Last Thursday's Opinions: No-contact orders, stalking, and telephone harassment

State v. Bunker, No. 81921-1. Three defendants, each convicted of violating a no-contact order, appeal those convictions. Looking to a "shall arrest" clause in the statute," defendants argue that the law (former RCW 26.50.110) "criminalizes only those contacts with a protected party that are violent, threaten violence, or occur in a specifically prohibited place."

The Court, in an opinion by Justice James Johnson and joined by seven other justices, holds that the plain language of the statute and the clear intent of the legislature is to criminalize all violations of a no-contact order. Justice Sanders dissents. (briefs, argument)

State v. Kintz, No. 81688-3. Clarence Kintz was convicted of two charges of misdemeanor stalking and appealed, challenging the trial court's interpretation of the statutory phrase "separate occasions" and the sufficiency of the evidence. In two incidents, one in December 2005 and the other in January 2006, Kintz frightened women by repeatedly and slowly driving past them and, in the latter case, offering the woman a ride and money. Both women called 911 and Kintz, who admitted some of the details of each incident, was eventually charged.

Kintz argues that "separate occasions" is ambiguous and that the Court should apply the rule of lenity to find that separate occasions must happen over a greater length of time than in these incidents. The Court of Appeals upheld the convictions and the Supreme Court sustains that decision, agreeing with the lower court that the plain meaning of "separate occasions" is "a distinct, individual, noncontinuous occurrence or incident." The Court also finds sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Justice Alexander authored the opinion for a majority of seven.

Justice Sanders dissents and would hold that the events leading to each of these stalking charges should be considered a single occasion, rather than "separate occasions," and thus do not meet the statutory definition of stalking. For related reasons, he would also find insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. Justice Chambers dissents separately in order to agree with Justice Sanders only as to the ambiguity in the term "separate occasions." (briefs, argument)

State v. Meneses, No. 83172-6. Andre Toi Meneses fathered a child by his then-girlfriend Jamila Willis. After they broke up, the child remained with Willis. Meneses began repeatedly calling Willis and leaving voice mail messages for her using "incredibly vile language, including racial slurs and descriptive obscenities," and threatening to kill Willis, her new boyfriend, and the new couple's infant. Willis eventually called the police, who recorded ten messages left by Meneses that became the basis for ten charges against him: four counts of felony telephone harassment, four counts of gross misdemeanor telephone harassment, and two counts of intimidating a witness. He was convicted by a jury on all counts.

The Court of Appeals sustained the convictions. The Supreme Court considered three issues raised by Meneses. First, the jury instruction on telephone harassment did not fail to specify that the criminal intent must have been formed before the call was placed. The instruction used the statutory language, and the Court has previously held that the meaning of the statute is clear on its face. Second, it did not violate double jeopardy for a count of telephone harassment and a count of intimidating a witness to arise from the same message because "each [conviction] required proof of a fact the other did not." Finally, because [n]o affirmative evidence supported the idea that Meneses committed witness tampering but not intimidating a witness," the trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense.

The Court, with an opinion by Justice Stephens, unanimously upholds the courts below. (briefs, argument)

Election round-up

This episode we discuss judicial election results, the death penalty in Washington, and whether police can search a vehicle based on a suspicious smell.

Supreme Court of Washington Podcast (RSS) - Election round-up

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Today's Opinions in Civil Cases: Equity versus property and is L&I a "person"?

Proctor v. Huntington, No. 82326-0. Dusty Moss subdivided his property into a 27-acre parcel purchased by the Huntingtons and an adjacent 30-acre parcel purchased by Proctor. Both parties were confused about their common boundary line, partly because they relied on the word of a surveyor who was apparently mistaken. The Huntingtons eventually built a house, garage, and well--all on Proctor's land. They have lived there since 1996.

