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City of Aberdeen v. Regan, No. 82476-2. Francis Regan was convicted of fourth degree assault in Aberdeen Municipal Court. The Court sentenced him to 365 days in jail, but suspended 360 days of the sentence in favor of placing Regan on probation for 24 months. A condition of Regan's probation required that he have no "criminal violations of law...."

During his probation, Regan was charged, tried, and acquitted for fourth degree assault and criminal trespass. The city moved to revoke his probation; Regan argued that the city was collaterally estopped by the acquittal. The municipal court revoked 5 days of Regan's suspension. He appealed and the superior court reversed; the city appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the ruling of the municipal court.

The Supreme Court accepted review of the case to consider whether a probation condition requiring no "criminal violations of law" requires a court

to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed a crime or find that the defendant has been convicted of a crime before the court may revoke the suspension?

The Court today affirms the Court of Appeals. Probation is "not a 'matter of right but is a matter of grace, privilege, or clemency granted to the deserving.'" In Regan's case, his probation included a condition that "unambiguously restrict[ed him] from engaging in conduct that is proscribed by the criminal law." Because the standard in probation hearings is "reasonable satisfaction," the acquittal (based on the higher "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard) did not estop the city from finding Regan in violation of his probation. The majority opinion is written by Justice Fairhurst and joined by four other justices.

Justice Alexander, joined by Justices Chambers and James Johnson, finds the majority's position in agreement with the Court's precedent and reluctantly concurrs.

My aversion to the result stems from my view that it is somewhat unfair for a city to seek revocation of Francis Regan's probation for noncompliance with a condition that he have "[n]o criminal violations of law" when Regan was acquitted in that same court of criminal charges that arose from facts identical to those that led to revocation of his probation.

Justice Sanders dissents. He would find the language ambiguous, apply the rule of lenity, and reinstate the decision of the superior court. (briefs, argument)

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The Supreme Court will likely release opinions on Thursday. No oral arguments are scheduled for this week. Eventually I will post summaries of the cases accepted by the court in September ... hopefully.

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The Supreme Court issued opinions in several cases today.

Port Angeles v. Our Water-Our Choice, No. 82225-5. The question before the court is whether citizen initiatives to reverse a city council’s decision to fluoridate its water supply are valid. The Port Angeles City Council decided to fluoridate its city’s water supply, but two citizen groups filed local initiatives to repeal the fluoridation plan. A trial court reviewed the initiatives and determined they were invalid for three reasons: they were administrative rather than legislative, they interfered with the council’s legislatively-delegated authority to regulate the water supply, and they exceeded the council’s legislative authority. In a 5-4 ruling, with Justice Tom Chambers writing, the Supreme Court ruled against the citizen’s groups. Citing previous cases, the court held that local initiatives that are administrative in nature (that is, initiatives which carry out an existing law or policy rather than making a new law) go beyond the scope of local initiative authority. Justice Richard Sanders, dissenting, wrote that the majority diminished the state’s constitutional commitment to the people’s right to directly create law.

Hudson v. Hapner, No. 82409-6. At what point can a party withdraw a request for a civil trial? Clifford Hapner rear-ended Lea Hudson, and Hudson sued for damages. The case went to mandatory arbitration where Hudson was awarded $14,538. After mandatory arbitration Hapner requested a trial, and the jury awarded Hudson $292,298. Hapner appealed, won a reversal, and the case was remanded for a new trial. After discovery for the second trial, but before the trial took place, Hapner filed a notice of withdrawal of his motion for a trial. This would allow him to pay only the arbitration award, plus Hapner’s court costs. The trial court struck the withdrawal at Hudson’s request. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen, writing for the majority, agreed that court rules allow for a unilateral withdrawal, but held that this right must be exercised prior to the start of trial proceedings. Thus, Hapner was precluded from withdrawing his request for a trial and the trial will move forward unless the parties reach a settlement. Justice Sanders dissented, writing: “It is difficult to address the majority’s reasoning because, much like Frankenstein’s monster, the majority opinion is a sewn-together collection of partial arguments, each pilfered from a different cadaver and none lending any real support to its conclusion.”

