Today's arguments - January 21, 2010
Today the Court is hearing three arguments, two in the morning and one this afternoon. (Docket, briefs)
Morning session
State v. Turner/Faagata, No. 81626-3. These consolidated cases present the question of whether two crimes can be merged for sentencing without completely wiping out any potential future sentencing on the lesser crime.
Both defendants are charged with two crimes (Turner for assault and robbery, Faagata for two murders) that arose out of the same facts, so it would be a violation of double jeopardy if a court convicted them of each crime separately. In both cases, the trial court merged the two crimes for sentencing, but stated that the lesser of the two crimes was still valid (i.e. separate) for future sentencing if the conviction for the greater crime was invalidated on appeal.
The cases originated in Pierce County Superior Court, and were appealed to Division Two Court of Appeals. The defendants lost at the appellate level.
Seglaine v. Washington Department of Labor & Industries, No. 81931-9. This case concerns whether L&I has statutory immunity from charges of malicious prosecution for complaints to the police about an individual.
Due to arguments between Seglaine and East Wenatchee L&I employees, the department staff served Seglaine with a "no trespass" notice, ordering him to not enter the building. Seglaine later tried to come back, staff called the police and Seglaine was arrested. Charges were later dropped, but Seglaine sued L&I for malicious prosecution, among other things.
Under RCW 4.24.510, a person who complains to a government agency, like the police, is immune to prosecution for the complaint. The trial court ruled for L&I based on this statue. Seglaine argues that L&I is not a "person," that it doesn't apply to malicious prosecution claims, and that L&I must prove it acted in good faith.
Summary judgment for the defendant was granted by Thurston County Superior Court and upheld by Division Two Court of Appeals.
Afternoon session
State v. Peterson, No. 82089-9. The question before the court is whether the state has to prove which time limit requirement a sex offender falls under in order to convict them of failing to register.
Sex offenders are required to register with the county sheriff when they change addresses. The statute requiring this registration gives different time limits depending on where the offender is moving: 72 hours for a fixed address, 42 hours for homeless, 10 days for out of county. Sex offender Michael Peterson left his residence and failed to register with the state for over a month.
Peterson was convicted of failure to register. On appeal, he argues that the time limit is an element of the crime, and that the differing time limits create alternative methods of committing the crime. Since the state doesn't know where he was during the time he failed to register, it can't prove which time limit applies, and thus can't convict Peterson of any form of failure to register.
The Division One Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the time limits “do not define the elements or create alternative means of committing the crime of failure to register as a sex offender. For a sex offender, like Peterson, there is only one means of committing a crime--knowingly failing to register[.]”
