Today's oral arguments - January 26, 2010
Today the Court will hear its normal four arguments, two in the morning and two in the afternoon. (Docket, briefs)
Morning session
Hudson v. Hapner, No. 82409-6. At what point can a party withdraw a request for a civil trial? That's the procedural question before the Court in this case.
Clifford Hapner rear-ended Lea Hudson, and Hudson sued for damages. T
he case went to mandatory arbitration where Hudson was awarded $14,538. After mandatory arbitration a party can request a trial before the superior court, which Hapner did. But the jury awarded Hudson $292,298. Hapner appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case for a new trial.
After discovery for the second trial, but before the trial took place, Hapner filed a notice of withdrawal of his motion for a trial. This would allow him to pay only the arbitration award, plus Hapner's court costs. The trial court struck the withdrawal at Hudson's request, but the Division Two Court of Appeals reversed, disagreeing with Hudson's argument that court rules include a time limit for withdrawal after a trial takes place.
State v. Osman, No. 82671-4. The question before the Court is what legal standard superior courts should use to review lower court rulings on the importance of missing trial records.
Abdinasir Osman was arrested and convicted for DUI. After the trial, Osman's attorney discovered that part of the trial had not been recorded. The missing portion included part of Osman's cross examination, objections to an exhibit, attorney arguments, and the judge's findings and conclusions.
A party in a district court is entitled to a new trial if a “significant or material portion” of the electronic recording is lost. Osman appealed to the superior court for a new trial, which remanded the question of whether the missing record was material back to the district court. The district court found that the missing portion was not material.
The superior court fully reviewed the district court's decision, concluded that the missing portion was material, and ordered a new trial. The state appealed, and the Division One Court of Appeals reversed the superior court, concluding that the superior court should only have looked at whether the district court overstepped its bounds in making the decision (abuse of discretion), rather than taking a whole new look at the question of materiality.
Afternoon session
State v. Hall, No. 82558-1. This case concerns whether multiple attempts to tamper with a witness can be prosecuted as multiple crimes.
Isiah Hall was charged with burglary, and Desirae Aquiningoc was called as a witness. Before the trial, Hall called Aquiningoc several times from prison and tried to get her to lie at the trial or to go into hiding. Hall was convicted of multiple counts of witness tampering.
Hall argues on appeal that all of his calls were part of a single case of witness tampering, and that convicting him multiple times violates double jeopardy. The Division One Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that each attempt to get Aquiningoc to lie or hide was a separate case of tampering.
State v. Jones, No. 82613-7. In this case, the Court will consider whether the rape shield statute bars testimony about contemporaneous sexual behavior for the purpose of proving consent.
Kashauna Dixon claimed that she was raped by her uncle, Christopher Jones. Jones admitted to having sex with her, but claimed that she consented. According to Jones, they were having a party with several others that included alcohol, sex, and drugs.
Based on Washington's rape shield statute, the trial court barred Jones from testifying about the party. Jones appealed, arguing that the statute only prohibits testimony about “past sexual behavior,” and that he wanted to testify about sexual behavior contemporaneous with the alleged rape. The Division Three Court of Appeals held that past behavior can refer even to the very recent past, and that even if the rape shield statute didn't apply the evidence would have been inadmissible because it would have unduly prejudiced the jury against Dixon.
Jones also appealed on other due process grounds, including the prosecutor's statement to the jury that Jones refused to submit to warrantless DNA testing.