Overlake Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Health, No. 82728-1. The legislature created the certificate of need program, which authorizes the Department of Health to control the number and types of health care services and facilities that are provided in a given area, in order to ensure that services and facilities are developed according to identified priorities and without unnecessary duplication. For certain health care providers to establish or expand health care facilities within this state they must obtain a certificate of need from the Department. The Department granted such a certificate to Swedish Health Services. Overlake Hospital Association and Evergreen Healthcare objected to the CN, and requested an adjudicative hearing. The hearing officer and later a superior court judge upheld the Department decision, but the Court of Appeals held the decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of governing statutes. The Supreme Court held that the appeals court failed to accord sufficient deference to the Department’s interpretation of the law, and affirmed the decision to issue a certificate of need. Justice Gerry Alexander wrote the unanimous opinion.

Rousso v. State, No. 83040-1. Lee Rousso, an attorney and amateur poker player, is challenging the state’s ban on Internet gambling, arguing it violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the ban. Justice Sanders opened the court’s opinion with an emphatic statement:

The question before this court is not whether Internet gambling, including playing poker on-line, should be illegal. That determination is reserved to the legislature, and the legislature addressed the issue by enacting and amending RCW 9.46.240, which criminalizes the knowing transmission and reception of gambling information by various means, including use of the Internet. Since sending and receiving gambling information is illegal, Internet gambling in the state of Washington is effectively banned.

It is not the role of the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom of the legislature, which enacted this ban. The court has no authority to conduct its own balancing of the pros and cons stemming from banning, regulating, or openly permitting Internet gambling.

The court rejected the argument that the ban was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. The court reasoned that the language of the statute does not openly discriminate against out-of-state entities in favor of in-state ones, as the ban applies evenly in state and out of state. “Here, the legislature balanced public policy concerns and determined the interests of Washington are best served by banning Internet gambling. The legislature chose the advantages and disadvantages of a ban over the advantages and disadvantages of regulation. … Under the dormant commerce clause, the burden on interstate commerce is not ‘clearly excessive’ in light of the state interests. RCW 9.46.240 does not violate the dormant commerce clause.”

State v. Doughty, No. 82852-1. A police officer observed Walter Doughty drive up to a drug house at 3:20 a.m., stop for two minutes, and leave. The officer stopped Doughty, discovered that he was driving with a suspended license, and upon searching him found that he had, indeed, bought drugs. Doughty claims that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. The issue in this case is whether Doughty’s actions created reasonable suspicion for the officer to conduct a Terry stop. Doughty was convicted in Spokane County Superior Court and the Court of Appeals upheld his conviction. The Supreme Court, with Justice Sanders writing the majority, held that the police officer lacked sufficient to stop Doughty. As a result, the court suppressed the evidence and vacated Doughty’s conviction. Justice Mary Fairhurst dissented. While the officer might lack grounds for an arrest, she wrote, he was certainly justified in stopping and questioning Doughty.

State v. S.J.W, No. 83177-7. This case presents the question of whether the burden of proving a child witness incompetent to testify is on the party calling the witness. S.J.W., a minor, was convicted of raping another minor. At trial, the court required S.J.W. to prove that the victim was incompetent to testify. S.J.W. failed to do so. S.J.W. appealed, claiming the burden should have been on the state to prove his victim’s competency. The Court of Appeals agreed, but found that the state met its burden and upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court, with Justice Charles Johnson writing the unanimous opinion, held that a party challenging the competency of a child witness has the burden of rebutting that presumption. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals but hold that trial courts should presume that 14-year-old children are competent to testify.

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Washington Supreme Court Position 6: A Debate Between Justice Richard Sanders and Challenger Charlie Wiggins

With questions from panel members
~Peter Callaghan, Columnist, Tacoma News Tribune
~David DeWolf, Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law
~Stewart Jay, Professor, University of Washington School of Law

Tuesday evening, September 28, 2010
Washington Athletic Club • 1325 Sixth Avenue, Seattle
Doors open at 6:30, debate begins at 7:00

Drinks and hors d’oeuvres will be served

Admission to this event is free and parking in the Washington Athletic Club garage (1409 Sixth Avenue) will be validated

RSVP to Michael Bindas by Friday, September 24, 2010
by email at mbindas@ij.org or phone at (206) 341-9300

Presented by

THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY
PUGET SOUND LAWYERS CHAPTER

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Today the Court will hear four arguments, two in the morning and two in the afternoon. (Docket, briefs)

Morning session (9:00 a.m.)

