder argued that the statute, entitled “[s]exual misconduct with a minor in the first degree,” was not intended to criminalize sexual intercourse between school employees and registered students age 18 or older because of the statute’s use of the term “minor.”

The Supreme Court (Justice Debra Stephens writing) disagreed. “In the end, a common sense reading of former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) must prevail. We hold that the former statute’s plain language unambiguously defines minor as a registered student and thus includes students up to the age of 21.” The court remanded the case to trial court for further proceedings. Justice Charles Johnson wrote a dissenting opinion.

Just for Thanksgiving...

For Thanksgiving, from the Court's archives, an opinion summarized in verse.

 

Nelson v. Imperial Trading Company, No. 9879, 1912.

Carl Nelson from Kansas, in the turkey trade,
With Imperial of Spokane, a contract made:
Two thousand pounds of fancy grade
Gobbler meat, for delivery November 23rd.

Yet on the contractually specified date
Imperial found the turkeys late,
And some of the fowls not fit for bait.
And so Imperial rejected every bird.

Held for the buyer: they did not waive
Objections for delivery that was delayed.
They are not estopped for what was said,
Wrote Justice Crow, the rest concurred.

Happy Thanksgiving! (And if the day isn't all you hope for, read about the Boyer family's Thanksgiving in 1927 in Boyer v. Tacoma for a reminder that it could be worse.)

Today's arguments - November 16, 2010

Today the Court will hear four arguments, as normal. (Docket, briefs)

Morning session (9:00 a.m.)

Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. Puyallup, No. 82374-0 (consolidated w/82803-2). Whether a person can claim a privacy exemption to disclosure of records under the Public Records Act after not disputing an earlier disclosure of the same records to a media outlet.

Bainbridge Island police officer Steven Cain was accused of sexual misconduct after stopping a suspected DUI. The Puyallup and Mercer Island police departments investigated, and the accusation was found to be unsubstantiated.

The Kitsap Sun requested and received documents related to the investigation from the City of Puyallup. Later, Kim Koenig (the alleged victim) and Lawrence Koss also requested the documents. Officer Cain sued successfully to prevent Puyallup from releasing them based on his right to privacy. On appeal, Koenig and Koss argue that releasing the documents would not violate Cain's privacy since the information has already been made public, and that Cain waived his privacy interest by not objecting when Puyallup gave the documents to the Sun.

In re the Personal Restraint of Joshua Dean Scott, No. 82951-9.  Whether a judge changing a sentence enhancement from a jury verdict of "armed with a deadly weapon" to "possessing a firearm" invalidates the sentence.

Joshua Scott was convicted of robbery and possession of stolen property. At trial, the jury was instructed on deadly weapon enhancements and returned special verdicts finding that Scott was armed with a deadly weapon (a rifle). In its ruling, the trial court indicated that the jury had found firearm enhancements (which increase the possible sentence) and sentenced accordingly. The court of appeals held that since the sentence misstated the jury's verdict, it was “facially invalid,” and sent it back to the trial court for resentencing.

The state argues that Scott was not entitled to relief (because Blakely v. Washington, a decision that requires enhancements to be submitted to the jury, had not been decided until after Scott's case), that the sentence was not facially invalid, and that the error was harmless.

Afternoon session (1:30 pm)

State v. Coucil, No. 83654-0. If a defendant jumps bail when he's charged with a felony, but that charge is later reduced to a misdemeanor, should he be charged with felony bail jumping?

Nikeemia Coucil was charged with felony harassment. When he failed to appear at his hearing, the state added a count of bail jumping. Coucil was eventually convicted of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor harassment, and of felony bail jumping.

The classification of bail jumping is based on the classification of the offense the defendant was “held for, charged with, or convicted of” when he jumped bail. Coucil argued on appeal that since he was convicted of misdemeanor harassment, the bail jumping should have been a misdemeanor as well. The appellate court disagreed, holding that bail jumping is classified “according to the nature of the underlying charge at the time the defendant jumps bail.” So since the underlying charge was a felony when Coucil jumped bail, it was proper to treat the bail jumping as a felony.

Coucil argues on appeal that the statute is ambiguous about whether bail jumping is classified based on the underlying charge or conviction.