In 2004, Proctor had his parcel surveyed because he was concerned that a different neighbor was encroaching on his land. Because of this survey, both Proctor and the Huntingtons came to realize that the Huntington improvements were on Proctor's side of their boundary line. After unsuccessful negotiations, Proctor sued to quiet title and to eject the Huntingtons. The Huntingtons counterclaimed for adverse possession and estoppel in pais. The trial court declined to decide for either party, instead crafting an equitable remedy that required Proctor to sell the one acre containing the Huntingtons' improvements to the Huntingtons for the fair market value of the land ($25,000). Both parties appealed.

The Court, with an opinion by Justice Stephens and joined by Justices Owens, Fairhurst, Chambers, and Charles Johnson, upholds the decision below.

The trial court's equitable approach in this case fits comfortably within the good-faith-mistake line of cases, including Arnold and Bufford, in which equity allows a court to apply a liability rule in lieu of rote application of a property rule. Because the trial court's chosen remedy was proper under Bufford and Arnold, the Court of Appeals was right to affirm it.
...
In upholding the equitable remedy imposed by the trial court, we recognize the evolution of property law in Washington away from rigid adherence to an injunction rule and toward a more reasoned, flexible approach.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sanders, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alexander and James Johnson, accuses the majority of overruling Arnold and violating protections of private property rights. The dissent looks to the Arnold decision's five-part test and would find that the Huntingtons could not satisfy two of those elements and thus were not entitled to their equitable relief. (briefs, argument)

Segaline v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., No. 81931-9. The Court addresses whether a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was time barred and whether a state agency is a "person" under RCW 4.24.510. While the Court unanimously determines that the 1983 claim was time barred, it fractures over the state law issue.

Michael Segaline is an electrician whose behavior shocked, offended, and possibly frightened staff at the L&I office where Segaline obtained electrical permits. L&I staff tried several times to reach an understanding with Segaline about his behavior, but finally told him that he was no longer allowed in the office. Segaline was subsequently arrested for criminal trespass when he refused to leave the office; the charge was later dropped. Segaline sued, alleging negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, negligent supervision, and civil rights violations. He later moved to add the 1983 claim.

The trial court dismissed all Segaline's claims. It held the 1983 claim untimely filed and and determined that RCW 4.24.510, which protects "persons" who report information to government agencies, provided immunity to L&I. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The lead opinion, by Justice Sanders and joined by three other justices, finds the meaning of the word "person" ambiguous in the statute. However, because the purpose of the statute is to protect freedom of speech, and because government agencies have no such protection,

[i]t makes little sense to interpret "person" here so that an immunity, which the legislature enacted to protect one's free speech rights, extends to a government agency that has no such rights to protect.

The Chief Justice, in a written concurrence, disagrees with the lead opinion's rationale. She would instead reach the same result by looking to the history of anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statutes. Justice Charles Johnson, joined by three other justices, dissents and would hold that the immunity does extend to government agencies. (briefs, argument)

Today's Opinions in Criminal Cases

State v. Adams, No. 82210-7. A King County Sheriff's Deputy stopped a vehicle because the registered owner had an arrest warrant for driving with a revoked license. Coryell Adams, the registered owner, was the driver and sole occupant in the car. When stopped, he got out of the car, locked it, and walked several steps away, all in violation of the officers orders to get back into the vehicle. After Adams was arrested, officers searched the car and found cocaine. Adams moved to suppress that evidence; the trial court denied the motion and was affirmed on appeal.

While awaiting review, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gant, which limits searches incident to arrest. The State filed a supplemental brief conceding that Gant applies here, but arguing for the court to apply the "good faith" exception.

