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The City of Seattle is asking the Supreme Court of Washington to order Attorney General Rob McKenna to withdraw from the multistate lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the health care bill recently adopted by Congress (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).

On April 22 City Attorney Peter S. Holmes filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. He wants the state Supreme Court to order a formal withdrawal from the lawsuit.

“The Mayor, the City Council and I want Rob McKenna to comply with the law. He does not have the authority to take this cynical, partisan action in the name of the State of Washington,” Holmes said. “He certainly does not represent the City of Seattle. While claiming concern for the U.S. Constitution, the Attorney General disregards Washington’s own constitution. He should withdraw from the lawsuit.”

According to the City Attorney’s Office, the Washington Supreme Court clerk has set a commissioner’s hearing for the petition for June 24. If the commissioner decides to send the case on to the Supreme Court a hearing date and briefing schedule will be assigned.

When McKenna announced he would join the lawsuit he said: “I believe this new federal health care measure unconstitutionally imposes new requirements on our state and on its citizens. This unprecedented federal mandate, requiring all Washingtonians to purchase health insurance, violates the Commerce Clause and the 10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”

We usually don’t offer predictions on this blog, but the odds for the City of Seattle are not good. The Supreme Court very rarely issues writs of mandamus. The petitioner must show that a public official is failing to perform a mandatory, non-discretionary duty. The attorney general will likely argue that his office has discretion in making litigation decisions.

This type of case, where the Supreme Court can find some freedom of judgment on the part of the official, usually result in a denial of the petition. Just recently the Supreme Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus, holding that Gov. Gregoire had no obligation, despite clear statutory language, to include arbitrated awards for public employees in her 2008 budget proposal.

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State v. Hall, No. 82558-1. In this week's only opinion, the Court unanimously decides that the defendant's multiple telephone calls trying to influence a witness constituted a single count of witness tampering.

In 2007, Isiah Hall pointed a gun at two people and threatened to kill them. While awaiting trial, Hall placed over 1,200 telephone calls to the woman who was his girlfriend at the time of the assaults and who would be a government witness at his trial. He tried to convince her either not to testify or to lie to the court. In addition to his other crimes, Hall was convicted of three counts of witness tampering. He challenges that his conduct amounted to a single unit--not three--of witness tampering.

The Court today agrees with Hall and remands the case for resentencing.

[T]he plain language of the statute reveals that the legislature intended to criminalize inducing 'a' witness not to testify or to testify falsely. We hold, under the facts of this case, Hall committed one crime of witness tampering, not three. ... We do not reach whether or when additional units of prosecution, consistent with this opinion, may be implicated if additional attempts to induce are interrupted by a substantial period of time, employ new and different methods of communications, involve intermediaries, or other facts that may demonstrate a different course of conduct.

(briefs, argument)

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Lawson v. City of Pasco, No. 81636-1. Paul Lawson owns and operates a mobile home park in the City of Pasco. The City issued Lawson a citation for permitting one of his tenants to live in an RV, which violated a city ordinance. Lawson challenged that the ordinance was preempted by state law, specifically the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA, RCW 59.20). The trial court found for Lawson, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

In today's five-to-four decision and with four opinions, the Supreme Court affirms the Court of Appeals. Justice Charles Johnson wrote the majority opinion, finding that the state has not preempted the field of mobile home park regulation and that Pasco's ordinance did not conflict with the MHLTA.

The Chief Justice signed the majority opinion and also wrote a short concurrence noting that both the state and local laws have been changed to allow tenants to live in RVs. Justice Sanders, joined by Justices Gerry Alexander and James Johnson, dissents and would hold that "the State has preempted the field of mobile home park regulation." Justice Fairhurst, in her own dissent, argues that "Pasco's ordinance ... conflicts with the MHLTA." (briefs and argument)

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Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Association, No. 81873-8. Woodcreek Condominiums feature units in both one- and two-story configurations. The Homeowners Association has over the years allowed some of the one-story owners to add a second story. When the Association allowed Glen Clausing to add a story to his one-story unit, his neighbor, Sandra Lake, sued both the Association and Clausing. She alleges violations of the Horizontal Property Regimes Act (HPRA) or Woodcreek's declaration (the legal  description of "the condominium properties and ... the covenants defining the property rights and legal obligations of the property owners").