In re J. David Smith, No. 200748-1. Whether a court rule that presumes an attorney who has pled guilty to a crime has actually committed the crime is constitutional.

As part of a plea bargain, J. David Smith pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud. Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct Rule 10.14(c) provides that a lawyer's conviction for a crime creates a conclusive presumption that the lawyer committed the crime. Based on this, the disciplinary board found that Smith had violated various professional rules and recommended that he be disbarred.

Smith argues that ELC 10.14(c) is unconstitutional when it assumes that he is guilty because he pleaded guilty. He says that it violates his due process rights because it keeps him from presenting a defense.

State v. Grier, No. 83452-1. Whether an attorney's failure to ask the judge to instruct the jury on less serious offenses the defendant could be found guilty of constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

Kristina Grier and Gregory Owen were drinking with several other people at Grier's house. During the evening Owen stole several items from Grier, including three guns, and got into several fights with Grier and her son. During the last fight a gun went off, killing Owen.

The state charged Grier with second degree murder. The defense requested jury instructions on lesser offenses included in the charge of murder, such as assault, but then withdrew the request, so the jury was not instructed on those offenses. The jury convicted Grier of murder. On appeal, the Division Two Court of Appeals held that the failure to request instructions on the lesser included offenses was ineffective assistance of counsel.

Afternoon session (1:30 p.m.) 

Qualcomm Inc. v. Washington Department of Revenue, No. 83673-6. Whether the primary purpose of Qualcomm's OmniTRACS system is information or telecommunications.

Qualcomm provides a service called OmniTRACS to truck companies. The service uses satellites to track the location of trucks and sensors to track data like engine condition and fuel use. OmniTRACS also allows truckers to communicate with their dispatch office through the system.

The Department of Revenue reclassified OmniTRACS from an information service to a telecommunication service, with tax ramifications. Qualcomm argues that this was wrong because the primary purpose of the system is providing “processed data or information.” The Division Two Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the primary purpose of the system is data transmission.

State v. Marohl, No. 83570-5. This is a case we discussed when it first was accepted for review, since it seemed like such a great bar exam question. It concerns whether a casino floor can be considered an "instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm."

James Marohl, a martial artist, got into a fight in a casino. He put his opponent into a choke hold and then threw him to the ground. Marohl was convicted of third degree assault based on causing bodily harm using an “instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm.” In this case the instrument or thing is the casino floor. Marohl argues on appeal that the floor is not an “instrument or thing” within the meaning of the statute. He lost at both the trial and appellate court levels.

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The Supreme Court released opinions in three cases on Thursday.

Curtis v. Lein, No. 83307-9. Tambra Curtis lived on a farm owned by Jack and Claire Lein. Curtis was injured after falling through a wooden dock on the Lein property. The dock was subsequently destroyed. The trial court ruled in favor of the property owners, saying that Curtis failed to prove that the Leins knew or should have known about the dock’s allegedly dangerous condition, and that causes other than the Leins’ negligence could have contributed to the dock’s failure. The Court of Appeals (Div. 1) agreed. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that Curtis could invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (“the thing speaks for itself”) to fill in the evidentiary gaps caused by the dock’s destruction. The court, with Justice Debra Stephens writing the opinion, remanded the case for trial.

Sanders v. State, No. 82849-1. Justice Richard Sanders sued the Attorney General's Office, alleging violations of the the Public Records Act by withholding hundreds of requested records under various exemptions claimed without explanation.

In 2004, Sanders sent a request to the Attorney General's Office for all documents related to his visit to the McNeil Island Special Corrections Center and the actions taken by the Commission on Judicial Conduct in response to his visit. Over a hundred responsive documents were withheld or redacted, with no explanation of why the documents fell under the cited statutory exemptions to disclosure.