Today, in a unanimous opinion by the Chief Justice, the Court declines to apply the good faith exception. The Court puts itself in its place, reasoning that while reliance on statutes that are subsequently struck down may warrant a good faith exception, reliance on the Court's erstwhile case law does not. (briefs, argument)

State v. Turner, No. 81626-3 (consolidated with State v. Faagata, No. 82336-7). In these cases, each defendant was convicted of two charges stemming from a single event. The trial courts set aside the lesser conviction to avoid violating double jeopardy, but issued an order that if the remaining conviction was overturned on appeal, the lesser conviction could be reinstated. The trial courts were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In a unanimous opinion by Justice James Johnson, the Court first reviews federal case law, which holds that double jeopardy does allow trial and conviction on lesser included offenses and "does not require permanent, unconditional vacation of the lesser of two convictions for the same criminal conduct...." However, the Court today reverses the Court of Appeals, and holds that the trial courts conditional vacation of the lesser offenses violated double jeopardy.

... a trial court must avoid (i) entering judgment on a defendant's lesser conviction and (ii) referencing that conviction when sentencing a defendant convicted of multiple crimes for the same criminal conduct. This is precisely what Turner and Faagata demanded, but did not receive, at trial and on appeal -- vacation of their lesser convictions without reference to any validity attributable to those convictions.

The Court notes that convictions for lesser included offenses that have been vacated can later be revived.

However, the lesser conviction, once vacated, and prior to reinstatement, is not "a valid conviction" and is not "entitled to some weight," contrary to the trial courts' rulings in these cases. ... In the future, the better practice will be for trial courts to refrain from any reference to the possible reinstatement of a vacated lesser conviction.

(briefs, argument)

Election results coming in...

Two races decided, one to go. As of 10:19 p.m.:

Chief Justice Barbara Madsen (unopposed) and Justice Jim Johnson (running against Stan Rumbaugh) have won their races and will advance to the general election without an opponent.

Meanwhile, Justice Richard Sanders and Charlie Wiggins are both under the 50 percent vote threshold required to advance unopposed, with Sanders enjoying an 8-point lead. Judge Bryan Chushcoff trails with only 12 percent of the vote.

Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Par

We usually reserve this site to discuss the business of the Washington Supreme Court, but want to notify you of an upcoming event.

Join the Freedom Foundation for its first annual Freedom Classic Golf Tournament on September 16, 2010! We'll be golfing at the beautiful Indian Summer Country Club & Golf Course in Olympia. Proceeds support the Foundation's activities including this blog.

We also have tournament sponsorships available for your company or organization.

Click here for more details

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Today's opinions, August 12, 2010

The Supreme Court issued opinions in three cases today.

Tobin v. Department of Labor and Industries, No. 81946-7. Jim Tobin was permanently disabled after being hit by a crane boom at work. He began collecting worker’s compensation benefits and sued the crane operator, settling for $1.4 million in damages, with about half of that amount being designated for pain and suffering. Under RCW 51.24.060, an injured worker is required to distribute a portion of a third-party recovery to the Department of Labor and Industries to reimburse the agency for worker’s compensation benefits. L&I informed Tobin that it would include the pain and suffering award he received in its calculation of what was owed the agency. Tobin argues the statute was designed to reimburse L&I for benefits paid, and L&I does not pay benefits for pain and suffering.

The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Barbara Madsen writing, agreed. The court held that chapter 51.24 RCW does not authorize L&I to seek reimbursement of damages awarded for pain and suffering. “[D]amages for ‘pain and suffering,’ like loss of consortium, constitute noneconomic damage that the workers’ compensation statutes do not compensate for. The Department did not pay out benefits for pain and suffering; therefore it cannot be ‘reimbursed’ from amounts recovered for pain and suffering. We hold that an award for pain and suffering may not be used by the Department in its distribution calculation.” Justice Mary Fairhurst dissented, arguing that the majority ignored the plain language of the recovery statute.

In Re Personal Restraint Petition of Cruze, No. 82567-0. Schawn James Cruze was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole under the “three strikes” provision of the Persistent Offender Accountability Act. Cruze filed a personal restraint petition arguing that the second conviction is not a most serious offense, or “strike.” However, Cruze filed his petition more than one year after his judgment and sentence became final, barring his claim unless the court could determine the sentencing was invalid on its face. The Supreme Court held that based on a plain reading of the statute, a deadly weapon verdict under the law includes a special verdict finding that a defendant was armed with a firearm. The court dismissed Cruze’s petition. Justice Susan Owens wrote the majority opinion. Justice Gerry Alexander wrote a dissent.