Lake lost on summary judgment before the trial court, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the expansion of Clausing's unit encroached a common area (the air above his original unit) and thus required the unanimous consent of the condo owners. Today, the Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals and awards attorney fees to Clausing (the Association did not request attorney fees). The Court holds first that the HPRA does not require unanimous consent of the owners to allow part of a common area to be incorporated into a unit. It further holds that the HPRA does not require that the value of each unit stated in the declaration reflect fair market value, thus it was not necessary to amend the declaration when the size of Clausing's unit changed.

Justice Fairhurst wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. (briefs and argument)

The Court today grants a new trial to Christopher L. Jones on a charge of second degree rape. His 17-year-old niece accused him of forcible rape. The jury failed to return a verdict in his first trial, and before his second trial Jones requested to present evidence that the act was consensual during an "alcohol- and cocaine-fueled sex party" involving several other persons. The trial court ruled that the evidence was an attack on the alleged victim's credibility and so was prohibited by Washington's rape shield statute (

). The jury convicted Jones and he appealed.

In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Owens, the Court holds that the trial court violated Jones's right to present his defense.

This is not marginally relevant evidence that a court should balance against the State's interest in excluding the evidence. Instead, it is evidence of extremely high probative value; it is Jones's entire defense. Jones's evidence, if believed, would prove consent and would provide a defense to the charge of second degree rape. Since no State interest can possibly be compelling enough to preclude the introduction of evidence of high probative value, the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment when it barred such evidence.

The Court further holds that the rape shield statute applies only to past, not contemporary, acts and so does not apply here (though if it did, it still would not overcome Jones's Sixth Amendment rights). Because the error was not harmless, Jones must have a new trial. The Court also identifies two statements in the prosecutor's closing argument that violated Jones's Fifth Amendment rights. (briefs and argument)

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The Supreme Court today ruled that a trial court judge was wrong to allow evidence of an undocumented worker’s illegal immigration status in a personal injury case. The case is Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, No.  81590-9 (briefs and argument).

Alex Salas, an immigrant from Mexico whose visa expired, fell off a scaffolding ladder and sued the company that set up the ladder. At trial, the court allowed evidence of his immigration status, in part to determine the value of Salas’ future earnings potential. The jury did not find Hi-Tech Erectors liable for Salas’ injury. On appeal Salas argues the trial court should not have allowed evidence of his immigration status.

The Supreme Court agreed. Justice Mary Fairhurst wrote that Salas’ immigration status was relevant information for determining the value of his future lost wages. Nevertheless, the court held that the value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfairly prejudicing the jury. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address additional issues.

Justice Gerry Alexander, a former trial court judge, dissented. He wrote that if the majority believed the evidence of Salas’ status was relevant for determining future lost wages then the trial court did not abuse its discretion and should not be reversed. “I cannot say that the trial court's decision to admit [the evidence] was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Neither can I say that it was a decision that no reasonable judge would have made.”

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The Supreme Court is scheduled to issue opinions in several cases tomorrow morning: 

Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Association, No. 81873-8 (briefs and argument). Sandra Lake and Glen Clausing are neighbors at Woodcreek Condominiums. Clausing, with Woodcreek’s approval, built a “bonus room” over his garage. This converted common area (the airspace over the garage) into apartment area. It also interfered with Lake’s view. Lake sued Clausing and Woodcreek, claiming that the law requires unanimous consent by the condominium owners to convert common area to apartment. Woodcreek and Clausing argue that unanimous consent is only required if the condominium declaration is amended, which did not happen here.

Lawson v. City of Pasco, No. 81636-1 (briefs and argument). The question before the Court is whether the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act preempts a city’s ordinance banning the use of recreational vehicles as permanent homes in mobile home parks. Lawson owns a mobile home park in Pasco, and has at least one tenant who uses a fifth-wheel as a permanent home. Pasco has an ordinance preventing this use of a recreational vehicle, and ordered Lawson to evict all such tenants. Lawson defends on the basis that the Landlord-Tenant Act allows the use, and that the Act preempts the City’s ordinance.

Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, No. 81590-9 (briefs and argument). Alex Salas, a construction worker, fell off a scaffolding ladder and sued the company that set up the scaffold. At trial, the court allowed evidence that Salas is an undocumented alien. The jury did not find Hi-Tech Erectors liable for the injury. On appeal Salas argues the trial court abused its discretion. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence about Salas’ immigration status was irrelevant and prejudicial, but affirmed the lower court.

State v. Jones, No. 82613-7 (briefs and argument). Whether the rape shield statute bars testimony about contemporaneous sexual behavior for the purpose of proving consent. Kashauna Dixon claimed that she was raped by her uncle, Christopher Jones. Jones admitted to having sex with her, but claimed that she consented. According to Jones, they were having a party with several others that included alcohol, sex, and drugs.

Based on Washington’s rape shield statute, the trial court barred Jones from testifying about the party. Jones appealed, arguing that the statute only prohibits testimony about “past sexual behavior,” and that he wanted to testify about sexual behavior contemporaneous with the alleged rape. The Court of Appeals held that past behavior can refer even to the very recent past, and that even if the rape shield statute didn’t apply the evidence would have been inadmissible because it would have unduly prejudiced the jury against Dixon.

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The Washington Supreme Court's internet presence just got an upgrade. Check out the new web page that provides a look at the court "up close and in action." Most of the information on this page was previously available, but it's now provided in a more user-friendly format, along with pictures and a schedule of events. 

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In re PRP of Steven Clark, No. 81522-4. Steven Clark agreed to plead guilty to two counts of second degree robbery in 1998 in exchange for the state dropping a third robbery charge (all involving bank robberies). Clark was sentenced to 25 months in prison. His plea agreement included at least one year in community placement after his release. Yet shortly after Clark's sentencing it was discovered that he did not meet the necessary statutory criteria for community placement and his sentence was amended to remove it.

Clark was released in 1999 and quickly robbed two more banks. He was convicted and sentenced as a "persistent offender" to life imprisonment. Clark challenges his 1998 plea bargain because he was wrongly informed that his sentence would include community placement. The Court does not reach that issue because it determines that Clark's petition is untimely. Justice Fairhurst, joined by seven other justices, determines that the one-year statute of limitations applies and so Clark's filing comes eight years too late. The test is whether the sentence is invalid on its face and the Court determines that Clark's sentence was not, even though there was confusion about his plea agreement.

Justice Sanders strongly dissents. He would find Clark's petition timely and indicates that he would hold that Clark could withdraw his earlier plea. (argument, briefs)

Merriman, et ux. v. Cokeley, et ux., No. 83700-7. The Court of Appeals had overturned a trial court's determination in a quiet title action that three boundary markers in an area overgrown with blackberries and ivy could not constitute a "clear and well-defined boundary." Here the Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion reverses the Court of Appeals and holds that the evidence supports the trial court's finding. (briefs)

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This month we discuss de facto parenthood, public employee raises, access to public records, and capital punishment.

Supreme Court of Washington Podcast (RSS) - Who's your daddy?

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SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, No. 82551-3 (briefs and argument). In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice James Johnson, the Supreme Court has ruled against SEIU 775NW and declines to order the governor to insert a $87 million arbitration award in her budget proposal to the legislature.

SEIU 775NW represents approximately 25,000 individual health providers who negotiated with the state for wages and benefits. During 2008 negotiations, SEIU 775NW and the governor’s office were unable to reach an agreement for the 2009-11 budget, and an arbitrator awarded the workers a raise and fringe benefits amounting to $87 million. Gov. Gregoire, however, did not include the arbitrated award in the budget proposal that she sent to the legislature, arguing it was not financially feasible. SEIU 775NW argues that the law governing labor relations for these employees (RCW 74.39A.300) states that the governor must include arbitrated awards in her budget.