ZDI Gaming, Inc., v. Washington Gambling Commission, No. 83745-7. Are cash cards a cash equivalent for purposes of pull tab gambling machines? And is Thurston County the proper venue for all cases involving the state gambling commission?

Washington State bans most forms of gambling, including slot machines, but allows pull-tabs. ZDI makes a pull-tab dispenser designed to mimic the sounds and display of a slot machine. They designed an updated version of the dispenser using special cash cards; players can use the cards to purchase pull tabs, and any winnings under $20 are automatically credited to the cards.

State law requires pull-tabs to be purchased with cash, check, or bank transfer, and prizes must be “cash or merchandise.” When ZDI sought approval from the Gambling Commission to sell the updated dispensers, the Commission denied approval because the cash cards don't count as “cash” or a “cash equivalent.” The superior and appellate courts disagreed, holding that the cash cards are a cash equivalent.

In addition to the cash equivalent issue, the Commission argues that the appellate court should be reversed on procedural grounds, regarding which is the proper superior court to hear the case.

Statement from Justice Sanders

The following message was sent yesterday from Justice Richard Sanders' campaign.

End of the trail

It looks like we're coming to the end of the campaign trail. After the latest numbers were released yesterday, I am now behind by about 4,500 votes out of nearly two millions votes cast, 49.9% to 50.1%. The campaign experts say that we are unlikely to make up that difference as the counties finish their tally over the next few days.

I want to particularly thank the many volunteers and more than a thousand donors who helped my campaign, not to mention the 930,000 voters who made good choices.

Charlie Wiggins and I had dozens of debates and on those occasions he showed the same intelligence and professionalism that I had seen before when he argued before the Court. I am sure he will be a good Justice, but of course he does not share my perspective on many issues. I have offered him my congratulations and promised him my 100% support for his new position.

I know that my supporters want someone on the Court who protects individual liberty, whether it's the right to privacy or the right to own and use property, or our dozens of other rights guaranteed in the Constitution. These are the things which make us free. They are essential to all of us -- defendant and judge -- liberal and conservative.

It has been a great honor to serve the people of Washington on their Supreme Court. I intend to stay involved, to participate in public life and to speak out on the issues that confront our justice system. I guess there’s some truth in the saying, “old lawyers never die, they just lose their appeal.”

God bless you all.

No result in the Sanders-Wiggins race

This episode we discuss the very lively Sanders-Wiggins race, a public records case, and whether online poker sites are permitted in Washington.

Supreme Court of Washington Podcast (RSS) - No result in the Sanders-Wiggins race

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Opinions: attempted child rape and nonparental custody

The Supreme Court issued opinions in three cases today.

Humphrey Indus. LTD v. Clay St. Assocs. LLC, No. 82687-1. Humphrey Industries, Ltd. (through several business partners) created Clay Street Associates, LLC, to hold a single real estate asset located in Auburn, Washington. In order to break a deadlock with principal George Humphrey regarding the sale of the property, the other members of Clay Street agreed to merge the company into a new limited liability company to facilitate the sale. Humphrey dissented from the merger and demanded payment pursuant to the dissenters’ rights provisions of the Washington Limited Liability Company Act, chapter 25.15 RCW. Clay Street agreed to pay Humphrey the fair market value of his interest as of the merger date but did not pay until the property sold.

Humphrey rejected the value calculation and sued. The trial court found that the property was worth more than Clay Street had calculated, and awarded Humphrey the difference plus interest. However, the court awarded Clay Street attorneys fees, finding that the dissenting Humphrey had acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith. The Court of Appeals (Div. I) affirmed.

The Supreme Court (Justice Jim Johnson writing) reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for reconsideration of the attorney fee award. The court held that the lower courts erred in finding that Clay Street “substantially complied” with the LLCA.

In re Custody of S.C.D.-L., No. 84186-1. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s order awarding custody of S.C.D-L. to her grandmother, Edna Littell. The court wrote that Ms. Littell failed to allege or offer facts at the show cause hearing conducted under RCW 26.10.030 that S.C.D-L. was not in the physical custody of one of her parents or that neither parent was a suitable custodian.