State v. Mitchell, No. 83169-6. This case hinges on the question of whether a child qualifies as a “dependent person” for purposes of the crime of criminal mistreatment. Marilea Mitchell and her boyfriend were charged with criminal mistreatment after starving the boyfriend’s four-year-old son almost to death. The statute refers to mistreatment of “a child or a dependent person,” and Mitchell was charged with mistreatment of a “dependent person.” Mitchell claims that the boy was a child, not a dependent person, and thus she was wrongly convicted. The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with Mitchell’s argument and upheld her conviction. Justice Richard Sanders wrote the opinion of the court.

Today's opinions: August 5, 2010

The court issued rulings in three cases today. Here is a brief summary of each case:

In Re the Honorable Judith Raub Eiler, No. 200,701-5. Judge Judith Eiler is a district court judge in King County. Based on a number of complaints, disciplinary proceedings were brought against her for treating litigants in an “angry, abusive, and condescending manner.” Eiler argues that there was not enough evidence, that the penalty is too high, and that punishing her for her demeanor violates her freedom of speech. Eiler appeals a disciplinary recommendation that she be suspended for 90 days without pay. The Supreme Court, with Justice Jim Johnson writing the lead opinion, found that Judge Eiler’s behavior only violated the judicial cannon requiring that a judge be “patient, dignified, and courteous.” The court reduced her suspension to a 5-day period.

Kelley v. Centennial Contractors, No. 82474-6. Phillip and Monica Blackshear sued Centennial Contractors Enterprises for injuries caused when a steel beam was dropped on Phillip. After they won the suit, they filed a complaint for loss of consortium on behalf of their three children. The complaint stated that it would have been impractical to include their claims with their parents’ suit. George Kelly was appointed guardian ad litem for the children. At trial, the children’s case was dismissed because the court said their claims should have been joined with their parents’ claims. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) reversed, holding that since the children did not yet have a guardian ad litem it would have been impossible to join them to the suit, and that it would have been impractical for them to bring their claims until the results of their father’s surgery were known. The Supreme Court, with Justice Gerry Alexander writing the lead opinion, agreed, holding that there were general issues of material fact that precluded a summary dismissal of the claim.

State v. Tibbles, No. 80308-1. Micah Tibbles appealed his misdemeanor convictions for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. During a traffic stop of Tibbles, Trooper Norman Larsen detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from Tibbles’ car. The trooper did not arrest Tibbles or seek a warrant, but conducted an warrantless search of the car, whereupon he discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The district court, superior court, and Court of Appeals all upheld the search under the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement, which allows law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless searches when obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape, or allow destruction of evidence. Justice Debra Stephens, writing for the Supreme Court, said that the exigent circumstances exception would not apply in this case and that the search of Tibbles’ vehicle was unconstitutional under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

Justice Richard Sanders - Postion 6

Richard Sanders earned a BA from the University of Washington and a JD from the University of Washington School of Law. He then entered private practice and continued to practice for 26 years, until he was elected to the Supreme Court in 1995. In addition to serving on the Supreme Court, Sanders teaches appellate advocacy at the University of Washington School of Law.

Rating

Notable Endorsements

Individuals

  • Justice Tom Chambers
  • Former Justice Phil Talmdage
  • Attorney General Rob McKenna
  • Congressman Ron Paul

Newspapers

Organizations

  • Association of Washington Business
  • Washington State Farm Bureau
  • Building Industry Association of Washington
  • Gun Owners Action League
  • Washington State Republican Party
  • Washington State Libertarian Party

Websites

 

Charlie Wiggins - Position 6

Charlie Wiggins earned a BA from Princeton University, an MBA from the University of Hawaii, and his JD from Duke Law School. After becoming a lawyer, he went into private practice. During his 33 years of practice, Wiggins has served as a Court of Appeals judge and as a pro tem judge in King and Jefferson counties. He is also past chair of the WSBA Disciplinary Board and Court Rules Committee, and past president of Washington Chapter of American Judicature Society.