The question for the court has been whether “must” in the statute is a mandatory obligation upon the governor, or if it is a permissive suggestion. At argument the justices clearly wrestled with the real-world consequences of ruling for either party. A ruling for the workers sends the governor back to the budget planning stage and would result in other cuts to the budget. But a ruling for Gregoire seems to muddy the plain reading of a statute.

Justice Johnson wrote that writs of mandamus ordering a state official to take action are only appropriate when the ordered action is mandatory, rather than discretionary. “Deciding the allocation of limited state funds in order to achieve the statutorily required balanced budget necessarily involves the exercise of the governor’s discretion,” he wrote. “It is difficult to imagine an act more essentially a policy decision for the governor than the submission to the legislature of a budget during an economic downturn. The creation and submission of a budget proposal is clearly one of those discretionary acts that are ‘in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive,’ and inappropriate for mandamus.”

The court said it would decline to order the governor to make budget changes even if mandamus were appropriate. “[T] the court may refuse to grant relief where private rights would be unwisely advanced at the expense of public interests. The recent severe economic difficulties faced by our state present circumstances dictating such judicial restraint.”

Alternatively, the court said it would rule against the union as the remedy it sought was no longer available. “Similarly, because the relief sought by the petitioner here—a change in a budget proposal long since submitted for a budget already adopted by the legislature—is no longer available, this case runs afoul of our mootness doctrine.”

Chief Justice Madsen dissented, arguing that the law mandates inclusion of arbitrated awards in the governor’s budget, regardless of the state’s economic picture. “There is, of course, a fixed amount of funding available to achieve a balanced budget and one budget request included in a proposed budget means that there is less money remaining for other proposed requests. But this fact does not turn a mandatory duty into a discretionary one. Pursuant to a state law duly enacted by the legislature, the governor had a mandatory duty to include in the proposed 2009-2010 budget a request to fund the arbitration award in this case.”

Justice Richard Sanders signed Madsen’s dissent and filed his own brief dissent, writing: “This case deserved swift action to protect the rights of these workers and their union. I have signed the dissent but would have preferred to initially decide this case by order with opinion to follow.”

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The Supreme Court will issue rulings in several cases tomorrow.

In re PRP of Steven Clark, No. 81522-4 (argument). Whether a judgment and sentence on a guilty plea may be collaterally challenged beyond the one-year time limit on collateral attack based on the erroneous imposition of community placement, even though the original judgment and sentence was soon corrected to remove the term of community placement.

Merriman, et ux. v. Cokeley, et ux., No. 83700-7. Neighbors brought an action against lot owners, seeking to quiet title to disputed triangle of land. The trial court quieted title in lot owners but denied their request for attorney’s fees and costs.

SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, No. 82551-3 (briefs and argument). The union representative for approximately 25,000 health care providers seeks a writ of mandamus to order Gov. Chris Gregoire to resubmit a budget to the legislature that includes the union's pay increases, which were the result of an arbitrated award. The governor had declined to request funding for the increases ($87 million) in the December 2008 budget proposal. As Justice Mary Fairhurst observed during arguments, the case could come down to how the court interprets the word "must." 

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Brad Shannon at the Olympian has this story about Rep. Brendan Williams considering a run against Justice Jim Johnson, who is up for re-election. Williams is leaving the state legislature this year after three terms. Here is what he had to say about a Supreme Court bid: 

Here are Williams' comments:

There has been a draft effort that some of my colleagues put together. Candidly, it's not something I had thought of prior to their efforts. However, having clerked at the Supreme Court for 2 1/2 years and being very familiar with the work of justice, it's something I'll look into.

I think I'm going to consult with some folks who are interesting in reforming the court and who are frustrated with the fact that there is at least one member of the court who is beholden to special interests and see what their thoughts are about my getting into a race.

I think there are a lot of people who observe the court's work and are frustrated with the rulings by some members regarding consumer protection and looking out for people's interests instead of special interests that fund people’s campaigns.

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The Supreme Court is in recess and will resume arguments in May. Opinions will nevertheless be issued and may be released this week on Thursday. Don't forget to check out our new Facebook page where we'll be posting news articles about the court that don't make it on the blog. 