The trial court found that the AGO had violated the PRA by not providing the required "brief explanation" for how exemptions apply, and that some of the withheld records should have been disclosed. Sanders asked for a $70 per day penalty, the trial court fined the AGO $5 per day for withholding records and $3 per day for not explaining the exemptions; and awarded Sanders 37.5% of his attorney fees. He appeals both the ruling that some of the documents were exempt, and the amounts of the penalties and fees.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Debra Stephens writing, held that the AGO's failure to provide a brief explanation of each exempt record violated the PRA and should be considered as an aggravating factor when setting penalties for withholding nonexempt documents. The court affirmed the trial court’s penalties, and awarded Justice Sanders 25 percent of his costs and attorneys fees.

State v. Montano, No. 82855-8. Jose Montano resisted arrest for assault and officers had to shock him twice before they could handcuff him. On the way to jail, Montano threatened the officer driving him with statements including “I know when you get off work, and I will be waiting for you,” “I'll kick your a**,” and “I know you are afraid, I can see it in your eyes.”

Montano was charged with fourth degree assault (domestic violence) and intimidating a public servant. The trial court dismissed the charge of intimidating a public servant, holding that the threats made did not necessarily show intent to influence a public servant’s actions. The Court of Appeals (Div. 3) reversed, reasoning that a jury could infer that Mr. Montano’s threats were designed to get the officer to change his course of action. The Supreme Court, with Justice Charles Johnson writing, disagreed, reversing the Court of Appeals, holding that Montano’s threats and taunts provided no evidence of any attempt to influence a police officer.

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Today the Court resumes oral arguments, with two in the morning and one in the afternoon. (Docket, briefs)

Morning session (9:00 a.m.)

Seattle Times v. Serko, No. 84691-0. This writ of mandamus action concerns whether fear over future prejudicial news coverage provides adequate grounds to withhold police investigation records and seal trial exhibits.

After Maurice Clemmons shot and killed four police officers in Lakewood, the Seattle Times requested various documents related to the investigation from the Pierce County Sheriff's Office. The Sheriff's Office prepared to release the documents, but seven people charged as alleged accomplices of Clemmons intervened, asking the court to withhold the documents on the grounds that release would impair their rights to a fair trial because of increased publicity. Judge Serko agreed.

Judge Chushcoff, presiding over the trial of one of the alleged accomplices, subsequently sealed all trial exhibits based on Judge Serko's order. The Times argues that both actions were in error.

UPDATE: Judge Chushcoff sent me a note clarifying that he did not actually preside over the trial of the accomplices, but merely signed the order restricting access to the trial exhibits until such as it could be determined which of those exhibits were covered by Judge Serko's order. Judge Arend actually presided over the trials but was unavailable when the sealing issue arose.

Bowie v. Wa Dept. of Revenue, No. 83426-1. This case involves the question of whether Valpak advertisement mailings should be considered a periodical under the B&O tax classifications, specifically whether Valpak provides its intended audience with its publication schedule.

Valpak is a group of franchises that regularly send ad mailings to homeowners. In 2002 the company asked the Department of Revenue for guidance on how to classify their business, and were given a letter ruling saying they fell under the favorable "periodical" classification. Valpak began filing under that status and claimed a refund for past taxes. The DOR later revoked its ruling and Valpak sued for a full refund. The trial court found for DOR, but the Court of Appeals rejected its reasoning and remanded for factual findings on whether Valpak provides its audience with a publication schedule--and thus should be defined as a periodical.

Afternoon session (1:30 p.m.)

State v. Lui, No. 84045-8. Here the Court must determine whether a defendant's constitutional right to confront an accuser is violated when an expert witness testifies about work performed by a different expert on evidence prepared for the trial.

Sione Lui was charged with murder after police found his fiancee, Elaina Boussiacos, strangled and stuffed into the trunk of her car. During the trial the state used a medical examiner to testify as an expert witness on the autopsy report, although the report was prepared by a different examiner. The state also used a lab supervisor to testify about DNA tests performed by other lab workers. Lui argued that the use of these witnesses violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The Court of Appeals ruled against Lui.

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Update: links to briefs and argument videos are now included.