Click here a summary of the majority opinions written by Wiggins when he served on the Court of Appeals. 

Ratings

Notable Endorsements

Individuals

  • Skagit County Commissioner Ted Anderson (Ret.)
  • State Representative Sherry Appleton
  • Kitsap County Commissioner Josh Brown
  • State Representative Maralyn Chase
  • State Representative Frank Chopp
  • 24th Legislative District Representative Lynn Kessler

Newspapers

Organizations

  • Washington Conservation Voters
  • Planned Parenthood Votes! Washington
  • NARAL
  • Washington Council of Police & Sheriffs
  • AFT Washington
  • Washington State Labor Council
  • Equal Rights Washington
  • Washington State Democrats

Website

 

Judge Bryan Chushcoff - Position 6

Pierce County Superior Court Judge Bryan Chushcoff earned a BA in business administration from the University of Washington, followed by a JD from the University of Puget Sound School of Law. He entered private practice in 1977 and continued to practice until 1996, when he was elected to the Pierce County Superior Court. He was elected Presiding Judge of that court in 2009.

Ratings

Notable Endorsements

Newspapers

Websites

 

Stan Rumbaugh - Position 1

Stan Rumbaugh earned a BA from Wittenberg University in Ohio and his JD from the University of Puget Sound Law School. He has been in private practice since 1979. During that time he has served as a board member of Planned Parenthood Washington and the World Affairs Council, and he is currently on the board of trustees for Bates Technical College and on the board of commissioners for the Tacoma Housing Authority.

Ratings

  • King County Bar Association: Well Qualified
  • Municipal League of King County: Very Good
  • Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys: Qualified

Notable Endorsements

Individuals

  • Former Justice Faith Ireland
  • Washington State Senate Majority Whip - 6th District - Chris Marr
  • Former Court of Appeals Judge Art Wang
  • Mayor of Tacoma - Marilyn Strickland

Organizations

  • Planned Parenthood Votes! Washington
  • Washington State Democrats
  • Equal Rights Washington
  • The League of Education Voters
  • Washington Education Association
  • NARAL Pro-Choice Washington
  • Washington Conservation Voters

Website

Justice Jim Johnson - Position 1

Justice Jim Johnson earned a BA in economics from Harvard University and a JD from the University of Washington. After school he spent 2 years in the U.S. Army, and then became an Assistant Attorney General for Washington. During twenty years at the Attorney General’s office he headed the Fish and Wildlife Division, the Special Litigation Division, and served as Counsel for the Environment. In 1993 Johnson entered private practice, and continued to practice until he was elected to the Supreme Court in 2004.

Ratings

Notable Endorsements

Individuals

  • Justice Tom Chambers
  • Justice Charles Johnson
  • Justice Susan Owens
  • Justice Debra Stephens
  • Former Chief Justice Gerry Alexander
  • Attorney General Rob McKenna

Newspapers

Organizations

  • Washington Association of Police and Sheriffs
  • Association of Washington Business
  • Building Industry Association of Washington
  • Washington State Farm Bureau
  • Washington State Republican Party
  • Mainstream Republicans of Washington

Websites

Editorial endorsement roundup

Newspaper endorsements are coming in fast now.

In the last week, Justice Jim Johnson has been endorsed for re-election by the Seattle Times, the Olympian, the Tri-City Herald, and the Yakima Herald.

Justice Richard Sanders has been endorsed by the Spokesman-Review.

Sanders’ opponent Charlie Wiggins has been endorsed by the Tri-City Herald and the Yakima Herald.