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Several additional cases were accepted for review from the court’s en banc conference:

Williams v. Leone & Keeble, Inc., No. 83743-1. Delbert Williams was injured on the job in Idaho while working for a subcontractor of a Washington general contractor. Mr. Williams submitted a worker's compensation claim in Idaho and was paid worker compensation benefits by the Idaho State Insurance Fund. Later, he sued the general contractor for negligence in Washington. The trial court dismissed the action, and the Court of Appeals (Div. 3) held that Williams was barred from relitigating the issue in a new jurisdiction.

Roe v. Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., No. 83768-6. TeleTech terminated newly-hired employee Jane Roe (a pseudonym) after she failed a pre-employment drug screening test. Roe was authorized to use medical marijuana under the Medical Use of Marijuana Act. Roe sued Teletech alleging wrongful termination, arguing on appeal that the Act allows a civil cause of action and that it expresses a public policy favoring medical marijuana. The Court of Appeals (Div. 2) rejected Roe’s appeal, noting that the Act only allows a defense to criminal prosecution but does not create any civil cause of action. The ACLU of Washington, which filed a brief in Roe's support, has more on the case.

Union Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. Dept of Transp., No. 83771-6. Union Elevator brought an inverse condemnation action, alleging that a Department of Transportation highway project had destroyed access to its property. The Court of Appeals (Div. 3) previously ruled in Union Elevator’s favor, holding that it was entitled to relocation assistance benefits under Washington's Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policy Act. In this subsequent appeal, the Court of Appeals held the State is liable for interest on damages under the Relocation Act, but denied attorney fees in excess of the statutory maximum under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

In re PRP of Raymond Martinez, No. 83219-6.

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Carlisle v. Columbia Irrigation District, No. 82035-0. The Court today unanimously upholds summary judgment in favor of the Columbia Irrigation District (CID).

In 2007 CID expanded, adding new lands and then establishing a local improvement district (LID) on them to allow future special assessment levies to pay for improvements. Thirty-four landowners sued, alleging that CID's expansion violated due process (article I, section 3) and failed to receive valid petitions representing at least one-half of the land area (RCW 87.03.560). They further alleged that the statute authorizing creation of the LID violates on its face the guarantee of equal elections (article I, section 19) and that notice of the hearing for formation of the LID also violated due process.

The Court first considers whether expansion of the irrigation district boundaries constituted a deprivation of property. The constitutional guaranty of due process only applies where a person is "deprived of life, liberty, or property...." The guaranty of due process does not apply to government decisions or actions that only create or increase the likelihood of a future deprivation. The Court holds that while CID's expansion made future assessments on plaintiffs' lands possible, "increased probability of an assessment was not a deprivation of property within the meaning of article I, section 3."

The Court further explains "that a democratically elected legislature has the prerogative to establish the procedures by which a local government entity is created or its boundaries expanded." This is because local governments are creations of the state government, receiving delegated state powers. Local governments have no authority not already present in state governments, thus there is no additional need for consent. "A person does not have the constitutional right to notice, a hearing, or the right to object." The Court adds in a footnote that "plaintiffs' real complaint is with the legislature," which has increased the notice requirements for road improvement districts, but not irrigation districts.

As to the question of the validity of certain petitions, the Court rejects the argument that petitions are invalid if the signer subsequently sold the property or if the petitions were submitted after an arbitrary, non-statutory deadline. Because including the petitions in those categories brings the total over the required threshold, the Court declines to address additional issues related to other challenged petitions.

The Court finds that the formation of an LID by implied-consent (RCW 87.03.485) is not an "election" and therefore cannot violate the article I, section 19, and does not violate article 1, section 3. Justice Fairhurst wrote the Court's opinion. Justice Alexander did not participate and was replaced by Justice Pro Tem. Karen Seinfeld. (briefs and argument)

In re Parentage of M.F., No. 81043-5. In the 2005 case In re Parentage of L.B., the Court created a new status of "de facto parent," "to correct a specific statutory shortcoming." The legislature had not created a legal framework for a person who was not a biological parent, was not married to a biological parent, and was not asserting that the biological parents were unfit, but who nevertheless wanted rights as a parent, so the Court "fill[ed] this statutory gap." Today, the Court refuses to extend that doctrine.