Guillen v. Contreras, No. 82531-9. Jesus Jaime Torres was killed in a mysterious shootout in Sunyside, Washington, in 2005. From the bloody scene, police seized $57,990 "packaged to resemble a kilogram of cocaine" and Torres's car. They seized another $9,342 that was in Torres's possession when he was shot. Torres's infant son, through his mother, challenged the property seizures. The superior court overturned the seizures of the car and the $9,342. The family moved for attorney fees. The superior court, relying on "substantially prevailing party" analysis, declined to award fees. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court today considers only "the meaning of the attorney fee provision of the forfeiture statute." The Court adopts the reasoning from the dissenting opinion by Chief Judge John Schultheis of the Court of Appeals and quotes from his opinion.

"[T]his forfeiture statute recognizes the success of only one party -- the claimant. What the seizing agency retains is not relevant. It will never be a substantially prevailing party or prevailing party under RCW 69.50.505(6)." Thus, he suggests, quantitative comparison is inappropriate as we are not balancing the comparative success of two parties with an equal statutory interest in attorney fees. We agree. This is an attorney fee provision designed to protect individuals against having their property wrongfully taken by the State. A bare mathematical approach is not appropriate. (citation removed; hyperlink inserted)

The case is remanded to the trial court to determine "the amount of attorney fees reasonably incurred by the respondents" for their successful claims. Justice Chambers wrote for the Court and was joined by seven other justices. Justice Sanders dissents because he believes the statute requires a recovery of all attorney fees rather than only those related to the successful claims. (briefs, argument)

Holden v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., No. 81487-2.  A fire in Laura Holden's rented home damaged and destroyed some of her possessions. Her rental insurance carrier, Farmers Insurance, sent her a check for the "cost of repair and replacement," but did not include Washington state sales tax in its calculations. Holden eventually brought this suit, "seeking a declaration that sales tax should be accounted for in the [actual cash value] calculation...." The Court today holds for Holden, finding the term "fair market value" as used in the insurance policy to be ambiguous. The Court thus interprets the term in favor of the insured. Justice Stephens writes for the majority, joined by five other justices. Justice James Johnson dissents, contending that "fair market value" is not ambiguous and does not include "a (theoretical) sales tax...." His opinion is joined by Justices Alexander and Owens. (briefs, argument)

In re Det. of Hawkins, No. 82907-1. As part of proceedings to determine whether Jake Hawkins is a sexually violent predator according to RCW 71.09, the trial court ordered Hawkins to submit to a polygraph examination. Hawkins refused and appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court accepted review to determine whether RCW 71.09.040(4) allows such an order.

The Supreme Court today reverses the lower courts, holding that the order requiring a polygraph examination was not permitted by the statute.

Because the legislature is undoubtedly aware of the inherent problems with polygraph examinations, it is fair to infer that the legislature intends to prohibit compulsory polygraph examinations unless it expressly allows for their use. ...

We are satisfied that professional evaluators will be able to reach conclusions without the use of such evidence.

Justice Owens writes for the six-member majority. Justice Stephens, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Fairhurst, disagree with the majority's interpretation of legislative intent and dissent. (briefs, argument)

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Scannell, No. 200,744-9. The Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) initiated an investigation of attorney John Scannell for conflicts of interest and assisting a suspended attorney to practice law. Scannell repeatedly and frivolously delayed the investigation, drawing it out from 2005 until today. The WSBA hearing officer found that Scannell had "negligently violated the conflict of interest rules--meriting minor sanctions--but that he had knowingly violated the rules requiring cooperation with disciplinary proceedings--meriting suspension." The disciplinary rule modified those findings, determining that Scannell's actions during the investigation were intentional and thus increasing the presumptive sanction to disbarment. The Board voted to disbar Scannell.

