Two more opinions: Parmelee gets paid and 5 for the common law
Parmelee v. O’Neel, No. 82128-3. The .jpg)
Court today unanimously holds that Allan Parmelee, a prisoner who successfully defended himself against an infraction based on Washington's criminal libel statute, is entitled to attorney fees.
Parmelee had written a letter making various accusations about the prison superintendant. Prison authorities refused to send the letter and found that Parmelee had committed a misdemeanor by violating the libel law. Parmelee defended and the Court of Appeals held the libel law unconstitutional, but refused to grant attorney fees. The Supreme Court holds that Parmelee is a prevailing party entitled to fees according to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (briefs and argument)
State v. Eaton, No. 81348-5. Thomas Eaton was stopped by Vancouver police for driving with his headlights off (presumably at night). He was arrested for DUI and taken to jail, where a bag of methamphetamine was discovered in his sock. He was convicted of DUI and possession of a controlled substance. He received a sentence enhancement (RCW 9.94A.533(5)) for the latter conviction because the drugs were discovered within the jail. The Court of Appeals overturned the enhancement, finding that Eaton was taken to jail against his will and that the statute "was not intended to punish defendants for their involuntary acts."
The Supreme Court begins its analysis with an attempt to describe the fundamental principles of criminal culpability. The effort is made difficult by past high courts' failures to enforce traditional protections against overreaching legislatures. The original common law definition of a crime required both an actus reus--literally, a "bad act"--with a corresponding mens rea--a "bad mind." There might be recovery in tort for a harmful act accomplished without mens rea, but it was not a crime. Additionally, an involuntary act was not considered an act at all. Punishment was meted out only where defendants were culpable--where they caused harm by choice and so might have chosen differently.
Today, the Court rejects the state's argument that the sentencing enhancement should apply without regard to the common law (or, some might believe, common sense) requirement of intent or at least volition. Justice Chambers, writing for the majority, reminds the state that statutes are construed "in a way that is consistent with their underlying purpose." The Court holds that the sentencing enhancement statute includes "a volitional element that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt."
Justice Fairhurst, joined by Justices Madsen, Owens, and Johnson, dissent. They would accept the state's argument and refuse to construe the statute according to the common law protections. (briefs and argument)