“A nonparent may petition for custody of a child if the child is not in the physical custody of a parent or if the petitioner alleges that neither parent is a suitable custodian. RCW 26.10.030(1). The trial court must deny a hearing on the petition unless the nonparent submits an affidavit (1) declaring that the child is not in the physical custody of one of the child’s parents or that neither parent is a suitable custodian and (2) setting forth facts supporting the requested custody order. S.C.D-L. was in [her father] Mr. Littell’s physical custody at the time Ms. Littell filed her petition, and the petition
does not allege that he is an unfit parent. Instead, the petition implies it would be in the child’s best interest to reside with Ms. Littell, but the ‘best interests of the child’ standard does not apply to nonparent custody actions."

State v. Patel, No. 82649-8. The Supreme Court upheld a conviction for attempted child rape where the “victim” was actually a police officer posing as a child.

Mitel Patel was caught in a police sting operation when he chatted with a detective pretending to be a 13-year-old girl and went to meet and have sex with “her.” He was convicted of second degree attempted rape of a child. Patel argues that the state did not offer proof that the intended victim (the detective) was underage, and thus did not prove an essential element of the attempted crime. The trial court and Court of Appeals disagreed, holding it sufficient that Patel believed his intended victim to be underage.

The Supreme Court (Justice Tom Chambers writing the four-vote lead opinion) agreed, holding that “a defendant may be convicted of attempted rape of a child where the alleged victim is a fictitious underage character created by the police.” The court reasoned that unlike convictions for actual child rape, which require a showing that the child was underage, attempt crimes do not depend on the ultimate harm that would have resulted from commission of the crime. Rather, the person is guilty of an attempt “if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he or she does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” RCW 9A.28.020(1).

Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Richard Sanders wrote separate concurring opinions.

Additional granted cases

The Supreme Court has granted review in several additional cases this month.

  • Citizens for Rational Shoreline Planning, et al. v. Whatcom County, et al., No. 84675-8
  • Anthis v. Copland, No. 85230-8
  • Dependency of Peter Tsimbalyuk, et al., No. 84458-5
  • Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, No. 84686-3
  • State v. Budik, No. 84714-2
  • Personal Restraint Petition of Teddy Glenn Talley, No. 83284-6 
  • Personal Restraint Petition of Ernest A. Carter, No. 84606-5
  • Personal Restraint Petition of Edward Michael Glasmann, No. 84475-5
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Charlie Wiggins takes the lead

For the first time since election day, Charlie Wiggins has taken a lead over Richard Sanders in votes counted. The latest vote update this evening (with a large number of ballots from King County, which heavily favors Wiggins) gives Wiggins a 3,491 vote lead.

The Secretary of State's Election Division estimates just over 186,000 votes to be counted.

Today's arguments - November 9, 2010

Today the Court will hear four arguments as usual, two in the morning session, and two in the afternoon.  (Docket, briefs)

Morning session (9:00 a.m.)

Samantha A v. WA Dept. of Social & Health Services, No. 84325-2. Whether it violates Federal Medicaid laws to reduce a disabled child's paid care due to the child's age or if the child lives with parents.

As part of Medicaid, DSHS provides paid personal care for disabled people. The extent of the care is based on a variety of eligibility factors that are re-evaluated periodically. A “children's personal care rule” reduces the amount of paid care a child can receive based on the child's age or if the child is living with parents (who already have a duty to care for the child).

This rule was challenged on behalf of a child named Samantha A. The challenge claims (and the Superior Court agreed) that the children's personal care rule violates Federal Medicaid law “requiring comparability of amount, duration, and scope of services among all recipients.” This is because the rule treats disabled children differently based on their ages and on their relation to their caregivers.

News Tribune v. Honorable James Cayce, No. 83645-1. Whether the public has a right to view a deposition taken in a courtroom and presided over by a judge.

Pierce County Superior Court judge Michael Hecht was charged with harassment and patronizing a prostitute. James Cayce, a visiting judge from King County, presided over the case. One of the key witnesses was in custody, so the prosecution received permission to conduct his deposition in an available courtroom. (The courtrooms have secure access to the jail.) Judge Cayce was present at the parties' request to rule on objections.