The Supreme Court today, in an opinion by Justice Stephens, exhaustively reviews the facts of the investigation and upholds the decision of the board. Three justices dissent, arguing in an opinion by Justice Alexander that the hearing officer's recommendation of suspension was the appropriate sanction. (briefs, argument)

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Shepard, No. 200,720-1.  Tacoma attorney Richard Shepard was found to have violated several Rules of Professional Conduct when he assisted a "living trust mill" that targeted seniors with unnecessary or improper financial products. The hearing officer recomended a six-month suspension, but the disciplinary board increased the recommendation to a two-year suspension. The Court today agrees with the board and suspends Shepard for two years. Justice Chambers writes for an almost-unanimous court. Justice Sanders dissents and would suspend Shepard for six months. (briefs, argument)

State v. Ervin, No. 83244-7.  James Ervin was convicted in 2006 of felony violation of a protective order. This appeal considers whether two earlier felony convictions should count toward Ervin's offender score at his sentencing. According to RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c), the two earlier felony convictions "washed out" if Ervin had subsequently been at least "five consecutive years in the community without committing any crime that subsequently results in a conviction." During a five year period, Ervin had not been convicted of any crimes but did spend 17 days in jail for violating probation. The State argued that the 17 days in jail restarted the five-year window. Ervin disagreed, arguing that only a conviction would reset the five years. While the Court finds the RCW somewhat ambiguous, it finds Ervin's reading more convincing. The lower courts are reversed and the case is remanded for resentencing with the lower offender score. The decision was unanimous, and Justice Owens wrote the opinion. (briefs, argument)

State v. Sanchez Valencia, No. 82731-1. Isidro Sanchez Valencia and Eduardo Chavez Sanchez were convicted of drug charges. Their sentences included community custody on the condition that they not use "items that could be used to ingest or process controlled substances, or to facilitate the sale or transfer of controlled substances." They appeal that provision as unconstitutionally vague, and the Court today unanimously agrees with the defendants. Justice Stephens wrote the Court's opinion. Justice James Johnson signed that opinion and added a concurrence pointing out that a simple change in language would allow a similar condition to stand. (briefs, argument)

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We encourage you to join the Freedom Foundation for its first annual Freedom Classic Golf Tournament on September 16, 2010. We'll be golfing at the beautiful Indian Summer Country Club & Golf Course in Olympia. Proceeds support the Foundation's activities including this blog.

We also have tournament sponsorships available for your company or organization.

Click here for more details: 

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Fitzpatrick v. Okanogan County, No. 81257-8. Two couples, the Fitzpatricks and Sturgills, purchased property in 1980 along the Methow River. They built a log house and garage more than 80 feet back from the river and above the 100-year flood level. In 2002, flooding washed away the house "and a substantial amount of the real property on which it was situated."

The couples brought this action against the state and county, alleging that the flood damage was a result of the governments' improvements to a dike upriver. The couples presented evidence that the dike, which protects a state highway, irrigation projects, and private properties upriver, cut off the river from natural overflow channels. As a result, the mild 2002 flood event destroyed the couples' house and damaged their real property. The couples' complaint "contained claims for inverse condemnation, trespass, negligence, and wrongful injury or waste of property."

The trial court granted summary judgement for the governments based on the common enemy doctrine. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, "holding that the common enemy rule does not apply if a landowner obstructs a watercourse or natural drainway or prevents water from entering a flood channel." The Supreme Court granted review to consider "whether the owners' inverse condemnation claim may proceed ... in light of the common enemy rule."

The Court sustains the Court of Appeals and remands the case to the trial court.

Under the summary judgment standard, which requires us to view the facts and the inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (the owners), it is apparent that there is a factual issue about whether the water that caused damage to the owners' property was water that was diverted from the natural watercourse, and if so, whether liability for that damage flows from the County and State's construction of the dikes.

The Court also rejects the governments' claim that the owners have no recovery in inverse condemnation because the damage was not a necessary consequence of the dike improvements. There too, the Court finds an issue of material fact to be resolved at trial. Justice Alexander wrote for the majority and was joined by six other justices. The Chief Justice wrote a dissent, which Justice James Johnson also signed, arguing that the majority misconstrues earlier case law because it "misunderstands the nature of riparian rights...." (briefs, argument)

In re Marriage of Freeman, No. 82283-2. Rob and Robin Freemen were married when, in 1998, Robin moved for a protective order against Rob. The order was issued and subsequently made permanent, based on a physical confrontation between Rob and one of Robin's teenage children and Robin's fear of Rob's possession of firearms and his military training. The couple divorced and Rob left Washington state. In 2006, Rob moved to terminate the protective order, which was preventing him from receiving a security clearance and thus from pursuing certain job opportunities. The court commissioner denied Rob's motion, he appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the commissioner.