M.F.'s natural parents divorced a few years after she was born and thereafter shared custody of her. The mother's next marriage lasted for about seven years, and her husband from that marriage here asks the courts to declare him M.F.'s de facto (third) parent. The Court declines. The majority explains that there is no need for the Court to expand its earlier invention to these facts, presumably because L.B. involved two persons of the same sex whereas this case involves three people and includes both sexes. The Court also says that its de facto parent doctrine would too easily apply to step-parent relationships.

Justice Chambers, joined by Justics Owens and Fairhurst, dissent and contest two "assumptions" of the majority: "first, that a child can have no more than two parents; second, that both of M.F.'s parents are fit." All three dissenters were members of the In re Parentage of L.B. majority, while the majority here contains the other three members of that majority and the two justices who dissented. (briefs and argument)

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Among the opinions released by the Supreme Court today:

Renner v. City of Marysville, No. 81959-9 (briefs and argument). Marc Renner was fired from his job as Network Administrator for the City of Marysville. The city cited misconduct and insubordination for the termination; Renner claimed he was fired for joining a union. Renner sued for wrongful termination, but failed to include 1) a specific damage amount, and 2) all of his addresses for the prior six months. The City successfully moved to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the filing requirements.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Charles Johnson writing, ruled in Renner’s favor and held that Renner “substantially complied” with the claim filing statute. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen filed a separate concurrence finding that Renner substantially complied in this particular case, but she cautioned that “in a given case simply stating the name of the claim without much more does not serve the purpose of former RCW 4.96.020(3).”

Justice Mary Fairhust dissented. “In the name of liberal construction and substantial compliance, the majority distorts the amount requirement of the claim filing statute,” she wrote. “By holding that it is sufficient to merely list all the available classes of damages, the majority undermines the legislature’s intent to encourage settlement.”

State v. Rhone, No. 80037-5 (briefs and argument). Theodore Rhone, an African-American, was charged with robbery, possession of a controlled substance, unlawful possession of a firearm, and bailjumping. During jury selection there were two African-Americans in the 41-member pool, one of whom was dismissed for cause. The other, “juror 19,” was removed by the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge. The question in the case is whether a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of the only African-American member in a trial of an African-American defendant amounts to a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial court concluded that Rhone had failed to establish a case of discrimination and did not require the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral explanation for his challenge of juror 19. Rhone was convicted on all counts.

The Supreme Court, with Justice Charles Johnson writing for a 4-vote lead opinion, upheld the conviction. The Court noted that under established case law, while a defendant has no right to a ‘jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race, the equal protection clause requires that a jury be composed of members who were selected by nondiscriminatory criteria.

The Court declined to recognize a bright line rule that a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose can be based on the mere dismissal of the only potential juror of the defendant’s race. The Court said Rhone could have presented a more complete argument to the trial court incorporating the totality of the circumstances involving the dismissal of juror 19, but that on appeal the Court will defer to the trial court’s ruling. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen filed a brief concurrence: “I agree with the lead opinion in this case. However, going forward, I agree with the rule advocated by the dissent.”

Justice Gerry Alexander, dissenting, wrote: “[W]e should adopt a bright line rule that a prima facie case of discrimination is established under [the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in] Batson when the sole remaining venire member of the defendant’s constitutionally cognizable racial group or the last remaining minority member of the venire is peremptorily challenged. I recognize that we have previously held that “a trial court is ‘not required to find a prima facie case [of discriminatory purpose] based on the dismissal of the only venire person from a constitutionally cognizable group, but they may, in their discretion, recognize a prima facie case in such instances.’” State v. Thomas, 166 Wn.2d 380, 397, 208 P.3d 1107 (2009) (quoting Hicks, 163 Wn.2d at 490) (alteration in original). Nevertheless, I am convinced that it makes sense to adopt the bright line rule ….”

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