A reporter from the News Tribune was denied access to the deposition proceedings. The Tribune filed for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Cayce to order the prosecution to produce a transcript and video recording of the deposition. The Tribune argues that since the deposition was presided over by a judge in court, they had a constitutional right to be present. Judge Cayce argues that the deposition was not a court proceeding.

Afternoon session (1:30 p.m.)

State v. Sims, No. 83779-1. Whether an appellate court striking down an element of a special sex offender sentencing agreement should ask the trial court to rehear just that section, or the entire agreement.

Jack Sims was convicted of child molestation and sentenced to life in prison. His sentence was suspended under a Sex Offender Special Sentencing Alternative (SOSSA) sentence. One condition of the SOSSA sentence was that Sims stay out of Cowlitz County and the City of Castle Rock.

Sims appealed this condition. The appellate court found the condition unconstitutional and vacated his sentence, remanding for resentencing. Sims argues that the appellate court should not have vacated the entire sentence because only the “banishment” condition was appealed, and allowing the trial court to reconsider the SOSSA sentence harms his right to appeal (since the trial court could refuse to grant Sims a SOSSA sentence on remand).

Community Transit v. First Transit, No. 83795-1. Concerns which public transport agency is responsible for tort claims from a traffic accident.

Community Transit contracted with First Transit to provide commuter bus service between King and Snohomish Counties. Part of the contract required First Transit to indemnify (pay) Community Transit for tort claims, except for those “resulting solely from the negligence of Community Transit.”

A Community Transit bus and a First Transit bus were involved in a multiple-car accident on I-5. The accident was caused by the negligence of the Community Transit driver and a third party driver; both parties agree that First Transit was not negligent. Community Transit settled several negligence claims by passengers, and filed indemnity claims against First Transit.

Community Transit argues that since the accident was not solely its fault, First Transit must indemnify them under the contract. But the appellate court ruled that the contract does not clearly state that First Transit must indemnify Community Transit even if First Transit did not cause or contribute to the accident. The court found that such a statement would be required to make one party indemnify another for the other party's own negligence, and ruled against Community Transit.

Sanders-Wiggins race tightens up

The vote counts continue to trickle in, and the race between Justice Richard Sanders and challenger Charlie Wiggins is much, much tighter. Check out the Secretary of State's website for a county by county breakout.

For some excellent analysis of the vote data, check out Just the Numbers, a blog written by Jamie Corning, a second-year law student at Seattle University.

Today's opinions - Nov. 4, 2010

Affiliated FM Insurance Company v. LTK Consulting Services, No. 82738-9. Affiliated FM provides insurance for the Seattle Monorail Services (SMS), which operates the monorail under an agreement with the monorail’s owner, the City of Seattle. In May 2004 a fire broke out under a Blue Line train, allegedly caused by an electrical short that occurred because of improper wiring performed by LTK Consulting in 2002. Affiliated sued LTK for negligence.

This case originated in King County Superior Court, from where it was removed to federal district court, appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and finally certified a question to the state supreme court: whether SMS, which does not own the Seattle Monorail, can bring a tort action against LTK.

In a two-vote lead opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Mary Fairhurst wrote that that SMS may sue LTK for negligence. “LTK, by undertaking engineering services, assumed a duty of reasonable care. This obligation required LTK to use reasonable care, as we have defined it, with respect to risks of physical damage to the monorail. SMS enjoyed legally protected interests in the monorail, and LTK’s duty encompassed these interests.”

Justice Tom Chambers filed a concurrence agreeing with the lead opinion’s outcome. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen concurred in part and dissented in part.

Ameriquest Mortgage Co v. Washington Attorney General, No. 82690-1. This case presents the question of whether the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which requires banks to keep customer information private, preempts the state Public Records Act (PRA). During an investigation of the lending practices of the Ameriquest Mortgage Company, the Attorney General’s Office obtained a number of documents from Ameriquest, including loan files, e-mails, and other papers. A public records request was filed for the documents, and Ameriquest sued the AGO to keep the files secret.

The Court of Appeals held that the GLBA preempts the PRA, preventing disclosure of the loan files. Preemption doctrine requires that federal law will prevail when it conflicts with state law.