With an opinion by Justice Sanders and joined by five other justices, the Court affirms the court below and holds that the commissioner abused her discretion.

As much as it is possible to prove a negative, Rob has done so here. The likelihood that Rob will commit future acts of domestic violence on these facts is low. Hand in hand with that determination, the facts do not suggest Robin's fear of Rob is based on a reasonable threat of imminent harm.

Justice Fairhurst, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Stephens, dissents. (briefs, argument)

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Internet Community & Entertainment Corp., d/b/a Betcha.com v. State, No. 82845-8. Internet Community & Entertainment Corporation launched a website called Betcha.com -- a person-to-person betting site that allowed users to post wagers on the outcomes of a wide variety of events. Betcha.com charged its customers a fee for user transactions. Losing bettors had up to 72 hours after a winning claim was made to choose not to pay the loss.

In 2007, the Washington State Gambling Commission informed the company that Betcha.com was engaged in illegal gambling. The company sued the state seeking a declaratory judgment that its social wagering site does not violate state law. Betcha.com lost at superior court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Betcha.com had not “gambled” because bettors understood that the losing bettor might not honor the debt.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Tom Sanders writing the unanimous opinion, reversed the Court of Appeals. The state Gambling Act prohibits bookmaking, which is defined as “accepting bets, upon the outcome of future contingent events, as a business or in which the bettor is charged a fee or ‘vigorish’ for the opportunity to place a bet.” RCW 9.46.0213. The court concluded that Betcha.com’s entire business model was based on charging fees from users for the opportunity to place a bet. Based on the conclusion that Betcha.com was engaged in prohibited bookmaking, the court declined to address whether the site’s users are actually engaged in gambling.

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The Supreme Court will issue decisions in four cases tomorrow.

Fitzpatrick v. Okanogan County, No. 81257-8. This case is on appeal from Division Three Court of Appeals, and presents the Court with the question of whether a landowner may be compensated (via inverse condemnation) for damage caused to his property by a public project.

The damaged property was a log home built by the Fitzpatricks near the Methow River, which was washed away when the river abruptly changed course due to the construction of a dike upstream. The dike was a joint project of the state and county. The trial court granted summary judgment for the county, relying on the Common Enemy Doctrine (a rule allowing landowners to divert surface water, even to the detriment of neighoring landowners), but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Freeman v. Freeman, No. 82283-2. What must be proved for a trial court to terminate a permanent protection order? Robin Freeman got a permanent protection order against Rob Freeman due to domestic violence. Rob, a member of the military, has since moved away. He lost a hand in Iraq, and this made it necessary to retrain and change careers within the military. However, he needed a security clearance and could not get one because of the permanent protection order.

Rob moved to terminate the protection order. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Robin is currently in reasonable fear of Rob. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Rob had not been in Washington or had contact with Robin since 1998, that he had violated neither the protection order nor any law, and that “due to time and distance, there is no evidence to support a current fear” of physical harm.

Internet Community & Entertainment Corp., d/b/a Betcha.com v. State, No. 82845-8. In 2007, Internet Community & Entertainment Corp. was informed by agents of the Washington State Gambling Commission that its website Betcha.com was engaged in illegal gambling. The company sued the state seeking a declaratory judgment that its social wagering site does not violate state law. Betcha.com lost at the trial level. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that because Betcha.com customers agreed in advance that participants were not required to pay their losses, Betcha.com was not engaged in “gambling” as defined in the Gambling Act.

State v. McCuistion, No. 81644-1. On appeal from Division Two Court of Appeals, this case originated in Pierce County Superior Court. It concerns whether a statute that prescribes the type of evidence sexually violent predators can use to show they qualify for a release hearing is constitutional.

McCuistion is a sexually violent predator who is committed indefinitely to a mental institution. State law permits him to have a release hearing (to determine if he is eligible for release) if he can clearly demonstrate (show prima facie evidence) that he is no longer a sexually violent predator. The types of evidence that can be used are limited, and the state is allowed to rely on annual psychiatric reviews. McCuistion appeals the evidence restrictions as unconstitutional.

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