The Supreme Court (Justice Fairhurst writing the unanimous opinion) agreed that federal law prevented the AGO from releasing protected consumer information. However, the Supreme Court determined that the GLBA did not preempt the PRA, as the two could be reconciled—the PRA specifically recognizes that “other statutes” may protect records from disclosure.

Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation, No. 81977-7. Linda Eastwood owns the Double KK Farm horse farm in Poulsbo, Washington. Horse Harbor is a nonprofit organization that cares for abused and abandoned horses. Eastwood and Horse Harbor agreed to a lease for a portion of the Double KK. Horse Harbor was obligated to maintain the farm and return it in good condition.

Horse Harbor neglected to maintain the farm. The Kitsap County Health District cited Horse Harbor for unlawful burning of solid waste and improper management of horse manure. The lack of maintenance resulted in pools of standing water and mud, broken fencing, a damaged riding arena floor, and horse-chewed wood surfaces. Eastwood complained to Horse Harbor’s board of directors but the board took no action. Eastwood sued for breach of lease, the commission of waste, and negligent breach of a duty to not cause physical damage to the leasehold.

The Court of Appeals characterized Eastwood’s claims as economic losses that resulted from Horse Harbor’s actions. The court held the economic loss rule applied and limited Eastwood to recovery only for breach of lease.

In a three-vote lead opinion, the Court (Justice Fairhurst writing) held that the Court of Appeals was mistaken to deny Eastwood tort damages for waste. “An injury is remediable in tort if it traces back to the breach of a tort duty arising independently of the terms of the contract. Because the term ‘economic loss rule’ inadequately captures this principle, we adopt the more apt term ‘independent duty doctrine.’ The existence of an independent duty is a question of law for courts to decide. We hold the duty to not cause waste is an obligation that arises independently of the terms of a lease covenant, and sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s findings of a causal connection between Eastwood’s losses and a breach of this independent duty.”

Chief Justice Madsen concurred with the result but objected to the analysis. “The lead opinion’s lengthy discourse on the economic loss rule and its new approach for determining when the rule applies is unnecessary for two reasons. First, we cannot apply the common law economic loss rule to nullify the statutory cause of action for waste without violating separation of powers principles and encroaching on the legislature’s authority to establish a cause of action. The issue whether the plaintiff was entitled to bring an action for waste should be resolved entirely on statutory grounds. Second, the injury to property here does not constitute an economic loss within the rule.” Justice Chambers also wrote a concurring opinion.

Jones v. State, No. 80787-6. The question here is whether a pharmacist whose business has been shut down by the state must exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing a tort action against the state, and whether state officials have absolute or qualified immunity against such a tort action.

Michael Jones owned a pharmacy franchise called the Medicine Shoppe, but after failing two consecutive inspections by the Washington Board of Pharmacy his license was suspended, causing his business to fail. He sued the Board of Pharmacy’s Executive Director and the two investigators that gave him the failing scores for negligent supervision and intentional interference with a business expectancy. The state moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Executive Director had prosecutorial immunity, all three defendants had qualified immunity.

The Supreme Court (Justice Fairhurst writing) reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding that the pharmacy inspectors enjoyed immunity, and also reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding that Jones failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies.

New petitions for review

The Supreme Court granted review in several cases in its November 2 conference.

  • Edmonson v. Popchoi, No. 84695-2
  • State v. Jim, No. 84716-9
  • Knight v. City of Yelm, No. 84831-9
  • State v. Brown, 84836-0
  • State v. Riley, No. 84678-2
  • State v. Thompson, No. 84739-8
  • City of Bothell v. Barnhart, No. 84907-2
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Sanders - Wiggins race still very close

As of 11:57 Tuesday evening, Justice Richard Sanders held a lead over challenger Charlie Wiggins - 51.27% to 48.73%, which is just under a 30,000 vote lead. Several counties will continue posting new vote totals today and tomorrow, so this race deserves a close eye. 

This week at the Supreme Court, Nov. 1, 2010

The Supreme Court will review petitions for review on Tuesday, and will likely issue opinions on Thursday. No arguments are scheduled this week.

If you haven't done so, be sure to vote!